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United Nations in the course of its 50 yea^s history, passing through different crises, has 
taken a form very different from the one mapped out for it at its inception. Today, in terms of its 
framework, character and performance, the United Nations is an altogether different 
organization. The fundamental change that has occurred is that, today, the UN is no longer 
subservient to, or aligned with any particular power or group of powers. Some may talk of 
'tyranny of majority' or 'hegemony of super powers' For Iraq has been forging a stable 
functioning democracy since its establishment in 1920. The legacies that US forces has left the 
country will make building a sustainable democracy extremely difficult. With ruthless efficiency 
the US co-opted or broke civil society through violence and patronage, forcing people to interact 
with the institutions of the state on an individual basis. The UN role in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict 
and its effort to rehabilitate Iraq on the path of democracy bears ample testimony to the growing 
effectiveness of the world organization in managing regional conflicts. Currently the Gulf region 
is passing through a critical phase of crises and tensions as never before. 
Clearly, the 1990-91 Kuwait crises did not arise from a vacuum. It was merely the latest, 
the most dramatic if certainly the most tragic manifestation of a long-established and complex 
dispute over the international status and territorial definition of the emirate of Kuwait. Because 
of the intransigence of the border question historically, it is clearly dangerous to assume that the 
UN demarcation has disposed of all the differences which have consistently separated the 
Kuwait and Baghdad governments. Likewise, it would be foolish to presume that the successors 
to Saddam Husain's rule in Baghdad, whenever they accede to power, will be any less concerned 
with access to Persian Gulf waters than was he or his predecessors. Notwithstanding the recent 
UN decision on the boundary, Kuwait and Iraq may still need in the long term to find a workable 
arrangement for access through the border zone. It is ultimately of critical importance for the 
future stability of Kuwaiti-Iraqi and also Iranian-Iraqi relations that Iraq no longer perceives 
itself as "squeezed out' of the Persian Gulf. Given its narrow coastline and the fact that Iraq does 
not exercise complete sovereignty over either the Shatt al-Arab or the Khor Abdullah, its two 
means of access to Persian Gulf waters, this will probably prove a very difficult perception to 
assuage. In future years it remains to be seen whether Kuwait will come under renewed Iraqi 
pressure to make concessions on the islands issue when Baghdad's relations with Tehran 
deteriorate seriously over the status of the boundary along the Shatt al-Arab, traditionally for 
decades the cue for Iraq to press its territorial demands on the emirate. All of these concerns are 
every bit as valid in the autumn of 1993 as they were in the spring of 1991, when the UN 
originally announced its prescription for settling the border question. During the last six decades 
successive Baghdad regimes have generally argued that Kuwait should compensate Iraq for its 
geo-strategic misfortune, that is its lack of frontage on the Persian Gulf. The UN demarcation of 
the boundary, but most pertinently its continuing guarantee of the integrity of Kuwaiti territory 
against the contingency of moves from the north may have lessened Iraq's expectations in this 
regard, but it is impossible to say so for sure. 
Historically, after a period of generally cooperative relations between Baghdad and 
Kuwait, following Qasim's overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in the Free Officers coup d'etat 
of July 1958, Shaikh Abdullah III of Kuwait was taken aback by the ferocity of Iraq's language 
in reasserting the historical claim over the emirate on the announcement of Kuwaiti 
independence during June 1961. The threat on this occasion remained verbal, however. 
Especially following Iraq's recognition of an independent Kuwait in the 1963 treaty and its 
acceptance then, on its own merits and for the first time since 1932, of the boundary delimitation 
introduced by the 1932 exchange of notes, it seemed that the prosecution of Iraqi claims for the 
annexation of the emirate was a thing of the past. How wrong such a presumption turned out to 
be. A further factor which probably contributed to Saddam Husain's decision to invade on 2 
August 1990 was the conviction that the Kuwaiti Government would never have agreed to the 
lease or cession of both Warba and Bubiyan and that further attempts to achieve Iraqi desiderata 
by negotiation were futile. This belief hardened considerably after February 1989. 
Regarding historical claims for the absorption of Kuwait, it also needs to be said that 
Britain had been concerned as early as the turn of the 1920s that the emirate would be swallowed 
up by its expansionist neighbour. The neighbour in question, however, was Ibn Saud's Najdi 
state. Had Britain not intervened directly at the height of the Jahra crisis in 1920 it is likely that 
there would have been no Kuwaiti state for Iraq to lay claim to in 1938, 1961 and 1990-91. 
The most fundamental and constant characteristic of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute for 
the half-century preceding August 1990, however, had undoubtedly been Iraq's refusal to 
demarcate the land-boundary according to the provisions of the vague 1932 delimitation. Unless, 
that is, its desiderata on the islands question were first satisfied. This, allied with Kuwait's 
traditional determination to hold on to every portion of territory specified as Kuwaiti in the 1932 
delimitation but most particularly to Bubiyan Island, had resulted in deadlock being reached on 
the boundary demarcation/islands issue by the early 1950s. All subsequent attempts to free the 
dispute from this impasse had ultimately met with failure. Proposals have been made before 
1990 to exchange Kuwaiti sovereignty over the islands for relatively well-watered inland strips 
of Iraqi territory. In his recent work Finnie (1992) comments that "nothing in the British archives 
indicates that the 1913/1923/1932 boundary was some clever plot to deprive Iraq of meaningful 
access to the waters of the Gulf. This tends to ignore, however, the whole genesis of Britain's 
special relationship with Kuwait at the turn of the century and Britain's determination to 
minimize the Ottoman shoreline on the Persian Gulf.' 
The UN would no doubt argue that Iraq only had itself to blame for forcing the issue. 
UNIKBDC's mandate, agreed to grudgingly by a defeated Iraq in the spring of 1991, as had been 
the Secretary-General's stipulation that the de jure 1932 definition of the boundary constituted 
the delimitation upon which settlement was to be based, was to demarcate an existing 
delimitation. When first announced, in April 1992, UNIKBDC's announcement for a boundary 
was castigated widely, albeit mistakenly, for having reallocated Iraqi territory to Kuwait. This 
had everything to do with the confusion pertaining over de facto and de jure territorial limits. 
UNIKBDC's case was harmed further when a map enclosed within its lengthy justification for 
the land boundary award (an interim report of July 1992), showed a line for its border which 
generally ran north of all previous cartographic depictions of the de jure boundary, notably the 
1990 British Military Survey map series, upon whose authority UNIKOM's demilitarized zone 
had originally been constructed. The demarcation team has not given an adequate explanation of 
why this was the case. This having been said, there can be little doubt that UNIKBDC's land 
boundary demarcation is basically what Britain had in mind with its announcement of the 
vaguely-described border in identical, unchanging terms in 1913, 1923 and 1932, and with its 
demarcation proposals of 1940 and 1951. As such, UNIKBDC's decision on the land border must 
generally be regarded as a faithful interpretation of the delimitation formula' of 1932. 
Finnie, 1992, op. cit., p. 24. 
Trans-boundary cooperation will remain elusive for years to come and will certainly be a 
non-starter for as long as Saddam Husain remains in power. Kuwait has made it clear in its 
recent pronouncements that cooperation on border-related questions will come about only when 
Iraq gives its unequivocal blessing to the UNIKBDC decision on the border.^ Clearly this is not 
likely to happen under the current Iraqi government, whose attitude towards the recent 
demarcation has been one of consistent denunciation, if not rejection. Yet the emirate almost 
certainly underestimates the political difficulties which will be involved for any future Iraqi 
government in giving binding recognition to the recently-demarcated boundary. Since Iraqi 
administration has now been drawn to positions north of the UNIKBDC line, as noted above, the 
UN probably takes the attitude that the Baghdad government has done the basic, absolute 
minimum necessary to comply with the territorial provisions of its settlement of the Kuwait 
Crisis. Kuwait has given notice of its intention never again to allow large scale Iraqi 
encroachments into its territory with the announcement of plans to construct an elaborate system 
of border defences. Its erection will reduce the scope for trans-boundary cooperation and minor 
territorial adjustments in the future. The section of the boundary along which Kuwait will 
construct no fortifications - the maritime sector along the Khor Abdullah - is perhaps where 
trans-boundary cooperation will be most needed in future decades, as Iraq seeks to redevelop 
Unmi Qasr and the Khor Zubair. For the March 1993 announcement of a median line boundary 
along the Khor Abdullah left its principal navigation channel, which Iraq had dredged and 
maintained for the three decades or so before the invasion, within Kuwaiti territorial waters. 
How have the prospects for territorial stability in the northern Gulf been enhanced by the 
UN settlement of the boundary question? It is very much to be hoped, in the words of UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in prefacing UNIKBDC's final report, that, t^he work 
performed by the Commission will have a beneficial effect on the restoration of international 
peace and security in the area concerned...' A few ominous developments suggest, however, that 
in the medium to long term and despite its reluctant agreement to the aims and mandate of 
Comments made by Abdullah Bishara (Former Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
currently a senior member of the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry) at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies (2 August 1993) and at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (3 August 1993). 
Letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council in 
United Nations Security Council document S/25811 (21 May 1993). 
UNIKBDC back in the spring of 1991, Iraq may not feel able to reconcile itself to the recently 
demarcated UN line and may, again, become restless about access. First and foremost, 
denunciation and virtual rejection of the UNIKBDC decision on the course of the boundary 
(when first announced in the spring/summer of 1992) was not limited to the current Baghdad 
government but also extended, as has been alluded to, with some unanimity to the very groups 
which the West would supposedly rather see ruling in Baghdad. The government of the United 
States in particular has been svnprised that its subsequent efforts to persuade Iraqi opposition 
groups to accept the UNIKBDC verdict on the boundary have been resisted so strongly. 
The acid test for the newly-demarcated Kuwait-Iraq boundary will surely come at some 
point in the future, when UNIKOM no longer polices the border zone and when relations with 
Iran next seriously sour over the status of the Shatt al-Arab. Though the Shatt al-Arab dispute is 
currently dormant, it remains some way short of being finally settled. It could, like that other 
long established and cyclical Irano-Arab dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunbs in 1992, be 
resurrected at short notice. If and when it is, Iraq may seek to compensate itself for any 
temporary loss of the Shatt al-Arab by trying to expand once again at Umm Qasr on the Khor 
Zubair. This is not idle speculation but a proven historical pattern. 
Territorial stability will probably come to this part of the world only when Iraq reconciles 
itself to its disadvantageous position at the Head of the Persian Gulf, when it perceives itself as 
no longer "squeezed out'. For the long-term stability of the northern Gulf it is perhaps more 
important for Iraq to lose its negative consciousness surrounding access than for the Baghdad 
government to have demarcated boimdaries at the Head of the Gulf. Whether or not access is a 
genuine problem is less important than the fact that successive Baghdad governments and, to an 
extent, Iraqi public opinion also, has always believed it to be so. Whatever line the UN had 
nominated to settle the border, de jure, de facto or otherwise, Iraq would still, almost certainly, 
perceive itself as a "big garage with a very small door'. In twenty-five years of dealings with Iraq, 
the Security Council has played a number of roles-Cold War Peacemaker, New World Order 
Policeman, Weapons Inspector, and Sanctions Enforcer-some with more success than others. The 
Council received its most euphoric reviews for its performance as a New World Order Policeman 
in Iraq in 1990-91, contrasting starkly with the disillusion widely experienced following its 
handling of Iraq in 2002-3 in context of Instrumental Multilateralism.'* 
All, save comprehensive isolationism, have been present in US policy toward Iraq, and 
isolationism sometimes rears its head in discussion of US policy toward the UN.^  The Iraq case 
initially shows US foreign policy of the Cold War era addressing the Iran-Iraq war through 
strategies seeking to contain the protagonists and, perhaps more importantly, the role of the 
Soviet Union in the Gulf shipping lanes (astutely exploited at the time by Kuwait). Following 
Saddam Hussein's defeat in Operation Desert Storm, containment through sanctions and 
inspections was Washington's central goal-and here the UN was given a central role as a 
framework for multilateral action. However, Washington paid a price in international support for 
failing to calibrate the inspections-plus-sanctions regime, and, to a degree, for its unilateral 
military enforcement action such as Operation Desert Fox in 1998. By neglecting the growing 
opposition of international opinion to policies perceived as taking Iraqi civilians hostage, it 
creating a growing skepticism-among its allies, no less than in the opinion of the Arab 'street'-as 
to US motives. 
The United Kingdom, increasingly aligned with Washington since the Suez Crisis and the 
Vietnam War episodes divided them, sought consistently to build bridges between Washington 
and other Council members on Iraq (and other issues), leveraging its own close ties with the 
United States. This involved a willingness to shoulder a significant proportion of the military 
burden on the ground in Iraq (and in the no-fly zones over it), and to lead on much of the 
diplomatic heavy-lifting in New York, for Foreign Office negotiating skills are widely 
recognized. When the chips were down in February 2003, London, incapable of finessing 
positions as starkly delineated as those of Paris and Washington (although it had been open itself 
to a number of compromise options), opted for Washington. Blair was widely credited with 
forcing the United States to take the 'UN route', but when the United States and the United 
Kingdom failed to secure a resolution clearly authorizing military action, his emphasis on 
This phrase refers to the conclusions of Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, US 
Hegemony and International Organizations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 265-72. Richard N. Haass, 
while an official of the George W. Bush Administration, had advocated a US policy of 'multilateralism a la 
carte'. See his The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course, New York, Public Affairs, 2005, 
181-2 for his further thinking on this topic. 
This proposition is countered by John R. Bolton, "Unilateralism is not Isolationism', in Prins (ed.). 
Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations. 
Security Council authorization worked against his own arguments that the war was legal 
regardless. By initially insisting on such a Council resolution only later to abandon that position, 
Blair confused his public and was caught in between the unilateralism of the United States which 
had seen the elusive Council resolution as an optional extra-and the institutionalism of the British 
and broader European publics. 
The goal of 'regime change', so often articulated in Washington (and occasionally 
London) after 1997, was unpopular among many governments at the UN, who suggested it 
shifted SCR 687's goalposts. Some were preoccupied with their own regime survival; others 
were fearful of where such policies might lead for weaker countries. In fact, SCR 687 sought to 
stigmatize the Iraqi regime and to deter others in the region and beyond from similar behavior. 
When Washington and London moved to implement regime change in Baghdad in 2002-3, this 
long-running and sour debate handicapped their arguments. Indirectly and for some, SCR 687 
might also have been intended to promote regional stability and societal change in the Middle 
East. It did undermine Iraq's capacity for aggression against neighboring countries. That, in turn, 
created the possibility for developing countries (the overwhelming majority at the UN, and 
sometimes the majority in the Council) to develop serious and vocal reservations over the 
stringent sanctions punishing Iraq's population with little apparent effect on Baghdad's leaders. 
As Stephen Schlesinger notes, France at first turned down the invitation to be a 
Permanent Member of the Security Council in 1945, only changing its mind halfway through the 
San Francisco Conference." Sixty years later, the United States may regret extending that 
invitation. Paris characteristically sought a central role in the Council's dealings with Iraq on 
numerous occasions, including during the lead-up to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, signaling 
its unwillingness to cede the stage to Washington. By 1996, it had claimed that central role, as its 
defection from the Western P-3 fuelled international opposition to Iraqi sanctions and, 
ultimately, to military intervention. 
The reasons for Paris's shift in the mid-1990s on Iraq policy are not entirely clear, but 
spawned from an increasingly assertive nationalism under the newly elected Jacques Chirac, 
possibly combined with a rereading of French strategic and commercial interests in Iraq. On Iraq, 
while the French intelligentsia took quiet delight in the excesses of US anti-French rhetoric (talk 
in the United States of an 'Axis of Weasels' involving Germany, France, and other false friends), 
roaring business was done in France and elsewhere in caricaturing not only the Bush 
Administration but American values and culture as well. It took the nominally left-wing daily Le 
Monde to point this out in a stinging response to lazy anti-Americanism.'^  The confrontation 
between France and the United States over Iraq in early 2003 was not inevitable-it required a 
degree of political mismanagement by both. The Canadian 'process' initiative of February 2003 
to bridge Council differences was scuttled by both Washington and (less publicly) Paris.^ 
While France triumphed for a period in UN circles for its opposition to the United States, 
it fared less well in the European Union, where the split between London and Paris soon 
generated a firefight of its own for approval of EU governments. The Cold War between the 
United States and USSR had long divided much of the world into rival 'spheres of influence'. 
Moscow seemed prepared to leave Washington a free hand, so long as situations clearly 
within its own sphere of influence-as in Chechnya did not find their way onto the Council's 
agenda, despite the egregiousness of the human rights violations there. The same approach was 
evident when it convinced the Council to acquiesce in its approach to conflict in Georgia in 
1994.^  
In the 'hierarchy of decision-making' revealed by the US's treatment of the Council in 
2002 and 2003, the Security Council was not at the apex.^ The question for the Bush 
Administration was not whether the Security Council would allow a return to military action in 
Iraq, but whether military action in Iraq would allow a return to the Security Council. Why 
accept a world powered by rules when it could have a world ruled by power? But, as noted by 
James Traub, 'the United States can determine the agenda of the Security Council, if it wants to, 
even if it can not quite dictate outcomes'.'^ France's former ambassador to the UN, in the fall of 
2002, described the United States as the 'first among equals' within the Security Council, and 
there is no doubt that President Bush altered the Council's agenda instantly through his forceful 
September 2002 address to the General Assembly." 
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UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix could not translate suspicions he seemed for a time to share 
with Washington into facts (the IAEA's Mohammed El Baradei having largely debunked 
allegations that Iraq was pursuing actively a nuclear weapons program). And so, Washington 
suffered a defeat in the Council that has cost the UN dearly. Fearing electoral backlash for the 
plight of the Kurds, James Baker and George H. W. Bush engineered SCR 688 providing a (thin) 
basis for US-led humanitarian intervention. Many speculated that US policy on Iraq at the UN 
and elsewhere in 1998 was driven in part by Bill Clinton's plight in relation to the Lewinsky 
scandal. Accounts of senior Bush Administration officials calling for an attack on Iraq in 
response to 9/11 also point to domestic political considerations influencing US policy on Iraq in 
that period. While such interpretations doubtless short-change Clinton and both Presidents Bush, 
the complex interplay between domestic politics and international initiatives has been a constant 
in our narrative, often confounding the diplomacy of successive UN Secretaries-General.'^ 
The appeal for support of its strategies on Iraq in early 2003 based on purportedly airtight 
intelligence that proved false carries its own costs, not least to US credibility next time it 
advances an intelligence-based claim. The lasting "blot' on his record of which Colin Powell 
candidly spoke in September 2005, further to the 'devastating' realization that his assertions to 
the Council in February 2003 had been misleading of course extends to the international 
credibility of the Washington Administration as a whole-and also to that of the UK government, 
for which Tony Blair has already paid a price in his domestic popularity.'"* Taken together with 
the Abu Ghraib events, these were serious and unnecessary self-inflicted wounds. 
In the chapter titled Post-Iraq Kuwait war dynamics, US-led coalition in 1991 was 
intended to serve a number of purposes. It was useful to demonstrate to the world that any grave 
threat to American interests would not be tolerated, particularly where these required the 
See Christopher Hitchens, "Weapons of Mass Distraction', Vanity Fair, March 1, 1999. In his last weekly 'Letter 
from America', in early 2004, Alistair Cook reminded his BBC audience that Clinton might well have invaded 
Iraq but for the Monica Lewinsky affair. 'By the time Clinton was ready to mobilize an American or allied 
force, he didn't possess the moral authority to invade Long Island.' ('Alistair Cook', The Economist, April 3, 
2004.) Conversely, 9/11 gave his successor all of the authority he needed. 
Clinton was also dogged by suggestions that his forceful reaction to the Kosovo crisis of 1999 was politically 
motivated. See Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, 'How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan 
War', New York Times, April 18, 1999, p. 1. 
Steven R. Weisman, 'Powell Calls His U.N. Speech A Lasting Blot on His Record', New York Times, September 
9, 2005, p. 10. 
unimpeded supply of fuel to the world's most energy-profligate nation. The chapter discusses 
other purposes: some obvious and some less so. The Americans did not disguise their delight at 
being able to experiment with a new generation of high-technology weapons. It was helpful to be 
able to test such devices on the flesh and fabric of a vulnerable state that was obligingly bellicose 
and conveniently racially-different from the United States. Another factor, rarely discussed, 
concerned strategic matters of an altogether different kind. Japan remains massively dependent 
on the huge oil tankers that ply the routes from the Gulf: how prudent for the United States to 
maintain a stranglehold on the crucial energy supply to a principal economic competitor in the 
rapidly developing tripolar system of world commerce.'^ It would be a mistake to believe that the 
primary purpose of the US initiated war on Iraq was the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from 
Kuwait. The US did not work to activate the United Nations in military opposition to the Israeli 
invasions of Lebanon and other Arab lands; to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor; or to the 
various South African invasions of Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, there is evidence 
that it conspired, to varying degrees, in such invasions; and, of course, the US itself has invaded 
many sovereign states (notably Grenada and Panama in recent years). Moreover, in order to 
protect the war on Iraq, the US sanctioned fresh contemporary or subsequent aggressions: further 
Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the Syrian onslaught on East Beirut, and the (post-Gulf War) 
Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Iraq. The war on Iraq, realistically viewed, was 
designed to protect US hegemony over oil (with the broad strategic aims that this implies), to 
educate the world about post-Soviet political realities, to test new anti-personnel and other 
weapons, and to justify the absurdly high levels of investment in US military power. Thus some 
discussion was provoked by the revelation that the American army had used earthmovers and 
ploughs mounted on tanks to bury thousands of Iraqi soldiers alive.'^ One attack of this sort 
resulted in thousands of Iraqi dead and wounded, with not a single American fatality. 
Raymond Naimy, an official of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
commented that Baghdad's water supply had been cut by 90-95 per cent, and a World Health 
Organisation (WHO) delegation noted a fourfold increase in the number of children being treated 
for diarrhoea. On 26 August 1991 Iraq reported that more than 14,000 children had died because 
In the early 1990s there were many signs of escalating commercial tensions between the United States and 
Japan. In 1992 there were growing threats of a trade war between the US and Europe. With the Cold War over, 
the leading commercial players of the world were increasingly able to revert to their traditional practices of 
economic confrontation. 
Patrick Sloyan, 'Iraqi troops buried alive say American officers'. The Guardian, London, 13 September 1991. 
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of the lack of drugs since the United Nations imposed the trade embargo. A month later, 
publicity was given to the results of the study carried out by the 87-member Harvard Study Team 
which investigated some 6000 Iraqi households. 
On 14 November the Iraqi agriculture minister, Abdul Wahab al-Sabagh, declared that 
thousands more children and old people would starve unless UN sanctions were lifted soon: '. . . 
only fifteen per cent of our people can afford to buy food on the free market. The rest must 
accept hunger. That is the reality of the embargo'. Iraq had been allowed to import 100,000 
tonnes of grain over the eight-month period since the end of the war, but the normal national 
requirement was 200,000 tonnes a month: 'Today we have a great lack of food and medicines. 
We lack spare parts for agricultural machinery. We lack fertilisers and pesticides as well as 
spares to get our power stations and oil refineries working again. We are a country that lives in 
the dark. . . we need pumps to bring the water to the fields and these require electricity which we 
do not have.' On 22 June 1993, Shibib al-Maliki, Iraq's Justice Minister, told the UN World 
Human Rights Conference in Vienna that the United Nations was violating human rights by 
retaining sanctions: 'The people of Iraq suffer today from shortages of food, medicine and 
medical requirements. . . the blockade is causing thousands of lives to be lost among women and 
the elderly.' 
At this time the United Nations was expressing a willingness to allow Iraq to raise 
revenues to buy food and other essential goods, provided that the UN was allowed to supervise 
food distribution and secure reparations for the victims of the Iraqi aggression. The Council 
might also learn, from its experiences with Iraq, that economic sanctions are unlikely to be 
effective if neighboring states conduct covert trade with the embargoed state. 
The thesis follows in as comprehensive a manner as possible all developments which 
have affected the status and definition of the UN Iraq-Kuwait boundary up to August 1993. By 
this time, the land boundary had been demarcated in its entirety by the UN, while delimitation 
had been announced between the two states for the Khor Abdullah, although the UN would 
insist, contentiously, that its delimitation for this stretch of water was a demarcation. The 
subjects covered in this chapter are: the border in the UN settlement of the Kuwait Crisis, April-
11 
May 1991; UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and incidents in the border zone, 
April-August 1991; the 'northward migration' of Kuwait's international borders with Iraq, 
February-March 1992; the land boundary demarcation ruling and reactions to it, April-June 
1992; the UN and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) verdict 
on the land boundary, July-August 1992; resurrection of the Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait 
on the second anniversary of the invasion of the emirate, July-August 1992; the demarcation of 
the Kuwait-Iraq land border, the resignation of the UNIKBDC chairman and delays in 
announcing a water boundary for the Khor Abdullah, October-December 1992; border incidents 
and the expansion of UNIKOM's terms of reference, January-February 1993; border defences, 
"returned' oil wells and compensation for displaced Iraqis, February-June 1993; a median line for 
the Khor Abdullah, March 1993; and the UNIKBDC's final report. May 1993. Iraq 
communicated its grudging acceptance of the cease-fire resolution. The Security Council was 
accused of having "determined in advance the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait' while Iraq 
sought to remind the Secretary-General "that in international relations boundary issues must be 
the subject of an agreement between States, since this is the only basis capable of guaranteeing 
the stability of frontiers'.'^ Iraq continued to adopt its well-worn line that the 1963 "Agreed 
Minutes' were null and void since ratification of this instrument had never taken place in 
Baghdad. Hence it considered the boundary question as "pending and unresolved'. The letter 
further complained that the Security Council had "imposed on Iraq the line of its boundary with 
Kuwait' despite originally calling, in Resolution 660, for the two sides to settle their differences, 
which implicitly included the border question Iraq argued, directly through bilateral negotiations. 
Iraq concluded that in dealing with the boimdary, "the Council resolution is an iniquitous 
resolution which constitutes a dangerous precedent. 
A UNIKBDC team of 13 New Zealander surveyors and 45 Swedish constructors assisted 
a construction crew contracted from the Eastern Asphalt and Mixed Concrete Company 
(EAMCO) in positioning each boundary monument. By the end of October they were emplacing 
pillars at the rate of three a day. On 23 November 1992 the UN announced that the last of the 
106 pillars demarcating the line announced on 16 April 1992 had been laid, somewhat ahead of 
'^  Text of letter in UN Security Council document S/22456, 6 April 1991. 
'" For a through treatment and convincing dismissal of this argument see Finnic, (1992). 
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schedule. A UNIKOM spokesman confirmed that there had been 'full cooperation from both 
sides' in the marker-laying operation, perhaps a little surprising given Iraq's withdrawal from 
UNIKBDC in July and the resurrection of its historical claim to the entirety of Kuwait soon 
afterwards. 
Troubles began when, on 7 January 1993, Kuwait accused Iraqi forces of attacking one of 
its established frontier posts.'^ Over the next four to five days, Iraq crossed the newly 
demarcated boundary with increasing regularity, employing ever greater numbers to retrieve 
everything it could lay its hands on before the UN deadline of 15 January 1993 was reached. 
Though Iraq argued that it had been given permission on 29 December to mount these 'smash 
and grab' raids, a charge denied by UNIKOM spokesman Abdullatif Kabbaj, it was the manner, 
intensity and scale of the Iraqi actions that most concerned the Kuwaitis and the UN. 
Iraq and Kuwait retained, of course, civil authority on their respective sides of the border. 
UNIKOM used the boundary line shown on the 1990 British Military Survey maps though, 
awaiting the deliberations of UNIKBDC, it could not and did not take a position on the precise 
location of this territorial limit. In the early stages of its operations at least, UNIKOM observed 
three types of border violations: minor incursions on the ground by typically small groups of 
soldiers; overtlights by military aircraft; and the carrying by Kuwaiti and Iraqi policemen of 
weapons other than side arms. 
A flurry of articles in February 1992 in the respected British broadsheets^" predicted the 
loss of strategically-placed Iraqi territory to Kuwait with the impending announcement of the 
UNIKBDC verdict on the precise course of the land boundary, a decision which was not actually 
communicated until mid-April 1992. 
After twenty-five years of dealings with Iraq, the Security Council at the end of 2005 was 
much changed 'that quarter-century of Council activity paints a remarkable portrait of political 
developments at the global level, and of their effect on the practice and prospects of the Security 
19 
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Reuters round-up by Inal Ersan, Kuwait, 7 January 1993. 
For example, 'UN aims to redraw Iraq border with Kuwait', Mark Nicholson, The Financial Times, London, 
19 February 1992; 'Kuwait set to gain from UN borders', Hella Pick, The Guardian, London and 'Dispute 
looms over new Kuwait border: Saddam Hussein could be at Kuwait's mercy for access to the Gulf if the UN 
moves the border to put the port of Umm Qasr in the emirate', Christopher Walker, The Times, London, 24 
February 1992. 
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Council. In the chapter, I highlight four major trends derived from this narrative: (a) the 
instrumental multilateralism of all five permanent members on the Council; (b) the manner in 
which its encounters with Iraq forced the Council to confront new threats, and to address 
questions of legality and legitimacy, representation, and democracy; (c) the underlying 
evolutionary trajectory of Council practice, away from a politico-military mode in which it 
mediated between warring states, to a mode in which it sits at the apex of a global legal-
regulatory architecture; and (d) the emergence of a comprehensive approach to peace, justice, 
security, and development, in which the Council occasionally and controversially legislates for 
all states on critical new security threats such as terrorism and WMD. 
In order to secure Iraqi compliance with its decisions, the Council repeatedly threatened 
Iraq with serious or severe consequences of non cooperation, perhaps most famously in its 
ambiguous Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002. In fact, serious consequences occurred all 
around when the Council failed to demonstrate unity in following up on that Resolution: the UN, 
trans-Atlantic relations, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Arab League, 
and Iraqis soon found themselves rent by the fallout of the Council's divisions. The Council's 
credibility, always under a degree of attack, was seriously undermined by its inability to unite on 
a strategy for Iraq in early 2003, and prospects for its continued relevance to the hardest security 
challenges at the end of 2007 seem uncertain. Most of the political parties now being used as the 
cornerstone of the new Iraqi government were imported into the country after regime change and 
have had a short period of time to gain the attention of the population, much less win their trust 
or allegiance. Attempting to build organized, institutionalized party politics in Iraq is certainly 
impossible with US intervention, but it will take both time and effort. Those who run the state 
may feel they have neither the resources nor the support to take this route. 
Perhaps the most challenging implication of events in Iraq for these interlocking debates 
on legality and legitimacy, representation, and democracy has, however, been largely 
overlooked. The growth in support of ideologies or faiths rejecting the UN's basic tenets has 
been present-if obscured-in the Council's dealings with Iraq for the last twenty-five years. 
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The Security Council's inability to manage successfully the Iraq crisis of 2002-3 was 
sobering, especially as the costs of this failure have been high for all concerned. An inability, 
perhaps an unwillingness, to see the pattern of Iraq's dangerous behavior as a shared problem 
requiring a shared solution an approach central to the concept of collective security-highlighted 
the tendency of each of the P-5 to view the value of the Council as at least largely instrumental. 
The crisis pointed to two contending forms of instrumentalism possible for the P-5: one realist, 
treating the Council as just one available legitimizing resource among many; the other, 
institutionalist, treating the Council as a long-term investment in international stability. The 
positions of the five permanent members represent five different variations on these two basic 
leitmotifs. 
It is instructive to review how the strategies of the P-5 on Council membership as an 
instrument of foreign policy (including in relation to each other) have played out during the 
Council's quarter-century of dealings with Iraq. Non-permanent members, often colorful but 
rarely central to the action, play a significant role in Council decision-making only when the P-5 
split, a rare occurrence as they have every interest in agreeing to the extent necessary to 'control 
the game'-though the crisis of 2002-3 precipitated just such a split.^' 
The normative systems the UN has done so much to help develop since 1945 are here 
truly challenged. As 9/11 made clear that the very concept of 'collective security', forcing the 
Security Council to adopt a more preventive stance.^ .^ Examples of the Council taking action in 
this mode in Iraq include its approach to the Iran-Iraq war, the establishment of UNIIMOG, 
UNIKOM, and the political aspects of UNAMI. In the legal-regulatory mode, the Council 
typically establishes detailed rules governing the behavior of States, individuals, or other subject 
entities. Examples of the Council taking action in this mode in Iraq abound: UNSCOM, 
UNMOVIC, the sanctions regime, the OFF Program, and the UNCC. UN Deputy Secretary-
General Lx)uise Frechette recognized the need for transformation following the release of the 
Volcker Inquiry's September 2005 Report: Everyone today agrees that the UN faces very 
different management challenges than those of the Cold War period. The UN was then mainly a 
deliberative body. Our major task was to support negotiations. Our administrative systems have 
'^ On the dilemmas this created for non-permanent members, see Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of Innocence, pp. 
147-8. 
^^  Correspondence with James Cockayne. 
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not adapted to new mandates and activities. On management, the Secretariat and Member States 
have failed to adjust.^ ^ Problems can arise when the Council establishes what it seems to intend 
as an independent delegate, but then fails to allow that delegate to exercise truly independent 
discretion. In Iraq, this problem arose with political interference on a number of levels in the 
administration of the OFF Program, UNSCOM, and during the US-UK contestation of 
UNMOVIC's work in 2003. The mandate and operations of the 661 Committee proved 
particularly problematic. A failure to adopt an impartial decision making procedure risks 
producing illegitimacy, as the UN Compensation Commission's refusal to give Iraq standing in 
its claim process risked aggravating Iraq's victim mentality. In the long-term, that can only hurt 
the UN. 
The Security Council itself is implicated in the collapse of the Iraqi state. Combined with 
this, the Council's assertive role in supporting the fight against terrorism, through SCR 1373 and 
subsequent decisions, contributes to a sense among many peaceable Arabs that the UN is an 
instrument of a self-serving P-5 dealing in double standards and aiming to marginalize the 
Muslim world.^ '* 
Thus, the Council's decisions on Iraq came to seem decreasingly legitimate to much of 
the UN membership. For many, the root of the Council's legitimacy' deficit is its 
unrepresentative membership, slighting the developing world and thus undermining the Council's 
authority. Such an analysis spurred attempts to reform the membership of the Council in 2005, 
predictably sucking oxygen away from other important reform initiatives. Debate on possible 
models for Council reform became both vexed and heated in the spring of 2005. The removal of 
Saddam Hussein has proved to be the beginning, not the culmination, of a long and very 
uncertain process of occupation and state building. The lawlessness and looting that greeted the 
US force's seizure of Baghdad on 9 April 2003 have evolved into a self-sustaining dynamic that 
combines violence, instability, and profound uncertainty. US troops and the nascent Iraqi 
security services now face an insurgency that has managed to extend its geographic scope, while 
increasing the level of violence and the capacity for destruction and instability. The Iraq saga is 
replete with lessons for actors in and students of international relations, some of which this thesis 
has attempted to distil. 
^^  See Louise Frechette, "L ONU doit reformer sa gestion', Le Figaro, September 8. 2005. original in French. 
'^' Such was the nature of the indictment of the UN made by Osama bin Laden in his address broadcast on Al 
Jazeera on November 3, 2001 in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. 
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PREFACE 
The United Nations in the course of its 50 years history, passing through different 
crises, has taken a form very different from the one mapped out for it at its inception. 
Today, in terms of its framework, character and performance, the United Nations is an 
altogether different organization. The fundamental change that has occurred is that, 
today, the UN is no longer subservient to, or aligned with any particular power or group 
of powers. Some may talk of 'tyranny of majority' or 'hegemony of super powers' but the 
reality is that today the UN belongs to no one but to all. It has been of crucial relevance to 
the Third World countries and serves as an institution for mobilising and maximising the 
strength of the Third World, In turn the UN has been considerably helped by the Third 
World states in its process of survival as an independent universal organization. Now; 
with the end of cold war the UN has acquired a new role as a promoter and consolidator 
of democratic values in the Third World. The UN role in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and its 
effort to rehabilitate Iraq on the path of democracy bears ample testimony to the growing 
effectiveness of the world organization in managing regional conflicts. 
Currently the Gulf region is passing through a critical phase of crises and tensions 
as never before. Besides the age-old Arab-Israel conflict the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the 
subsequent war against Iraq added a new dimension to the crisis situation. The arms race 
in the region has generated a new danger in the region. The rise of the Gulf States into 
economically prosperous and politically independent units led to the generation of a host 
of issues involving territorial claims and counter-claims. The ideas of pan-Arabism, 
republicanism, and revolution, the Palestine question, Israeli ambitions in South Lebanon, 
the Iran-Iraq territorial disputes over the Shat-al-Arab and its spill over effect on the UN 
for the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq resulting into a full scale war, the Iraqi claims 
on Kuwait and the subsequent events that ensued in Iraq are the few major issues that 
confront the Gulf today. 
The Claims of each Arab Country to full sovereignty and independence, while 
continuing to dream of uniting the Arab World into a Arab Nation are the two 
contradictory trends that have endangered fierce rivalry among the Arab states, foreign 
ideologies adopted by some Arab countries have also complicated inter-Arab relations, 
colouring the ideological map with a mosaic of regimes ranging between extreme 
varieties of reactionary and progressive systems. These conflicts and rivalries continue to 
be a consistent danger to their peaceful co-existence and pave a way for the outside 
powers to meet their evil designs in the region. 
Interestingly enough, the UN resorted to a new role pattern in the aftermath of the 
Iraq-Kuwait crisis that manifested in the form of inspections, oil for food program and 
now to monitor events in the post-war scenario. Resolution 687 was adopted 
unanimously by the Security Council as a part of the ceasefire after the gulf war. It had 
five main elements of which first three related to disarmament and they called for:-
1. Declarations by Iraq of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and long-range 
missiles. 
2. Verifications of the declaration by UNSCOM, which was a UN special 
commission established by the same resolution and the IAEA. 
3. Supervision by the organisations of the destruction or the elimination of 
prescribed items and programs. 
The present thesis probes the causal factors behind the growing confrontation in 
the region. It seeks to understand the extent of success and the bottlenecks of the UN in 
resolving these crises. The main focus of the thesis inter alia pertains: 
a. To analyze the new thrust in the nature and direction in the UN peace keeping 
efforts; 
b. To understand the foreign policy interests and preferences of the Gulf states and 
their likely impact on the course of the regional disputes; 
c. To examine the areas of dispute in the Iraq-Kuwait relations; 
d. To understand the course of action adopted by the UN to resolve the conflict; and 
e. To assess the new political dynamics that ensued following the Iraq-Kuwait 
conflict 
The study is divided into seven-chapter and a conclusion. It is descriptive and 
analytical in nature. The study is based on data combined in books, articles and 
government policies. The empirical data about Iraq were gathered from various sources 
that included documentary analysis of reports, studies, and other documents. The 
documents were either gathered directly from the institutions or from official Web sites 
of the related bodies. The information about Iraq was mainly taken from official Web 
sites of related agencies. Data contained in the foreign policy documents of the Gulf 
countries is also taken into account. 
Chapter I of the thesis entitled "A Historical Profiles of the Gulf Region" deals 
with the massive and substantive changes as geo-strategically significant to the major 
powers. The partition of oil riches in the Gulf among the world's top oil companies was 
mainly completed by the beginning of the Second World War; no sultanate on the saline 
and sun-scorched coast of the Gulf escaped their voracious gaze. Britain's over 
whelming political predominance did not prevent other overseas businessmen from 
scoring highly tangible success in the competition. Thus, in late 1930s the US 
monopolies had taken full possession of the oil deposits in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, 
half of the oil output in Kuwait, and about a quarter of the output in countries where Iraq 
Petroleum was active. Similarly British firms, in addition to extracting oil in Iraq, Iran 
and Kuwait, exercised control over the deposits in Qatar, Muscat, Trucial Oman and 
some other principalities. In pursuing its policy of economic expansion in the region the 
United States applied more flexible methods than its rivals. Posing as friends of the Arab 
peoples, the Americans always inserted in concessionary agreement and contracts a 
clause on non-interference in internal affairs. Thus with the old unfair system of relations 
between the oil-producing states and the imperialist monopolies being destroyed, the 
United States also faced the need to work out new political, military and ideological 
measures that would ensure its interests. The nationalization of the property of foreign 
oil companies in some countries along with policy changes as regards concessions 
rendered the exploitation of the region's oil riches through old colonial methods 
impossible. All these factors made US policy in the Gulf more active and shaped its long-
term strategy, to maintain US control over the region. 
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Chapter II entitled "Foreign Policy and Regional Conflicts" brought out the 
changing nature of striking asymmetries of size and power among its component states. 
Historically, the strongest countries on the Gulf lay in the north - Iran and Iraq - As the 
Gulfs importance grew in the mid to late 1960s and the British were reaching a decision 
to withdrew, American policymakers were concerned about the resulting "power 
vacuum", consequently the American government opted for a "twin-pillars" policy that 
envisaged US encouragement and support of Iran and Saudi Arabia in order that they 
might assume the mantle of policemen of the Gulf. The twin-pillar policy naively 
assumed that Iran and Saudi Arabia would cooperate on the basis of common interests 
rather than coming into conflict as a result of divergent interests. The policy overlooked 
the disparity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Washington underestimated and misread 
Iraq. The nature of and limits on the power of the "pillars" were never understood. In the 
years following the British withdrawal from east of Suez, the smaller Gulf countries -
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE - appeared to many as the artifacts of a previous 
era, short-lived anachronisms in a turbulent area. The five smaller Gulf countries are 
often lumped together by outsiders for matters of convenience, leaving the impression 
that they are all similar. In fact, of course, their differences are as great as those of other 
countries in the Middle East. Apart from the obvious geographical propinquity, and the 
fact that they are all Muslim states, the smaller Gulf countries have in common only the 
shared external threat from the larger Gulf states to the North and East, a tradition of 
social conservatism, and a history of isolation from the processes of world politics. These 
small countries vary greatly, but, take together, share a number of common interests, 
principal among which is high vulnerability and therefore, a shared and profound concern 
about the stability and security of the Gulf they all share. They all depend upon 
petroleum commerce, even if in different ways and to different degrees. They all look to 
Saudi Arabia to take the leadership role in the Gulf, despite past conflicts with the 
kingdom in some cases because of its size, resources, and links to the West. 
The politics of the region is primarily the product of internal relationships. 
Nevertheless there are distinct ideological differences among the gulf political systems. 
There are other factors of differences of size, population, and political-military power. 
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The smaller states of the gulf - Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar the seven UAE Shaykhdom, 
Oman and Yemen have little political or military power and could scarcely resist political 
ultimatums from any of the three big Gulf States. Oman is more favorable in its attitude 
toward US policies in part because of its geographical isolation from the other Gulf states 
and in part because of its negligible Palestinian and Shiite population. The US interests in 
the Gulf region although boil into a single major factor - oil, there are in fact a wide 
variety of US interests in the Gulf, some deriving from its location, others from its 
resources, and yet other from the prominence of the Gulf in international politics. The US 
has attempted to secure its economic interests in the Gulf by fostering the already strong 
financial and commercial interdependence between the US and the area. While oil 
remained the factor in US economic interest so is generation of revenue by arms sales 
which had an enormous impact upon American society and economy since world war -
II. Currently, the US objectives are to prevent any single power from gaining control over 
the bulk of Gulf oil reserves and to prevent the use of revenue from oil sales by a hostile 
power to undermine the regional order. 
Chapter III of the thesis entitled "United Nations and Regional Conflicts" first 
considers the basic premise that the UN mandate was to save succeeding generations 
from the encourage of war. The Members are required to settle their international dispute 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice, are 
not endangered. These are further required to refrain from in their international relations 
from tlireat to use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The chapter 
also discusses the dispute settlement under the auspices of the United Nations through the 
initiative of the Security Council, through the initiative of any Member State, through the 
initiative of a non-Member State, by virtue of the mandatory provisions of the Charter, 
through the mutual request of the parties to disputes; and settlement through other 
agencies. Ever since its creation the United Nations has been concerned with Palestinian 
issue and the conflict in West Asia remain a moot question both in the United Nations 
and the nations of the world. The chapter also discusses how it remained a source of 
international tension and a threat to world peace and security. In context of bigger 
powers of the region, from 1929 to 1958 relations between Iran and Iraq were stable, as 
both regimes were monarchies, despite their old conflict which they inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire. Ideological rivalry has always been and explosive issues between the 
two countries were substantially discussed in the chapter. Each side is driven by a set of 
goals: Iran by Shiite revivalism and Iraq by secular Islam, striving towards Arab destiny. 
Chapter IV entitled "Iraq-Kuwait War" postulates the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as 
culmination of series of attempts proclaiming the entire territory of Kuwait as part of 
Basra province. This Iraqi claim over Kuwaiti territory was largely due to the land 
locked position Iraq finds itself except for a tiny access to the Gulf. The emergence of a 
full fledged Baathist party government in July 1968 in Iraq opened a new chapter in Iraq-
Kuwait relation. Kuwait was first to accord state recognition to the new Baathist regime 
in Iraq. 
Next, the chapter V titled "United Nations and Kuwait-Iraq war discusses a 
number of barriers and how the United Nations demonstrated its for-reaching ability to 
act as powerful instrument for international peace and security through its sustained and 
decisive response to Iraq's advance in Kuwait. The chapter substantially examines the 
diplomatic efforts, 45-day period between the adoption of Security Council resolution 
(SCR) 678 (1990) and the deadline for Iraqi compliance saw a number of initiatives 
aimed at averting an outbreak of war. The role of the United nations in the Gulf situation 
has led some commentators to hope that it would augur well in future for an effective tool 
by the United Nations for enforcement of peace on the lines envisaged by the Charter. 
Chapter VI entitled "Post Iraq-Kuwait War Dynamics" examines the war on Iraq, 
realistically viewed, was designed to protect US hegemony over oil (with the broad 
strategic aims that this implies), to educate the world about post-Soviet political realities, 
to test new anti-personnel and other weapons, and to justify the absurdly high levels of 
investment in US military power. A further aim was to bolster the reputation of a US 
president beset by the 'wimp factor' and the prospect of a presidential election in 1992. 
The chapter also discusses the war dynamics that how the most significant factors of the 
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Gulf War was the speed with which the US-led coalition was able to achieve its military 
machine including the air supremacy. Also the six weeks of allied air raids was discussed 
which had destroyed the bulk of the electrical power stations that supplied hospitals, 
water pumping facilities, sewage treatment plants and water purification facilities; in 
addition, these various facilities had often been totally or partially destroyed by the 
bombing. A consequence was that many parts of Iraq had to face a public health crisis of 
vast proportions. There was a real risk of widespread deaths through disease and perhaps 
starvation. In November 1991 there were reports of food riots in Baghdad and other Iraqi 
cities, with particularly serious disorder in the Baghdad (Shia) suburbs of Thawra and 
Khadhimaya. The West, for the most part, continued to pay little attention to the 
privations brought to the Iraqi people by the seemingly permanent sanctions. 
The last chapter of the thesis entitled "United Nations and Iraq: Post War 
Scenario" brings out in comprehensive manner all developments which have affected the 
status and definition of the boundary up to August 1993. By this time, the land boundary 
had been demarcated in its entirety by the UN, while delimitation had been announced 
between the two states for the Khor Abdullah, although the UN would insist, 
contentiously, that its delimitation for this stretch of water was a demarcation. The 
subjects covered in this chapter are: the border in the UN settlement of the Kuwait Crisis, 
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and incidents in the border zone, the 
'northward migration' of Kuwait's international borders with Iraq, the land boundary 
demarcation ruling and reactions to it, the UN and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) verdict on the land boundary, resurrection of the 
Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait on the second anniversary of the invasion of the 
emirate, the demarcation of the Kuwait-Iraq land border, the resignation of the 
UNIKBDC chairman and delays in announcing a water boundary for the Khor Abdullah, 
border incidents and the expansion of UNIKOM's terms of reference, border defences, 
'returned' oil wells and compensation for displaced Iraqis, a median line for the Khor 
Abdullah, and the UNIKBDC's final report. The Security Council's credibility, always 
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under a degree of attack, was seriously undermined by its inability to unite on a strategy 
for Iraq in early 2003, and prospects for its continued relevance to the hardest security 
challenges at the end of 2007 seem uncertain. 
A study of this nature, though apparently look easier, but when one actually 
ventures to under take it, lands one into lot of confusion. It was the able guidance of my 
supervisor. Prof. Asmar Baig, that has provided a proper direction to present the thesis. 
Therefore, first and foremost 1 am extremely grateful to my supervisor for his constant 
support and encouragement. Indeed, I shall never forget his benevolence and humility 
through out the course of work. 
I express my respects and thanks to Prof. Murtaza Khan, Dean Faculty of Social 
Sciences for his constant encouragement and scholarly insights in the completion of this 
thesis. Indeed, I am extremely grateful to Prof. Naheed Murtaza, Head, department of 
Political Science for her kind cooperation during the course of my study. 
My thanks are due to the other members of the Department of Political Science, 
particularly Prof. Mohammad Abid and Prof. Arif Hameed. I record my sincere thanks to 
the library staff of Dr. Zakir Hussain Library, Jamia Millia Islamia, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University library and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis for their untiring 
support in providing me with the data. 
I shall be failing in duty if I do not mention the constant support and 
encouragement provided to me by my wife Ilham, daughters Ola and Zainab and son 
Mustafa. I am extremely grateful to all of them. 
Indeed, this work would not have completed without the support of my sons-in-
law Ik and Haider. I am highly indebted to them. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
A HISTORICAL PROFILE OF THE GULF REGION 
Ever since the end of World War II, no region of the world has received more 
attention and experienced on perpetual conflict situation than the Gulf, and no other 
global zone is as geo-strategically significant to the major powers than the Gulf. 
The Gulf - 'Arabian Gulf or 'Persian Gulf is interested in the West and the 
East. The Western intersection is a inseparable part of the Arabian Peninsula. History 
gives evidence that this area has always been inhabited by Arabs. Initially the Coast from 
Basra to Oman was called al-Khat. This coastal area included Kuwait, Qatar, cities of the 
coastal Ahsa (Qatif, Jubael, Dammam, Khaber and two pots of Ra'as Tannura and al-
Uqair) the city of Dhahran, and the present United Arab Emirates (UAE). It was 
customary to include in this "the inner cities of Hajjar and the islands of the Arabian Gulf 
called Al-Bahrain by them, which was considered an independent entity. 
Piny, Roman historian of the 1st century AD (62-113 AD) referred to the Gulf as "Arabian Gulf and 
he mentioned the city of Charax which researchers believe is - the city of al-Muhammara Pliny wrote: 
Charax is a city situated at the farthest extremity of the Arabian Gulf at which begins the more 
prominent portion of Arabia Flix (Eadaeman). 
A.T. Wilsonj, The Persian Gulf: A Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of 20"' 
Century, Oxford, 1928, pp.30-49. 
Roderick Owen, A Britisher wrote in the 1950s that maps have wrongly marked the area as "Persian 
Gulf when it should be called "Arabian Gulf. 
"No English map shows the Arabian Gulf; a matter of some concern for those who live there. A 
traveler has to proceed as though bound for the Persian Gulf-will probably think that that's where he is 
when he reaches Kuwait or Bahrain, only to be told that that's where he isn't Persian Gulf? Gthese dry 
expanses of brown sand, those blue expanses of shallow water are, have been, will Owen, The Golden 
Bable: Arabian Gulf Documentary, London, 1950, p. 13. 
The term "Persian Gulf was first used by Alexander the Great, King of Macedonia. Alexander's 
Cretan admiral Nearchos, on the journey back from India, reached Iraq and continued till the mouth of 
Euphrates and led the aramada down the course of the Qarun river and encamped at the town of 
Shueza (Shueja) where Alexander was waiting, thus they remained at the Eastern coast. This is the 
reason why the Greeks called it Persian Gulf and it continued to be known as such. 
Richard Coke, The Heart of the Middle East, London, 1925, p. 17, A Danish travelers Carstein 
Neibuhr, who traveled the region for ten years, from 1962 to 1972, wrote: "It is ridiculous in our 
geographers, to represent a part of Arabia as subject to the Kings of Persia; when to far from this, the 
Persian monarchs have never been master of the seacoast of their won dominions but have patiently 
suffered it so remain in the possession of the Arabians". 
Carstein Niebuhr. Travels Through Arabia and Other Countries in the East, Edinburgh, 1792, p.8. 
At the dawn of the century, the Gulf areas was a huge feudal association that 
included the lands of the Arabian coast from Qatar Peninsula and the islands of the 
Bahrain archipelago to the Cape of Ras at Hadd, and in the north - most the coast of 
Luristan and a number of islands, among which the most important were Qishm and 
Hormuz. The administrative and economic center of that association was Hormuz. 
Under the authority of its ruler were the sheiks, who governed separate regions of the 
Persian and Arabian coasts in the gulf. But the ruler of Hormuz himself was considered a 
vassal of the Persian Shah and paid tribute to him. 
Portugal was the first European power to start colonial expansion in the East. 
Portuguese merchants plundered the African coast, taking with them gold, ivory and later 
on (from 1442), slaves too. At the end of the 15* century Spain also embarked upon 
colonial conquests. 
Vying with each other, the Portuguese and the Spaniards conquered new lands in 
all parts of the world. In 1486, Bartholomeu Dias, a Portuguese, reached the Cape of 
Good Hope, and in 1497-1498 his compatriot Admiral Vasco de Gama became the first 
European to sail Africa, which enabled Portugal at the beginning of the 16"" century to 
capture the main trade routes in the Arabian Sea. 
In 1487, on his way home from India, Pedro de Covilhao arrived in Hormuz. In 
1503 Hormuz was visited by Lodovico di Varthema, who left a description of it. At the 
same time Affonso de Albuquerque came there; his appearance in Hormuz visited 
marked the begirming of a dark age of Portuguese rule in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman. After that visit and drew up a plan to set up there a colonial empire that promised 
incalculable incomes. The plan was approved by the Portuguese rulers and, to implement 
it, in 1506 Albuquerque set off with several ships from Lisbon to the Indian Ocean. 
Albuquerque made the ruler of Kalat (then the principal city on the coast of 
Oman) stop paying tribute to Hormuz and recognize dependence on Portugal. Then the 
city of Quryat was attacked; its inhabitants put up a fierce resistance. Taking advantage 
of their superiority in artillery, the Portuguese burned down the city and the ships moored 
at the harbour; they showed excessive cruelty, indiscriminately killing unarmed civilians 
and cutting off the ears" and noses of prisoners. The same fate befell the city of Muscat, 
and their ruler pledged to pay to Portugal the tribute which he had formerly been paying 
to Hormuz."* 
In October 1507 a Portuguese fleet approached Hormuz, conducting military 
operations on the western frontiers of his State, Shah Ismail of Persia lacked forces to 
fight on two fronts. To help the ruler of Hormuz he managed to send him only 500 
soldiers - too few to save Hormuz from being captured.^ The invaders prohibited local 
merchant vessels to trade in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, without the 
permission of the Portuguese authorities. The Portuguese began to build a fortress for 
their garrison on the island, and founded a trading station in the city. 
But the 1507 campaign of conquest along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the 
Gulf of Oman was only the first attempt of the Portuguese to consolidate their grip on 
that region. The fierce resistance of the local population and differences among the 
invaders themselves forced the latter to abandon Hormuz in 1508. On their way to India 
they had to capture Kalat a second time because during their absence the local rulers had 
restored their authority. With the departure of the Portuguese the inhabitants of Hormuz 
also rebelled under the leadership of Rais Hamed who jailed the Portuguese henchman 
Saif-ud-Din and began to rule on behalf of Shah Ismail.^ 
At that time Persian was waging a long war against Turkey. In those days the 
Turkish army was one of the strongest - it had more than once defeated the troops of 
European states. In the late 1520s the Turks took Budapest (1526) and besieged Vierma 
(1529), Shah Ismail was searching for allies to fight the Turks; for their part the 
^ See Affonso de Albuquerque, The Commentaries of the Great Affonso d'Albuqureqite, Hakluyt 
" Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
Society, 1875, Vol.1, pp.61-62. 71. 
. 
. 
Albuquerque , Vol. IV, pp.80-87. 
European monarchs, in the face of the Turkish threat, were also interested in an alliance 
with the Shah. 
Turkish cannon inflicted particularly heavy losses on the Persian troops; so the 
Shah was eager to improve his artillery. On learning about this Albuquerque tried to 
establish relations with the rulers of Persian. In 1509 he, then already they Viceroy of 
India, sent Ambassador Ruy Gomes to Persian, and in 1513 he sent Miguel Ferreira. 
Albuquerque offered Persian Portuguese artillery, army and navy to fight Turkey. The 
Shah sent a special envoy to negotiate with him.^  
But the Viceroy had no intention of giving any real help to Persia. He was 
conducting a farsighted policy, hoping that because of Persia's difficulties in the war with 
Turkey the Shah would make territorial concessions in exchange for promises of help 
alone. So Albuquerque dragged out the talks with Shah Ismail, awaiting the right time to 
implement his plans of conquest. Albuquerque found an opportunity in, when Ismail, in 
view of a dismal prospects of further struggle with the Sultan of Turkey, was compelled 
to conclude with the Portuguese a treaty on assistance, in exchange for which the Shah 
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agreed to temporarily cede Hormuz to them. 
After capturing Hormuz a second time, the Portuguese gained a foothold in other 
strategic areas in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, on the northern and southern 
coasts and on the islands. The major defences were in Sohar, Muscat, Kalat and Bahrain, 
where the invaders built fortresses and stationed garrisons. Relying on them and on the 
warships that periodically appeared in the Persian Gulf, the colonialists were able to 
wield power over all the areas. They imposed an exorbitant contribution on the captured 
cities and took control of all trade. They formalized their domination in these parts 
through special unequal treaties, in so doing they interfered in the relationships between 
the local rulers who had to swear loyalty to the king of Portugal and were not even 
^ Ibid, pp. 88-89. 
* //7/£?, Vol. IV, pp. 153-154. 
allowed to move from place to place without the permission of the Portuguese governor. 
In addition to direct military actions, the Portuguese strengthened their rule by more 
flexible measures, including frequent use of all manner of bribery and intrigue. For 
instance, they managed to gain influence among the sheiks, who were eager to get rid of 
subordination to Hormuz, but as a result found themselves in bondage to the Portuguese 
governor."^ 
However, by the beginning of the 16* century the status of the Portuguese 
colonies had changed owing to the fact that in 1580 Portugal itself was annexed to Spain. 
From the 1580s the English made for Persian Gulf from the south. While previously they 
had tried to evade the monopoly of their rivals by smuggling and piracy, in that period 
English pirates, encouraged and equipped by the British government, were in effect 
waging England's unofficial war against Portugal; this become an integral part of the 
aggressive policy of the London trading companies. Also taking part in operations 
against the Portuguese and Spanish warship of the British Royal Navy, which not only 
robbed merchant vessels but systematically destroyed the enemy's warships. 
The intensifying struggle of the English and the Dutch against the Spanish and the 
Portuguese culminated in 1588, when for the first time they managed to rout the Spanish 
fleet-the Great Armada. As a result, Spanish domination at sea and on land was 
impaired. The opportunity opened up before the English companies to oust their rivals 
from their colonies not by penetrating in a round about way, but by striking at them in the 
main commercial-strategic routes, "this method of war," noted the English historian A.S. 
Morton, "followed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, laid the foundation of the 
British Empire." 
The British East India Company in its pursuit on negated all expansionism 
,notions of "just" or "criminal", indeed; "if all nations in one way or another begin with 
9 A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, An Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the 
Twentieth Century, x, 1928, pp.122-123. 
S.P. Miles, The Countries and Tribes, Vol. I, pp. 162-163. 
See G. Griffith, Men who Have Made the Empire, London, 1883, pp.5-6. 
plunder, it means the pirates are the best builder of empires. Fortunately we haven't run 
out the spirit of piracy." 
There was no limit to the means to which the East India Company was prepared 
to resort in order to attain its aims; it was ready to commit any crime to get its annual 
300-percent net profit. The Union Jack fluttered in different parts of the Indian Ocean; 
piracy and privateering flourished; the slave trade was widely practiced. The India-based 
flotillas of the East India Company organized regular raids not only on merchant vessels 
and trading stations of the competing European Powers, but also on merchant ships and 
on the coastal populated areas of all Asian and African countries adjoining the Indian 
ocean as well as the Gulf countries.'^ 
This piracy, perpetrated for the sake of territorial acquisitions and of the 
establishment of British domination in the main sea trade routes, is the best confirmation 
of the eloquent description of the deeds of the British East India Company given back in 
the 18'^  century by Adam Smith. He wrote: "The government of an exclusive company 
of merchants is perhaps the worst of all governments for any country whatever." 
The strongest resistance to the East India Company's attempts to penetrate into 
the Gulf area was put up by Oman, which was large and powerful state in the 18* 
century. The Arab tribes inhabiting Eastern Arabia, who wanted to retain control over 
local navigation and develop their own sea trade, were allied with Oman. Consequently, 
it was a great risk for any of its ships to appear there; its trading station in Bandar 
Busheher (Persian) encountered numerous difficulties and dragged out a miserable 
existence; its second trading station in Basra (which then belonged to the Ottoman 
Empire) was altogether idle, and nothing came of the attempt to transfer it to Kuwait; the 
projected commercial colonial expansion in the eastern areas of the Ottoman Empire and 
the southwestern parts of Persian was nipped in the bud. However, the East India 
Company's undamaged trading station in Bandar Bushehr gradually turned into an open 
'- Ibid. 
Quoted from Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, The John Day Company, New York, 1946. 
p.284. 
British trade mission in that region; it existed for over a hundred years and became the 
forerunner if the British political administration in the Gulf-
It was during that period that the interest of the British rulers in the Gulf area was 
for the first time officially based on the need to ensure India's defence. But in fact it was 
still most closely connected with the long-standing plans of commercial colonial 
expansion in the eastern areas of the Ottoman Empire and the southwestern parts of 
Persia. Despite the complicated international situation in the late 18* century, the British 
plans for the region were successful because of the wakening of the Turkish influence in 
the Gulf area, which was a direct result of the crisis of the Ottoman Empire and the 
decline of its international prestige after a number of military defeats and territorial 
losses; second, the weakening of Persian influence, brought about by a fierce struggle in 
Persia for the Shah's throne between the Zands and the Kajars; third, the formation in the 
Gulf area of, "a power vacuum" brought about not only by the weakening of the positions 
of Ottoman Empire and Persia, but also by the driving out by the Arabs in 1776 of the 
Dutch, the most dangerous aspirants to economic and politic al domination in that 
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region. 
In view of the experience gained during the East India Company's clashes with 
the population of South and East Arabia the Governor General of India, Charles 
Comwallis, was instructed to orient the East India Company not towards preparing for a 
resumption of hostilities against the Arabs, but towards conducting with regards to them 
complicated diplomatic maneuvers in line with the new British Colonial policy. The 
immediate objective of these maneuvers was declared to be "normalization" of relations 
with the rulers of South and East Arabia. 
Lord Comwallis thought it best to start carrying out these instructions by 
attempting to establish "friendly relations" with Oman. 
'" See A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf. 
In the early 19"' century Sir John Malcolm, the then Governor of Bombay, worked 
out a plan for the British colonization of the Persian Gulf. Its main points were: 
a) The states and feudal principalities of Persia, Eastern Turkey and Arabia were to be 
considered as countries which "any nation whose interests it promoted" might use 
for its purposes. Such a nation, according to Malcolm, was England which was to 
establish its authority in these countries, bring them into sphere of influence of its 
policy, and then colonies them. 
b) "With an established footing in the Gulf of Persian which must soon become the 
emporium of our commerce, the seat of our political negotiations, and a depot for 
our military stores, we should be able to establish a local influence and strength that 
would not only exclude other European nations from that quarter, but enable us to 
carry on negotiations and military operations ... to any extent we desired ... we 
must make ourselves strong in the Persian Gulf ... and inspire those sentiments of 
hope and fear which must be felt by all the states in that quarter, before we can 
expect to establish any relations with them that will be really beneficial to our 
interests ... if ... we could but establish ourselves ... in the Persian Gulf, all else 
that we desired would follow in due course ... and threaten all enemies of Great 
Britain in Persia, Arabia and Eastern Turkey".'^ 
c) Malcolm proposed embarking on colonial conquests at once in order to outstrip 
rivals, with a blow struck at Kharq Island first. He wrote, "The more I contemplate 
this island, the more I am satisfied it might be made one of the most prosperous 
settlements in Asia, situated within a few hours' sail of Bushire, Bunder Begh, 
Bussorah ... Baherin ... it would, if under a just and powerful government, be 
though too small (only twelve squire miles) when it became an emporium of 
commerce ... I could not contemplate this stand without thinking it far from 
improbable that the English government might be obliged, by the progress of its 
enemies in this quarter, to take possession of it, and my mind passed rapidly from 
W. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm, London, Vol. I, pp. 407, 
432. 
that idea to the contemplation of my-self as the chief instrument in the execution of 
this plan" '^  
d) His study of the two century experience of British colonial policy suggested to 
Malcolm one more point: he proposed paying special attention to the fact that the 
appearance of the colonialists military forces in the Middle East countries would 
inevitably entail a "momentary irritation" (i.e.; counteraction) on the part of local 
authorities and population. To prevent anti-British resistance, Malcolm 
recommended encouraging internecine wars and the accompanying disruption: "... 
and this system when that (English) government had once established a firm footing 
and a position situated on the confines of Persia and Turkey, it could easily pursue, 
with a very moderate force, an d without any great or expenditure, Malcolm wrote 
in conclusion of his argument. 
Thus, in his plan Malcolm clearly specified the objectives pursed by the English 
in trying to secure control over the Gulf area: to make it a market for selling their goods, 
England's political center in the Middle East and military base using which they could 
counter any rivals and mount military operations against Persia, Arabia and Turkey on 
such a scale as would enable them to hold away there as in India. 
The ways and means of attaining these goals are equally explicit: the first step -
to capture Kharq Island and turn it into stronghold; second - to interfere in the internal 
affairs of adjacent countries and kindle internecine wars with a view to preventing any 
likely anti-English coalition and facilitating the subjugation of these countries; third -
open diktat in Persia, Turkey and Arabia; the turning of the Gulf area as a whole into a 
colonial possessing and bridgehead for further expansion. 
In English historical literature Malcolm's plan is assessed as the work of a lone 
eccentric person who disregard England's purely peaceful, commercial interests in the 
Persian Gulf it first decade of the 19"' century, and therefore the plan is said to have 
'* J.W. Kaye, pp. 424-425. 
" Ibid, p. 434. 
failed to get the approval of the government.'^ This assessment does not correspond to 
reality. In reality the paragraph of the plan were endorsed at the military-political council 
under the Governor General of India on August 30, 1808, specially dealing with a British 
incursion into the Gulf. The English government adopt the plan and invested Malcolm 
with special powers to implement it.'^ 
The facts show that British policy in the Gulf region was subsequently conducted 
in accordance with that plan, although its full implementation took some 60 years. 
However, it should be specially mentioned that the Arab population of the eastern areas 
of Arabia strongly resisted the colonialists. The leading, role was played by the tribal 
association of the Qawasimes, who lived on Masandam Peninsula and controlled the 
entrance to the Gulf. Towards the early 19* century the Qawasim fleet comprised 63 
large and 800 small vessels with crew totaling some 19,000. The appearance of the 
British East India Company's merchant ships in the Gulf caused considerable damage to 
the interests of the local seafarers and could not but evoke counteraction. That is why 
British expansion in that region began with attempts to destroy the Arab fleet. The 
English were compelled to send large naval forces to the Gulf. On direct instructions 
from London they launched systematic attacks on Arab merchant vessels. 
British colonial policy in the Persian Gulf area was also directed against Great 
Britain's rivals. In 1911-1912, on the eve of the First World War, Britain managed to 
conclude several more agreements advantageous to itself. On July29, 1913, an Anglo-
Turkish convention was signed, under which Turkey renounced its claims to the crucial 
Oman Principalities, Qatar and Bahrain, and agreed to the status of Kuwait as an 
"autonomous" region of the Ottoman Empire. But after Turkey joined the war, the Sheik 
of Kuwait, under British pressure, already in 1914 renounced his "autonomy" and 
officially recognized the British protectorate. 
'* J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880, Oxford, 1968, p.98. 
' J.W. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm. Vol. 1. pp.433-435. 
438. 
^° Kelly, Op cir, pp. 101-102. 
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In December 1915 Emir Nejd ibn-Saud, too, established "special relations" with 
Britain. And in November 1916 Qatar became a British protectorate. Moreover, in 
imposing these enslaving agreements the British intentionally left open the issue of 
establishing clear-cut boundaries between the principalities, in order in future to retain 
the role of obiter in resolving territorial disputes and conflicts. '^ 
In spite of all the isolation measures taken by the British colonialists,, the national 
liberation movement could not but affect the Persian Gulf countries. The principalities 
and sultanates, including Trucial Oman, put up strong resistance to Britain policy. British 
diktat was resisted by the chieftains of many Arab tribes. In 1920s it was with great 
difficulty that London managed to retain its positions is that region. 
Under the 1920 Treaty of Sib, not only Muscat, but Great Britain as well were 
compelled to recognize the independence of Oman, thereby legally ending more than a 
century of British diktat in Oman. After bringing the Gulf Arab emirates under its control 
and imposing on them its protector ship, Britain in an attempt to create a firm foothold 
for itself, preserved the social system of the Arabs. Britain colonial policy had an 
extremely adverse effect on economic and cultural development of the Arab people, 
making the socio-economic structure of Arab society absolute and stagnant. The political 
administration in the Gulf was an effective instrument with which the British imperialists 
successfully conducted their colonial policy there. Beginning from the mid 1820s, when 
two political agent's posts were instituted to observe the situation in the emirates, the 
staff and functions of the political administration were continuously increased and 
improved, although its structure remained unchanged. 
The political administration was headed by the political resident whose 
headquarters was from 1946 situated in Manama (Bahrain). He was simultaneously a 
diplomat, political adviser and military leader, and on the whole was more like a colonial 
governor than an ordinary ambassador. The resident exercised supervision over the 
-' Op cit, p. 421. 
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political agents in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and over the Consul 
General in Muscat. 
Being representatives of the political administration in the emirates, the agents 
maintained close personal contact with the sheiks and other members of the ruling 
dynasties - a fact of major importance. Frequently, meeting unofficially, the agents -
controlled the activities of the rulers and noted every change in their policy; this enabled 
the British resident to react to any change in good time and take appropriate measures. 
The British political administ4ration's relations with the sheiks were legally based 
on treaties and agreements imposed on them by force of arms in the 19"" and early 20* 
centuries. Despite the fact that in accordance with them Britain was granted the right to 
control only the foreign policy and defence of the emirate, the British political 
administration also regulated matters of some policy and the economy. The sheiks were 
always being given "advice" on how to improve the forms and development of their 
administration and cope with economic problem.^^ 
Apart from that, the Sheiks were "persuaded" to approve a number of laws whose 
basic principles had been worked out in various ministries and departments of Britain. In 
addition to implementing the code of law, the British authorities on many occasions 
introduced martial law is the emirates, which constituted a gross violation of the 
obligations undertaken by the British government under the treaties and agreements 
concluded with the sheiks.^ '* 
The British political administration constantly interfered in the internal affairs of 
the emirates, controlling their administrative bodies. The political administration also 
paid great attention to economic issues. Since the Gulf formed part of the sterling zone, 
the administration had to protect the interests of the pound sterling. The resident 
" See R. Hay, The Persian Gulf States, Washington, 1959, pp.81-96. 
^^  Ibid, p.98. 
A State of martial law was introduced in all the emirates during the Second World War. Martial Law 
was also introduced during anti-British actions in Bahrain in 1956 and 1965. See Ibid, pp. 108-120. 
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personally controlled all currency operations in the emirates, and persuaded the sheiks to 
deposit their oil incomes in British banks only.^ ^ It was also the duty of the resident to 
cope with questions pertaining to the development of trade between the emirates and 
Britain; in this business he had the assistance of the bureau for trade at his headquarters. 
The British administration kept a watchful eye on matter of oil policy. The 
resident carefully followed all talks between oil companies and the sheiks on new 
agreements or on the amendment of earlier ones, so that no new settlement might be 
detrimental to the interests of the British government. That is why he insisted that the 
sheiks should grant oil concessions either to British companies or to those which were 
helping Britain to conduct its colonial policy in the emirates. Matters of oil policy were 
also the business of political agents, who became more active in this field after the 
Second World War. 
The political resident controlled the activities of the British military units 
stationed in the Gulf area and headed the Defence Committee, which included top 
officers of the Air Force, navy and infantry units. After 1967, when the headquarters of 
the British forces in the Middle East was shifted to Bahrain, all military matters were 
decided directly by the resident and commander of the British armed forces in the Gulf 
area.^ ^ One of the methods to which Britain often resorted in conducting its colonial 
policy in the emirates was the repeated change not only of rulers who did not suit it, but 
also of those who failed to adequately meet the demands of promoting the interests of 
British policy. 
In Bahrain, British diplomacy interfered for the first time in dynastic affairs in 
1843, when the British resident demanded that the ruler of Bahrain, sheik Abdullah al-
Khalifa, sign the agreement of 1835 between Britain and the Trucial Oman emirates. 
When the Sheik refused to do so, he was accused of maintaining secret relations with 
Persia and his fate was decided. Manama was subjected to bombardment by British 
'^ Before independence, Abu Dhabi, Duabi and Qatar kept 80 percent of their overseas assets in British 
banks or their branched, Bahrain - 60 percent. Ibid. 
"• Ibid. 
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warships, and Abdullah al-Khalifa was deposed. Sheikh Muhammad ben Khalifa al-
Khalifa became the new ruler of Bahrain; he signed the agreement between Britain and 
the Trucial Oman emirates. 
The signing of these agreements strengthened Britain's position in the island to 
such an extent that soon after their ratification the British political resident asked 
Muhammad al-Khalifa to recognize British protectorship over Bahrain. The Sheik's 
attempts to evade this request led to Manama being bombarded for a second time in 1867, 
and to his replacement. The new ruler was Sheik Isa ben Ali al-Khalifa, who not only 
confirmed all former treaties between Bahrain and Britain, but signed new ones which 
made the emirate a British protectorate. 
In 1920-1923 Bahrain saw popular actions against British protectorship and 
British interference in the internal affairs of the emirate. Sheik Isa al-Khalifa received a 
delegation of insurgents and agreed to some of their demands, in particular to the setting 
up of a consultative assembly and to the organization of a local police force. After his 
decision the British political resident considered it necessary to interfere in the emirate's 
internal affairs. At the entrance to the port of Manama there appeared two warships -
Triad and Crocus - and as they got ready to shell the city Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa was 
"persuaded" to abdicate in favour of his son. Sheik Ahmad be Isa al-Khalifa. 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when a world crisis broke lout, there developed 
in Bahrain a situation what was extremely unfavourbale to the British colonialists. 
Popular unrest was caused by the grim economic situation and foreign domination. In 
such conditions, in 1932 a more experienced leader became the ruler. He was Hamad be 
Isa al-Khalifa, brother of the former ruler Ahmad ben Isa al-Khalifa. By carrying out 
some minor economic reforms the new ruler managed to stabilize the internal situation in 
the country and ensure the pursuance of a propagandist policy. This time the change of 
" Akad Salah, Political Trends in the Arabian Gulf, Cairo. 1974, p. 118 (in Arabic). 
^* Yusef al-Falki, Bahrain's Problem Between the Past and the Present. Al-Manama, 1960, p.87. 
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rulers was successful; at the entrance to the port of Manama stood the six ships constantly 
patrolling the Gulf. 
After the death of Hamad al-Khalifa in 1942, the British resident installed as ruler 
of Bahrain not his eldest son, Ahmad, who by tradition should have taken over power, but 
his sixth son by age - Sulman ben Hamad al-Khalifa, known for his close ties with the 
British administration. Although a gross violation of dynastic traditions had taken place 
and the new ruler had been appointed without the approval of the rest of the members of 
the ruling family, the sheiks had no objection. Their complaisance had been ensured by 
the large contingents of British troops stationed on the island and by the warships at the 
ports. To be on the safe side, the British introduced "martial law" in Bahrain, which 
banned any opposition from both the ruling family and the population. 
In Qatar the British resident actively interfered in dynastic affairs in 1913: at his 
insistence, not the eldest son of the late Jasim ben Thani, but his third son by age, 
Abdullah, was made ruler of the emirate. The members of the ruling family had to give 
in because there were Royal Navy ships at the port of Doha.^ ^ The same thing happened 
in 1960, when the British resident made Sheik Ahmad al-Thani ruler of Qatar, he was the 
second son of the late Ali ben Abdullah al-Thani. But this time British diplomacy met 
with opposition from both the ruling circles and the population. For the first time in its 
entire history the emirate saw the emergence of political groupings which came out 
against the new sheik, demanding closer ties with Arab countries and support for the 
peoples fightinhg for freedom and independence. 
Under these circumstances, Britain worked out and implemented a whole series of 
measures. First, the oil companies' concessionary deductions, amounting to 54 million 
dollars a year were suspended. Second, in Qatar the official posts of British political 
agent and his assistants were abolished, and their functions transferred to the "Arabised" 
government; but the sheik still had British advisers. Third, as usual in such cases 
"' Mahmud Bahjat Siman, A General History of Qatar, Baghdad, 1966. p. 89 (in Arabic). 
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additional contingents of British troops were sent to the emirate. As a result of these 
measures the resistance of the population was broken and "law and order" restored in 
Qatar. 
After the death of Sheik Buti ben Maktum of Dubai in 1912, Man ben Rashid was 
elected ruler of the emirate; he tried to pursue an independent policy, Britain refused to 
recognize him officially and appointed a new ruler. Said ben Maktum, to whom it gave 
effective support and forced the tribal chieftains of Dubai to change their original 
decision. 
After that there began a series of assassinations of rulers in 1912 Tahnum be 
Zayed was killed, in 1912 - Hamdan ben Zayed, in 1926 - Sultan be Zayed, and in 1928 
- Saqr ben Zayed. Power was to have been given to Khalifa be Zayed, known for his 
anti-British sentiments. But as a result of British interference, Shakhbut ben Sultan al-
Nahayan became the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and stayed in power for 38 years. But in 1966 
the British administration removed him from power, too, because he had tried to resist 
some recommendation from London. In particular, the sheik has told the League of Arab 
States of his desire to cooperate with it and its member countries and he had denounced 
the British plan to set up a federation of Arab states in the Gulf- Area. A coup d'etate 
was inspired, as a result of which Shakhbut ben Sultan al-Nahayan, as an "egoist who had 
failed to put the emirate's funds to good use", handed over power to his younger brother 
Sheik Zayed ben Sultan al-Nahayan.^' 
In the mid 1960s the conflict between the British political administration and the 
ruler of Sharjah, Saqr ben Sultan al-Qasimi, came to a head in Trucial Oman; he was 
admonished after his attempt in 1962 to secure more advantageous terms in contracts 
with the oil companies. After he tried in 1965 to insist on his sovereign rights (among 
other things, he called for cooperation with members of the League of Arab States and 
refused to renew the treaty with Britain on the lease of the base on the territory of the 
°^ Akad Salah, Political Trends in the Arabian Gulf, p. 202. 
By tradition power should have passed into the hands of his eldest son. 
16 
emirate), a "family plot" was staged and his place was taken by the more compliant sheik 
Khalid ben Amer al-Qasimi. Immediately after the coup, in June 1966, the new ruler of 
Sharjah signed an agreement with Britain on the expansion of the British base on the 
territory of the emirate. 
Several attempts were made on the life of the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, who had 
tried to follow the example of Saqr al-Qasimi and establish contacts with the League of 
Arab States. 
The results of the Second World War (1939-10945) brought about a change in the 
alignment of forces in the world and promoted the growth of the national liberation 
movement in the Middle East. The revolutions in 1952 in Egypt and in 1958 in Iraq, the 
winning of political independence in Kuwait in 1961, and the proclamation in 1962 of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, and in 1967 of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen 
(subsequently the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) had repercussion in many 
emirates. 
The first strike of oil workers in the history of Bahrain took place in March 1951. 
In the summer of the same year mass disturbances broke out, in which people demanded 
a revision of the enslaving agreements imposed on the country by British Colonialists. 
The latter had to use force to suppress the unrest. 
But already in 1954 a new wave of clearly anti-imperialists strikes and 
disturbances swept Bahrain. In the same year in Manama the Committee on national 
Unity was set up - a democratic organisation which demanded that Sheik Sulman bin 
Hamad al-Khalifa carry out a number of radical political and economic changes aimed at 
satisfying the rights of the working people and democratizing the socio-political system 
of Bahrain. 
These demands were not met and mass actions went on, reaching their peak after 
the tripartite imperialist aggression against Egypt in 1956, when a general uprising 
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against British domination flared up in Bahrain which managed to suppress the uprising 
this time as well. 
The 1958 revolution in Iraq gave fresh impetus to the development of the national 
liberation movement in the emirates. Under its direct impact popular unrest erupted in 
Qatar in 1960 against the domination of British administration's "advisers". As a result, 
reforms were carried out to "Arabise" the administration of the emirate: the posts of 
British advisor and his assistants were abolished; the administration of finances and the 
water economy and all administrative functions were transferred to the sheik's ruling 
family. Yet effective control over the country's life remained in the hands of the British, 
let alone foreign - policy functions, which continued to be prerogative of the British 
administration in the Gulf. 
The population of Qatar was of course not satisfied with these half-measures and 
in 1960-1964 it demanded the democratization of the country, the adoption of the new 
labour legislation and the establishment of political and economic ties with other Arab 
countries. In 1963 there was a general strike in the emirate for Arab unity. 
. The attempt of the British in 1964 to prevent the arrival of a League of Arab 
States delegation in Qatar evoked an even more reaction on the part of the population. 
Nationwide demonstrations for Arab unity forced Sheik Ahmad of Qatar to give his 
official consent to cooperation with the League of Arab States in matters of social and 
economic development. 
The Kuwait crisis of 1961-1963, which was due to Iraq's refusal to recognize the 
independence of Kuwait and which led to an armed intervention by Great Britain, had a 
tremendous impact on other Gulf emirates in which mass demonstrations were held 
against British interference in the internal affairs of Kuwait. This was reflected with 
particular force in Bahrain, which entered in the early 1960s the stage of vigorous 
struggle for independence, led by the national Liberation Front of Bahrain. The presence 
in the country of units of the British navy and expeditionary forces, which were preparing 
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to participate in the Kuwait operation in June-September 1961, evoked indignation 
among the majority of Bahrainis. The emirate saw frequent demonstrations of protest 
against the stay in Bahrain of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Samuel Charles Elworthy 
(who supervised the operation in Kuwait), and against his meetings Luce, political 
Resident in the Gulf, and with the ruler of Bahrain, Sulman al-Khalifa. 
The discovery of new deposits of oil in the emirates led British diplomacy to 
explore means how to keep the Gulf area within its sphere of influence. Oil extraction in 
the emirates led to a sharp increase of their population due to a large inflow of 
immigrants, as well as to the appearance of funds that were substantial for these counties 
part of these funds went into the building of the infrastructure. In the new economic 
conditions of the region the sheiks were no longer able to govern the emirates by the old, 
outdated methods. Help came quickly from the British political administration, it worked 
out an implemented a plan to set up bodies of local government, consisting wholly either 
of members of the ruling families or of Arab states citizens loyal to Britain.''^ A large 
group of British official worked in the local administration as advisers or experts on 
employment. 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company formed in 1908 subsequently renamed British 
Petroleum became a part of the British Capital. "We must become the owners, or at the 
any rate, the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the supply of natural oil 
which we require"'''' Winston Churchill, told the House of Commons on July 17, 1913. 
The beginning of the exploitation of the oil deposits in the Middle East stirred up 
the oil industrialists of the United States, who had already appreciated the ever increasing 
value of that black liquid. The capitalists of France and Germany pricked up their ears. 
32 In 1959 out of Bahrain's 739 policemen only 202 were Bahrainis, 127 were from North Yemen, 69 
from Iraq, 61 from Oman and as many from South Yemen. 
In the late 1950s, out of the 60 key posts in the Bahraini administration 23 were held by British official 
and 17 of the 29 police officers were British. 
Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, (ed.) By Robert Rhodes James, Vol. 2, 
1908-1913, New York and London 1974, p. 2131. 
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Nor did the presumed presence of oil deposits in Mesopotamia (Iraq). Persia's 
neighbour, leave them indifferent. 
Before the First World War the majority of Arab countries including 
Mesopotamia, were nominally incorporated in the Ottoman Empire; that is why the 
destiny of Iraq's natural resources was being decided in Istanbul. After long backstage 
strife and derision of shares, the right to prospect for and extract oil throughout Iraqi 
territory was secured in June 1914 by the newly founded Turkish Petroleum Company. 
The British managed to get hold of the majority of its shares. 
While controlling the rich oil deposits in Persia and Iraq, Britain at the beginning 
was not serious about oil prospecting on the territories of the Gulf Arab principalities, 
although there is every reason to believe that even before the First World War British 
knew about the existence of oil deposits there. In 1910 the British geological service 
discovered oil on the Bahrain Islands. Apparently this fact served as a pretext for 
imposing on the rulers of the principalities agreements to the effect that the right to 
prospect for and extract oil would not be granted to any body, except the rulers of Great 
Britain. Such agreements were signed with the ruler of Kuwait in 1913, with the rulers of 
Bahrain, Trucial Oman and Muscat in 1914. 
After 1920, when a small company called the Eastern and General Syndicate was 
formed in London, its representative, major Frank Holmes, a New Zealander, took 
resolute steps to gain control of geological prospecting in some principalities. In 1923 he 
managed to get a concession to prospect for and extract oil in Kuwait and in the Saudi 
part of the neutral zone, in 1924 - in the Kuwaiti part of the neutral zone, and in 1925 he 
obtained the exclusive concessionary right to the entire territory of the Bahrain Islands.^^ 
Yet the Eastern and General Syndicate lacked funds to conduct prospecting work 
and failed to find supper among British industrialists, who had put their main stake on the 
already powerful Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil company (AlOC). So Holmes, 
•« fbid. 
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unexpectedly for Britain, on November 30, 1927, relinquished his concessionary rights 
on the Bahrain Islands to the US-owned Gulf Oil Corporation. That was the beginning of 
US - expansion in the Persian Gulf region. 
Having in those years full control over the rich oil deposits in Iraq and Iran, 
Britain still regarded the Arabian Peninsula only from the point of view of its strategic 
importance. It was not particularly active there in studying natural resources, apparently 
wishing to keep them in reserve until necessity arose. Probably the British oil 
industrialists had been misled by their unsuccessful attempts to discover oil in a number 
of Gulf Arab principalities. Nor did the British government back the efforts of its oil 
industrialists to obtain concessions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. As such Britain did not 
avail itself of its political dominance in the Gulf area to secure effective monopoly on its 
oil resources. The British could not imagine the Gulf area would be the scene of fierce 
battle among the oil magnates, in which the British monopolies would suffers serious 
defeats. 
The most crushing blow was dealt to the British monopolies in Saudi Arabia, 
where the overseas oil magnates paved their way with money. In 1933 the US-owned 
California-Arabian Standard Oil Company, which had full control over the Standard Oil 
Company of California, asked King Ibn Saud to grant it a concession in exchange for a 
subsidy of 100,000 pounds sterling, which, incidentally, was far more than the British 
promised. The money decided the matter. King Ibn Saud gave the overseas monopolists 
the right to extract oil in his country. They were granted, until the year 2005, a territory 
of 1.1 million sq. km which is equal to the area of Texas and California taken together. 
This was a great shock to the British politicians. Eyewitnesses said that when Britain's 
envoy learned about the deal he nearly had a stroke. But London became fully aware of 
its miscalculation much later, when Arabia ranked among the world's biggest oil 
producers.^^ 
" Ibid. 
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In 1935 the Texas Oil company (Texaco) joined in the exploitation of Saudi 
Arabia's oil deposits. In 1944 the California-Arabian Standard Oil company was 
renamed the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco). In 1946 another two major oil 
companies of the United States - the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the 
Socony Mobil Oil Company - began to exploit Saudi Arabia's oil resources. These two 
companies, according to the World Petroleum journal, increased Aramco's capital by 125 
million dollars. Aramco's shares were divided as follows: 30 percent each for the 
Standard Oil Company of Cahfomia, Texaco and the Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey; and ten percent for the Socony Mobil Oil Company." 
Encouraged by their success in Saudi Arabia, the oil industrialists launched a 
broad offensive on Britain's positions in the Gulf area. London was greatly alarmed 
when the US-owned Gulf Oil Corporation was granted concession to extract oil in 
Kuwait, which was of strategic importance to Britain owing to its location. 
Pressure was put on the Sheik of Kuwait, and in 1934 he urgently granted an oil 
concession to a new company, the Kuwait Oil Company, which included both US and 
British firms exploiting oil deposits a formally equal basis. The Kuwait Oil Company's 
shares were equally divided between the Gulf Oil Corporation and British Petroleum. The 
concessionary agreement was concluded for a period of 75 years and applied to the entire 
territory of the country. 
The US monopolists also began to steal up on Britain's rear on the Arabian 
Peninsula. In particular, the Standard Oil Company of California tried to get concessions 
in Qatar and Trucial Oman. But there it failed owing to Britain's resistance. The defeats 
that Britain had suffered in the struggle for Arabian oil forced it into more active 
resistance against its rivals. To insure themselves against further trouble, the British oil 
industrialists hastened to obtain oil concessions in Qatar, Muscat and Trucial Oman, 
" Ibid. 
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where they thought there should be oil deposits, although they were compelled to share 
part of these riches with their partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company.^ ^ 
In Qatar all oil deposits, including those in territorial waters were given in May 
1935 to Qatar Petroleum, a branch of Iraq Petroleum. In Oman and Muscat (with the 
exception of the Dofar province) the entire territory or the principalities was given in 
1937 to another branch of Iraq Petroleum, namely, petroleum Development (Oman), 
Trucial Oman's oil deposits in its territorial waters was given to yet another branch 
company of Iraq Petroleum- Petroleum Development (Trucial Coasts).''^ 
The partition of oil riches in the Gulf among the world's top oil company is was 
mainly completed by the beginning of the Second World War; no sultanate on the saline 
and sun-scorched coast of the Gulf escaped their voracious gaze. Britain's over 
whelming political predominance did not prevent other overseas businessmen from 
scoring highly tangible success in the competition. 
Thus, late 1930s was the US monopolies had taken full possession of the oil 
deposits in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, half of the oil output in Kuwait, and about a 
quarter of the output in countries where Iraq Petroleum was active. Similarly British 
firms, in addition to extracting oil in Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, exercised control over the 
deposits in Qatar, Muscat, Trucial Oman and some other principalities. 
In pursuing its policy of economic expansion in the region the United States 
applied more flexible methods than its rivals. In the first place at capitalized on the 
prevalent dislike for the British colonialists. Posing as friends of the Arab peoples, the 
Americans always inserted in concessionary agreement and contract a clause on non-
interference in internal affairs. In difficult situations the dollar helped out or the State 
^' N.S. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, Whittier Books, INC, New York, 1954, pp. 321 -352. 
'" Ibid. 
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Department joined in to put pressure not only on the rulers of the Arab countries, but on 
the British government as well.'"' 
The post World War II did not put an end to Anglo-American rivalry, which in 
those years flared up mainly over Saudi Arabia. The almost complete termination of oil 
incomes placed in an extremely difficult economic situation. Britain decided to take 
advantage of this in order to establish political control over Saudi Arabia, which, right till 
the beginning of 1943, had almost wholly been dependent financially on London. In 
those years there were plans to set up a British bank in Saudi Arabia and push the country 
into the sterling areas.'*' 
This seriously alarmed the US oil companies. Fearing for their positions in Saudi 
Arabia, they openly demanded that the US Government should take energetic measures 
to prevent the kingdom from becoming a British protectorate. As result of strenuous 
efforts by officials representing oil interests, Washington declared that the protection of 
Saudi Arabia was vital to the security of the United States. Consequently Saudi Arabia 
became subject to the Lend-Lease Act, which enabled the US oil magnate to frustrate 
Britain's attempt to take revenge for its past defeat in Saudi Arabia. This country was an 
extremely important bridgehead for the United State from there it could attempt to 
bolseter its economic and political positions in the entire Gulf areas. 
Thus at an early stage of development. Middle East Oil wealth was controlled by, 
as an American economist Helmut J. Frank put it, "a handful of giant firms each highly 
integrated from well to gasoline pump, each with far-flung it not worldwide interests 
linked through joint ventures, supply and marketing arrangements, and at one time 
through formal agreements including features agreements including features highly 
restrictive of competition" These firms were mainly European companies at rifst. As 
for the Americans, they came to the Middle East area only in the late 1920's when Exxon 
"" S.H. Longrigg, Op. Cit. 
H.J. Frank. Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East, Frederick a Prager Publishers, New York. 1966. pp. 1 -
2. 
'' Ibid. 
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and Mobil bought an interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company. Later they got more 
concession in the Gulf through Kuwait. So Cal and Texaco through Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain got their piece of the "oil pie". But their entry into the Middle East was not 
smooth, it was accompanied by acute competition from the British old-timers. 
A conglomerate consisting of four US-led companies-so Cal. Exxon, Tesao (30 
percent interest each) and Mobil (10 percent). Came into beginning Saudi Arabia they 
jointly owned the Arabian America Oil Company known as ARAMCO. So all seven 
sisters, had dominated the world oil market until the mid-50s, had their share of the rich 
Arab concessions. The 'seven majors' accounted for an estimated 90 per cent of crude 
production and refining. They owned a smaller portion of the tanker fleet, but total 
control through ownership and time charters also amounted to over 85 per cent. 
Concentration in marketing varied somewhat more. In some countries as few as three 
suppliers sold 90 per cent of all petroleum; in others the number of large sellers might be 
as many as seven".'*'' 
In 1949, the explored oil reserves in the West valued at 68.8 billion barrels. Of 
these reserves the Middle East potential accounted for 32.6 billion barrels or about half. 
Middle East reserves exceeded the 50 per cent mark in 1951 (51.3 billion out of 96.5 
billion bbl); were close to two-third of the world reserves (97.5 billion out of 147.7 
billion bbl) in 1954'*'* and increased to 366.8 billion bbl or 50.T 50.1 billion tons b late 
1971, i.e., 57.6 per cent of the world deposited (641.8 billion bbl)'*^ John M. Blair, a 
leading American authority on oil economics, states, "it was of course the fabulous 
profits arising from extraordinary low costs that induced the major oil companies to go 
such lengths to control oil in the Middle East""*^ . The cost of extracting crude oil in thus 
region was, in fact, very low. In 1947, it was estimated to be $0.10 per barrel in Saudi 
Arabia and $0.1 in Bahrain while the consumer at that time paid $1.05 per barrel. 
Payments go the government of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were $0.21 and $0.15 per 
'^  Ibid, p. 129. 
"' Ibid, p. 72. 
''^ Middle East International, June 1972. 
"* J.M. Blair, The Control of Oil, Pantheon Books, New York, 1976, p.47. 
25 
barrel, respectively. It is easy to calculate how much money went into the companies' 
pockets as net profit. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
reported that typical Middle East production costs were about $0.25 per barrel while they 
were $0.50 and even in Venezuela and $1.45 to $1.75 in the United States."*' 
By the mid - 1980s the Persian Gulf Oil resources constituted about 70 per cent 
of all known oil reserves in the non-socialist countries, or 48 billion tons, of which Saudi 
Arabia alone had 21.5 billion tons."** 
The importance of oil for the USA in the 1970s when it became the biggest 
importer of energy resources, mainly from the Gulf. The growing gap between the rising 
consumption and the amount of oil extracted in the country dictated the necessity for 
greater imports. America imported 23 per cent of the oil it consumed in 1970, 38 per 
cent. Thus oil became the factor which determined the intensification of US activities in 
the Gulf and added to the US military and political strength. The US armed forces 
stationed in Western Europe and Southeast Asia, for example mainly used fuel produced 
from Gulf oil. 
Control over Gulf oil gave the USA besides economic advantages and important 
lever to pressure West European countries and Japan whose dependence on oil imports is 
immense (in 1979 the share of Middle East oil in the total oil imports of Western Europe 
and Japan was 63 and 73 per cent respectively; it went up to 66 and 70 per cent in 
1980).''^  Using this dependence as a trump card, the US became the protector of the 
interests of the whole capitalists world, and tied down its allies and prevented them from 
making foreign policy decisions running counter to US interests. Moreover for the US 
the Gulf became brought a highly profitable market for armaments, which brought 
American a munitions corporations colossal profit.^° 
47 
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H.J.Frank, Op. ar.,p.l44. 
US Secretary Interests in the Persian Gulf, Washington, 1981, p. 83. 
US Interest in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf, 1980, Washington, 1980, p. 218. 
In 1974, the countries of the region purchased weapons worth 4.3 billion dollars, or 52 per cent of the 
total export of American weapons for that year. In 1977 US weapon exports to the Gulf reached 7.5 
billion dollars or 68 per cent of that year's sale of American military hardware. See Middle East 
Review, 1978, t.l 1, No. 1, p. 35. Armament sales to Saudi Arabia alone brought American monopolies 
11 billion dollars in 1979-1980. The Defence Monitor, 1981,1.10, No.4, p. 816. 
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The fact that the oil-producing states of the Gulf have a substantial part of their 
foreign investments in US banks which is highly beneficial for the US monetary and 
financial system, is another reason for the growing economic importance of the Gulf for 
the United States. Similarly, the Gulf area remains a profitable market for the export of 
US products (other than weapons) and services. In spite of the tough competition with 
other imperialist states there, the USA's positions remain solid. For example, the United 
States sold Saudi Arabia, 5.52 billion dollars' worth of goods in 1980, coming first in the 
latter's imports. 
The US military and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf area have always been 
determined by the region's favourable geographic position between two oceans and three 
continents. Yet in the late 1960s the importance assigned to this region in the system of 
American foreign policy plans began to grow sharply. 
In the first place, the US felt it necessary to oppose the upsurge of national 
liberation movements in the region as a result of the fall of the monarchy in Iraq, the 
revolution in Northern Yemen, the victory of the national front in Southern Yemen, the 
assumption of power by the revolutionary democrats in Aden, and the formation of 
independent sovereign states in place of former British protectorates; at the same time, it 
wanted to fill the "vaccum" left as a result of the loss of British domination there. 
Secondly, the US was also interested in neutralizing the undesirable tendencies in 
the Gulf area brought about by Washington's support for Israel's expansionist course 
toward the Arab countries, a task which became especially urgent after the Arab oil 
embargo and the multiple oil price increases of 1973-1974. Washington's plans to keep 
its interests in the Gulf intact by artificially separating it from the Arab-Israel conflict 
were unsuccessful. 
Thus with the old unfair system of relations between the oil-producing states and 
the imperialist monopolies being destroyed, the United States faced the need to work out 
" The Financial Times, April 26, 1982. 
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new political, military and ideological measures that would ensure its interests. The 
nationalization of the property of foreign oil companies in some countries along with 
policy changes as regards concessions rendered the exploitation of the region's oil riches 
through old colonial methods impossible. 
All these factors made US policy in the Gulf more active and shaped its long-term 
strategy, to maintain US control over the region. 
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CHAPTER II 
FOREIGN POLICY PATTERNS AND REGIONAL 
CONFLICTS 
Like most regions of the world, the Gulf is also characterized by striking 
asymmetries of size and power among its component states. Clearly, the interactions of 
Gulf States are not relations among equals. Historically, the strongest countries on the 
Gulf lay in the north - Iran and Iraq - As the Gulfs importance grew in the mid to late 
1960s and the British were reaching a decision to withdrew, American policymakers 
were concerned about the resulting "power vacuum", consequently the American 
government opted for a "twin-pillars" policy that envisaged US encouragement and 
support of Iran and Saudi Arabia in order that they might assume the mantle of policemen 
of the Gulf. The twin-pillar policy naively assumed that Iran and Saudi Arabia would 
cooperate on the basis of common interests rather than coming into conflict as a result of 
divergent interests. The policy overlooked the disparity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Washington underestimated and misread Iraq. The nature of and limits on the power of 
the "pillars" were never understood. 
The United States' programmatic efforts to upgrade Saudi defensive capabilities, 
showed results in the Kingdom's ability to absorb greater quantities of more sophisticated 
weapons systems in the latter half of the 1970s. 
The Iran-Iraq war has been portrayed as merely a contemporary version of a 
conflict that has endured for over millennium between Persian and Arab, Shia and Sunni. 
There are a number of other elements - disputes over the role of each country in the Gulf 
rivalry between sectarian and secular ideologies; and clash between the personalities of 
the ruling elites. It is quite clear that Iran and its revolution constitutes fundamental 
challenge to the existing system of relations is the Gulf. The virulent revolutionary 
ideology and uncompromising political tactics of Iran had placed Iraq in the 
unaccustomed position of defending the status quo in the Gulf. 
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The government in Iran has made no secret that its ultimate target is not Iraq, but 
Saudi Arabia. And in fact the Iranians have already perpetrated a large number of 
subversive acts in the Kingdom. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, for its part, concluding that 
the weakness of the Gulf is its own weakness, has moved quickly and decisively in recent 
years to broaden and strengthen the security resources in the Gulf, stressing regional 
cooperation rather than simply arms acquisition. Saudi Arabia enjoys close and 
cooperative relations with all the smaller Gulf countries, and has worked assiduously to 
develop better and more effective exchange of information with the Gulf sheikhdoms on 
all security threats, internal and external. Saudi Arabia has also taken the lead in 
rationalizing oil prices, and to this end has taken the lion's share of the production cuts in 
the glut." 
The Saudis have a number of advantages which their smaller neighbours do not, 
and they realize it. They have size, which provides a certain strategic depth unavailable 
to the smaller Gulf States. (However, from a security point of view, the oil fields, lie 
close to the borders and to international waters) the Saudi government has also had a 
degree of stability foreign to some of the smaller Gulf states, and benefits from a level of 
legitimacy within the country that probably exceeds that of all of the other Gulf nations 
and of most countries in the region. 
Saudi Arabia also benefits from a position of regional leadership conferred on the 
kingdom by virtue of its oil resources which are thought to provide influence in the West, 
its financial strength, its subventions to a number of other countries, and from its 
religious stature amongst Muslim nations as the guardian of the Muslim holy places at 
Mecca and Medina. Ever since the reign of the late King Faisal, Saudi Arabia has also 
had a reputation of moral leadership in policy, a position Iran's new leadership has tried, 
so far in vain, to attack. 
"^ In late 1985, Saudi Arabia was forced to abandon its long held role of swing producer as a result of 
repeated violations of quota agreements by other OPEC members. The present Saudi policy is 
expected to be temporary, and is intended to restore discipline within OPEC. 
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In the years following the British withdrawal from east of Suez, the smaller Gulf 
countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE - appeared to many as the artifacts 
of a previous era, short-lived anachronisms in a turbulent area. The five smaller Gulf 
countries are often lumped together by outsiders for matters of convenience, leaving the 
impression that they are all similar. In fact, of course, their differences are as great as 
those of other countries in the Middle East. Apart from the obvious geographical 
propinquity, and the fact that they are all Muslim states, the smaller Gulf countries have 
in common only the shared external threat from the larger Gulf states to the North and 
East, a tradition of social conservatism, and a history of isolation from the processes of 
world politics. 
These small countries vary greatly, but, take together, share a number of common 
interests, principal among which is high vulnerability and therefore, a shared and 
profound concern about the stability and security of the Gulf they all share. They all 
depend upon petroleum commerce, even if in different ways and to different degrees. 
They all look to Saudi Arabia to take the leadership role in the Gulf, despite past conflicts 
with the kingdom in some cases because of its size, resources, and links to the West. 
Thus the politics of the Gulf operate at several levels. At one level are the 
political dynamics of each individual states. At a broader level are the regional gulf 
politics. And finally the gulf in the world politics. 
All Gulf political regimes, whether radical or conservative operate with roughly 
the same raw materials traditional societies and small but growing number of educated 
elites. Thus, tribal family, and technocratic relationships have been as important in the 
operation of government in Ba'thist Iraq as in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. Another common 
factor among all the gulf states is shortage of qualified participants in the governmental 
decision-making process. Modem political ideologies play a relatively minor role in 
domestic politics. Political actions are based more on personalities than on abstract 
political ideas. 
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The politics of the region is primarily the product of internal relationships. 
Inherent in these relationships are a number of striking contrasts that on occasion erupt 
into open confrontations and even hostilities. The greatest contrasts lie among 
conflicting political ideologies and between the two nationalisms which collide head on 
in the gulf. 
Nevertheless there are distinct ideological differences among the gulf political 
systems. Iraq in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) of 
South Yemen to the southwest of the gulf region have radical regimes. Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf emirates and Oman, despite differences in their political outlook 
and development, all have basically conservative regimes. The arena for ideological 
differences among them is primarily in the field of foreign affairs, both regionally and in 
gulf relations with the rest of the world. 
Despite the desire of Iran and Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states to cooperates, 
particularly in the area of regional security, their capacity to do so is inhibited by the 
collision of Iran abd Persian nationalisms in the gulf. Divided by language culture, and 
historical traditions, there has rarely been a great affinity between the Persians and the 
Arabs. They do share a common religion, but even that is tempereSd by religious schism. 
The Iranians are predominantly Shia, while most of the Arabian Peninsula Arabs are 
Sunnis. The Wahhabi Saudi particularly find some of the Shia practices repugnant to 
their strict interpretation of Islam. Thus Arab nationalism is increasingly running counter 
to Iranian national aspirations in the gulf. One of the best illustrations of the conflict is 
the dispute over the name of the gulf: the Iranians insist that it is the Persian Gulf and 
even take umbrage over the neutral term, "the gulf; the Arabs have been just as insistent 
that it is the Arabian Gulf.^ "* 
There are other factors of differences of size, population, and political-military 
power. Iran, Iraq (before the fall of Saddam Hussein) and Saudi Arabia are the "big 
powers" of the gulf. 
Chapter f of the thesis documents the details of the controversy. 
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The smaller states of the gulf - Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar the seven UAE 
Shaykhdom, Oman and Yemen have little political or military power and could scarcely 
resist political ultimatums from any of the three big gulf states. Nevertheless, the 
ideological and nationalistic confrontations in the gulf balanced each other in restraining 
any of the larger gulf powers from seeking to impose its will on the smaller states. For 
example, Iraqi aspirations in the gulf are checked by Saudi Arabia and Iran, whereas 
Iranian national aspirations are restrained by Arab nationalist sentiments which were 
shared by the Saudis and the radical Iraqis alike. The resulting political equilibrium 
allowed the smaller gulf stats some scope for independent political decision making, 
probably much more than they otherwise would have. 
The domestic concerns and priorities of the smaller Gulf States, coupled with 
their interaction with each other and the larger Gulf States forms the basis of their foreign 
policy formulation in the region.^ '* 
The Gulf States of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates act 
independently in their domestic policies but consult with Saudi Arabia before taking any 
actions in the realm of foreign policy, where their priorities follow those of the Saudis. 
Bahrain's ruling Al Khalifa family needs and gets economic and political support from 
the Saudis. Qatar's Al Thani dynasty and various sheiks of the UAE - particularly the 
ruler of Abu Dhabi and the ruler of Dubai, whose emirate has good economic relations 
with Iran - are not dependent on the Saudis economically. They nevertheless almost 
always wait to see what Saudi policies will be before moving politically themselves. 
The Lower Gulf States, in addition to their solicitude to Saudi concern over 
security issues, are attuned to the Middle East peace process and the Iranian revolution, 
both of which directly concern their large Palestinian, Iranian and/or Shites populations. 
John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum, Washington, D.C., 
The Middle East Institute 1975, Rouhollah Ramazani, The Apersian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979; Robert Litwak, Security in the 
Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Interstate Conflict. Montclair, N.J. Allanheld, Osmun. 1981, and portions, 
but not all, of the books in the series edited by Shahram Chubin. 
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There are over 1,500 Palestinians in Bahrain, where over half the country's 
population of 360,000 are Shiites, approximately 40,000 Palestinians and 50,000 Iranians 
Shiites in UAE, whose population is around 1,00,000; and approximately 20,000 
Palestinians and 40,000 Arabs of Iranian extraction in Qatar, whose population is about 
2,30,000. 
As a result of these figures, the Sheikdoms are necessarily sensitive to Palestinian 
radicalism. They are concerned about Islamic pressurise and apprehensive about 
nationalist claims such as Ayatollah Rouhani's reassertion of Iran's claim to Bahrain in 
1979. Islamic pressures, some fear, could radicalize not only Shiites or Palestinians but 
also the Gulfs large, mostly male expatriate populations and thereby seriously threaten 
the position of the ruling families. Their fears acquire credibility when one considers that 
in the UAE expatriates outnumber the indigenous population by a ratio of approximately 
five to one. 
Kuwait, with a larger Palestinian population (almost 25% of 1.4 million) than any 
Gulf state, a sizable Shiite population (30% of the total), and an extremely vulnerable 
position at the head of the Gulf,^ ^ is forced to manage a complex array of conflicting 
forces in order to ensure its survival. As a result the Kuwaitis do not necessarily follow 
Saudi guidelines. Regarding themselves as more enlightened than the Saudis and 
possessing a freer press as well as a National Assembly that provides at least the 
semblance of political participation, the Kuwaitis frequently question Saudi 
predominance. They also pursue their own foreign policies and maintain diplomatic 
relations with a number of socialist non-Arab states. While they are sensitive to Iraqi 
designs on their territory, which they were forced to contest (with outside help) in 1961, 
1973, 1976 and 1990, they also recognize the fact that Iran's military power has to be 
reckoned with, and that there is relatively little the Saudis can do for them. For this 
reason, although Saudi Arabia is their most important regional ally and their diplomacy in 
generally coordinated with Saudi Arabia, they are aloof from US policies. 
^' Various metaphors used to describe Kuwait's geopolitical position include that of "a nut in a 
nutcracker" and "between Iraq and a hard place" Kuwait borders Iraq and is only 12.5 miles from Iran 
at its nearest point. 
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Oman is more favorable in its attitude toward US policies in part because of its 
geographical isolation from the other Gulf states and in part because of its negligible 
Palestinian and Shiite population. Most of Oman's relatively small number of 
expatriates, who do not amount ot more than 20% of its 800,000 inhabitants, are from the 
subcontinent. Oman was the only Gulf state to support Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat's peace initiative and the Camp David accords, to distance itself from the decisions 
of Baghdad Summit, to Grant the US Access to facilities, and to invite a joint military 
exercise on its territory. Hence until recently, when the Gulf States began to give 
increasing attention to their security concerns, Oman (which had been fighting the Dhofar 
rebellions since the midO 1960s), was relatively isolated in its relationships with its 
neighbours. 
This brief review of the relationships between the smaller states of the northern 
Arabian peninsula littoral and Saudi suggests that, in spite of longstanding historical 
quarrels, there is natural alliance between them. The alliance, which transcends some 
extremely bitter territorial and boundary disputes, is based on belief in common ancestry 
and reinforced by threats from without. In conjunction with events of the last decade 
common bonds have contributed to a common concern that beyond a desire of economic 
integration. The concern for political and military integration has been reinforced by a 
series of events, the Israeli bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, Iran's bombing on three 
different occasions of Kuwaiti oil installations, the tripartite agreement signed in August 
1981 by Libya, the PDRY, and Ethiopia which formalized their rivalry with Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Jordan; Iranian support for the December 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain and 
subsequent coup attempt in Qatar, the Iranian counteroffensive against Iraq, and the 
bombing of the American Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983 and above all the Iraq-
Kuwait war. These events, progressively, have helped to bridge differences among Gulf 
States. In May 1981 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman 
(conveniently excluding both Iran and Iraq because of the war between them), were able 
56 See Roger Nye, 'Political and Economic integration in the Arab states of the Gulf, Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978, pp. 3-21, who cites eight examples of regional 
cooperation for economic ends. Political integration since it involves a loss of national sovereignty and 
since the benefits are Jess visible, has (untiJ recently) }ess oven commitment. 
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to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Subsequently, the states of GCC were able 
to agree on basic principles of collective security and take concrete steps to implement 
those principles.^^ In October 1983 the GCC conducted its first joint military exercises in 
the United Arab Emirates western desert - a development whose importance was 
underscored by Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz While joint military 
exercises were more symbolic than functional, the United States should encourage this 
trend and support it in every way possible.^ ^ 
The rapid successes in the Horn of Africa, the people's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen and Afghanistan, has dismayed the Gulf States. These destabilizing events 
coupled with the revolution in Iran, the subsequent war between Iran and Iraq, and the 
revolutionary fervor or Iran, have dramatically heightened Gulf fears over vulnerability to 
attack or subversion. The Gulf States view American capabilities as immense. As a 
result the Gulf states perceived United States as the only power capable of deterring 
Soviet inroads into the region and look and to the United States for fundamental 
protection, although they want to keep the US out of the Gulf and "over the horizon" 
because a United States presence could bring the Soviets in as well. 
Consequent upon the "loss" of Iran, the demise of America's "two-pillar" policy 
and the problems posed by the Iran-Iraq war, a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia and 
the smaller gulf states became the only real option left open to the United States. The 
Carter Doctrine, to which President Reagan has added his corollary (i.e., the United 
States will not permit Saudi Arabia "to be an Iran") provides a general framework for 
continuing "special relationship" between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The 
essence of this relationship, at its most fundamental level, revolves around the exchange 
of security for oil. This exchange was evident most recently in two episodes: (1) Saudi 
willingness to make up for the world's short-fall in oil production after the Iranian 
revolution and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war; and (2) President Reagan's personal 
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intervention with Congress to ensure the sale of Airborne Warning and Control system 
(AWACS) planes to Saudi Arabia in the Fall of 1981.^ ^ 
The US interests in the Gulf region although boil into a single major factor - oil, 
there are in fact a wide variety of US interests in the Gulf, some deriving from its 
location, others from its resources, and yet other from the prominence of the Gulf in 
international politics. For the United States as a superpower more so as hegemonic 
power in the post cold war period, it is certain that events which take place in the region 
inevitably affect American standing, power, and efficacy as a principal member of the 
global community; and American standing power, and efficacy in turn directly affect the 
direction and course of events, stability peace and security of the Gulf region. American 
economy, which is increasingly international, remains dependent upon petroleum 
supplies from the Gulf. It is not merely the economy, but also the defense of US that 
require Gulf oil in order to function. As Richard Nixon has pointed out "Now its oil is 
the lifeblood of modem industry, the Persian Gulf region is the heart that pumps it, and 
the sea routs around the Gulf are the jugular through which that lifeblood passes".^" In 
another book, Nixon argued that because the Persian Gulf is likely to continue as "the 
only source of significance exportable oil in the world for the next twenty five years - we 
have no choice but to remain engaged in the area".^' Addressing a republican fund-
raising luncheon during the election campaign in October 1975, former US President 
Gerald Ford said in San Francisco: "American concern for the Middle East is not a 
strategic part of the world and the source of a significant and growing portion of our 
energy resources and those of Western Europe and Japan".^ ^ Outlining the US policy 
toward the Gulf in the post 1990 era Defence Secretary Dickcheney had pointed out in 
April 1991 that "given the enormous resources that exists in that part of the world, and 
given the fact that these resources are going to rise in the years and the US and our major 
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partners cannot afford to have these resources controlled by somebody who as 
fundamentally hostile to our interest".^^ 
The Americans came to the Gulf area only in the late 1920s when Exxon and 
Mobil bought an interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company. Later 'Gulf through Kuwait, 
so Cal Texaco through Saudi Arabia and Bahrain get their piece of the oil pie. But their 
entry into the Middle East was not smooth; it was accompanied by acute competition 
from the British old-times. A conglomerate thus resulted in Saudi Arabia consisting of 
four US - led companies - so Cal, Exxon, Texaco (30 per cent interest each) and Mobil 
(10 per cent). They jointly owned the Arabian American Oil Company ARAMCO. So 
all Seven Sisters,^ "* who had dominated the world oil market until the mid-50s, had their 
share of the rich Arab concessions. The 'seven majors' accounted for an estimated 90 per 
cent of crude production and refining. 
They owned a smaller portion of the tanker fleet, but total control through 
ownership and time charters also amounted to over 85 per cent. Concentration is 
marketing varied somewhat more. In some countries as few as three suppliers sold 90 per 
cent of all petroleum; in others the number of large sellers might be as many as seven".^ ^ 
John M. Blair, a leading American authority on oil economics, states, "it was of 
course the fabulous profits arising from extraordinary low costs that induced the major oil 
companies to go much lengths to control oil in the Middle East".^ The cost of extracting 
crude oil in this region was, in fact, very low. In 1947, it was estimated to be $0.19 per 
barrel in Saudi Arabia and $0.1 in Bahrain while the consumer at that time paid $1.05 per 
barrel. Payments to the government of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were $ 0.21 and $ 0.15 
barrel, respectively. It is easy to calculate how much money went into the companies' 
pockets as net profits. The organisation OF petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
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reported that typical Middle East production costs were about $.0.25 per barrel while they 
were $0.50 and even $0.80 in Venezuela and $1.45 to $1.75 in the United States.^ ^ 
The US has attempted to secure its economic interests in the Gulf by fostering the 
already strong financial and commercial interdependence between the US and the area. 
This interdependence is evidence by the flow of funds into US investments; the 
repatriation of US oil companies' profits and dividends; and US exports of goods and 
services to Arab states. Of additional importance, the $75 billion exported from the US 
to the Arab Gulf states in 1983 provided nearly 3 million jobs for American worker by 
the US government's own reckoning that every $1 billion in exports pays for 40,000 full-
time jobs. Still more weight is given to US-Gulf interdependence, and concern for 
regional security is justified by the fact that another 754,000 US citizens live and work in 
the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia alone, there are 1,000 US firms conducting business, making 
profits and providing jobs.^* 
While oil remained the factor in US economic interest so is generation of revenue 
by arms sales which had an enormous impact upon American society and economy since 
world war - II. Though usually underplayed, the fact remains that reduction in arms 
sales would mean closure of some production lines which, in turn, would adversely affect 
the employees and the economics of the areas in which these companies are located.^ ^ 
The end of the Cold War had seen thousand of workers being laid off by defence 
companies. If the Cold War had shattered the economy of the Russians, its end nearly 
did so far the "free world". In their desperate search for markets amidst the shrinking 
demands and reduced defence budgets, the Western weapon suppliers came across the 
brilliant idea of sustaining themselves by supplying vast quantities of arms to the ultra-
rich had highly insecure regimes of Gulf. In order to sell arms, they had to create a 
demand for enhanced securing in the region. Americans have usually succeeded in hard-
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selling "their" threat perceptions to the recipient states. If earlier it was the Communist 
hordes and fanatic Islamists whom the Gulf monarchs had to be scared about, the end of 
the Cold war saw the western media build up Sandman Hussein as a devilish clone of 
Hitler beat upon annihilating the Gulf regimes. This image of Saddam was to prove to be 
worth nearly $20 billion to the US in terms of arms sales to the region. 
The US Congressional Research Service estimated that during the period 1984-
91, the former Soviet Union and the United States aco9unted for 27.3 per cent and 26.7 
per cent of arms sales to the Middle East. France accounted for 12.9 per cent, the UK for 
9.4 per cent China traileSd behind with 5.8 per cent. Compared to the above, the US 
alone, world arms worth $32 billion to Middle East countries between August 1990 and 
September 1992. Significantly, out of this total sale, about $ 25 billion work of 
equipment was sold to one single recipient - Saudi Arabia.^" 
Currently, the US objectives are to prevent any single power from gaining control 
over the bulk of Gulf oil reserves and to prevent the use of revenue from oil sales by a 
hostile power to undermine the regional order. Also involved is the interest of having 
"captive" arms markets in the Gulf. In order to safeguard these interests, the policy-
makers of the US are of the opinion that the "presence of an outside power is needed to 
maintain a stable balance of power in the (unstable) region; and to do so, the United 
States, in conjunction with its Western allies, is best placed to play the balancing role.^' 
Addressing the joint Session of the US Congress on March 6, 1991, President 
George Bush suggested the following steps to promote stability in the Gulf region; "First, 
the GCC states should improve their overall defensive capabilities and accelerate the 
integration of their plans and programmes for the defense of their territory. Second, the 
United States should strengthen its military ties with the GC states and maintain a limited 
military presence on the peninsula. This presence would take the form of propositioned 
equipment, training missions, periodic deployments of air and navel units for joint 
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exercise and the continued deployment of the US Navy's Middle East Force in the 
Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea. Third, the United States should work with the GCC in 
developing a greater role for regional and extra-regional actors, principally Egypt, Britain 
and France"^^ 
In a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees during hearings in 
summer 1973, Joseph Sisco, assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
Asian affairs, referred to the Gulf as an area in which "we have very, very significant 
political-economic-strategic interests"/^ Earlier in the statement Sisco defined those 
interests as being: 
1. Support for indigenous regional collective security efforts to provide stability and to 
foster orderly development without outside interference. 
2. The peaceful resolution of territorial and other dispute among the regional states 
and the opening up of better channels of communication among them. 
3. Continued access to Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient 
quantities to meet our growing needs and those of our European and Asian friends 
and allies. 
4. Enhancing of our commercial and financial interests. 
In the same heritage, James Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defence for Near 
East, African and South Asian affairs, described United States security interests in the 
Gulf as follows: 
1. Containment of Soviet military power within its present borders. 
2. Access to Persian Gulf oil; and 
3. Continued free movement of United States ships and aircrafts into and out of the 
area.^ ^ 
72 Ibid, p.m. 
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Consequently American strategy concentrated on developing pacts and alliance 
along the south-western flank of the Soviet Union and forging close bilateral cooperation 
with the key states of the region. It was motivated by a desire to safeguard the oil 
producing states against Soviet encroachments. The policy of "containment of 
communism' and encroachment of USR clearly aimed at forming a Cordon Sanitaire to 
arrest the expansion of Soviet power in the direction of the Gulf. The Lend-Lease 
programme, the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the formation of Baghdad Pact including 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq (besides Britain and Pakistan) had all been the part of American 
strategy to 'defend' its oil interests in the Gulf region. Soviet Union, in turn promoted 
the Arab nationalists and socialists against the western supported states and by utilizing 
the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist sentiment among the non-aligned Arab states, 
tried to out-maneuver the US sponsored military alliances in the region. The Suez War 
(1956), crisis in Lebanon and Jordan and military revolution in Iraq (1958) could to some 
extent be attributed to the rising wave of Arab nationalism. The Dhofor Insurgency in 
Oman (1962) and armed confrontation between the royalists and leftist in Yemen (1962) 
should also be seen as a reaction of the nationalist forces to Eisenhower Doctrine 1957) 
of the United States which empowered the President to send American troops to foreign 
countries, particularly to West Asia in defence of America's vital interests.'^ 
In the presence of building a strong hold over the Gulf region America developed 
a vested interest in the protection of Iran and Saudi Arabia, which between them 
accounted for about two thirds of the Middle East oil production. Iran's geographic 
proximity with Soviet Union, its geo-strategic importance in the protection of the oil rich 
states of the Gulf and its being free from the anti-Zionist obsessions were considered 
useful in the advancement of America's economic and military interests in the region. 
With the establishment of bilateral military relationship between the two, America 
increased the arms supplies to Iran which turned the latter into a strong 'bulwark' against 
the Soviet pressures from the north. 
Shed K. Asopa, Oil Arms and Islam in the Gulf, Print well Publishers, Jaipur, 1986, p.98. 
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Saudi Arabia's unwavering loyalty towards American was also considered an 
assets to be guarded covetously. The oil kingdom applied its diplomatic skill in 
emasculating the demand for using oil as a political weapon against the industrialized 
world on the issue of partition of Palestine (1948), during the Suez War and again during 
the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In cognizance of the Saudi solidarity with the interests of 
the United States and its total apathy towards the radical and nationalist ideologies 
propagated by the frontline Arab states made it an extremely dependable ally of the 
United States.^ ^ 
US-Saudi relations, however, are much more complex than the simple exchange 
of security for oil. As a result of the relationship's complexity and, perhaps, because of 
cultural barriers the two countries have occasionally experienced serious 
misunderstanding. At the heart of these misunderstandings are the US government's 
imperfect notions about the royal fami91y's room for maneuver and American tendency 
to overestimate its own importance in Saudi calculations. During the Carter presidency, 
for example, Washington expected that the Saudi regime could and would support, or at 
least would not actively oppose, the 1978 Camp David agreement. This expectation 
precipitated, in March 1979, the visit to Saudi Arabia of a high-powered U.S. team under 
Zbigniew Brzezinski to pressure the Saudis to support the agreement. The 
administration's failure to understand what the Saudis told that delegation, and a previous 
delegation under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in February 1979, was mirrored in 
an unintentionally ironic editorial in the Washington Post that hailed Saudi support for 
Camp David.^ ^ 
The Reagan administration, when it took office, expected that the Saudi regime 
could and would provide bases for the Rapid Deployment Force. According to one Saudi 
Prince, Riyadh was concerned that the United States would come to them with great 
hopes: "Ronald Reagan will offer us weapons in return for ports and bases in Saudi 
Arabia. We will say no, and he will be disappointed because he expects too 
'^  Ibid, p.99. 
'* Baghdad II, April 1, 1979. (See also the editorial for April 2, 1979). 
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much."^^Other disappointments followed over Saudi failure to support the Hussein-Arafat 
rapprochement in the Spring of 1983, and over Saudi failure to exert pressure on Syria to 
withdraw its forces from Lebanon in the Summer of 1983.^ ^ Saudi behavor, in short, has 
created puzzlement in U.S. official circles about what the Saudi want. 
The primary cause of puzzlement in U.S. official circles about what the Saudis 
want is to be found in the Saudi sense identity with other Arabs. They have sense of 
obligation as the protectors of Arabism, A primary goal of the Saudis on any major 
international issue is to obtain a consensus that will enable the Arabs to function as one 
nation. Even those Arabs who are philosophically opposed to the Saudis are not rejected; 
instead, they are considered errant members of the larger Arab family who must be 
brought back into the fold. More typical of Saudi practice is the royal family'[s care in 
keeping open its ties with the Baathists in Damascus and in continuing financial aid to 
Syria's friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and Syria's differences with Jordan, Iraq 
and Lebanon. After the Arabs, other Muslims are of greatest concern to the Saudis. The 
Saudis view themselves as, and most Muslims consider them to be guardians of the 
Islamic holy places and protectors of the faith. As such, they feel a great obligation to 
ensure that Muslim interests in the international arena are protected. The pattern of Saudi 
financial assistance reflects this priority; whereas Muslim nations have received generous 
financial assistance, non-Muslim Asian and African states have obtained relatively 
little.*' 
It was Kind Faisal, the architect of Saudi foreign policy who gave concrete shape 
to the country's Islamic policy in the 1960's. Apart from Faisal's commitment to Islamic 
cause and advancement of Muslims, there were also certain domestic and regional 
compulsions that forced Riyadh to pursue and Islamic foreign policy. This was the 
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challenge posed by radical Arab nationalism, let loose by the Egyptian revolution in 1953 
and the emerger of Abdul Nasser as a charismatic leader and voice of the Arabs. This led 
to defection in the House of Saud, the most celebrated instance bagging that of Princes 
Talal, Badr and Fawwz all sons of King Abdul Aziz. In 1962 they formed an Arab 
Nationalist Front whose aim was to create a 'Free Saudi Arabia". Faisal quickly moved 
to blunt the Pan-Arab attack from Cairo by advancing the cause of Pan-Islam and by 
encouraging the development of Islamic institutions. 
The rivalry between Cairo and Riyadh found an expression in the Yemeni civil 
war in 1962.*^ The Yemeni crises and the subsequent development in the region posed 
serious threat to the very survival of the Saudi monarchy. As thousands of Egyptian 
troops started arriving in Yemen, Faisal thought it appropriate to call for Islamic 
solidarity. Consequently during the 1962 Hajj, delegates from 43 countries agreed to 
established Muslim World League which could combat the serious plot by which the 
enemies of Islam were trying to destroy the unity and brotherhood of Muslims.^ "* Saudi 
Arabia has also used the Arab-Israeli conflict to promote Pan-Islamism and assert its 
leadership in the Muslim world. The crushing defeat in the June 1967 war not only 
incapacitated Riyadh's principal enemy Egypt but also blunted its ideological thrust. For 
the Saudis and other oil-rich States it meant not only the discomfiting of their rivals but 
the chance to devalue secular radical notions and promote an Arab solidarity based on the 
most prominent feature of Arabism-Islam. In the words of Vatikiotis "the balance of 
power shifted in their favour as financiers of the new solidarity and brokers of inter-Arab-
power".^ '* At the Khartoum Arab summit held in the August-September 1967, Nasser 
made a tactical commitment to accept Saudi Arabia as the guardian of Arab interest in the 
Gulf. This met Saudi Arabia's condition for the grant of an annual subsidy of $50 
million to be shared by Egypt and Jordan until such time as the effects of Israeli 
aggression were eliminated. 
^' For details see James N. Cordata, The Yemen Crisis, Los Angles, 1965. 
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Having eliminated opposition to its Islamic polices at the regional level, Riyadh 
geared itself up to champion the cause of Islam at the global level and seek vindication of 
its Islamic policies among the comity of Islamic nations. The first opportunity for global 
Islamic leadership to come its way was the incident of the burning of AI Aqsa mosque in 
occupied Jerusalem 1969 which aroused religious passions of Muslims every where. 
King Faisal was quick to seize this opportunity and subsequently an Islamic summit was 
convened at Rabat in 1969 with the active help and initiative of Saudi Arabia. Thus 
Riyadh was largely successful in imparting religiSous overtones to a conflict that was 
essentially political.**^  The fact that Saudi Arabia had been trying to islamise the whole 
issue Arab-Israel is evident from the following statement of Saudi foreign minister who 
said, "the Pan-Arab attitude to Israel has failed. What is needed is Pan-Islamic 
approach".^^ 
Nonetheless, after 1973 the Saudis moved, without abandoning their traditiSonal 
subtlety, from a rather passive and defensive regional role to one that is more active and 
complex. They have patched up Egyptian-Syrian differences over the disengagement 
agreements, mediated in more than one inter-Arab dispute (Algeria versus Morocco, 
Iraqi versuSs Syria, Syria versus Jordan and other) and contributed more than once (and 
as recently as 1981) to calming down the Lebanese civil war. Saudi Arabia is also 
believed to have played an active role in encouraging President Anwar al-Sadat to expel 
the Soviet from Egypt and to liquidate his relationships with the Soviet Union in the 
years after 1972,1 in containing the radical People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) throughout the 1970s, and in attracting to the anti - Moscow camp such 
countries as Sudan and Somalia. In short, as Balgat Korany has noted, Saudi Arabia has 
added petropower to its traditional Islamic influence, and spiritual Mecca has become 
also a political Mecca, where many of the diplomatic meetings of Arabs and Muslims 
convene. 
"* Ayman, AI-Yasini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, London, 1985, pp.124-29. 
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Although the Saudis are certainly more active than they were a decade ago, 
domestic limitations as well as international dependency cannot but constrain Saudi 
Arabia's possible role as the leader of the Arab world. As John Campbell has explained, 
"the oil and wealth that given country the means for regional leadership also make it a 
target. There is a fragility about Saudi Arabia, both in its internal order and in its position 
within the Arab world, that belies the wide-spread impression of impregnable power.**** 
The take a position on the Iranian Revolution-with its important Shiite dismension 
and its embrace of the Palestinians-however, was not a matter of choice for the Saudis. 
Both they and, in particular the smaller Gulf states, had significant numbers of shias and 
Palestinians among their populations. Some 200,000 shias live in Saudi Arabia's oil-
producing eastern region, and although the Palestinian residents number only 10,000, 
they are believed to represent a good percentage of Aramco's total labor force. Shias 
account for some 30 to 40 percent of the population in Kuwait, 20 percent in Abu Dhabi, 
30 percent in Dubai, 30 percent in Qatar, 50 percent in Oman and nearly 75 percent in 
Bahrain. About half a million Palestinians reside throughout the entire Arabian 
Peninsula, and they are estimated at 240, 000 - 260,000 (Or 20 percent of the population) 
in Kuwait, 456,000 (22 percent) in Qatar, where they outnumber the native-born Qataris, 
and 40,000 (30 percent) in United Arab Emirates, where expatriate workers of all 
nationalities outnumbers the native workers by eighteen to one.*^ 
More seriously, however, the Iranian Revolution is a threat by virtue of presenting 
a vigorous, militant alternative to the formalistic state wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, a 
threat that was brought still closer by the Iran-Iraq War. These uneasy times also 
challenged seriously the fragile compromise that had been struck with great difficulty 
between the "pro-U.S. position" and "the Arab Nationalist poison", and the familial and 
organizational networks that underlie those positions.^^ 
J.C. Campbell, 'Oil Power in the Middle East', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, October 1977. p. 107. 
*' Cooley, Iran, the Palestinians and Gulf, Pp.1020, 1026-27, MERIP Reports, no 19. October 1980, 
pp.14, 21. 
•* /feid. pp. 10258-31. 
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The situation of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states Is indeed so 
vulnerable that one can argue that any conflict on their doorsteps - regardless of who 
might win or lose is likely to harm them, the radical Islamism of Iran and the Arab 
socialism of Iraq both have the potential to the equally destabilizing to the status quo and 
the interests of the ruling elites, while Iraq in Arab and should naturally be supported, it 
was also precisely because of this that Iraq had a more realistic claim to leadership of the 
Arab states of the Gulf, thus challenging in one way or another the existing Saudi role. 
Iran is also a Muslim country, and it would not have looked at all proper if Saudi Arabia 
had tuned completely against Iran in a war that, after all, was not launched by Teheran. 
Saudi Arabia has therefore held to the formalistic pattern of condemning war between 
Muslim countries, claimed to observe a position of neutrality (though clearly leaning 
towards Iraq) and tried to mediate and bring the conflict to a halt. Saudi Arabia's 
position in the spring of 1980 was described by Adeed Dawisha as. The Saudi may have 
tacitly condoned Iraq's invasion of Iran in the hope that a quick Iraqi victory might lead 
to a subgstantial diminution of Khomeini's disruptive influence among the Hulf's Shia 
Moslems...but the Saudis now think that the war has gone on long enough and could 
itself become a disruptive agent. Moreover, they realize that the major Saudi oil 
terminals, concentrated on the Eastern province just across the Gulf from Iran, are very 
vulnerable to the Iranian Phantoms which have already proved their effectiveness Iraq.^' 
OPEC Policies 
OPEC provided a strong source of bond between Iran and the Arabs. Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and Iran took the lead in setting up this universal organisation to unite oil 
producers against the oil companies. 
The decision in August 1960 by the major oil companies to reduce oil prices 
caused five oil exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait) to 
meet in Baghdad on 14 September and establish the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
"' A.I. Dawisha, Iraq and the Arab World: The Gulf War and After, The World Today 37, May 1981, 
193. 
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Countries (OPEC). OPEC was completely ignored during the 1960s by the se4ven sister 
(Exxon, Texaco, Standard oil of California, Mobil, Gulf, BP and Royal Dutch/Shell), 
who refused to discus substantive issues with it collectively and insisted on dealing with 
individual producing countries. A similar attitude was adopted by the industrialized 
countries. Both groups did realize, however, the potential threat OPEC represented to 
their dominant position in the production, transportation, refining and sale of oil in the 
international market. OPEC, while not achieving much in practical terms during the 
1960s, was able nevertheless to consolidate its unity, strengthen the political and 
diplomatic links among its members and pave the way for recruiting other Third World 
Oil - producing states such as Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, the United Arab 
Emirates, Nigeria, Ecuador and Gabon. The organization was also able to draw up 
Declaratory statement of Petroleum Policy in 1968 which laid the foundation for many of 
the changes that have occurred since. 
Iran's friendship with the US under the Shah and accommodation of oil 
companies and the Shah's carrot ands stick policy towards the Arab states contributed to 
Iran's continuing linkages with the OPEC. However, things changed swiftly following 
the revolution in Iran and in 1986 during the Iran-Iraq war when a Saudi oil glut helped 
by Kuwait and UAE reduced oil prices from around 28 US dollars P/B to below 10 dollar 
P/B in les than two months. Iran considered this act as a 'treason' on the part of Saudi 
Arabia. '^ 
The Shah had made it known as early as 1968 that following the British 
withdrawal, the region's stability and security was to be henceforth preserved by Iranian 
military might. With the approval of the Western powers, especially the United States, 
the Shah proceeded to establish himself as the defender of the peace in the gulf and to a 
mass by far the largest arms arsenal in the history of the region.^ ^ The concerted builduo 
of Iran's new armed forces began after 1968 and has accelerated at an astonishing pace. 
'^ See Amirahmadi, Iran and Persian Gulf Crisis; Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nadevg Extessar, Iran and 
the Avas World, Macmillan, London, 1993. 
See Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms ii 
Public Policy Research, 1974. 
 l  . ti ,  in the Persian Gulf, Washington D.C. American Enterprise Institute for 
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Not only were Iranian warships constantly visible in the Indian Ocean and the 
gulf view of the Arab states. Iran's military operation in Oman occurred on 30 
November 1971 when the Irani9an navy stormed the three gulf islands of Abu Musa and 
the two Tunbs. The timing of this operatio9n was significant in the sense that December 
1971 signaled the dismantling of the British military presence in the area. 
From a regional perspective, the Shah's naval operation against Abu Musa and 
the Tunbs warranted three things: 
a) He was on his way to becoming a leader of international stature. 
b) He made it clear to his neighbours that he considered Iranian military hegemony a 
serious matter. 
c) He was intent on establishing this hegemony through every means at his disposal, 
military and diplomatic, Arab protests notwithstanding. 
The Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, rejected the Shah's self-assumed role 
of gulf policeman. The Arabs feared Iran's territorial ambitions. These fears have a 
three-pronged base: 
1. Iran's occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in November 1971 and the landing 
of Iranian troops in Oman in December 1973. 
2. The extensive and costly buildup of the Iranian armed forces especially the navy 
and air force. 
3. The often-repeated statement of Iranian officials pointing out the Shah's ordained 
role as the protector of "60% of the world's oil".^'' 
The Arab minds were agitated with questions like: Why does the Shah need such 
a military machine? If Iran feels insecure on its northern frontier with the Soviet Union, 
Why would it concentrate on its naval buildup? Can the shah ever really hope to create a 
credible military capability against the Soviet Union? Or in this military machine 
designed to spread the Iranian view of regional stability over both sides of the gulf and to 
Sada al-'Usbu', 11 June 1974, p. 6. A special article entitled "Arab - Iranian Relation: The Beginning 
and the End", pp.6-8. 
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maintain the type of ideological purity which is to the Shah's liking? Could the Shah be 
engaged in some contingency planning which would, future situations permitting, include 
an Iranian occupation of oil resources on the Arab side of the gulf? 
Iran's ambition to control the Gulf coincided with America's need for strong and 
dependable allies in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia and Israel had been the main pOillars 
of American military strategy in this region but the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war exposed 
the Saudi capability of countering the opposition of the radical Arab states and America 
started looking for an alternative. Iran being non-Arab and free from the anti-Zionist 
obsession was considered important. In 1967, Iran increased its oil productiSon and 
supplemented the Arab cut-backs. Besides, its importance for oil, its tacit strategic 
alliance with Israel could also be counted on to sabotage and neutralize any Arab oil 
offensive. Thus, developed a close and intricate relationship between the United States, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Under Nixon's Guam Doctrine Iran came to be treated as a key 
country along with Saudi Arabia and Israel and became a recipient of massive arms 
supplies from the United States. 
In the post-revolution era Khomeini, after establishing himself firmly in power 
gave first priority to the elimination of Western influence from the entire Muslim world 
by exporting his Shia revolution to them. The rulers of the neighbouring Muslim states -
especially the monarchies having pro-western orientation were put on the defensive. 
Initially, by expressing support of for the revolution they tried to cultivate good relations 
with the new regime but they dreaded the growing impact of this revolution on their own 
Shiits population which started showing signs of unrest. The Shi'its disturbances in the 
Gulf countries during 1979-1980 including the incidents of November-December 1979 
which happened to coincide with the seizure of the Holy mosque in Mecca caused 
sufficient alarm in these countries and they felt compelled to draw a common strategy to 
counter the threat coming from the international objectives of the Iranian revolution. Iraq 
became the immediate target of Iran's revolutionary campaign. A major cause of the 
armed confrontation between Iraq and Iran is Khomeini's personal grudge against 
Saddam Hussein, who on being persuaded by the Shah expelled Khomeini from Nejaf in 
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1978 where he had established his headquarters to conduct the anti-Shah activities". 
Khomeini declared in September 1980: "It is the duty of all Muslims to struggle against 
the Baghdad regime and help the Iraqi people to free themselves from the Bathist 
oppression. Condemning Saddam as a 'megalomaniac' he called him an agent of 
Ame3rican imperialism. 
From the beginning of the revolution, Iran initiated fundamental changes in her 
foreign policy, especially with the regional states, particularly Iraq. A propaganda war 
between Iran and Iraq erupted shortly after the revolution. In February 1980, Ayatollah 
Khomeini stated: "We will export our revolution to the four comers of the world, because 
our revolution is Islamic". 
On another occasion, Khomeini stated: "We should try to export our revolution to 
the world. We should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because 
Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all 
oppressed people of the world. If we remain in an enclosed environment, we shall 
definitely face defeat".^ '^  In Khomeini's words, "Islam is a sacred trust from God to 
ourselves and the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it has fed Islam 
to the rest of the world".^ ^ 
The Arab reaction to the Iran-Iraq war became clear after the first meeting of the 
Arab League after the outbreak of the war in September 1980. While the Arab Gulf 
countries of Jordan, Morocco and North Yemen supported Iraq, Syria and Libya for their 
own reasons, sided with Iran. Algeria, showed neutrality and offered her good will for 
mediation. Despite this division, the Secretary General of the Arab League was able to 
announce a cease-fire and normalization of relations and non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of each other. Immediately, Iran warned the Arab Gulf countries, through various 
channels, to stay out of the war. In response to this threat, the six rulers of the Arab Gulf 
states, on May 21, 1981, established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GC) for mutual 
defence, peace and security in the area. 
' ' R.K. Ramzani, 'Iran's Islamic Revolutions and the Persian Gulf, Current History, January 1985, p. 6. 
'* Ibid, p. 5. 
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The same year, one leading Iranian clergy, Ayatollah Ruhani, threatened to lead a 
revolutionary movement for the annexation of Bahrain, adopted an Islamic form of 
Government similar to that or Iran. The Arab leaders protested which promoted Prime 
Minister Mehdi Bazargan to deny responsibility for such an "unauthorized" statement.^ ^ 
Again in 1981, Iran was accused of siding a coup plot in Bahrain and other Gulf states. 
Iran also was accused of multiple bombings in Kuwait in December 1983. The GCC 
members sent a strong message protesting that Iran was behind all the sabotage. In a 
press conference held in Bahrain, the Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif Ibn Abdul Aziz, 
said: "I hope that this conspiracy against Bahrain will bring to light matters which might 
be known to the security apparatuses in the area and will confirm the intentions which 
Iran's current ruling regime has. We had hoped that Iran, our neighbour and friend, 
would not have such intentions. But after what has happened in Bahrain, our hopes have 
unfortunately been dashed, and it has become clear to us that Iran has become a source of 
danger and harm to Gulf nations and their security. At the very beginning of their 
revolutions, the men in power in Iran said that they would not be policeman of the Gulf. 
Iran previously considered itself to be the policeman of the Gulf, but even in those days 
there did happen what is happening today, because of the setions of the men currently in 
power in Iran who have said that they are hoisting the honor of Islam and consider that 
their policy is being guided by the Islamic faith. But now we find that they have violated 
Islam by doing harm to (other) Muslims. If they are true Muslims, then let them fight 
alongside the Afghan people to defend Islam in Afghanistan".^* 
These words brought the tension much deeper between Iran and GCC. During the 
closing session of Global Congress of the world's Friday prayer leaders held at Teheran 
in May 1983, Khomeini told the leaders, "You should call on people to rebel like Iran". 
Also the political demonstrations of about 100,000 or so Iranians on their pilgrimage to 
Mecca, shouting slogans in 1981, was quite distasteful to Saudi Arabia. Khomeini also 
charged the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) on September 
20, 1983, "To aim to form an Islamic government and to implement God's commands in 
Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, Prager Fall Ewinter, 1989, p. 130. 
Sadia, Al Majallah, Arabic, London, England, Saudi Research and Marketing Ltd., September 13-9, 
1981,p. 11. 
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Iraq'.'"' Thus the Gulf saw Khomeini as a more formidable threat to them than the Shah 
of Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. 
For the first time since its revolution, Iran gave a new thrust to its foreign policy 
in different directions in the Gulf as well as in Central, South and East Asian regions. 
Iran initiated its di9plomatic drive for strengthening its bridges with the Arab 
Sheikhdoms.™ An envoy of President Rafsanjani toured the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states' capitals canvassing for the proposal that the Gulf littoral states form a 
common market as a prelude to some kind of security understanding. The Iranian please 
that the security of the Gulf region should be the exclusive responsibility of the littoral 
states an d that extra regional powers must withdraw and not meddle in this region's 
affair were brushed aside.'°' Although a few states were willing to bolster relations with 
Iran, most of them also saw a link between such a rapprochement and the extent to which 
Tehran could be persuaded to live with the embryonic security structure which was 
essentially pro-West. There was little prospect of breakthrough as even the most 
"liberal" and "moderate" leaders in Tehran could not reconcile to the idea.'°^ 
Although their bilateral relations were restored in March 1991, the element of 
mutual suspicion and apprehension still lingered between Iran and Saudi Arabia which 
blunted Iran's moves in the Gulf. The pitch was further queered for Iran when in mjid-
1992, its long-standing dispute with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) put into could 
storage in 1971, heated up again. "'^  Two views could be held about it. One that it was a 
purely bilateral dispute revived because of local factors such as some sheikhdoms getting 
sensitized to Iran's armaments or Iran attempting to probe into the GCC solidarity, 
capabilities and intentions after their recent security arrangements and those of their 
'^ R.K. Ramzani, 'Iran's Islamic Revolutions and the Persian Gulf, Op.cit, P. 7. 
'°° For the comprehensive essay, see M.E. Ahrari, Iran, GCC and the Security dimensions in the Persian 
Gulf, in Amirahmadi and Entessar, n. 10, pp. 193-21. 
"" Pradoxically, ,this was the precise policy the Shah followed for a decade and it was accepted by all the 
lower Gulf states and even blessed by the United States. 
'°^ Nadim Jaber, 'Conflicting Visions', Middle East International, London, No. 413, November 2, 1991, 
p. 13. 
'"' For analytical accounts, see A.H.H. Abidi, 'Changing Politico-Security profile in the Persian Gulf. 
Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, September 1993, and Sreedhar, 'Iranian action in Abu Musa', Strategic 
Analysis, November, 1992. 
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Western allies. The other that it was deliberately precipitate(f%(^isTi!||ip"Jtprpa^krfriran 
under invisible extra regional prompting. Either view led to different scenarios prospects. 
While the Arab states adopted a firm position in three for a,"^ '* the US stance seemed 
equivocal. On the one hand, it described Iran's action in Abu Musa as "high handed" 
and, on the other, it advised its GCC partners to exhaust all peaceful means and opposed 
any resort to military force by either side.' ^ Moreover, the Acting Secretary of State, 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, made an oblique gesture to Iran when he stated that the United 
States "would not go into the issue of where sovereignty lies with regard to the disputed 
island". "^ ^ It did not cut much ice and the issue again became dormant since 1992. 
Not being able to secure a formal endorsement of its position by the GCC states, 
Iran turned towards cultivating closer relations with the newly emancipated states in its 
north. Iran also floated the larger idea of coalescence among the three civilizations of 
Asia, namely China, India and Iran. Rafsanjani emphasized the need for developing 
friendly relations with outranged states whereas the United Stats government remained 
the "villain" and "evil power", certain other European states were seen as benign with 
who Iran could cultivate relations on a level of national interest and mutual advantage.'"** 
Shortly after the ceasefire agreement with Iraq, Iran embarked on an 
unprecedented arms acquisition programme, "^ ^ which according to the Foreign Minister, 
Ali Akbar Vilayati was "for our own defence". Iran acquired arms from a variety of 
source. In addition to conventional weapons, Iran showed keen interest in seeking and 
developing chemical and nuclear weapons as well. Iran's spree raised the eyebrows of 
Western powers and the United States in particular created problems for, and put pressure 
on Iran. Iran's president efforts to acquire nuclear technology became cause of concern 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
The Gulf Cooperation Council the League of Arab States, and the Damascus Decriaration States, GC 
plus Egypt and Syria. 
Wireiess File, New Delhi, USIS, September 24, 1992, p. 4. 
Ibid, September 26, 1992, p. 7, Tehran Times, September 27, 1992. 
It was raked up early in March 194 whe4n the Foreign Minister of three countries had their 
coincidental, 'meeting in Tehran'. The Iranian considered the event as "significant". 
The Times of India, New Delhi, April 16, 1992. 
James Adams, Tehran's arms buying alms Washington", The Sunday Times, London, as reproduced in 
the Times of India, June 5, 1992. 
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to the Clinton Administration. Besides, Russia and China, the United States cautioned 
some other states"° against dealing with Iran in this respect. The Administration 
concluded that the leadership of Iran (Iraq) will remain hostile to the US aims for the 
foreseeable future and hence certain non-military measure should be taken to isolate and 
weaken both the countries. Thus, in terms of the policy of "Strategic dual containment", 
the new approach was to ensnare both the countries in a tight web of international trade 
and fiscal restrictions aimed at depriving them of the income and technology necessary 
for strengthening their economy and boosting armament.'" 
Thus Iran's foreign policy in the post revaluation era has to rely on the support of 
Arab Shiites (in Lebanon, Iraqi cities and Gulf emirates), among the Persian speaking 
Shiites of Afghanistan and among the Shiites of Pakistan and to a lesser extent, of India 
even though none of these groups is wholly pro-Iranian. The Gulf States saw their local 
Shiite communities as in Iranian fifth column. 
Ever since the revolution of July 1958, Iraq has been steadily moving away from 
the west. The process started with the Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact (1959) 
culminated in the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship in 1972. 
Correspondingly, in the domestic field also, the Bath developed closer alliance with the 
left wing parties, namely the Communist Party and Kurdush Democratic Party (KDP). In 
cooperation with the National Liberation Front of South Yemen, Baghdad envisaged to 
extend the influence of Arab radicalism right up to the Gulf of Oman by giving active 
support to the Dhofari insurrectionists in the Sultanate of Oman. Iraq also mounted its 
pressure on Saudi Arabia against the latter's closer links with the United States. 
Iraq (a relations with Iran also deteriorated in the seventies over Shatt al-Arab 
when the Shah of Iran unilaterally abrogating the Treaty of 1937 started giving arms and 
training to Kurdish insurgent in northern Iraq. Baghdad retaliated by claiming 
sovereignty over the Iranian province of KuSszitan and expelling al large number of 
Iranian residents from its territory. 
' ' They included the United Kingdom. France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan and India. 
The new strategy was disclosed by Martin S. Indyk, senior director for Near East, South Asian Affairs 
in the National Security Council, The Times of India, May 26, 1998. 
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The massive arms build up in Iran by the Unitd States also contributed to the 
deterioration in the relations between Iraq and Iran. In December 1974, Iran short down 
two Iraqi fighter planes by means of Am3rican-made Hawk missiles. This turned the 
Iraqi fury towards all the pro-American traditional monarchies of the region. The Algiers 
Agreement of 1975, concluded between the two hostile neighbours was largely an 
outcome of the effort of the OPAEC members who desired to miligate Iraq's anti-
westemism by pacifying it through this Treaty. The Algiers Agreement brought about a 
marked change in Ira's attitude towards Iran and other Gulf states but the Shia revolution 
of Khomeini totally annulled its accomplishments. 
The Iraq-Iran war which broke out in September 1980 has restored Iraq's relations 
with the Gulf States. The Islamic regimes of the Gulf, notwithstanding Iraq's radicalism, 
maintained complete solidarity with the Bath regime by extending financial and political 
support to it. However, Saddam Hussein ambition to gain an upper hand in the Gulf and 
his consequent adventure to occupy Kuwait and its oil wealth alienated powerful Gulf 
States from Iraq. 
Thus uncertainties surrounding the behaviour Iraq and Iran, add and to the shaky 
political and security environment in the region. Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam 
Hussein, has proven to be a source of aggression and instability. Even worse, his 
departure might result in disintegration within Iraq and more instability in the region. On 
the other side, Iraq, the largest and most populous country on the Gulf, has not been fully 
integrated in the regional system since revolution in 1979. 
The security dilemma resulted in the Gulf states can be demonstrated by 
examining the military, economic and demographic constraints, as set out in the Table. "^ 
112 Columns 1,2,3 and 6: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 194-195, 
London: Brasey's 1994. pp. 124-140. 
Coumns 4 and 5: The European World Year Book 194, London, Europa Publications, 195, pp. 456, 
256,3011. 
Column 7, James Finn (ed.) Freedom in the World, New York: Freedom House, 1994, pp. 136, 311, 
439,484, 564. 
a. In both Iran and Iraq the percentage of expatriates is insignificant. 
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Table GCC States, Demographic, Military Economic Features 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bahrain 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
S.Arabia 
UAE 
00.56 
65.00 
20.00 
01.70 
02.00 
00.59 
18.20 
02.40 
68 
a 
a 
39 
73 
25 
69 
24 
32 
a 
a 
61 
27 
75 
31 
76 
40 
04 
45 
70 
b 
85 
85 
80 
60 
90 
5 
30 
10 
15 
15 
20 
008,100 
513,000 
382,000 
016,600 
042,900 
010,100 
004,000 
061,500 
10,706 
03.253 
03,508 
15,178 
09,972 
1,400 
10,989 
16753 
1 = Population in millions 
3 = Percentage of expatriates 
5 = Percentage of Shi'is Muslims 
6 = 1993 Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) (PPPs are real GDP per capital) 
2 = Percentage of national 
4 = Percentage of Sunni Muslims 
5 = Total Armed Forces 
The Table shows the wide gap between the six Gulf monarchies and their two 
neighbors - Iraq and Iran - in terms of both financial wealth, measured by Purchasing 
Power Parities, and military Power measured by total number of armed forces. In 
addition, the figures show the small and divided population pool these Gulf monarchies 
have. No wonder that security has been significant concern for all the sates within and 
outside the region. For the past several years GCC states have pursued a complex 
b. In Oman 90% of the population profess the Ibadi sect of Islam which rejects both Sunnism and 
Shi'ism. 
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defense strategy with three interconnected dimension: self-reliance, regional balancing 
and growing depency on Western Powers. 
The Gulf War established the indispensability of U.S. for the security of the GCC 
states. This belief was reinforced in October 1994, when Iraq mobilized its forced close 
to the Kuwaiti borders. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other four states have sought to 
cement their relations with Western Powers, Particularly United States, Britain and 
France. Has been translated into security agreements between the Western Powers and 
number of GCC states. Another area of cooperation has been regular joint military 
exercises. Even more important are the huge arms deals which tie the prosperity of 
Western economics to the security of Gulf monarchies. 
Saudi Arabia had led the way. During the 1980s Riyadh was the largest single 
buyer on the international arms market. From 1989 till 1993, the Kingdom spent 
US$8,039 million, making it the third leading recipient of major conventional weapons in 
the world. UAE was number 17, spending US$ 2,491 million on weapons and Kuwait 
number 21 spending US$ 2,308 million."'' Early in 1993, King Fahd announced that 
Saudi defense spending would rise by 9% and Kuwait earmarked some US$12 billion for 
weapons purchases over the next decade."'* 
The Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War moved the balance of power in the Gulf in favour 
of Iran, which then embarked on ambitious efforts to re-assert itself as an important 
regional power. In line with this policy, Iran has since 1992 reinforced its claims to three 
small islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa, The Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb. The GCC 
states rejected the Iranian claims; in response Iran unilaterally extended its territorial 
waters to a 12 - mile limit, placing all three islands well within its redefined territorial 
sovereignty. The significance of these islands is that they give Iran more control of the 
Strait of Hormuz, a waterway that handles one fifth of the world's oil production. In 
"^  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, 194, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1994, p.485. 
"" International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Surx'ey, 193-194, London, Brasaey's 1994, p. 
143. 
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addition, unconfirmed reports of the Iranian nuclear program have increased the 
uncertainty of security arrangements in the Gulf. Against all the odds, President Saddam 
Hussein is still in power. Since the early 1990s Iraq, under his leadership has been 
reintegrated into the Gulf system. The rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have asserted 
their distrust of the Iraqi president and have given political and financial support to 
various opposition groups to overthrow him. 
Seventeen years after the revolution, the Islamic republic in Iran shows no signs 
of collapsing."^ The regime has survived the defeat in the war against Iraq and the death 
of its founder Khomeini among other challenges. The 'dual containment' strategy has 
failed to overthrow the Islamic regime in Tehran. In 1994 Japan and the EU countries 
agreed to reschedule most of Iran's debts. Both Russia and China agreed to support the 
Iranian nuclear program in 195, despite of strong US pressure. In 194 Exxon, Texaco 
and Mobil together brought US$3.5 billion worth of Iranian crude oil for resale to 
customers in Latin America and Asia."^ 
It appears that United States and Britain are moving alone in trying to isolate Iraq 
and Iran. Russia, China, Japan, France, Germany and other countries are gradually 
pushing for an approach of 'constructive engagement'. France, Russia and China are also 
eager to resume trade with Iraq. To sum up. President Hussein has survived the defeat 
and is gaining power, or at least is not growing weaker. This is perceived by United 
States, as well as by other countries, as a threat to the Gulf region. 
' " In December 1994 an intelligence analysis prepared by the Clinton Administration concluded that 
Iran's Government is durable, and that neither isolation nor embrace by the outside world is likely to 
overturn it. See David E. Sanger, Fear, Inflation and Graft Feed Disillusion Among Iranians'. New 
York Times, May 30, 1995, p. 1. 
Economist, 'Iran and America: A Convemenl Marriage", Vol. 334, No. 7903, February, \95, p. 43. 
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CHAPTER III 
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL CONGFLICTS 
The United Nations is the device the victorious nations in the World War II 
established in 1945 to secure world public order peace and security. The first declared 
objective of the UN is 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and towards this end to unite 
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance 
of principles and institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be used, save in 
common interest...' To attain these goals the Charter, laid down some prescriptions and 
set up an enforcement machinery. 
The prescriptions are contained principally in Article 2 Clauses (3) and (4). The 
Members are required to settle their international dispute by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice, are not endangered. These are 
further required to refrain from in their international relations from threat to use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations'. 
The machinery consists of the Security Council, the General Assembly and 
Regional Organisations. The Security Council is vested with the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is vested, as is well known, 
with two types of competences, firstly, to act to settle international disputes or situations 
the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security; and secondly to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, and to recommend or decide on measures of maintain or 
restore international peace and security. 
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Broadly speaking, the dispute settlement under the auspices of the United Nations 
is made possible through proceedings which may com e into being in the following ways: 
a) Through the initiative of the Security Council; 
b) Through the initiative of any Member State; 
c) Through the initiative of a non-Member State; 
d) By virtue of the mandatory provisions of the Charter; 
e) Through the mutual request of the parties to disputes; and 
f) Settlement through other agencies. 
Through the Initiative of the Security Council 
Chapter 4 of the charter of the United Nations, which deals with pacific settlement 
of disputes, gives the security council powers, under Article 34, to investigate any dispute 
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in 
order to determine whether the continuance of such dispute or situation is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Further, under Article 36, the Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of 
the nature referred to in Article 33, namely, disputes continuance of which is likely to 
endanger international peace and security, recommend, but not order, appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment at its own initiative, keeping of course, in view, as 
required under Article 36(3), that while making recommendations under this Article the 
Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a rule 
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. Besides, by virtue of its 
powers under Article 24 of the UN Charter, in the form of "primary responsibility for 
maintenance of internationals peace and security" the Security Council can, either on a 
request from a disputant party, or its own initiative, use its "good offices" or "mediation", 
as it in fact did in case of the Indonesian Conflict in 1947. 
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Article 33 of the UN Charter stipulate that: 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is hkely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their 
choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, ell upon the parties to settle 
their disputes by such means. 
These provisions indicate that the choice of the appropriate procedure lies with 
the parties and as such they make use of any of the procedures laid down in Article 33(1) 
for the pacific settlement of their disputes. Thus, under Article 33(2) the Security 
Council can, and therefore, shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle 
their disputes by such means as enumerated in Article 33(1). 
Through the Initiative of any Member State 
Under Article 35(1) of the UN Charter "any Member of the UN may bring any 
dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the 
Security Council or the General Assembly." 
Thus, the provisions of Article 35(1) are wide enough to entitle "Member" to take 
initiative in this respect irrespective of the fact whether that member is a party to such a 
dispute or not. 
Through the Initiative of Non-Member State 
Article 35 clause (2) provides that: 
"A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the 
Security Council or the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts 
in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligation of pacific settlement provided in 
the present charter." 
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The provisions of clause (2) of Article 35 differ from the provisions of clause (1) 
of that Article in this respect that under the clause (1), a Member State can take the 
initiative irrespective of the fact whether Member State is party to such a dispute or not 
whereas under clause (2), a non-member State is entitled to make such a move only then 
if it itself is a party to such a dispute. Further, a non-member state has to accept in 
advance, for the purpose of the said dispute, the obligation of pacific settlement provided 
in the charter, before it takes such an initiative."'" 
By virtue of the Mandatory Provisions of the Charter 
1. "Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fails to settle 
it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security 
Council." 
2. "if the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide 
whether to take action under Article 36 or to recomme4nd such terms of 
settlement as it may consider appropriate." 
The provisions of Article 37 are mandatory and they contain the obligation of the 
parties to compulsorily refer a dispute to the Security Council as well as the powers of the 
Security Council to make recommendations if the circumstances of the dispute are such 
that the provisions of this Article can be invoked. 
'" Just like the right of a non-member state, under Article 35(2), the General Assembly and the Secretary 
General are given a right under Articles 11, (3) and 9, respectively, to bring to the attention of the 
Security Council, "Situation" or "any matter", respectively if such "situation" or "any matter" are 
likely to endanger or may threaten "international peace and security." 
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Through Mutual Request of the Parties to a Dispute 
Article 38 states that: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all 
the parties to any dispute request, make recommendations to the parties with a vies to a 
pacific settlement of the dispute. 
The Action of the Security Council in the form of recommendations etc., under 
this Article is dependent upon the factum of agreement of all the parties to make requests 
to the Security Council. If all the parties do not join in such a request then the Security 
Council may move under the provisions of any other Article, e.g.; Article 36, etc.; but it 
cannot move under Article 38 in the absence of the element of mutuality, of all the 
parties, in the said request. 
Settlement through other Agencies: 
Article 33 makes provision that the parties to any dispute the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall 
seek a solution through means enumerated in the said Article. Along with other means of 
settlement there is a mention of the means of "resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements." 
Besides Article 33 there are also some other provisions of the Charter, which 
contain such references. Article 52(3), for instance provides that: 
3 "The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of 
local disputes through such regional arrangement s or by such regional agencies 
either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security 
Council." 
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In the light of these provisions, or otherwise, some regional organisations have 
emerged within the community of States and these organisations have created some 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising among the member states with reference 
to the field covered within the framework of the respective organisations. Some of these 
arrangements or development are: 
i) The Pact of Arab League of 2-3-1945."^ 
ii) The Treaty of Brussels for Economic, Social and Cultural cooperation 
of 17-3-1948."'' 
iii) The Inter-American Treaty of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 3-4-
1948 (Bogota Pact).'^" 
iv) The European Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 29-
4-1957.'^' 
v) The European Community for Coal and Steal, The European Atom 
Community (EUR ATOM), The European Economic Community 
(EEC) and The Court of European Community, 
vi) The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of 25-5-
1963.'^^ 
It is evident from chapter IV that the Gulf region is infested with internecine 
conflicts among its member states on one or the other issue. However, the magnitude of 
these conflicts is localized. There are a few major conflicts like the Arab-Israel, Iraq-Iran 
and Iraq-Kuwait that have acquired global dimensions and reached the UN. This chapter 
will document the role of UN in the two major conflicts of the region viz; Arab-Israel and 
Iraq-Iran. A separate chapter is devoted to the UN role in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. 
' " US Department of State Publication 646, 1243 ff, (1957). 
' " 2 B.G. Bl, Bundesesetzblatt, 256, 195. 
''" UN Text Book, 1954, 385 ff. 
'^' 2B.G. Bl. 81 ff, 1961. 
'^ ^ 2 Archive des Veolkerrecht, 318 ff. 
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The Arab-Israel Conflict 
For several decades, the Palestinian Question and the conflict in West Asia 
remain a moot question both in the United Nations and the nations of the world. It 
remained a source of international tension and a threat to world peace and security. Ever 
since its creation the United Nations has been concerned with this issue. The partition 
Plan marked the beginning of a meddling process of the UN in the Palestinian problem. 
Earnest Begin, then British Foreign Secretary, on 18 February 1947 in the House of 
Commons said "His Majesty's government saw no prospect for a settlement of the 
problem of Palestine, and had no choice but to submit the whole problem of Palestine to 
the United Nations."'^^ On, 2 April 1947 the British representative. Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, wrote a letter to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nation, Victor Chi 
Tsai Hoo, requesting him: 
To place the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the General Assembly at its 
next regular annual session to sum on, as soon as possible, a special session of the 
General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to 
prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly.'^ "* 
A special session of the UN General Assembly took place on 27 April 1947. The 
special session of the UN General Assembly discussed the question of the future 
government of Palestine. The United Nations special commission on Palestine submitted 
its report in September 1947. The report offered two plans, a majority and minority plan. 
The majority plan proposed the termination of mandate, the partition of Palestine and the 
creation of an Arab State, a Jewish State and special international regime for the city of 
Jerusalem to be administered by the UN. The Arab and Jewish states were to be lined by 
an economic union. The minority plan also suggested termination of the mandate, but 
favored the setting up of a federal state and Jewish State with Jerusalem as the capital. 
'"•' UK House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 433, Col. 1938 
''•* Un Document A/364 
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Despite Arab opposition the General Assembly adopted on 29 November 1947, 
by a vote of 33 to 13 with 1 abstentions, a resolution for the partition of Palestine 
basically along with proclaiming the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, when the British 
Mandate lapsed. The British withdrew their forces without making any arrangement for 
maintaining the law and order. The Arabs were determined to fight the division of their 
land. The Palestine Commission appointed by the UN General Assembly was convened 
to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine. Discussion in this 
session revealed at a number of states had by now revised their opinion about the 
durability of partition of Palestine. The UN General Assembly met on 4 May 1948, the 
last day of British mandate and adopted Resolution 186-S-2, which in effect annulled the 
earlier (dubious) partition recommendation and appointed a UN mediator to virtually run 
the country and try to reach a peaceful adjustment of the Culture situation of Palestine. 
On May 1948, the Security Council accepted Israel's application for admission to 
the United Nations. A wee later, the General Assembly also passed a resolution - GA 
Resolution 273 (III) - and granted Israel the membership in the United Nations. The 
Israeli representative had given assurance that Israel would observe the principles of the 
UN Charter and would implement its resolutions without invoking the claim of domestic 
jurisdiction. The UN General Assembly resolution admitting Israel had made specific 
reference to those assurances and to the fundamental resolutions. It said: 
"Noting.... The declaration by the declaration by the State of Israel that is 
unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes 
to honor them from the day the it becomes a member of the United Nations." 
Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking 
note of the declaration and explanations made by the representatives of the Government 
of Israel before the adhoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the 
said resolutions. 
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"The General Assembly.... Decides to admit Israel to membership in the United 
Nations." 
The consequence of the establishment of Israel in Palestine against the opposition 
of the Palestinian Arab majority widened into a broader Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1956 
Suez War was one outcome of this dispute, although not directly involving the Palestine 
issue or territory. The Arab-Israel war of June 1967, however, brought immediate and 
direct repercussions on the Palestine question. Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza 
strip and East Jerusalem as well as territories beyond the control far more than the area 
claimed by the World Zionist Organisation in 1919, except for the East Bank of the 
Jordan. 
The great majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were made 
refugees-may for the second time, having sought refugee in these areas during the first 
exodus of 1948 those that stayed in Israeli occupied territory after 1967 came to form a 
new category distinct from those within Israel's pre-1967 borders, who were entitled to 
Israeli citizenship. The new class was one of a people under foreign military occupation, 
subject to military rule, its repercussions and its consequences for the suppression of civil 
liberties and rights. 
An uneasy peace had been maintained since 1956 with the help of the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and after 1967 peacekeeping responsibilities were 
assumed by the Unit Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO). 
Immediately after the cease-fire of June 1967, the Security Council unanimously passed 
resolution 237 from the United Nations. Standpoint, Resolution 242 was intended to 
establish a frame-work for peace in the Middle East. However, it did not explicitly 
mention Palestine the only cognizance of the underlying issue of Palestine was in the 
reference to "the refugee problem". Further, on the territorial plane, resolution 242, by 
calling on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 war borders. Implicity endorsed Israel's 
jurisdiction over the territory occupied by Israel in the 1948 war beyond the line laid 
down by the partition resolution. 
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Under Security Council Resolution 242, the Secretary General appointed 
Ambassador Jarring of Sweden as Special Representative in another United Nations 
effort to try and negotiate a Middle East settlement. Ambassador Jarring's attempts from 
1967 to 1970 to promote agreements on the basis of Resolution 242 did not succeed. In 
1971, in identical aide-memoire to Egypt and Israel, he proposed that they give 
simultaneous and reciprocal commitments subject to the eventual satisfactory 
determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement. Israel would give a commitment 
to withdraw its forces from occupied Egyptian territory to the former border between 
Egypt and mandate Palestine, and Egypt would give a commitment to enter into a peace 
treaty with Israel on certain explicit undertakings in relation to Resolution 242. Egypt 
agreed to give the commitment required if Israel would likewise give the commitments 
covering its own obligations. 
The Israeli response, without specific reference to the commitment requested 
from it, stated that it viewed favourably Egypt's expression of readings to enter into a 
peace agreement with Israel, and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful 
negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. 
Israel stated it would give an undertaking to withdraw its forces to secure regognized and 
agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdrew to 
the pre-5 June 1967 lines. The Jarring missions could not produce an agreed basis for 
discussions, and was suspended in 1972. 
On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armies simultaneously attacked 
Israel to get back the territories that they had lost in June 1967 the Security Council met 
ten time between 8 and 27 October to consider the West Asian situation. 
The debate in the council remained inconclusive till 20 October. Nothing 
tangable in the form of a cease-fire resolution was achieved, chiefly because of lack of 
consensus among members. At the same time, no initiative was taken to persuade either 
side to cease hostilities. Indeed there prevailed a feeling of frustration in the United 
Nations over the worldbody's inability to influence events. At last on 21 October, the 
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United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint resolution containing the basis of a 
cease-fire. This resolution was adopted as resolution, 338 (1973) by a vote of 14 to nil. 
(China did not participate in the vote). The Resolution called upon the parties concerned 
to stop the fighting to cease-fire and terminate all military activity within twelve hours 
and in the positions these parties occupied at the time of the adoption of resolution. The 
council also called upon them to start implementing Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its 
parts immediately. The Israeli representative demanded that cessation of military activity 
should also include the lifting of the blockade imposed by Yemen at the Bab-el Manadab 
Straits.'^^ 
The cease-fire arranged on 2 October was broken when Egyptian and Israeli 
clashed again on both sides of the Suez Canal. Resolutions 338 (1973) was incomplete in 
the sense that it did not link the call for a cease-fire with the means to ensure response to 
it, a weakness that Israel tried to exploit with a view to improving its military position. A 
second cease-fire was, therefore arranged on 23 October. The council adopted joint US-
Soviet draft resolution as resolution 339 (1973) by 14 votes to nil. China did not 
participate in voting. 
On the initiative of the non-aligned countries the Council adopted a resolution 340 
(1973) - following abortive and persistent Israeli attempts to invade the city of Suez and 
proceed to the West Bank of the Canal. 
In 1973, the General Assembly specially and strongly again endorsed the right of 
return of the Palestinian people, tracing it directly to resolution 194 (III) of twenty-five 
years earlier, declaring that the Assembly: 
"Declares that full respect for land realization of the inalienable rights of th4e 
people of Palestine, particularly its rights of self determination, are indispensable 
for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and that the 
enjoyment by the Palestine Arab refugees of their right to return to their homes and 
125 Official records of the Security Council (SCOR) yr 281, Col. 64-66. 
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property, recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 194 (III) of 1 
December 1948, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Assembly since that 
date, is indispendable for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee 
problem and for the exercise by the people of Palestine of its right to self-
determination."'^^ 
In 1975, reaffirming to the previous resolution, the General Assembly established 
127 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people. 
The Committee on Palestinian Rights presented its report in May 1976. 
The Committee's report was discussed by the Security Council in June 1976. A 
draft resolution was submitted affirming: 
"The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the 
right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." 
The resolution failed due to the negative vote of a permanent member (the USA). 
The Committee's report was endorsed by the General Assembly in November 
1976 and in December 1977 the Assembly on both occasions re-endorsed the right 
to return of Palestinian people. 
On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly adopted a resolution GA Resolution 
3210 (XXX)-recognising the PLO as the true representative of the Palestinian people. It 
'-* General Assembly Resolutions 3089 D (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 Votes: 87 in favour, 6 against, 
33 abstentions. 
' " General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XX) of 10 Novembe3r 1975 Votes: 90 in favour, 18 against, 27 
abstentions. 
'^ * General Assembly Resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976 Votes: 90 in favour, 16 against, 30 
abstentions. 
'^' General Assembly ResoMiom 32/40 of 15 December 1977. 
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authorized the PLO "to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the 
question of Palestine." 
On 13 November 1974, the Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, was invited to 
address the Assembly. In his speech Arafat declared that the United Nations had no 
authority to partition Palestine in 1947. The General Assembly partitioned what it had no 
right to divide- an "indivisible homeland". He concluded by saying that he had come 
bearing "an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not drop the olive branch." 
On 22 November the General Assembly adopted another resolution GA Resolution 
3236 (XXXIX) - which conceded to the Palestinians the "inalienable right to self-
determination, independence and national sovereignty." It declared that "the inalienable 
rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of 
Palestine." 
On the same day, by another resolution - GA Resolution 3237 (XXXIX) it 
accorded observations to the PLO in the General Assembly and at all international 
conference that might be convened under the UN auspices in the future. Thus the United 
Nations sought to correct and make amends or the error it had committed when deciding 
on partition of Palestine and on 29 June 1976 the Security Council considered a draft 
resolution taking note of the report of the committee and affirming the inalienable rights 
of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right 
to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, an accordance with the UN 
Charter. 
On 13 November 1974 Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, addressed the General Assembly. In his speech he directly addressed the 
question of the terrorist image of the PLO. 
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"Those who calls us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering 
the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the 
terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence." 
"I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty 
over its own land. 
Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not 
let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my 
hand. 
War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be bom."' 
As its thirtieth session in 1975, the General Assembly requested the Security 
Council to act to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights. The Assembly 
also called for the participant of the PLO, on an equal footing with other parties, in all 
negotiations on the Middle East held under UN auspices, requesting the Secretary-
General to make effort to secure the invitation of the PLO to the Peace Conference on the 
Middle East (first convened at Geneva in December 1973). 
Further in another resolution, the General Assembly expressed its concern and 
established the committee on the Exercise for the inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
people.'''^ 
Ambassador Medoune Fall of Senegal, Chairman of the Committee, "... (the 
committee's) mandate was not to deal with Middle East question in its entirely, but, 
rather, to seek ways and means of implementing the inalienable rights of Palestinian 
people. In other words, the task of our committee consists, above all, in righting the basic 
imbalance which has always characterized the various United Nations approaches to 
'^ ^ DocumentA/PV.2282, pp. 31ff. 
'•" United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975. 
'^ ^ United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975. 
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Palestine, to redress that regrettable imbalance and to give the Palestine question its 
rightful place and its true dimension....".'^'' 
The Chairman stressed that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people had 
been recognized by most countries adding that: 
"Israel's right to exist is no longer challenged by anyone. But Israel in turn must 
recognize the legitimate rights of its neighbours. The world is now thirsting for peace 
and security Israel has no right to continue to pose constant threats to the very 
survival of our planet..."'^'' 
However, the Security Council adjourned the discussion without taking any 
action. 
The Camp David 
In the mean time Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem on 19 
November 1997 this visit by the head of state of the largest Arab country to Israel, with 
which it had been at war for 30 years had the effect of bombshell in the Middle East. In 
his address to the Knesset on 20 November he outlined two basic points of his peace 
proposal: 
(i) Total Israeli withdrawal from Arab lanes occupied in 1967. Such withdrawal, 
he said, being "elementary, not negotiable and not subject to argument." 
(ii) Realization of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their self-
determination, including the establishment of their own state. 
In the negotiations that followed between Begin the Sadat, a complete deadlock 
occurred on the question of Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Sadat declared: 
Egypt will insist on Israel's withdrawal from 'every inch of Sinai', on the dismantling of 
133 
' ' United Nations Document S/PV. 2041, p. 8. 
" Jbid,p. 11. 
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every Jewish settlement' established there and on the departure of 'every Israeli settler' 
from Egyptian territory. 
To which begin retorted in Shylock fashion that Israel would not return 'one grain 
of sand' of Sinia without receiving value in return and would maintain its settlements and 
settlers. In the face of this impasse, US President Jimmy Carter offered his service as a 
mediator and invited the two men to come to Camp David to negotiate under his 
patronage. During two weeks of seclusion and intense negotiations the three protagonists 
developed what they thought to be a suitable terrain for compromise: Palestinian rights 
and territory in consideration for withdrawal from Sinai. This formula inspired the Camp 
David Accords which were signed on 17 September 1978 and embodied a framework for 
peace in the West Bank and Gaza as well as provision for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty that followed and was signed on 26 March 1979. The Camp David Accords were 
denounced and declared invalid in several resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN 
as being inconsistent with the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. 
The General Assembly of the UN proclaimed the invalidity of the Camp David 
Accords. In its resolution 33/28 of 7 December 1978 the General Assembly declared in 
paragraph 4 that: 
"The validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that 
they lie within the frame work of the United Nations and its Charter and its 
resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national 
independence and sovereignty in Palestine and with the participation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization." 
This was followed by resolutions 34/65 of 29 November 1979 in which the 
General Assembly declared in paragraph 4 that, "The Camp David Accords and other 
agreements have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967." Resolution 34/65 was reaffirmed 
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by the General Assembly on 16 December 1981 in its resolutid^6/l20vE.wliieh^feieol^d 
any accords that ignore, infringe, violate or deny the inalienable rigntS^iteParestinian 
people, including the rights of return, self-determination, national independence and 
sovereignty in Palestine. 
With the Intifadah, Israel's perception of its security environment slowly began to 
change. It realised that its internal security problems could wrench the country apart 
unless solutions were found for dealing with violence and the political sources of 
Palestinian discontent. And in 1988, when Iraq defeated Iran, it received a further shock. 
Israel feared the Arab world would fall under the spell of Saddam Hussein and sure 
enough during the spring of 1990, Saddam's rhetoric against Israel found a receptive 
audience in Arab capitals. 
In order to crush the uprising thousands of Israeli forces, military vehicles, 
armoured Vehicles, helicopters and light planes were employed in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The Zionist repression meted out to the Palestinian included measures such as 
demolishing houses, beating the curfew breakers, breaking the bones of the 
demonstrators, harassing the inhabitants and deporting the people. 
In November 1988, some 90 nations formally recognised the existence of the state 
of Palestine and the US entered into a dialogue with PLO, now recognised as the sole 
representative of as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In December, 
Yasser Arafat announced his support for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and accepted the right of Israel to exist. The talks lasted till June 1990, but broke off 
because the PLO refused to condemn terrorist attacks on Israel. 
A whole realignment of the geographical situation also brought about change in 
attitudes among the political elite in the region. With the end of super-power rivalry 
Israel realised it could not continue its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan 
Heights without creating some friction with Washington. And finally in 1990, Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait created new dangers for Israel as both Jordan and the PLO tilted 
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towards Saddam. Though Saddam was defeated by the Allied forces, Israel's inability to 
defend itself against Scud bombardment during the war made it conscious of its own 
vulnerabilities. The United Nations stand was very clear. The first resolution of the 
Security Council when the intifadah commenced, disapproved Israeli policies and its 
exercises which were nothing but violation of Human rights of the Palestinian people in 
the occupied lands. The UN resolution 605 which was issued on 12.12.1987 mentioned 
specifically the shooting incidents by the Israeli Army which led to the killing and 
injuring of a large number of the unarmed Palestinian civilians. 
The Israeli Prime Minister, Izhaq Shamir was against this resolution. Shamir 
during his discussion with US expressed fear of reaching a mediator solution which will 
prevent US from voting. Shamir also announced that the refusal of the US to use its veto 
power will encourage the extremist at real. However, it voted in favour of the second 
resolution 607 which was passed on 5.01.1988 this resolution 607 called upon authorities 
in the occupied territory to stop the forced immigration of the Palestinians and asked 
them to stay committed to their responsibilities mentioned in the Geneva Agreement of 
1949 which is related to the security of the civilians under occupation. 
In the meantime the Secretary General of the UN as per resolution No. 605 
authorised Assistant Secretary General of the UN Mark Golding, to prepare a report on 
the situation in the occupied lands. He was appointed on 12.01.1988 and very soon he 
started his work. But Mark Golding was prevented from his duty. The Israeli Army tried 
to make his task difficult from entering the Gabalia camp, and Al-Shaten in Gaza Strip. 
The reason given was that the first camp was in a military zone, and in the area of second 
camp, prohibition orders were in effect. But Golding reached the conclusion at the end of 
his task that the Palestinian actually hated occupation. He exposed further that his 
impression of 20 years of occupation made the situation unbearable.'^^ 
Even in the presence of Golding in the occupied territory the Zionist state violated 
the Security Council Resolution 607 and removed four more Palestinians from the 
135 The Hindu, New Delhi, 15 January 1988. 
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occupied lands. The Security Council issued resolution 608 on 15.01.1988 with 14 votes 
in favour and the US abstaining which asked the authorities in the occupied area to cancel 
the orders of the removal of civilians and to return those who were sent out.'"*^ 
The Israeli authorities in occupied areas adopted a new method to freeze the 
Palestinian people uprising. They adopted the hunger siege method as a means of 
freezing uprising. At that time the Attorney General of the International Agency for 
Relief Word (UNRWA) warned that the dis-continuation of the supply to the area would 
lead to actual starvation of children and elderly women and men.'^ ^ 
The UN Secretary General prepared a detailed report to put it forward to the 
Security Council on the prevailing situation in the occupied territory on 22.01.1988. " 
In this report the main thrust was on the ways and methods of securing safety to the 
civilians under Israeli occupation. It also reiterated the need to implement the Geneva 
Agreement of 1949. Despite efforts and numerous resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations, regrettably, all these remained unimplemented. In an era when most nations 
have attained freedom, the Palestinians continue to live under Israeli occupation. 
Resolution 181 of 20 November 1947 had set up a Jewish state and an Arab state. 
Whereas, Israel has been created the Arab state of Palestine has still not come into 
existence. 
The Iraq - Iran Conflict 
From 1929 to 1958 relations between Iran and Iraq were stable, as both regimes 
were monarchies, despite their old conflict which they inherited from the Ottoman 
Empire. But after the revolution of 1958 which brought a military regime to power in 
Iraq, the direction of Iraq's domestic and foreign policy changed. During this period, the 
relations between the two countries sunk to its lowest point, and even in 1968 by the 
coming of the Arab Baath Party, relations became worse, because Iran escalated its 
'•^ * The Times of India, New Delhi, 17 January 1988. 
'^ ^ See John and Jonet Wallach, Arafat, Heirman, London, 1991. 
"'^ UN Document. 
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support to the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. However, in March 1975, the mediation 
by several leaders, especially Algerian President Boumedian, led to the signing of the 
treaty know as the Algiers Accord. But this compromise did not last long. On September 
17, Saddam Hussein abrogated this treaty in response to kan's provocation and military 
skirmishes along the Iran-Iraq frontiers, and on September 22, 1980, a full-scale war 
started with Iraqi forces invading Iran. 
Ideological rivalry has always been and explosive issue between the two 
countries. Each side is driven by a set of goals: Iran by Shiite revivalism and Iraq by 
secular Islam, striving towards Arab destiny. This rivalry opted radical Arab socialism, 
including Ba'thism against the Shah who, as defender and protector of the regional status 
quo was determined to prevent the Iraqi influence and power throughout the Gulf region. 
With the success of the Iranian revolution, the ideological debate reached a severe 
intensity under its spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who branded Ba'thism as a 
Satanic philosophy and who swore to destroy it and Saddam Hussein. Khomeini, like the 
Shah before him, declared himself under the Shia banner, a champion of Iranian 
supremacy driven by a religious ideology to achieve domination of his nation. 
Another factor in the war was the existence of a large Shia population in southern 
Iraq, Khomeini banked on the call on the Iraqi army to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Shia 
militants in Iraq were executed and 40 thousand Shia of Iranian origin were deported and 
expelled from Iraq. Relations between the two countries became intense and the conflict 
became imminent in September 1980. 
Besides, the Iranian revolution was the single most important event that led th 
way to war. With the coming of Khomeini and his clerics, Iran was swept by human 
upheaval and its institutions fell into chaos and turmoil. Iraq got the impression that 
because of chaos sweeping Iranian institutions, particularly the armed forces which had 
been purged of their best trained elements, Iran became weak, isolated internationally and 
easy prey in armed conflict with Iraq. Similarly, the signing of the Camp David Accords 
by Egypt and Israel under the sponsorship of the United States made room for Iraq to 
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claim a leading role in the Arab world after Egypt forfeited its role. Saddam Hussein saw 
that opportunity coming to him if he ever took advantage of a coup that would put him in 
the forefront of Arab leadership. 
In 1929, Britain asked Iran to recognize Iraq so it could have more votes and be 
accepted as a member of the United Nations. But Iran, having old border disputes with 
the Ottoman Empire said it would only recognize Iraq under one condition: The Iraq 
would recognize Iranian sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway Britain assured 
Iran that the Iraqis would recognize Iran and opened her first embassy in Baghdad. But 
the negotiations went nowhere, causing anger and despair in Iran. As a result, the Iranian 
government notified Iraq on December 1, 1931 that the 1914 treaty which defined the 
border lines between the two countries was invalid from the Iranian point of view. 
Following this new development, the border conflicts between the two countries resumed 
once again. 
In 1932, King Faysal of Iraq, who was serious about resolving the conflict with 
Iran, visited Tehran accompanied by his Prime Minister, Noory Al-Saeed. In a friendly 
atmosphere the problem was discussed with the Shah of Iran (Reza Shah). And it was 
also agreed that the Shah of Iran would visit the following year. But due to the death of 
king Faysal in September 1932, the trip was cancelled and despite the positive progress 
that was made during the King's earlier visit, the basic dispute concerning the division of 
the Shatt Al-Arab based on the thalweg line between the two countries remained 
unresolved and the clashes between the two neighbours increased. 
For the first time Iraq took her border conflict with Iran to the United Nations in 
1934. In a letter, which was signed by Foreign Minister Noory Al-Saeed, Iraq claimed 
that the border conflict with Iran, according to the 1847 Ardum Treaty and the Protocol 
of 1913 were signed by four countries: Ottoman (Turkey), Persia, Britain and Russia. 
Noory Al-Saeed emphasized that according to the treaty, once all parties agreed on the 
Manchester Parsadust, The Roots of the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian Book Published, Tehran, 1982, pp.51 
70. 
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side of the border and it was defined, the other side of the border should apply for the 
same condition, and there should not be any change from the other side (Iran). He added 
that unfortunately the Iranians had ignored this treaty. The Iraqi representative at the 
United Nations emphasized that Iraq would approach all possible ways to resolve this 
problem with Iran peacefully and would negotiate with Iran directly. Another letter was 
delivered by the Iraqi charge d'affaires in Iran to the Iranians authority explaining that the 
Iraqi complaint to the United Nations should not be considered as in Iraqi escalation of 
tension between the two countries. The main point of Iraqi foreign policy would be 
friendly with Iran, and after resolving this matter, Iraq would open a new era of 
friendship between the two peoples of Iraq and Iran.''*^ 
Iran defended here position that according to the 1847 Ardum Treaty and Protocol 
of 1913, all of the lands located on the east port (left side) of the Shatt Al-Arab which 
was occupied mostly by Persia, so the land known as Iranian territory, above the water of 
the left side from the river will belong to Iran. And because the navigation and direction 
of the water in the river make it hard to define the border. The thalweg line which 
divides the river is reasonable to be considered as a border line between the two 
countries. Also, according to international law, all of the countries bordering the sea 
have the right to a six-twelve mile border. So this law could be applied for the river 
between Iran and Iraq. After a long discussion from 1932 until 1935 between Iran and 
Iraq at the United Nations, the two countries finally decided in may 1935 to negotiate 
directly in their respective countries and Noory Al-Saeed, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, with 
a high-level delegation, went to Iran. At last Iran and Iraq agreed, with the help of the 
British, to recognize the border in the area of Abadeen (Khider Island) to be divided 
equally between them according to the thalweg line, and in 1937 Iran and Iraq signed a 
treaty which is known as the Treaty of Saad Abad. According to this treaty, which 
contains six chapters, for the first time, the thalweg line near Abadeen from both sides. 
The important point of this treaty is Iraqi sovereignty over Shatt Al-Arab was not 
mentioned. During the following 13 years, the Iranian authorities complained that Iraq 
never followed the agreement and the money which Iraq was receiving from the Shatt 
'^ » Ibid. 
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was never used for the cleaning and the Iranians were not advised of how the money was 
being spent, when in 1957 the Prime Ministers from Iran and Iraq met in Karachi, 
Pakistan during the Baghdad Pact, they discussed the problem but they never reached an 
agreement, and when King Faisal II visited Iran, they agreed to appoint a Swedish 
mediator to define the border line, but the coup in Iraq in 1958 by Abdul Karim Qasim 
stopped this mission. Relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated further in July 1958, 
when General Abd-al-Karim Qasim seized power in a bloody coup and brought pan-
Arabists to power in Baghdad.''" 
The July 1968 Revolution injected an ideological element into Iraqi politics. The 
newly establishment Ba'th party in Iraq appointed Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr as President, 
and from its early days of revolution tries to establish good relations with all political 
factions including the Kurds in Iraq, as well as trying to resolve its border problem with 
Iran. A high delegation headed by Prime Minister Taher Yahya went to Iran to discuss 
the border problem and the treaty of 1937 which Iran felt was imposed on her by Foreign 
powers. In December 1968, both countries agreed to appoint a commission to negotiate 
the dispute over the Shatt Al-Arab. The commission met in Baghdad in January 12969. 
the Iranian delegation insisted that the treaty of 1937 was signed under British pressures 
and requested that a new treaty be prepared based on international law, using the 
thalw3eg line as border line between Iran and Iraq. The negotiations failed since each 
side insisted on its original claim. As a result, the armies of both countries were put on 
alert. 
In 1969, two important events took place in the Gulf which encouraged Iran to 
play an important role in the Gulf in general and with Irq in particular. First, the British 
decision to withdraw from the Gulf made Iran announce that it would take back the two 
greater and smaller Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands, belonging to the United Arab Emirates, 
situated at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz which were strategically important to Iran. 
Finally on December 3, 1971, Iran occupied these Islands and assumed full control. This 
action by Iran prompted opposition by All Arab countries, especially Iraq, which saw it 
M. El-Azhavy, The Iran-Iraq, //st. Martin's Press, New York, 1984. 
83 
as an imperialist attempt to change the Arab character of the Gulf and to take control of 
its natural resources. Iraq cut off its diplomatic relations with Iran and ordered the charge 
d'affaires and all other staff members of the Iranian embassy in Baghdad to leave Iraq 
within 24 hours. 
The Second even which gave Iran more encouragement was President Nixon's 
Doctrine which, burdened by the war in Vietnam, initiated a new US policy in the Gulf. 
This policy which is known as the Twin-pillar policy to furnish military and economic 
assistance of nations whose freedom was threatened. The aim of this policy was that 
the United States had strategic interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which meant the 
support for either would alienate the other. Despite the distrust, their cooperation was 
needed in the face of growing Arab radicalism. Since Iran was willing to fill the 
vacuum left by the British, and also was ready to pay for all necessary equipOment, the 
US provided the Shah with the advanced American aircraft, and all military assistance 
which was requested by Iran. 
Iran by the late 1960s, having the support of the United States felt stronger to 
expand their control over the Gulf and to play the role of the policeman in the region. 
The issue of the Shatt Al-Arab was raised by Iran again in February 1969 claiming that 
the Iraqis were using revenues from the waterway for purposes other than maintaining the 
Shatt which was stipulated in the 1937 accord. 
In April 1969, the Iranian government abrogated the 1937 treaty and Iran's 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Iranian Parliament declared: "on the basis of 
establish international principles, the 1937 Frontier Treaty is considered null and void 
and worthless by the Imperial Government....the Imperial Government does not 
recognize, along the entire length of the Shatt Al-Arab any principle of international law, 
i.e.; the median as baseless. Hence, it will use all that is in its power to prevent any 
violation of its sovereign rights in the Shatt Al-Arab and will not allow anyone to violate 
them.'^ ^ 
'''^  Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Little Brown, Boston, 1979, pp. 223-225. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teheran, Some Facts concerning the Dispute between Iran and Iraq over 
the Shatt Al-Arab, May 1969, p. 6. 
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Following Iran's abrogation of the 1937 Treaty, relations between Iraq and Iran 
reached their lowest point. Iran intensified here supply of arms to the Kurdish rebels, and 
Iraq accused the Shah of planning a coup attempt against the Ba'ath government in 1970. 
Iraq refused to accept the Iranian claims over the Shatt. They argued that Iran's actions 
violated international law and that the Shatt remained Iraqi. Iran responded by sending 
through the waterway and Iranian ship guarded by Iranian naval vessels. Iraq countered 
by expelling more than 10,000 Iranian many of whom were forcibly removed. A military 
clash between Iraq and Iran erupted on April 14, 1971 in the Khanagin region of northern 
Iraq. 
The situation worsened during 1972-73, when open fighting broke out along the 
border at several points. The fighting broke out along the border at several points. The 
fighting occurred on a small scale but casualties mounted. Fighting ceased during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war, as Iraq diverted its troops to its western borders, but conflict 
resumed in January 1974 in February of the same year, a major battle took place with 23 
Iraqis and 70 Iranians killed and a large number wounded. Both countries accused the 
other of trying to launch an invasion.''*^ In late February 1974, Iraq took the border 
dispute to the United Nations Security Council. Turkey, Algeria and Jordan all tried to 
mediate an end to the fighting. Negotiations to settle all pending issued were initiated at 
the UN Security Council. It was another year, however, before a settlement was reached. 
From the begirming of the revolution which started in 1979 Iran initiated 
fundamental changes in her foreign policy, especially with the regional states, 
particularly Iraq. A propaganda war between Iran and Iraq erupted shortly after the 
revolution. In February 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini state: "We will export our revolution 
to the four comers of the world, because our revolution is Islamic..." 
On another occasion, Khomeini stated: "We should try to export our revolution to 
the world. We should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because 
Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of the all 
''"' Khadduri, O .^OV, p. 150. 
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oppressed people of the world. If we remain in an enclosed environment, we shall 
definitely face defeat."''*'^  In Khomeini's words, "Islam is a sacred trust from God to 
ourselves and the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it has fed Islam 
totherestoftheWorld.""*^ 
On the contrary Saddam Hussein believed "The Ba'ath idea oppose the use o 
religion for politicl purposes. While we respect out Islamic religion, we also must respect 
other religions which our people believe in." Obviously the sensitivity of these two 
issues of religion and nationalism lead to the conflict between the two regimes. A bomb 
was thrown in a crowded student gathering at Al-Mustanesiriyah University in Baghdad, 
and Iraq accused Iran and in retaliation, expelled large numbers of Shiites of Iranian 
origin. Throughout 1980, a series of border classes occurred between the two countries. 
Iraq accused Iran of having violated the Algiers Agreement more than 187 times between 
the period of June and September 1980 by military actions. On September 17, 1980, 
President Saddam Hussein renounced the Algiers treaty which had defined the thalweg 
line the Shatt Al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran. 
After renunciation of the Algiers treaty on September 27, 1980, by Iraq, Iran 
began to attack some residential and economic areas on the other side of the Shatt Al-
Ara. Some merchant ships were hit in the waterway. On September 22, 1980 Iraqi 
forces crossed the Iranian border, and advanced into Iranian territory for several hundred 
miles. 
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the UN Security Council "applied" to the 
two states to cease hostilities and authorized the Secretary-General to use his "good 
offices" to secure an end to the crisis.'"*^ However, the mediatory efforts of the UN were 
subjected to a delay, a few days later, "to give more time to the Islamic Peace initiative 
by President Ziaul Haq. Following this, a Mexican sponsored resolution in the Security 
'"^ R.K. Ramzani, Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf, Current History, January 1985, P. 6. 
* See Annexure I. 
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Council, "(called upon) Iraq and Iran to refrain immediately from any further use of 
forces and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law."'"*^ 
When these efforts failed to produce the desired results, the Secretary General 
appointed Mr. Olaf Palme, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, s his special 
representative to Baghdad and Tehran. By the end of his second mission to the two 
capitals in January 1981, Mr. Palme, despite the rejection by Iran of his proposals, was 
able to state that though "hard positions" were being maintained by both countries "both 
parries are interested in continuing to see whether one could find a peaceful process to 
end the war."''*'' At the end of Mr. Pale's fifth mission in March 1982, the conflict still 
defied solution. Therefore, in July 1982, the Security Council called for a ceasefire and 
propped the withdrawal of forces to internationally recognised boundaries; the 
dispatching of observers to verify, confirm, supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal, and 
the continuation of mediation in a coordinated manner through the Secretary General.'''° 
These proposals, however, were rejected by Iran. 
At the thirty-seventh session of the UN General Assembly (September 21 -
December 21, 1982), Resolution 37/3 declared that the conflict endangered international 
peace and security proposed an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of forces to 
internationally recognized boundaries "as a preliminary step" towards the peaceful 
settlement of the dispute, and furthermore, called on other states to refrain from hindering 
peace efforts.'^' These proposals were once again rejected by Iran. 
In October 1933, the UN Security Council, despite the rejection of its proposals 
twice in the preceding months, asked the Secretary General to continue his mediatory 
efforts and called upon both states to refrain from endangering international peace and 
'"* Facts on File,, 18 January 1981. 
"" Times of India, Delhi, 14 July 1982. 
"" UN General Assembly Resolution, October 22, 1982, 37/3 adopted by 119 votes to 1, Iran and 15 
absententions, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1983. 
This was in response to the Iranian threat to close th( 
acquired French Super Etendard bombers, Indian Express, Delhi, 4 November 1983. 
e straits of Hormuz if Iraq used her recently 
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security as well as from jeopardizing marine life through pollution of the Gulf as a 
consequence of attacks of oil installations. A further clause sponsored by Zaire, Togoland 
and Guyana, stressed the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters.'^^ 
Iraq accepted this resolution and Iran though rejected the proposals, expressed its 
confidence in the UN Secretary General and Mr. Palme.'" 
The Security Council Resolution SQS'''* (20 July 1987) sought a cessation of 
hostilities between Iran and Iraq, and bilateral peace negotiations between the two 
countries. The United Nations proposal did not cast blame for the hostilities on either of 
the protagonist. Iraq accepted the UN proposal relatively quickly; however, two days 
short of one year elapsed before Iran accepted the proposal. 
Despite relentless efforts in resolving the conflicts in region the UN's 
performance provides much less cause for celebration. The record is particularly grave 
with regard to the application of the most basic principles of the Organisation having to 
do with the maintenance of International peace and prohibition of unilateral violence. 
The Charter promised much but for complex reasons, achieved precious little. Article 2 
(4) of the United Nations Charter stipulates: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner in consistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
Article 2 (5) affirmed the commitment of Member states to lend assistance to United 
Nations and to refrain from assisting states "against which the United Nations is taking 
preventive or enforcement action." 
152 P.V. Narasimha Rao's Statement to the Indian Parliament 18 November 1980, India and foreign 
Review, 1 December 1980, p. 4. 
The member of the mission were the foreign ministers of Algeria, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, 
Zambia and the head of the PLO. Political Department, Ibid, P. 5. 
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations Resolutions 598 read: 
1. Demands that, as a first step toward a negotiated settlement Iran and Iraq observe an immediate 
cease-fire discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the 
internationally recognized boundaries without delay; 
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Under Article 10 of the UN Charter the General Assembly has power to discuss 
everything under the sun and in fact discussed many things from the High seas and sea-
bed to pollution and outer space. Article 11 empowers the General Assembly to discuss 
the steps to be taken to maintain international peace and security. It will refer the matter 
to the Security Council. It is of course, the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
under Article 24 of the Charter to maintain and restore international peace and security. 
But its composition neutralized its power as a peace-keeping organ of the UN. In 
violation of the accepted principle of equal sovereignty the Security Council was 
designed to be dominated by five big powers and the concurrence of these big five who 
are permanent members of the Security Council in all important decisions was made 
essential under Article 27 (3). This article further provides that decision on procedural 
matters may be carried out by a simple majority of nine member, but decisions on 
important matters require nine votes including (concurring votes of the five permanent 
members." It is understandable why the Security Council was invested with the Security 
Council being a small body could be convened at a short notice. Article 28 of the charter 
requires that the Council will be in sessions for all the twelve months and its member-
states shall station their diplomats in New York so as to be easily available in the case of 
emergency. But why the veto power was required to vest in the Big Five or on what 
moral legal principles it so vested in them, is yet to be searched out. If even 
responsibility of maintenance of the world peace is shifted to the General Assembly from 
the Security Coimcil. It is doubtful in the present context of conflicting interests between 
different nations, whether great or small, that there will be no breach of peace or 
recurrence of war. 
The ability of the smaller members of the UN to disturb peace is essentially 
limited. War between smaller states can easily be avoided if supplies of arms are 
prevented by the joint action of the arms-dealers, such a war cannot either break out at all 
or escalate. In this regard a positive step is expected from the super powers. The 
increasing difficulties of financing international police actions the discrepancies between 
legal rights on the one hand and political and economic responsibilities on the other hand 
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have restricted the active role of the United Nations in its peace keeping activities and 
have left major political decisions in the hands of the major powers, acting directly w i^th 
or against each other. 
Despite this, the United Nations is useful or even indispensable as a medium for 
exchange of views, a forum of world opinion, or even as a sanctioning organ for 
decisions made between the major powers. With the rise of new powers, new philosophy 
of co-existence, common concept for international peace, democratization of the world 
and with the fear of total war and futility of war, purisuits of collective security and the 
realization of anachronism of national sovereignty, the United Nations has acquired 
strength, despite lack of enforcement power of authority, as an instrument of global peace 
and order. 
90 
ANNEXURE-I 
The Algiers Agreement 
Following the agreement between the two leaders of Iran and Iraq, the foreign ministers 
of the two countries met countries met separately with the attendance of the foreign 
minister of Algeria and agreed to the following: 
1. Both countries agreed to carry out final delineation of their lands boundaries 
in accordance with the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the proceedings 
of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914. 
2. Demarcation of their river boundaries according to the thalweg line. 
3. The two parties shall restore security and mutual confidence. 
4. The two parties also agreed to consider the agreement as inseparable elements 
of a comprehensive solution. 
From the above mentioned agreement the following remarks can be made: 
A. Iraq gains some land bordered with Iran, according to Constantinople Protocol 
of 1913. 
B. For the first time Iraq agreed that the border between the two countries will be 
drawn at the thalweg of the Shatt Al-Arab. Iran always argued that when a 
river forms the boundary between two sovereign nations, the thalweg of the 
river is generally considered the border line. But Iranian claims concerning 
this river are weak, Iraqi sovereignty over that Shatt had been recognized in 
three different agreements - the 19847 Erzerum Accord, the 1913-14 
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Constantinople Agreements, and the 1937 treaty signed by three Iranian 
governments. So in this part, Iran had gained a substantial victory. 
C. The Kurdish rebellion collapsed shortly after Iran ended its support in 
accordance with an agreement. This was big victory for the Iraqi government, 
since Iran agreed on the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference 
in internal affairs of both countries. But in the eyes of the Kurdish people, 
Iran had committed a moral crime in that they did not carry out their promises, 
and they were looking only for their own interests. 
Lastly, both countries agreed to put aside their old disputes and to open a new chapter of 
friendship between each other. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
THE IRAQ - KUWAIT WAR 
It was around the turn of the 18"' Century that word reached the heart of Arabia of 
the lucrative pearl-fishing in the coastal areas of the Gulf, together with information that 
the rule of the Safavid Empire of Persia was on the decline. Three families of the Utoobi 
clan of the Unaiza tribe of southern Nejd, attracted by the prospect of a better life near the 
sea, began to migrate from their ancient desert home, headed northwest, and landed in 
Qarain (now known as Kuwait) in 1710 AD. The depiction of the settlement of Kazima in 
maps produced in the century (1652-1737) preceding the Utub settlement of Kuwait Bay 
is given a thorough treatment in Dutch archivist's B.J.Slot's excellent work on the history 
of the state of Kuwait in maps.'"^ ^ They were the Beni Sabah, led by Sheikh Suleiman bin 
Ahmad; Beni Jalahimah, led by Sheikh Jaber bin Utoobi; and Beni Khalifah, led by 
Sheikh Khalifah bin Mohammad. Qarain, at the time, though nominally a part of the 
territories of Eastern Arabia ruled by Sadun bin Mohammad, Sheikh of Beni Khalid, was 
in reality a no-man's land. The Sheikh of Beni Khalid paid no attention to the 
immigration of Utoobi clans to Qarain. 
The Settlement (Qarain) was a humble village, consisting of some tents belonging 
to the members of Awazim tribes, some fisherman's huts, and the Sheikh's small fort 
(Kut in Arabic). The name "Kuwait" which means "Little Kut" or "Little fort" derived 
from this small fort which was situated on the southern side of the Kuwait bay. ^^  
The three families formed a union for the purpose of resisting attacks from the 
more powerful clans in the neighbourhood of the settlement. The leadership of the Union 
was initially shared by the principal sheikh of the three families; Sheikh Suleiman, 
Sheikh Jabir and Sheikh Khalifah. They determined to become, at once, merchants and 
pearl-fishers, and the profits arising from these occupations to be shred equally amongst 
' " Slot, B.J., The Origins of Kuwait, Part 2, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1991, pp. 39-55. 
'^ * For details see Pirouz Mojitahid Zadleh, 'Gids in the North West of the Persian Gulf, in The Iranian 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. II, No. 4, winter, 1990/1991, pp. 541-42. 
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the whole union. The Al-Jalahimah handled shipping, Al-Khalifah became merchants, 
and Al-Sabah controlled political affairs and diplomatic relations. The first fifty years of 
this union witnessed a rapid growth in wealth and significance of the settlement and by 
matrimonial alliance with other tribes in the beighbourhood. The federation grew 
rapidly in its population and strengthened its position vis-a-vis the Beni Khalid who until 
then dominated the entire north-eastern parts of Arabia. 
Forty two years since their arrival in Qarain, the tribes of Qarain agreed (in 1752) 
to appoint Sheikh Sabah ben Jabir Al-Sabah as the ruler of Qarain. He remained in 
power till his death in 1762 A.D.'^ ^ This development gave birth to the independent 
Emirate of Al-Sabah in a place which was virtually no man's land. No one opposed the 
move and nobody challenged it. Fourteen years later, the federates, became anxious to 
enjoy singly their lucrative branch of the original league. 
Sheikh Khalifah, chief of Al-Khalifah branch of the union, an artful ruler 
succeeded in 1766 to persuade members of the other two tribes to take his skill in peal-
fishing and trade elsewhere. They moved south-east-wardly, heading towards the pearl 
shores near Bahrain. The Al-Jalahimah guaranteed their safe passage to Zubarah in 
north-western comer of the Qatar Peninsula Zubarah was the principal settlement of the 
Al-Khalifah area from where both Qatar Peninsula and Bahrain archipelago were 
governed. The Al-Khalifah completely succeeded in its objectives in Zubarah in a short 
period of time and at length refused a share of profits resulting from its attainments to 
both the other parties in the original union. Al-Jalahimah themselves found the idea of a 
second migration quite attractive. They too, moved from Qarain to Qatar, and settled 
there. Thus, Al-Sabah found themselves as they are today, the sole rulers of the 
settlement in Qarain. Interestingly, one historical source mentions that Sabah, who was 
the brother of Rahim, was based at his fort at Umm Qasr, lying on the west bank of the 
Khor Zubair, right until his assumption of power in Kuwait.'^* 
The Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait: The Truth and The Tragedy, Center for Research and Studies on 
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By the end of the 18* century, pearling and trade created a thriving port of the 
north-western end of the Gulf. When in 1775 the port of Basrah, to the north of Qarain, 
was overrun and occupied by the forces of Karim Khan Zand, king of Persian, the British 
residents and a number of the inhabitants of Basrah migrated to Qarain. Diverted to the 
new port was also the bulk of the Indian trade with the Ottoman cities. This development 
proved to be highly profitable to the growing town of Qarain and increased its importance 
in the region. Even after the British East India Company's offices returned to Basrah in 
1779 when the Iranians lost Basrah to the Ottomans once and for all, Qarain's harbours 
continued its significance as a place to transfer goods from boats to caravans bound for 
Baghdad, Aleppo, and Constantinople. 
During the rule of Sheikh Abdullha al-Sabah (1762-18150 the powerful Beni 
Kaab tribe of Khuzestan of Iran began forcing Al-Sabah of Qarain to pay tribute and its 
chief married Sheikh Abdullah's daughter (Mariam) apparently by force. The Al-Sabah 
forces, commanded by Sheikh Salem al-Sabah rebuked the Bani Kaab challenge. Though, 
the autonomous Bani Kaab, based on the marshlands east of the Shatt al-Arab in modem-
day Khuzista, had, until this point, exercised maritime supremacy in the northern Persian 
Gulf, occasionally exacting tribute from Kuwaiti vessels. They had also sufficiently 
powerful to defeat the Ottoman fleet at Basra during 1765.'^^ The Al-Khalifah of Zubarah 
supported their cousins in the event, and together they defeated Beni Kaab navy at 
Riqqah off Bubbian island. This was the first major political achievement for Al-Sabah, 
boosting their moral so much that led them to begin active political functioning in the 
Gulf. Very soon the opportunity arrived for the Al-Sabah to return Al-Khalifah's favour 
and to mark their existence in the Gulf as political force.'^^ 
Briefly, Al-Khalifah began their slow migration from Zubarah to Bahrain 
archipelago as from the time of their arrival in Zubarah. Sheikh Nast Khan, the Iranian 
governor of Bahrain found this move disturbing to the status quo. He attacked Zubarah 
in 1779 but sustained defeat. Quickly he dispatched the intelligence Bahrain, and warned 
Schofield, R., Evolution of the Shatt al-Arab Boundary Dispute, Menas Press, Wisbech, 1986, p. 24. 
'"" Ibid, p.543. 
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him to be resolute and vigilant against foreign attacks, until he went back with 
reinforcement. The boat conveying the dispatch was intercepted in passage and the 
papers were discovered by Al-Sabah who had sent vessels there to intervene in favour of 
Al-Khalifah. Aware of the defenceless state of the islands, they immediately proceeded 
to the attack and gained possession of its principal posts previous to the arrival of Sheikh 
Nasr Khan's fleet. Finding the islands in possessions of the enemy Sheikh Nasr Khan 
Zand's death that year made Iran leaderless for sometimes and Sheikh Nasr Khan was not 
able to go back to Bahrain. Thus, by 1783 the Al-Khalifah of Zubarah, with the help of 
Al-Sabah, made themselves masters of the islands of Bahrain, albeit they accepted 
Iranian sovereignty under the Qatar Shahs. 
Establishment of the Al-Khalifah authority in Bahrain opened up new trading 
opportunities for both tribes. Goods began to be imported in Qarain from Muscat, 
Zubarah, Bahrain and Qatif. The thriving port of Qarain gradually became an entity 
independent all powers in the neighbourhood. The domain of the gradually became 
known as "Kuwait". However, when Basrah was recovered by the Ottomans from the 
Persian, the British East Indian Company's factory at Basrah was moved to Kuwait, in 
anticipation of Ottoman interference in its affairs. This development increased the 
European presence in Kuwait which, in turn, prompted several attacks by the Wahhabis 
of Arabia (who founded the Saudi Kingdom at a later date) attempting to incorporate the 
town of Kuwait in the Arabian dominions. By 1795, Wahhabi attacks become so frequent 
that the British decided to return to Basrah. The Al-Sabah, therefore, found no 
alternative but to cooperate with the Wahhabis.'^' 
In 1800, the Wahhabis reduced the forces of Beni Khalid whose dominions 
included the entire region from Hasa, Qatif, Abiqiq, and as far as Qarain. Al-Sabah's 
cooperation with the Wahhabis continued until 1818 when their authority was 
temporarily overthrown in 1818 by Mohammad Ali Pasha, Khadi or viceroy of Egypt 
who had invaded Arabia on behalf of the Ottoman Sulat. 
'*' Ibid., p. 544. 
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From this time until 1898, Kuwait maintained some form of de facto Ottoman 
sovereignty as a self-determining emirate, the tax from which being levied by the 
Pashalik of Basrah. Under Abdullah II Al-Sabhah (1866-92) Turkish influence grew 
steadily in Kuwait. In 1871, the Ottomans asked Al-Saah's assistance in their efforts in 
Al-Hasa. Sheikh Abdullah provides 300 ships to carry horses, artillery and troops. He 
also encouraged the Sheikh of Al-Thani of Dohah in Qatar to accept the Turkish flag. 
Sheikh Abdullah was awarded the Ottoman title of Qaem Maqam (Locum Governor) of 
Kuwait, given to him by Medhat Pasha, Wali of Pashalik of Baghdad. Still, Medhat 
himself later admitted in his autobiography that the Kuwaitis had successfully resisted all 
Constantinople's effort to bring them into the Ottoman's orbit.'^^ This is the closest 
politically that Kuwait came to the Ottoman Empire, after more than 150 years of 
independent existence under the emirate of Al-Sabah. 
In 1896, Sheikh Mubarak succeeded his brother Sheikh Mohammad who, in turn 
had succeeded the older brother Sheikh Abdullah II in 1892. Sheikh Mubarak's rule met 
a series of challenges notably from Sheikh Jassem of Qatar and the Al-Rashid rulers of 
Hail in northern Arabia. The latter inflicted a serious defeat on Mubarak's forces at Sarif 
in 1901, but themselves were crushed and annihilated by the Wahhabis soon afterwards. 
These threats, together with the increasing g danger of Ottoman, Russian and German 
interference in Kuwait's affairs, forces Mubarak to seek outside protection. He 
approached the British in 1897 with proposals for an alliance. The British rejected the 
offer initially as: ".... In 1896, Kuwait occupied little or no place in British political 
affairs, the principality being regarded at home as under the exclusive influence of the 
Porte.... In 1898, however, Russian activity induced Britain to reconsider her attitude to 
adopt measures for countering forewing influence at Kuwait. There was reason to 
suspect that the Russians wished to establish a port of coaling station there, and attempts 
were being made to obtain a concession from the Porte in favour of Count Kapnist, a 
Russian subject, for the construction of railway from the Mediterranean to the Gulf - a 
Association of Free Kuwait (1990), 'Kuwait-An Independent State" reprinted in Lauterpacht, E. et al 
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scheme which, if it had materialized, might have ended in the creation of Russian 
territorial rights at Kuwait".'^' 
Kuwait, thus, became a place of strategic significance in the eyes of the super 
powers of the time. The French and Germans were also suspected by the British of 
wanting to extend the proposed Berlin-Baghdad railway to Kuwait. Hence, in January 
1899, Britain signed a treaty with Kuwait, whereby the former officially undertook to 
protect Kuwait against outside interference, and the latter undertook to conclude no treaty 
with other powers. Therefore, the principality of Kuwait became an official British 
protectorate. 
The British protection did not, however, deter tribal conflicts in the vicinity of 
Kuwait, especially in regard to Wahhabi movement which gave prominence to the Saudi 
family in Arabia. Abdul Aziz ben Saud who had spent his childhood in Kuwait returned 
to Riyadh in 1902 and regained the Saudi patrimony by mobilising a new generation of 
Wahhabis, known as Ikwan. In 1920, the British protectorate of Kuwait attacked the 
Ikwan and was heavily defeated. Later that year, the Ikwan, commanded by Faisal al-
Dawish, attached Jahrah village and besieged its fort. The Kuwaitis began to erect high 
walls around the town of Kuwait and managed to free the fort in Ajaharah. A series of 
attacks against the tribes and Sheikhs on the northern margins of Arabia continued 
throughout 1920s by Ikhwan. 
By the end of November, 1914, British forces moved up the Shatt al Arab 
persuaded Kuwait that it was too dangerous to continue with its flying green Ottoman 
flag. British forces fired warning shots across the bow of a Kuwaiti dhow flying the green 
Ottoman flag. The result was that Sheikh Mubarak began to fly his own distinctive flag, 
with the word 'Kuwait' inscribed on a red background, over his own and his merchant 
and military vessels.'^ 
' " Wilson, Sir Arnold T.. The Persian Gulf, London, 1928 , pp. 251 -52. 
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Amir Abdul Aziz ben Saud, crowned himself in 1926 as the King of Hijaz. The 
continued military efforts against the tribes of northern Arabia inspired a concerted 
attempt to crush the Ikhwan. These men, formerly Ibn Sauds shock troops, had by then, 
turned against him. Ibn Saud, therefore, openly backed the British air force and the Arab 
Legion, under the command of John Bagot Glub (Glub Pasha) - which in 1928 resulted 
in the Ikhwan's retreat to Kuwait, where Al-Dawish and the leaders of Ikhwan 
surrendered in 1930. Two years later the State of Saudi Arabia came into being on the 
southern and eastern flanks of Kuwaiti. To the north of Kuwait, the modem State of Iraq 
was created in 1924 in wake of the war-torn Ottoman Empire. The two former Ottoman 
Pashaliks of Baghdad and Basrah formed the territories of the state of Iraq which was 
given to a branch of the House of Hashemite of Arabia.'^^ 
Iraq and Kuwait defined their approximated boundaries in the Batinah (Kuwait) 
and Rumailah (Iraqi) regions, in 1932. The treaty recognized also the eight offshore 
islands, including Bubiyan and Warbah, belong to Kuwait. Warbah became a bone of 
contention later when in 1990, attention was given to the Iraqi demands that Bubiyan 
Island be leased and that Iraq already regarded Warbah Island as its own national 
territory.'^^ Only four days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Thomas Pickering, the US 
Ambassador to the UN, urged his Jordanian counterpart, under instructions from his 
government, to pass on the following message to Baghdad: 'We acknowledge your need 
for an opening to the Gulf, and the issue of access to the islands is one that we could look 
on favourably.'^ ^ 
Discovery Of Oil And Iraqis Claim 
With the discovery of oil resources in the areas around the town of Kuwait in 
1938, the territories belonging to the Emirate of Kuwait were defined to include a semi-
circle of rather featureless country. Having heard of Kuwait's great wealth in oil 
' " /fc/V/.,pp.445-446. 
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deposits, King Ghazi of Iraq claimed sovereignty over this emirate on the basis of 
Kuwait's position as tributary of the Ottoman Pashalik of Basrah between 1871 and 1899. 
the Iraqi kind had neglected the fact that Kuwait existed as an independent emirate about 
120 years prior to becoming a tributary of the Pashalik of Basrah and the fact that it 
became an official protectorate of Britain in 1899, some twenty-five years before the 
State of Iraq was created by the British and her allies in the post-world war-I. The 
Hashemite king did not heed that if Kuwait was to be given to Iraq on the basis of having 
been a tributary of the Ottoman Pashalik of Basrah for 28 years, the entire Mesopotamia 
should be given to Iran as it formed Persia's eastern province in the greatest part of 
history since 500 B.C.'^^ 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was culmination of series of Iraqi attempts at 
armexing Kuwait - first during 1938 - 41 and again from early 1950s - proclaiming the 
entire territory of Kuwait as part of Basra province. This Iraqi claim over Kuwaiti 
territory was largely due to the land locked position Iraq finds itself except for a tiny 
access to the Gulf. 
Iraqi Frontier 
The Iraqi frontier with Najd was defined in the Treaty of Mohammara in May 
1922 and a neutral zone of 7000 sq kms was established adjacent to the western tip of 
Kuwait frontier. An agreement in May 1938 concerning the administration of this zone 
was signed between the two states which more or less settled their boundaries, without 
however, demarcating them. 
The Kuwaiti ruler Sheikh Ahmad Sabah and the British High Commissioner for 
Iraq Sir Percy Cox on April 19, 1983 defined the Iraqi-Kuwait border. The Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri as Saeed Pasha on July 21, 1932 confirmed the "existing frontiers" 
between Iraq and Kuwait to the British Resident in Kuwait as defined in the Anglo-
Ottoman Agreement of 1913 which included Warba and Bubiyan as part of Kuwait. The 
" ' Ibid., p. 547. 
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frontier was described as: From the intersection of the Wadi of Audja with the Batin and 
thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan, thence 
eastwards passing South of Safwan wells, Jebel sanam and Umm Qasar leaving them to 
Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir Abdulla. The islands of Warbah, 
Bubiyan, Failakh, Auhah, Kubbas, Qaru and Umm al Maradim appertain to Kuwait.'^^ 
Infact, last minute considerations of the negotiating teams included the possible existence 
of bituminous oil wells at Burgan, lying to the south between the outer and inner zones of 
influence proposed for Kuwait, and reports of submarine oil seepages between the islands 
of Qaru and Kubbas, both of which were recognized by Britain as belonging to 
Kuwait.''"' In much the same way as the July 1913 Anglo-Ottoman settlement had 
preserved the factions of the Porte's control of Kuwait, a treaty of 15 May 1914 
concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Ibn Saud,''' recognizing the latter as Pasha 
and Wali of the wilayat of Najd, did the same for the nominally Ottoman territories south 
of Kuwait. 
In an earlier exchange of letters on April 4 and April 19, 1923 between the Sheikh 
of Kuwait and Sir Percy Cox the existing frontiers between Iraq and Kuwait had been 
clearly emphasized. Cox's prime territorial concern in north-east Arabia at this time was 
to stabilize tribal unrest in the undefined southern territories of Iraq which matched with 
the expanding Saudi emirate. Before any precise limits to territory could be fixed. Cox 
tried to address the question of loyalties and allegiances in the border zone.'^^ 
Uqair Protocol of 2 December 1922 saw the appearance, for the first time in 
Arabia, of the notions of a 'neutral zone'. Such features are usually agreed on when 
no 
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territorial disputes between the neighbouring states reach deadlock and generally involve 
a partial surrender by both sides of sovereignty over the area in question.'^^ 
The Kuwait ruler in a letter dated August 10, 1932 confirmed the boundaries as 
mentioned in Nuri Pasha's letter. In line with their deep interest in the establishment of 
Kuwait, the confirmation of the boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait was the zenith of 
the success of their diplomacy. Thus, Britain had finally established as a legal entity and 
recognised by Iraq. But there was a gap. The Iraqi - Kuwaiti boundaries had not been 
demarcated. 
Meanwhile Kuwait prospered under the rule of Sheikh Jaber and due to massive 
oil revenues in a matter of few years the shape of Kuwait Town was dramatically 
changed from an old fashioned and dhow port to a modem busy city attracting the best 
talent from all over the world.'^ '^  In the records of history, King Ghazi (second king of 
Iraq) was the first Iraqi ruler to lay claims on Kuwait. In fact, he had raised the 
possibility of Iraq intervening in Kuwait and incorporating it just before his death on 
April 5, 1938 in mysterious car accident. Kuwait which raised the issue of border 
demarcation for the first time in 1951 found Iraq unenthusiastic of this issue and when 
the Kuwaiti ruler pursued the issue Baghdad expressed its desire to have Warba in return 
for demarcation of their borders. Until then all had appeared smooth and satisfactory but 
beneath this tranquility a storm was building up which the British were fully aware and 
conscious. The Kuwaiti ruler found the Iraqi demand as unacceptable and opposed it. 
The Iraqi kept up their pressure on Kuwait when in 1954 in the context of negotiations 
related to the supply of water from Shartt al Arab, Iraq increased her claim on Kuwaiti 
territory. This time it claimed about four kms of Khaur al Sabiya coastline which is north 
of the Island of Warba and Bubiyan. 
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The British realized the Iraqi predicament and urged the Kuwaiti ruler to consider 
leasing Warba Island to Iraq in return for water from Shatt-al-Arab. The ruler of Kuwait 
rejected Britain proposal in 1956. Nuri as Saeed in early 1958 called on Kuwait to join in 
a confederation between the two Hashmire monarchies of Jordan and Iraq and in return 
Iraq offered to demarcate the border and supply Kuwait Shatt-al-Arab water and to 
guarantee continuation of the existing degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Kuwait ruler. 
Despite Iraq's territorial claim over parts of Kuwait, under the monarchy relations 
were more or less normal and at times cordial. The British due to their massive presence 
tried to keep things under control. When Iraq demanded Warba in return for Kuwaiti 
demanded for demarcation they prevented things from getting out hand and in fact, 
outwardly tried to mediate to resolve the problem amicably. But in the end they had laid 
the basis for a feature conflictual relationship.''^ The attitude of the post July 1858 
revolutionary Iraq was quite different towards Kuwait which was became independent on 
June 19, 1961. The Kuwait ruler Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah applied for 
membership of the Arab League on June 22, 1961. But Iraqi Prime Minister Kassem on 
June 25, 1961 claimed Kuwait to be a part of Basra province. He proceeded to designate 
the Kuwaiti ruler as Qaimmaqam of the Governor of Basra, like it was done during 
Sultan's rule. This move come only six days Kuwait signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Mutual Consultation which terminated the British protectorate of Kuwait and the 1899 
agreement which had given Britain the responsibility of the condu8ct of Kuwait's 
Foreign Policy. Kassem denounced the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement as a "specially 
dangerous blow against the integration and independent" of Iraq and Kuwait and declared 
Kuwait as in inseparable part of Iraq. On June 26, 1961 the Iraqi Foreign Minister issued 
a formal statement enumerating the legal grounds for its claim over Kuwait. Threatened 
with an Iraqi appealed for British Military help under the June 19, 1961 agreement with 
UK. He also rejected all the Iraqi claims over Kuwait. The British only July], 1961 
promptly responded by landing 6000 troops. The Sheikh of Kuwait also requested King 
Saud of Saudi Arabia to send troops whose contingents also immediately arrived. The 
" ' Ibid., pp. 20-2]. 
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Kuwaiti ruler also mobilized his own small force to safeguard the nascent independence 
of his oil rich Emirate. 
The Arab League Secretary General Khaleq Hassouna visited Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq to defuse the situation and on July 20, 1961 the League reached the 
following decisions: it called for the withdrawal of British troops from Kuwait as quickly 
as possible; it urged to pledge that it would not resort to the use of force to annex Kuwait; 
it supported any Kuwaiti desire for union or merger with any Arab state. More 
significantly it welcomed Kuwait as a new member of the Arab League on July 21, 1961 
and urged its members to support the request of Kuwait for UN membership. It also 
asked the Arab states to provide active help for guaranteeing the independence of Kuwait. 
Thus a temporary resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait crises was reached.''^ 
After Kassem over throw in a coup de late in February 1963 the new Iraqi 
President Abdul Salam Arif recognized Kuwait's independence on October 4, 1963 and 
said it wanted to clear "the sullied atmosphere created by the Kassem regime". The 
occasion was during a visit by a high powered Kuwaiti delegation led by the crown 
Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah the interior Minister and 
acting Foreign Minister and other officials. The delegations visited Iraq on an invitation 
from the Iraqi Prime Minister Major General Ahmad Hassan al Baker. At the meeting 
and recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of Kuwait and its boundaries 
as specified in the letter of the Iraqi Prime Minister dated 21.07.1932 and which was 
accepted by the Kuwait Ruler in his letter dated 10.08.1932. However, this did not lead 
to the resolution of their border demarcation problem. 
The emergence of a full fledged Baathist party government in July 1968 in Iraq 
opened a new chapter in Iraq-Kuwait relation. Kuwait was first to accord state 
recognition to the new Baathist regime. Saddam Hussein who became Vice-President 
under General Ahmad Hassan al Bakr made clear his desire to establish close ties with 
Kuwait. 
"* Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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But beneath this fafade of normal relations remained the old issue of demarcation 
of common border, and meanwhile Iraq on April 28, 1973 suggested to Kuwait that the 
border demarcation talks should be resumed and that the "solution of the problem" 
should take into consideration not only the interests of the two countries but also the 
larger interests of the Arab world. Moreover, in a note on May 27, 1973 Iraq rejected 
previous border agreements saying they had not been ratified as required by Iraqi 
Constitution. Around the same time the Iraqi foreign Minister emphasized the 
importance of the two Kuwait islands of Warba and Bubiyan to Iraq and asserted that 
without them it could not be a "Gulf Power" and that it was prepared to give up "all of 
Kuwait" in return for the islands.''' This clearly revealed that Iraq had not renounced its 
claim over Kuwait despite having recognized its sovereignty and territorial integrity in 
1963. 
One crucial reason for Kuwait determination in rejecting Iraqi demands over the 
two islands was their desire not to antagonize the Shah who desired to be the policeman 
of the Gulf. These two islands would have surely strengthened Iraqi position and desire 
to dominate the Gulf. The expected Iraqi challenge was sought to be nipped in the bud 
by the Kuwait rulers whose tilt towards the Shah and West was well known. Kuwait 
ultimately realized that leaving the two islands unused only attracts Iraqi demands. So 
they decided to have their presence.'^^ Soon after the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in August 1988 
Kuwait confident of Iraqi friendship asked for the demarcation of its border. Again Iraq 
raised the issue of Bubiyan island and was firm that unless this is transferred to Iraq there 
won't be demarcation. Again Kuwait turned down Iraqi demand and the situation 
reverted to the Stalemate. It must be stressed that the Al Sabah rulers were convinced 
that if they were to yield Iraq on this issue, it would be seen as a grave provocation by 
Iran. Later in October 1990 Iran told Kuwaiti exiled rulers not to grant the island of 
Bubiyan to Iraq and that it would take appropriate measures (meaning they themselves 
will occupy it) if they actually did so as part of any settlement.'^^ United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)'s account of the Bubiyan episode therefore went 
some though not all the way towards supporting the Baghdad government's protestations 
' " Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
" ' Ibid., p. 26. 
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of innocence, that if there had been an incident on or off the island, then 'smugglers and 
1 SO 
pirates' might have been responsible. 
In the realm of historiography, the fifty years during which the present state of 
Iraq gradually evolved was a history of numerous negotiations, memoranda, mapmaking, 
lost records, procrastination, contradictory evidence, and little accord. Iraq inherited 
1,472 kilometers from the Gulf to Mount Ararat. Approximately 700 of the 1,472 
kilometers pass through the region known as Kurdistan.'^' The complicated negotiations 
that defined this Ottoman-Persian frontier were clouded by intrigue, the extent of which 
may only be surmised. The earliest surviving document relative to the boundary 
settlement is dated at Zuhab in 1639, but was itself preceded by negotiation known to 
have occurred about one hundred years previously. The Zuhab treaty was followed by 
numerous attempts at further adjustments, most important in 1746 (Kurdan) 1823 and 
1847 (Erzurum), 1911 (Tehran) and 1913 (Constantinople). All of these agreements were 
accompanied by the efforts of numerous commissions and cartographers and interspersed 
with border strikes and general unrest. On one occasion there was a massacre of as many 
as 30, 3000 Persian Shi'is in Karbala when the Ottoman established their suzerainty over 
the city in 1843.'^^ 
After World War I the fate of this territory was taken up in a new series of treaties 
and conferences; the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, the Cairo conference in 1921, the Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty in 1822, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and the Anglo-Turkish Treaty in 
1926. Subsequent protocols with Iran - sought to define Iraq's frontiers with the 
neighbouring states. 
Iraq itself was assigned as a British mandate in 1920 despite widespread public 
resentment. The mandate encompassed roughly the three former Ottoman Wilayas, or 
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administrative district of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra which had been established during 
the mid-to late nineteenth century. (Kuwait was once part of the Wilaya of Basra even 
though the Ottoman never established real control there). After the Mesopotamian 
Revolt against British occupation during the summer and autumn of 1920, Britain 
decided at the Cairo Conference during March 1921 that its mandate over Iraq should be 
executed in an indirect rather than a direct manner, as had originally been intended at San 
Remo in April 1920. Such an arrangement was also expected financially.'^'' There was 
some doubt about the fate of the Wilayas of Mosul, disputed by both France and Great 
Britain. It remained a "dark incubus of uncertainity"'^'* until it was allocated to Iraq in 
1925 after much international bartering. The territorial content of the mandate was not 
finally defined until 1932. The British simultaneously brought about the enthronement of 
Faisal bin Hussain Al-Hashim as King, a position his successors inherited until the 
revolution of 1958.'**-'* 
Britain's foremost concern in the post World War I period in the Middle East was 
to secure economic and strategic interests that revolved primarily around India and 
Egypt. The founding of Jewish home in Palestine under the terms of the Balfour 
Declaration constituted political and strategic concerns. British officials felt that if they 
could control Iraq and Egypt, they could secure all these interests. A primary factor in 
the delineation of Iraq was to allow for potential railway, pipeline and air routes between 
Palestine and Mesopotamia. A glance at a map of the Middle East shows that Iraq and 
trans-Jordan together formed a strategic corridor linking the Gulf to the British mandate 
of Palestine on the Mediterranean Sea. Britain also had secondary obligations to the 
Hashmite family, which had supported Britain's was efforts and was considered a 
potentially useful political tool in the aftermath of the war. Members of this family were 
installed as leaders in the two adjoining states. Britain hoped that they would provide a 
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chain of Hashimite control across northern Arabia that would remain under the protection 
and influence of the British. 
Iraq's northern region, including Mosul, had originally included territory the 
French hoped to control. It became a major issue between the two mandatory powers. 
When the British realized that Russia would not have a common border with Iraq after 
the war, they sought to include Mosul within Iraqi territory, promising France 10 percent 
of any oil revenues derived from the region or part ownership in any of concession. 
Although recent studies have stressed that the British government recognized the 
potential of Mosul's oil resources, London was alt least as concerned about the economic 
and political viability of Iraq as a state. British authorities worried in particular lest the 
waters of the Tigris be drawn off before reaching lower Iraq and lest the civil 
administration lose its revenue from tobacco, wood and grain - commodities that were 
produced in the north but were scarce or lacking altogether in the south. 
The justification for the delimitation of Iraq's southern border involved radically 
different concern. A straight line through the desert was delineated by the British on the 
initial assumption that thus region was largely uninhabited, but large and powerful tribes 
and tribal confederation moved throughout the territories now included within Syria, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Ever since the mid twentieth century, negotiations have 
continued over the formal legal status of many of these boundaries Iraq, for example, laid 
claim to all of Kuwait as recently as 1961'^* and to its islands of Warba and Bubiyan in 
1973 on the historical grounds that they were all formerly part of the Basra Wilaya; it 
settled the issue of the Neutral zone with Saudi Arabia only in 1975, and signed an 
additional boundary agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1981 to which two protocols were 
appended in February 1982.'*^ The celebrated Algiers Declaration of 1975 between Iraq 
and Iran was one of a long series of efforts to establish secure borders and to adapt to the 
ever-changing economic and political needs of the states concerned. Perhaps motivated 
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by a desire to consolidate support from other Arab governments during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Iraq since 1980 has settled some of its outstanding boundary issues with, for example, 
Jordan, with which it had discussions in 1980-81 and signed an agreement over their 
international border in 1984. 
One of Iraq's immediate responses to the unleashing of hostilities against it on 16 
January 1991 had been to cancel all charters and agreements concluded since 1968 with 
Saudi Arabia, from whose soil the allied attack had been launched. Iraq argued that Saudi 
Arabia had thereby violated several existing agreements, most prominently the 27 March 
1989 'Agreement on non-interference in internal affairs and the non-use of force between 
the Republic of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'.'^° It must be presumed that 
among the list of instruments 'cancelled' were the border agreements of July 1975 and 
December 1981, by which the two sides had agreed to partition their rhomboid-shaped 
neutral zone (originally established with the conclusion of the December 1922 Uqair 
protocol) and to smoothen and straighten out the whole of the land boundary further 
west.'^' 
Thus it is evident that the Prime factor affecting Iraqi foreign policy is the 
relationship between Iraq's turbulent political past and Western attempts to impose 
boundaries as political solutions for Western problems. At least twelve states have 
appeared as newly created political entities in the Arabian Peninsula since World War I: 
almost without exception, subsequent acceptance of their borders by native inhabitants 
was accompanied by turmoil. Some areas to contested that boundaries remained totally 
undefined, while neutral zones between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Saudi 
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For text see Ehteshami and Nonneman, 1991, op. cit., p.l65. 
For translated texts of the 1975 and 1981 agreements see Schofield, Richard (ed.), 'Arabian Boundary 
Disputes', Vol. 6, Saudi Arabia-Iraq, Archive Edition, Farnham Common, 1992, p:785-809. Although 
the exchange of ratification of the 26 December 1981 Saudi-Iraqi border treaty took place in Febuary 
1982, it took until June 1991 for the text of the treaty (with border coordinates) to be registered with 
the United Nations and even then, this was done unilaterally by Saudi Arabia. The feeling persists that 
Saudi Arabia would not have bothered to take this action, were it not for the Iraqi statement of 21 
January 1991, canceling all bilateral agreements concluded with the kingdom since 1968. For Saudi 
Arabia had shown no inclination previously to register its border treaties with their coordinates at the 
United Nations. For further details see Schofield, Richard (ed.) Territorial Foundations of the Gulf 
States, UGL Press, London, 1993, Chapter 1. 
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Arabia evolved as the only workable solution to intractable political problems. One study 
has estimated that there have been at least twenty-two active boundary disputes in the 
region since 1900'^ ^ and no fewer than twenty-one instances in which redress was sought 
by military means. As such. International boundaries have negotiating table, and the 
outcome of the long fought Iran-Iraq hot war is equally a temporary and arbitrary 
political solution which is bound to re-erupt any moment. 
As a matter of fact, the two main sources of contention between the Government 
of Iraq and Kuwait were a dispute about the frontiers between the two states, and another 
on the rights to the production of oil from Rumaillah oilfield. In addition to that there 
was the old Iraqi interest in securing an outlet to the waters of the Gulf which had been 
denied them because of the way in which the boundaries between the two countries were 
drawn by the representative of the British Government in 1922. 
The nub of the problem with Kuwait in Baghdad's eyes was the open flouting of 
the OPEC output quota by Kuwait (as well as United Arab Emirates). Overproduction by 
these states in the spring of 1990 depressed the oil price well below OPEC's reference 
price of $18 a barrel, fixed in November 1989. During a closed session of the 
extraordinary Arab summit in Baghdad in 30 May the Iraqi President addressed the 
gathering on the subject. He alluded to the failure by some of Arab brothers to abide by 
the OPEC decisions when they flooded the world market with more oil than it needed, 
thereby enabling clients to buy below the fixed (OPEC) price. He added that 'for every 
US dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil the Iraqi loss amounted to $1 billion 
annually'. The total loss to the oil-producing Arab countries was manifold. After urging 
that the matter be viewed from 'a pan-Arab angle', he said, 'War is fought with soldiers 
and harm is done by explosion, killing and coup attempts, but it is also done by economic 
means sometimes'. He added, 'I say to those who do not mean to wage war on Iraq, that 
this is in fact a kind of war against Iraq. Were it possible we would have endured.... But 
Lenore, Greenschlag Martin, A Systematic Study of Boundary Disputes in the Persian Gulf, 1900 to 
Present, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979. 
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I say that we have reached a point where we can no longer withstand pressure'.'^'' The 
Iraqi leader knew well the efficacy of the economic tool. During the First Gulf War, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had succeeded in damaging Iran's economy by causing an oil 
price collapse from over $30 a barrel in late November 1985 to under $ 10 i9n early April 
1986 by flooding the market. Tehran never recovered sufficiently from this near-fatal 
blow to its economy to wage its war with Baghdad vigorously. Iraq's economy suffered, 
too, but unlike Iran, it received substantial financial and other aid from Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait - not to mention the 13S and other Western nations to withstand the oil price 
crash. "^ '^  
Now Saddam Hussein's plea seemed to have fallen on deaf ears. Overproduction 
continued, and depressed the price to $ 11 a barrel in June, a level of which Iraq's oil 
income was barely enough to meet current expenses, leaving nothing to meet the 
repayments of foreign loans or pay for minimum reconstruction that was needed in late 
June a desperate Saddam Hussein sent a personal message to the Kuwaiti Emir, warning 
him to Kuwait's excess output (of 600,000 b/d over OPEC's quota of 1.5 mb/d) as it was 
having a negative impact on Iraq and OPEC's vital interests'. He addressed a similar 
missive to the ruler of UAE.'^ ^ Iraq's deputy Prime Minister, Sadoun Hamadi, told 
Kuwaiti officials that the oil price needed to be raised to $ 25 a barrel. 
To resolve the worsening problem, Saddam Hussein proposed a summit meeting 
of the Arab Gulf members of OPEC: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Having agreed to the idea of such a gathering in principle. King Fahd tried to rally 
fellow-monarchs against Iraq's move to raise the petroleum price to $ 25 a barrel, aware 
that a high oil price was detrimental to the economy of the West, particularly America, 
whose interests were dear to the Saudi royal family for political and personal reasons. 
' " Baghdad Radio, 18 July 1990. 
"•^  Hiro, The Longest War, p. 175; Daniel Yergin, Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power, 
Simon and Schuster, New York and London, 1991, pp. 749-50. 
" ' Foreign Broadcast Information service, 28 June 1990, New York Times, 28 June 1990. Pierre Salinger 
with Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War, Penguin Books. 
Harmondsworth, 1991, p. 32. 
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Two day before the meeting of the oil ministers of the Arab Gulf members of 
OPEC on 11 July 1990, Iraqi intelligence secured the intercepts of a telephone 
conversation between the Saudi king and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa ibn Hamad al 
Thani. To Saddam Hussein, these tapes established conclusively that the two rulers were 
plotting against Iraq's interests (See Appendix -1). 
The meeting of the petroleum ministers of Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE held in Jeddah on 11 July went some way towards the Iraqi objective of $ 25 a 
barrel. It unanimously urged OPEC to freeze the ceiling on the overall output of 22.1 
mb/d to help raise the price per barrel from $ 14 to the $ 18 target which had been set in 
November 1989.'^ ^ However, on 13 July, this stand was repudiated by the Kuwaiti oil 
minister, thus rekindling Saddam Hussein's apprehension, built up over many months, 
that the Gulf monarchs were lining up against Iraq's economic interests. On 9 July, the 
day the Saudi and Qatari rulers agreed to undermine Saddam Hussein's proposal for 
summit, the Kuwaiti government welcomed the foreign minister to resume the ferry 
service with Iran while continuing to stall Baghdad's suggested resumption of air travel 
between Iraq and Kuwait also upset Iraqi govemment.'^^ Equally disturbing to Baghdad 
was the visit to Cairo on 14 July by President Haflz Assad of Syria - an arch - rival of 
Saddam Hussein who had aided with Iran during the First Gulf War - after an interval of 
thirteen years. It went down badly with the Iraqi President and cooled his relationship 
with President Mubarak. 
While the threat of Israel appeared to be rising support for Iraq from fellow Arab 
countries seemed to be declining - a process in which, according to Saddam Hussein, 
America and Britain played important roles. In an interview he said: 'British and US 
diplomats are combing the Gulf warning rulers to fear Iraq.' '^ ^ 
On 15 July Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, sent a letter to Chadli Klibi, the 
Arab League Secretary-general in which he complained about the oil policies of Kuwait 
"* Wall Street Journal, 12 July 1990. 
'"^  AlThawra,2\ July 1990. 
'^ * Wall Street Journal, 28 June 1989. 
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and the UAE and laid specific territorial and financial claims against Kuwait. "Precisely 
since Iraq began to raise its voice calling for regaining the Arab's rights in Palestine and 
drawing attention to the dangers of the American presence in the Gulf, the Kuwaiti 
government began to adopt an unjust policy aimed at harming.... Iraq, wrote Tariq Aziz. 
'The government of the United Arab Emirates participated with the Kuwaiti government 
in this regard'. The oil glut created by these stats, he continued, had caused the price to 
fall below OPEC's minimum price of $ 18 a barrel - to between $ 11 and $ 13 a barrel. 
Since a drop of $ 1 in the price of barrel of oil lead to a drop of $ 1 billion in Iraqi 
revenues annually'. He argued Baghdad had lost many billion of dollars due to the 
policies of Kuwait and the UAE. Despite the Iraqi President's appeal to these states at 
the Baghdad summit (in late May) they had continued the policy of overproduction of oil. 
"We have no choice but to deduce that he who deliberately, directly and openly adopts 
this policy or he who supports or instigate it, is implementing part of the imperialist-zone 
plan against Iraq and the Arab nation", he stated. 
Secondly, Tariq Aziz added, since 1980 Kuwait had been extracting oil from the 
Iraq Rumeila oilfield' (which extended three miles into Kuwait) and based on the prices 
between 1980 and 1990, the oil stolen by the Kuwaiti government from the Rumeila 
oilfields.... Amounts to $ 2.4 billion (at the rate of 25,0(X) b/d). Finally, he summarized 
Iralq's assessment of the Iran-Iraq war and the financial aid it had received from the Gulf 
states to conduct it. "The war which Iraq was obliged to wage was not only inte4nded to 
defend Iraq's sovereignty, but also to defend the eastern flank of the homeland, especially 
the Arabian Gulf region", Tariq Aziz wrote. "This was confirmed by the Gulf leaders 
themselves in the strongest words. 'In a war that hasted eight years, the value of the 
military hardware for which Iraq paid currency....amounted to $ 102 billion. Because the 
conflict severely disrupted Iraq's petroleum production (of 3.6 mb/d before the war) and 
exports Baghdad lost $ 106 billion in oil revenue. Among the countries that benefited 
from the decrease in Iraqi oil exports were Kuwait and the UAE. How can these amounts 
(i.e.; the interest-free loans from Kuwait and the UAE to Iraq up to 1982) be regarded as 
Iraqi debts to its Arab brothers when Iraq made sacrifices that are many times more than 
these debts in terms of Iraqi resources during the grinding war and offered rivers of blood 
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of its youth in defence of the (Arab) nations' soil, dignity, honour and wealth?'^^ While 
no figures were mentioned it was widely believed that Kuwait's interest free loans (in 
cash and oil counter sales) to Iraq amounted to $ 10 to $ 14 billion.^ *'^  
Two days later, in a television speech on the 22"^ * anniversary of the Baathist 
coup, Saddam Hussein issued a public warning to the Arab countries conspiring with the 
US to hurt Iraq. He distinguished between the 'old method' of military means and the 
'new method' of economic warfare. 'This new method, which has appeared within the 
ranks of the Arabs seeks to cut off livelihood while the old method, which has already 
been contained (by Iraq), sought to cut off neck, the Iraqi leader said. At the behest of 
the US, certain Arab states had deliberately overproduced oil in defiance of the willof the 
OPEC majority. As a result of the fall in oil prices from $ 27 - $ 28 a barrel which 
prevailed 'not very long ago' Iraq had been loosing a $ 14 bn a year. 'Raising our voices 
against the evil (of overproduction) is not the final report if the evil continues, he warned. 
'There should be some effective act to restore things to their correct position. Iraqis will 
not forget the saying "Cutting necks is better than cutting the means of living". He then 
went on to explain why the US was increasing 'at high rates corresponding to its 
increased demand', and 'now that it has the opportunity, the United States is determined 
to become the only superpower without competition', it is working to guarantee the flow 
of oil to it at the cheapest price'. Moreover, the US wanted an increasing strategic 
reserve of oil' in order to withstand any disruptions caused by strife and was in the 
Middle East likely to result from America's superpower ambitions and Israel's 
expansionist reserve (of America) will not be as heavy a burden to the US Treasury as it 
would have been if bought at its true value.' Given this, Saddam Hussein argued, 'the 
policies of certain Arab rulers are American inspired and detrimental to the interests of 
the Arab nation.^"' 
While the Iraqi national Assembly backed Saddam Hussein's attack on the oil 
policies of Kuwait and the UAE, the Kuwaiti national Council, meeting in a closed 
' ' ' Baghdad Radio, 18 July 1990. 
^'^ Wall Street Journal, 18 July 1990, Guardian, 26 February 1991. 
*^" GMar<//fl/i, 19 July 1990. 
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session on 18 July, denounced Iraq's memorandum to the Arab League for 'its violation 
of the rights of neighbourliness and its shunning of the Arab AND Islamic fraternity.'^°^ 
In his reply to Iraq's letter on 19 July, Kuwait's foreign minister. Sheikh Sabah al 
Sabah, described Iraq's charges of Kuwaiti installations on Iraqi territory as 'a 
falsification of reality'. He referred to 'repeated Iraqi attempts to dig oil wells within 
Kuwaiti territories, which inflict severe damage on the reserves of the part of the 
(Rumeila) field within Kuwaiti territories'. He proposed an Arab League committee to 
settle the border dispute. Regarding the deterioration of the (oil) price he described it as 
'an international problem in which numerous sides - produces, consumers and OPEC 
members and non-members - were involved.'^ ^^ 
On 19 July 1989 the US states of department expressed 'strong commitment' to 
'supporting the individual and collective self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with 
whom we have deep and long standing ties'. The friends in this case were apparently 
Kuwait and the UAE. Baghdad took unkindly to this, with an editorial in the Baathist 
Party newspaper, Al Thawra (The Revolution), on 21 July expressing astonishment at the 
American position. To lower tension. King Fahd dispatched his foreign minister to 
mediate between Baghdad and Kuwait. And, responding to an invitation by President 
Mubarak, Tariq Aziz arrived in Cairo on 22 July. 
The next day, as Mubarak flew to Baghdad to cool tempers against the 
background of the dispatch of 30,000 Iraqi troops to the Kuwait border, Washington 
confirmed that its six warships in the Gulf, including four frigates, had been put on alert, 
and that they had joined an exercise with the UAE navy as a signal of support for the 
UAE and Kuwait.^ *^ 
^"^ Kuwait Radio, 18 July 1990. 
Ibid, 19 July 1990. In its response to the Iraqi memorandum the UAE described Iraq's attack on its oil 
policy as 'void of responsibility of the oil-producing countries inside and outside OPEC's regarding 
the fall in oil prices. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 July 1990. 
^'^ Guardian, 24 My 1990. 
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It was against this charged atmosphere that Saddam Hussein had a two-hour 
meeting with the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, in his office on 25 July. After 
receiving Glaspie's account of the meeting President Bush sent Saddam Hussein a 
'Presidential message' on 28 July via US embassy in Baghdad. In it, he reportedly told 
Saddam Hussein that the US wanted to improve relations with Iraq, but advised him 
against pursuing 'threats involving, military force or conflict' to resolve Iraq's grievances 
against Kuwait, and added that the US would 'support other friends in the region, 
meaning the moderate Gulf States.'^''^ In the meantime despite rivalries Iraq and Iran 
joined hands at the OPEC meeting in Geneva on 25 July 1989 to push for a reference 
prince of $ 21 a barrel. Assisted by Saudi Arabia, they achieved their objective. At the 
same time the overall OPEC output was raised slightly to Rs.22. mb/d, with the Iraqi 
quota fixed at 2.7 mb/d.^ °^ 
With that matter settled, regional attention once again turned to the Iraq-Kuwait 
crisis. Aware of Baghdad's animus towards his foreign minister, Sheikh Sabah al Sabah, 
the Kuwaiti Emir named Shaikh Saad al Sabah as the head of the Kuwaiti delegation to 
meet its Iraqi counterpart led by Izzat Ibrahim. The two delegations arrived in Jeddah on 
31 July with different expectations. The Iraqis came simply to secure their 'rights', 
territorial as well as financial, which included not only obtaining $ 2.4 billion for the 
Iraqi oil that Kuwait had allegedly stolen but also a loan of $ 10 billion to surmount the 
current financial crisis. The Kuwaitis arrived to haggle, intent on exploiting Iraq's 
weakened economic situation to settle once and for all what mattered most to them: 
frontier delineation.^^^ According to one version, the Kuwaiti crown prince insisted that 
they discuss the border demarcation before anything else. This angered the Iraqi leader. 
Tempers flared. 'Don't threaten us'. Shaikh Saad reportedly said to Izzat Ibrahim. 
'Kuwait has very powerful friends. You'll be forced to pay back all the money you owe 
us. This seemed in tune with the guidelines reportedly specified by the Kuwaiti Emir to 
Shaikh Saad: not to make any concessions to Iraq in the negotiations, and to remember 
that this position was based on the advice given to him by the US, Britain and Egypt. 
^"^ Washington Post, 21 October 1990. 
°^* Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Strom, Horpen Collins, London, 1992, pp.79-97. 
''' Ibid. 
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'Whatever, you hear from the Saudis and the Iraqis about Arab brotherhood and 
solidarity, don't Hsten to it, 'Stated the Kuwait Emir's memorandum of 29 July 1990 to 
Shaikh Saad.' 'Both have their own interests. The Saudis want to awaken us and exploit 
our yielding to the Iraqis so that in the future we shall yield to them the (jointly owned) 
Neutral Zone, and the Iraqis want to compensate for their war from our accounts.^°^ 
The second Iraqi letter to the Arab League had not responded to the Kuwaiti 
suggestion that the question the border's demarcation be submitted to an Arab arbitration 
tribunal. Kuwait had to wait four days longer until 25 July 1990 for Iraq's rejection of 
this initiative.^°^ At the same time the US administration leaked information to the 
Washington Post that satellite pictures showed that six Iraqi divisions, consisting or 
95,000 soldiers, were deployed near the Iraq - Kuwait frontier. These actions of the 
pentagon and the behaviour of Shaikh Saad al Sabah in Jeddah seem to have convinced 
Saddam Hussein that further negotiations with the Kuwaitis were futile: an assessment 
which paved the ground for the decision by the Iraqi high command on the night of 31 
July - 1 August to invade Kuwait.^'° 
The Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait in the early hours of the morning of August 
2 took the world by surprise. King Hussein was informed that the invasion had taken 
place at exactly 5.50 a.m. through a telephone call from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who 
requested that President Saddam Hussein should be urged to limit his invasion to the 
extent of the disrupted boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait until the whole dispute could 
be resolved peacefully. When asked b y King Hussein about where the Iraqi forces were, 
he was shocked to learn that they were approximately six kms from Kuwait city and still 
moving in. Iraq's borders and airspace were closed and all attempts to telephone the Iraqi 
President failed until he returned His Majesty's calls just after midday on August 2, His 
Majesty was informed that in response to a measured approach from Arab governments 
"°* Guardian, 15 February 1991, Citing the Amman-based Al-Rai, 14 February 1991. 
^°' Etheshami, A. and Nonneman, G., War and Peace in the Gulf, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p.75. 
According to PLO sources, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait was taken around midnight 
on 31 July - 1 August 1990, Independent, 2 October 1990. 
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and out to threats provocation, or condemnation. Iraqi foOrces (by now essentially in 
occupation of all of Kuwait) would begin to withdraw from Kuwait within days and 
complete their withdrawal within weeks.^" 
Us Security Council's Resolutions 
The 15 members UN Security Council adopted 12 resolutions on the Gulf crisis 
between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the expiry of its deadline for 
Iraqi withdrawal at 0500 GMT on January 16. The first came only after the invasion with 
a demand that Baghdad withdraw from the Emirates immediately. Four days later the 
Council imposed stringent economic sanctions. To enforce these, the Council on August 
25 imposed air embargo. It took two more months - until November 29 - for members to 
adopt a US proposal demanding Iraq withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 or face 
the threat of war. 
Following the summaries of the resolutions: 
1. August 2, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 660, condemned Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait and demanded Baghdad withdraw its forces. The vote was 14 to 0 
with Yemen not participating. 
2. August 6, 1990 - The Coimcil, in resolution 661, imposed, stringent sanctions 
on all trade so and from Iraq except for medicine and in humanitarian 
circumstances, foodstuff. The veto was 13 to 0 with Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining. 
3. August 9, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 662, unanimously declared Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait null and void. 
4. August 18, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 664, unanimously demanded Iraq 
allow foreign nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait and rescind its order to close 
diplomatic missions in Kuwait. 
211 See White Paper, Jordan and the Gulf Crisis August 1990-March 1991, The Government of 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, August 1991, 4, pp. 2-3. 
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5. August 25, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 665, permitted states to use 
limited naval force to ensure compliance with the economic sanctions, 
including the right to inspect cargoes. 
6. September 13, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 666, approved food 
shipments to fraq and Kuwait for humanitarian purposes, but only if 
distributed by approved international groups. The vote was 13 to 2 with Cuba 
and Yemen opposing. 
7. September 16, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 667, unanimously condemned 
raids by Iraqi troops on French and other diplomatic missions in occupied 
Kuwait. 
8. September 24, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 669, unanimously adopted a 
procedural measure entrusting its sanctions committee to evaluate requests for 
assistance from countries suffering because of the trade embargo. 
9. September 25, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 670 prohibited air traffic with 
Iraq and occupied Kuwait except in humanitarian circumstances. The Vote 
was 14 to 1 with Cuba opposing. 
10. October 29, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 674, asked states to document 
financial losses and human rights violations from the invasion. The vote was 
13 to 0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. 
11. November 28, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 677, unanimously asked the 
UN Secretary-General to safeguard copy of Kuwait's pre-invasion population 
register. 
12. November 29, 1990 - the Council, in resolution 678, authourised States 'to 
use all necessary means" against Iraq unless it withdraw from Kuwait on or 
before January 15, the vote was 12 to 2. China abstained. Cuba and Yemen 
voted against. 
On January 3, 1991 the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey during a 
one-day trilateral meeting in Islamabad, called for a total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait and for the full restoration of Kuwait's independence and sovereignty in 
accordance with US Security Council resolutions and the organization of Islamic 
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Conference (OIC) declaration. The Ministers called upon the Secretary-General of the 
OIC to undertake every conceivable effort, including an emergency meeting, to promote 
a peaceful solution to the crisis. 
On January 4, 1991, Iraq agreed to send Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to meet 
Secretary of State Baker in Geneva,^ '"* and on January 8 as Mr. Baker and Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tariq Aziz arrived in Geneva, Mr. Bush, in a television address, called Mr. 
Baker's mission "perhaps the final chance" to resolve the conflict peacefully. On the 
way to Geneva, Mr. Baker met with allies in France, Germany and Italy. Mr. Bush called 
on the US Congress to adopt a resolution stating that it "supports the use of all necessary 
means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678". In a letter to Congressional 
leadership, Mr. Bush said that such a resolution "would send the clearest possible 
message to Mr. Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from 
Kuwait".^'^ 
On January 9, 1991 Mr. Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz held talks in 
Geneva which lasted for six and one-half hours and at a news conference following the 
talks, Mr. Baker stated that "regrettably... I heard nothing that suggested to me Iraqi 
flexibility whatsoever on complying with the UN Security Council Resolution". He also 
said the Mr. Aziz refused to accept a letter from Mr. Bush to Mr. Hussein. In Baghdad, 
Mr. Hussein told a Baath party meeting the "we will make them (Americans) swim in 
their own blood" if war starts. Mr. Bush, in a press conference,, pointed out that while he 
is "discouraged" about the outcome of the talks he will "continue to try to reach out" to 
Mr. Hussein, "want to go the extra mile for peace", he said. "But Mr. Hussein doesn't 
move, UN Resolution 678 will be fully complied with".^''' 
On January 12, 1990 the US Congress by a 250 to 183 vote in the House and 52 
to 47 in the Senate - passed a joint resolution that give Mr. Bush full authority to use US 
' ' ^ The Times of India, New Delhi, 4 January 1991. 
The Times of India, New Delhi, 5 January 1991. 
The Times of India, New Delhi, 9 January 1991. 
The Times of India, New Delhi, 10 January 1991. 
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Armed Forces to drive Iraqi resolutions.^'^ The following day on January 13, UN 
Secretary-General Javier Perz de Cuellar met Mr. Hussein for talks widely seen as the 
last chance to avert war. Emerging from three - and - a half hours of talk, Mr. De 
Cuellar said he report no progress in persuading Iraq to pull out of Kuwait by the January 
ISdeadline.^'^ 
On January 15-16, United Nations Secretary-General mate a final appeal to the 
Iraqi President "to turn the course of events away from catastrophe". In an appeal on the 
eve of the United Nations deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, Mr. Perez de 
Cuellar urged Iraq "to commence, without delay, the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait". But Iraq rejected the UN appeal.^'* 
On January 17, The United States launched air attacks against Iraq and on January 
22 - Iraq set some Kuwait oil facilities ablaze. Treaty to a jump in oil prices. The 
Coalition officials said that Iraq sabotaged Kuwait's main supertanker loading pier, 
dumping millions of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf. On February 15, 1991 - Iraq 
offered conditional pullout, but Bush dismissed it as 'cruel hoax'. On February 18 - Iraq 
foreign Minister Tariq Aziz held three-and-a-half hours of talks in Moscow with Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev and in February 22, a Soviet peace olan was revealed 
according to it Iraq was to withdraw its forces from Kuwait within 21 days of a cease-
fire. 
On February 25 - Mr. Hussein ordered his forces to withdraw from Kuwait. The 
White House reacted icily to the radio dispatch. The Iraqis score, a direct hit with scud 
missile attack on the US barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 troops and 
injuring 100. a majority of the US Security Council members insisted that Baghdad 
accept all 12 Council resolutions before a ceasefire coOuld considered. As a last blow to 
Iraq's mauled army and tank battles raged on the outskirts of Basra. Mr. Bush declared 
that "Kuwait was liberated" and that at midnight "all United States and coalition forces 
'^* The Times of India. New Delhi, 19 January 1991. 
•^ " The Times of India, New Delhi, 14 January 1991. 
The Times of India, New Delhi, 17 January 1991. 
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,,219 
will suspend offensive combat operations" and ultimately on February 28 ceasefire 
being as Iraq agreed to honour all UN resolutions on the war. 220 
The Iraqi strike against Kuwait was followed by three critical misperceptions on 
the part of Saddam Hussein. The first was Iraq's belief that the sheer magnitude of her 
military power would smother any military response from the Gulf and Arab states. The 
second was the belief that she could divert the ire of the Gulf States from Iraq to Zionist 
Israel. And third, Saddam appeared reasonably certain that a recession hit USA could not 
and would not interfere militarily on behalf of an insignificant Kuwait. A number of 
political commentators and analysis have alleged that the US had deliberately misled 
Saddam Hussein into this misperception. They have alluded to a possible conspiracy and 
have put together fairly formidable evidence in support of a theory that the USA had 
planned to go to war to establish her credibility in the eyes of the world, in collusion with 
other major powers like the UK and USSR. The Executive Intelligence Review of July 
20, 1990, vol. 17, No. 20 made startling disclosures that The USA was conducting high 
level secret talks with Israel on launching a war against Iraq. This 'Conspiracy Theory' 
was supported by Helga Graham in the "Observer' (Lx)ndon) of 21 October 1990, Patrick 
Cockbum in 'Independent' (London) October 1, 1990 Henry Schaler, in Arab Oil and 
Gas Journal of 1 March 1990, Efrain Karsh and Inari Rautsi in 'Survival' of 
January/February of 1991. The origin of this 'Conspiracy Theory' lies in transcripts of 
taped conversations between the American Ambassador Ms. April Glaspie and President 
Saddam Hussein of 25 July 1990, released by Iraq in September 1990 (the United States 
has not released its own transcript). During a meeting between the two, on 25 July 
1990, she is alleged to have hinted that the USA would not interfere in an Arab versus 
Arab conflict and that the US had no military commitment to Kuwait. Other sources 
allege that the USA was not averse to raising oil prices to $ 25 a barrel. "Apparently 
reassured of American neutrality, Hussein preceded to the last stage of his plan".^ ^^ 
The Times of India, New Delhi, 29 February 1991. 
For a Chronology of war events and UN Resolutions see Annexure III and IV. 
Efrain Karsh and Inari Rautsi, 'Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait'. Survival, January/February, 
1991, p. 27. 
' " Ibid.,Y>.2%. 
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It was also on the 25 July 1990 that the US Ambassador in Baghdad, April C. 
Glaspie uttered her famous assurance to Iraqi President Saddam Husain, 'We (the US} 
have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with 
Kuwait.'^ ^^ 
George Bush froze assets in the United States soon after the invasion occurred, 
and Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a statement 
condemning the invasion from Moscow.^ '^^  Bush then met Thatcher in Aspen, 
Colorado. At the time, he did not believe that Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia and was 
leaning against a military response. However, Thatcher argued that Iraq would invade 
and that the only option was to send troops to the region. This established an Anglo-
American cooperation that would be the core of the Coalition. Given their reticence 
concerning the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis were approached 
cautiously. Cheney and Powel discussed a coalition force with the Saudi Ambassador, 
and when Bush learned that the Saudis were not going to permit the deployments, he let 
them see satellite photographs of Iraqi forces amassing for an invasion along their border. 
The king reversed his stand and accepted the troop deployments.^ ^^ Support was solicited 
from other Arab nations, and the Soviets agreed to honour the sanctions against Baghdad 
and to halt further arms sales. Japan and China agreed to boycott Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. 
Turkey given its proximity to Iraq faced a difficult situation, but with firm assurances, it 
joined the Coalition and closed the oil pipeline to Iraq on August 7*.^ ^^ 
For over 43 days the coalition air force prosecuted an air war, the likes of which 
these never been witnessed before. "The Iraqi Air force, the sixth largest and most 
expensive Air Force in the world, collapsed on January 26 after producing nothing for its 
nation, either defensively or offensively".^ '^' "The US may have emerged from the Gulf 
War as the only military super power as well as the only country capable of forging and 
^" Draper, T., 'The Gulf War Reconsidered' in the New York Review of Books, 16 January 1992, pp.46-
53; Scionlino, E., The Outlaw State: Saddam Husain's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis, John 
Wiley, New York, 1991. 
'^ •^  Margaret G. Warner, 'The Moscow Connection', Newsweek, September 17, 1990, p. 24. 
^ '^ Michael Kramer, 'Read My Lips', Time, August 20, 1990, pp. 21. 25. 
-^ * Russel Watson, 'Baghdad's Bully', Newsweek, August 13, 1990 pp. 17-21. 
"^ Gulf War, US News and World Report. 11 February 1991. 
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leading a coalition of diverse nations, but it was clear it could not execute the war without 
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financial help from Japan, Germany and the oil-producing allies". 
The calculations of Saddam Hussein did not achieve any of his major goals; he 
did not retain Kuwait, he did not obtain financial resources to offset against his $80 
billions debt (a major cause of his invasion), he did not get any revision of the boundary 
between Kuwait and Iraq, he did not mobilize a sustained or credible popular following 
in the Arab and Islamic worlds. He remains in power, but as far as the regional and 
international situation is concerned, he is much weakened; he has discredited himself in 
the eyes of many Arabs, for failure and for bomb blast, and remains in almost complete 
diplomatic isolation. No other state in the world sides with Iraq or provides significant 
help. In most respects, the war, in the destruction it brought, and the consequences, was a 
major defeat, for more so than the eight-year war with Iran. The sense of Iraqi patriotism 
which he mobilized against (Imam) Khomeini was exhausted by the time the second 
conflict with Kuwait, begun: the reply of his people was the mass insurrection of March 
1991, in which it is likely that more people were killed than in the war with the USA. 
The war widely divided the Arab world and, less expectedly the Islamic world. 
Certainly, the division into anti-Saddam and neutral states was severe during the war, but 
those states that refused to back fully the Desert Strom Operation (it would be 
emphasized non backed Iraq and all condemned the occupation of Kuwait itself) did so 
because of popular and/or Ba'thist pressure from within their own countries or following, 
Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, the PLO. These states, to repeat, did not support Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait but tried to get Saddam to withdraw by diplomatic means; they 
were as disappointed as anyone when he refused to listen to them. Lieutenant General Ali 
Abdulla Saleh, President of the Republic of Yemen has asserted that Yemen did not 
support the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This was also proved upon the passing of time. 
Such a stand was distorted may be in a premeditated way to affront the close brotherly 
relations between the two countries and peoples in Yemen and Kuwait, he said. 
" ' Susumu, Awanohara, 'The Test of War', Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 March 1991 
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The President, in an interview with the Kuwait "Al-Watun" Newspaper, went on 
to say: "Yemen was against the war because it perceived its consequences and 
jeopardizes against the Arab Nation. It constantly affirmed the importance of Iraq's 
commitment to implement the Security Council's resolutions pertaining to the Gulf Crisis 
and War and to positively deal with, so as to enable the Iraqi people bring into an end the 
economic embargo imposed upon". He affirmed that the relations between our country 
and its brothers in Gulf are good and boosted continuously. "We do not have differences 
or a problem with our fratemals in Kuwait and traces and vestiges of the Gulf crisis and 
war should be eliminated". He added. 
Regarding the Yemeni-Saudi relations Mr. President said, they are close and 
developed relations, adding that works of committees formed in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding on resolving the borders problems between the two 
countries are progressing in a good way, which the two sides feel satisfied with. 
He considered the restoration of Kuwait-Jordanian relations as excellent 
restoration of Arab solidarity. The presence of Yemen in Gulf cooperation Council is a 
natural thing, because Yemen is the Strategic historic, geographical depth and human 
stockpile for its brothers in the Arab Gulf and Peninsula, he said. 
He denied threats of any sort against oil companies either in the northern or 
southern Govern orates of the Republic. Mr. President further affirmed that Yemen is 
with the peace process and champions all efforts exerted for the achievement of peace in 
the Region. "Yemen is with the equitable and comprehensive peace with which wants 
the restoration of Arab rights and eliminates Israeli occupation of Arab lands in Palestine, 
the Gowlan Heights and South Lebanon, guaranteeing the erection of an independent 
Palestinian state with its capital Jerusalem", he said.^ ^^ 
In an article in Newsweek magazine of November 26, 1990, US President George 
Bush presented three reasons for US involvement in the war: one, to administer 
For details see Annexure - II. 
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exemplary punishment to Saddam Hussein for Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, 
two, to ensure oil supply from the region for the United States and other consumer and 
three, to create a world in which American and others can live free from fear.^ ""^  The US 
was obviously capitalizing on the changing world perception of its long-time adversary, 
the Soviet Union. By flexing its military muscles in the Gulf and concentrating the 
largest ever military force since the Vietnam War, Washington announced to the world, 
clearly and loudly, that the days of a US-centric unipolar power system had arrived.^^' In 
a broadcast to the nation soon after the war was over, George Bush stated: "The Vietnam 
syndrome - the legacy of self-doubt and disunity has been kicked out forever"^^^ By 
restricting Israel from taking any pre-emptive or retaliatory measures against Iraq, the US 
had also highlighted Israel's vulnerability to pressures from Washington.^ ^^ 
"° Goyal, 'NAM: Poor Response, World Focus, New Delhi, Vol. 12, No. 53. 
" ' Kumar, Jeevan D., 'The Kuwait Crisis: Role of NAM', in Pasha, A.K. (ed.) The Gulf Turmoil: A 
Global Response Perspective, p. 143. 
7 'bid. 
"^ Kumarswamy, P.R. 'Israel and US: Conflict and Convergence' in Pasha A.K. (ed.), The Gulf in 
Turmoil: A Global Response, Op. Cit, p. 313. 
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ANNEXURE-I 
Fahd 
Khalifa 
Fahd 
Khalifa 
Fahd 
Khalifa 
Fahd 
Khalifa 
Fahd 
Khalifa 
Fahd 
Conversation between Saudi King and Amir of Qatar 
We have had enough: Israel threatens Iraq and now Iraq threatens Israel. 
New we're back to the same old story of (President) Nasser before 1967 
(Arab-Israel war). We want to think the matter over. 
1 shall always be with you. 
1 wanted to tell you that I told Hisham (Nazer, Saudi Oil Minister) to tell 
his brothers not pay attention to what the Iraqi minister said. Iraq is in 
trouble. There's a sensitive situation between Iraq and Israel.... The 
important thing is that we put everything in order during these two months 
(until September) especially when things become quiet and we follow a 
defensive stand. Two months are left to us. As Gulf states, we shall meet 
and organize matters. The same applies to Iraq. The Iraqis have lost their 
temper.... And you know when someone loses his temper his speech is 
unreasonable. 
True, their speech is unreasonable. 
We don't want that. 
I am sure it is unreasonable. 
We don't want problems with Israel. We don't want problems with Iran. 
True 
But we are envied as Gulf States. Yet where were those who now envy us 
when we were poor. They did not say our brothers have nothing. 
No, they did not.... 
All I want to do is stop the bad temper. When things become quite it will 
be easy to Iraq. Saddam thinks highly of you. All we must do is to stop 
this bad temper. I told my minister to meet their minister in Iraq 
tomorrow. Before you meet with Iraq, all of us must agree (on policy) as 
Gulf ministers. Keep quiet even if the Iraqi minister says something bad. 
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These people the Iraqis, have got themselves into a problem with Israel, 
but they have nothing to do with Israel. 700 kilometers separate them 
from Israel. The matters must be settled wisely.... 
Fahd : They (Iraqis) have given themselves the same problems as Nasser, and he 
could not solve them. How we fight the whole world? Between (the two 
of) us, I think the Palestinians have pushed matters too far. They are 
losing nothing. 
Khalifa : True 
Fahd : I hope Abu Ammar (i.e. Yasser Arafat) will be reasonable I told our 
brothers, the Palestinians, that we will do our best so that they might not 
lose the West bank and Gaza. I don't want to see the West Bank and Gaza 
lost by sheer words. 
Khalifa : That'd be disastrous. 
King Fahd then pointed out that the Iraqis proposing the summit conference for a time 
when Shaikh Khalifa would be away. 
Fahd : (Continuing) As a principle, when they mentioned that idea I said it can't 
be. Let oil ministers meet first, and discuss with one another. It will be 
better if ministers of oil, foreign affairs and finance meet in every country 
to discuss the matters from all political financial, social and oil aspects. 
Khalifa : True 
Fahd : At that time you might think of a summit meeting. But don't think of 
holding a summit if there's a chance of failure. 
Khalifa : And Kuwait? 
Fahd : Probably our brothers, the Iraqis will agree to discuss the idea of a summit 
meeting. 
Khalifa : God be praised. 
Fahd : It's easy to start a conflict but it is very difficult to stop it. Israel is our 
number one nightmare. It has 200 nuclear warheads and 47 atom bombs. 
Its people are crazy. All out Palestinian brothers have to do is to do their 
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best, and we will help them. They have got to put their hand on the West 
Ban and Gaza. They don't have to go to the extreme. In that case Israel 
would make them real colonies. 
Khalifa : We have to gain one position after another. 
*Source : Cited in John Bulloch and Harvey Moris, Saddam's War: The Origins of 
the Kuwait Crisis and International Response, Faber, London and Boston 
1991, pp. 143-46. The reference to the meeting in September pertained to 
the annual GCC summit. 
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CHAPTER-V 
UNITED NATIONS AND KUWAIT - IRAQ WAR 
The Iraqi entry and attempt of occupation of Kuwait was the first instance since 
the founding of the United Nations in which one Member State sought to completely 
overpower and annex another nation. The United Nations has demonstrated its for-
reaching ability to act as powerful instrument for international peace and security through 
its sustained and decisive response to kaq's advance in Kuwait. The breadth of actions 
taken by the United Nations in more than five years of work-from the immediate, intense 
worldwide diplomatic activity aimed at ensuring universal support for the restoration of 
Kuwaiti sovereignty, to the ongoing challenge of building long-term peace and stability 
in the region - have confirmed the extraordinary relevance of the United Nations in 
addressing the most complex political issues facing the international community. It was 
the starting point of a full review and reversal of U.S. policy toward Iraq, which over the 
previous decade had been indulgent towards Saddam's dictatorship, taking Iraq's side in 
Its war agamst Iran. 
The United Nations' central role began at the very outset of the crisis. Within 
hours of the Iraqi entry on 2 August 1990, the Security Council met to demand Iraq's 
withdrawal from Kuwait. Acting incrementally in addressing Iraq's aggression and its 
aftermath, the Council by late November had adopted 12 resolutions under Chapter VII 
of the Charter covering various aspects of the situation. No other crisis in the history of 
the United Nations had elicited such attention and action from the council in such a 
compressed span of time. The international outcry extended to the General Assembly, 
where virtually all Member States participating in the general debate during September 
and October 1990 deplored the invasion and occupation of Kuwait and called for the 
restoration of Kuwait's Government and respect for its territorial integrity. 
Chehab, Zaki, Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency, I.B.Tauris: London, 2006, p. 74. 
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There were many who questioned the nature and extent of the US-led response to 
Saddam's invasion. According to John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, there were those who 
saw the crisis as principally a US affair, focusing on the United States' desire to establish 
its domination of the Gulf; and yet a remarkable international consensus backed the 
American position, reflected in numerous UN resolutions and in the decision of more 
than twenty countries to participate, alongside US forces, in the international coalition 
confronting Saddam. Even Iraq's nominal supporters, the PLO, Jordan and Yemen, did 
not condone the annexation.^ "^ "^  
Pursuant to requests from Kuwait and the United States, the Security Council 
convened within hours of the initial reports of Iraq's invasion and unanimously adopted 
resolution 660 (1990), in which, invoking articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, it condemned the invasion, demanded that Iraq immediately and 
unconditionally with draw all its forces to the positions they had occupied the previous 
day and called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin intensive negotiations to resolve their 
differences. '^'^  Each of the five permanent members of the Council voiced opposition to 
the invasion the United States called it a "heinous act", the Soviet Union expressed 
"profound concern and alarm", France "most firmly" deplored Iraq's use of force, China 
stated that Iraqi troops should be withdrawn, and the United Kingdom said, "This is an 
ugly moment in world affairs." Each also stressed the need for negotiation. Iraq's 
representative for his part, stated that Iraqi troops had entered Kuwait solely in response 
to a request from the "Free Provisional Government of Kuwait" to assist it "to establish 
security and order so that Kuwaitis would not have to suffer", and he declared that the 
Iraqi forces would withdraw "as soon as order had been restored". Later that day, 2 
August 1990 Security General Perez de Cuellar, met with the permanent representatives 
of Kuwait and Iraq to the United Nations and appealed to the latter for full 
Bulloch, John and Harvey, Morris, Saddam's War: The Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and the 
236 
International Response, Faber and Feber Limited: London, 1991, p. xi. 
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the President of the UN, Security Council 
requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council. S/21423, 2 August 1990. 
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implementation of resolution 660 (1990).^ ^^ The outcry beyond the Security Council was 
just as strong. On 3 August 1990 the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the "brutal 
Iraqi aggression against the fraternal State of Kuwait" and called upon Iraq to withdraw 
its forces immediately and unconditionally. The League of Arab States, the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference, the European Community, other regional groups and 
individual United Nations Member State representing the breadth of world opinion also 
voiced their opposition. 
The Security Council returned to action on 6 August when it adopted resolution 
661 (1990), imposing under Chapter VII of the Charter comprehensive and mandatory 
sanctions on Iraq and deciding not to recognize any regime set up in Kuwait by the 
occupying Power. The Council also established a committee (known informally as the 
Sanctions Committee) to monitor implementation of the sanctions, which covered the 
sale and supply of all products and commodities, including weapons and other military 
equipment, as well as the transfer of funds. Exceptions to the sanctions regime were 
made for supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian 
circumstances, foodstuffs. Nonetheless, Iraq, in a letter to the Secretary-General, 
described the sanction resolution as "unjust", "Precipitous", "iniquitous" and designed to 
"starve and Iraqi people".^ "^ ^ 
On 7 August, in response to requests from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and 
other Governments in the regions, and in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, 
which recognizes Member States' "inherent right" of "individual or collective self-
defence", the United States, followed by the United Kingdom and other European 
countries, began dispatching air and naval forces to the region. This operation eventually 
237 
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UN, Security Council Resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanding the immediate 
and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces and calling for negotiations for peaceful resolution of 
their differences. S/RES/660 (1190), See Annexure - II. 
UN, Security Council resolution imposing mandatory economic Sanctions against Iraq and establishing 
a committee (the "Sanctions Committee") to monitor those sanctions. S/Res/661 (1990), 6 August 
1990, See Annexure - III. 
Letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Iraq to the Secretary-General 
concerning Security Council resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait, S/21503, 13 August 1990, See 
Annexure- IV, 
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grew into a multinational effort involving more than 30 nations. Arab participation was 
decided upon at an Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo on 10 August at 
which the League of Arab States adopted a resolution calling upon Iraq to withdraw its 
forces from Kuwait, insisting on the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government 
and starting that the League would comply with the request of Saudi Arabia and the other 
Arab States of the Gulf that "Arab forces should be deployed to assist" their armed forces 
in defending their "soil and territorial integrity against any external aggression". 
On 12 August, Kuwait wrote to the President of the Security Council and, 
invoking its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and Article 51 of the 
Charter, informed him that Kuwait "has requested some nations to take such military or 
other steps as the necessary to ensure the effective and prompt implementation of 
Security Council resolution 661 (1990).^ '*° Kuwait, whose leader has escaped their 
occupied country and issued a decree that the Government of Kuwait would be convened 
temporarily in Saudi Arabia, also forwarded a series of rep[orts rejecting Iraq's claims 
against Kuwait as well as the "Government" set up by Iraq in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti 
communications charged that Iraq, in systematically taking over the country, was 
ransacking houses, plundering public facilities and private homes alike, desecrating 
houses of worship, stealing vehicles, looting banks and businesses, terrorizing civilians 
and taking steps to alter the demographic nature of the country so as to buttress its 
political and territorial claims. 
On 7 August, Iraq had declared its "comprehensive, eternal and inseparable 
merger" with Kuwait. In an initiative announced on 12 August, President Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq linked any Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories, the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops from Lebanon, a mutual withdrawal by Iraq and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran from territory occupied during the war between those two countries, and the 
withdrawal of United States forces from the Gulf region. President Hussein proposed 
-''° Letter dated 12 August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the President of the UN, 
Security Council reporting that military assistance has been requested for implementation of resolution 
661(1990) S/21498, 13 August 1990. See Annexure V. 
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that the same principles by applied to achieving each of these withdrawals, but added that 
"prior cases of occupation" had to be resolved before, addressing the Iraq-Kuwait 
question. 
With no sign that Iraq planned to withdraw from Kuwait or otherwise comply 
with resolutions 660 (1990), the Security Council took action on three further occasions 
during the first month of the crisis. On 9 August, the Council stated in its resolution 662 
(1990) that Iraq's annexation of Kuwait had no legal validity and was "null and void". 
On 18 in resolution 664 (1990), THE CoOuncil demanded that Iraq permit and facilitate 
the departure of third-country nationals, grant immediate and continuing access of 
consular officials to them and take no action to jeopardize their safety, security or 
health. '^'^  An on 25 August, in resolution 665 (1990), the Council called upon Member 
States cooperating with Government of Kuwait which were deploying maritime forces to 
the area to use such measures as might be necessary "to halt all inward and outward 
maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to 
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in 
resolution 661 (1990)".^ ^^ 
The Council also requested Member States to use, "as appropriate", the Council's 
Military Staff Committee to coordinate their actions. Under the Charter, the Military 
Staff Committee was established to advise and assist the Council on all questions relating 
to the Council's mihtary requirements. 
The Security Council addressed the humanitarian situation in Iraq and Kuwait in 
its resolution 666 (1990), adopted on 13 September 1990, in which it instructed the 
Sanctions Committee to keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under 
241 
242 
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Ibid. 
UN, Security Council Resolution expanding the sanctions against Iraq and authorizing maritime forces 
to take "Commensurate" measures to ensure strict compliance S/RES/665 (1990) 25 August 1990. 
See Annexure VI. 
UN, Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq permit the departure of third - state nationals 
from Kuwait and Iraq S/RES/664 (1990), 18 August 1990. See Annexure VII. 
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constant review, paying particular attention to children under 15 years of age, expectant 
mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly.^ '*'* 
On 16 September, the Council responded to Iraq's decision to order the closure of 
diplomatic and consular mission in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges 
of those missions and their personnel, as well as to Iraq's abduction of foreign nationals 
who were present in these premises. In resolution 667 (1990), the Council said it was 
"outraged" at these violations, declared that such acts "stricke3s at the root of the conduct 
of international relations in accordance with the Charter", strongly condemned Iraq's 
aggressive act, demanded the immediate release of the abductees and decided to consult 
urgently on what further measures take "in response to Iraq's continued violation of 
Charter of the United Nations, of resolutions of the Security Council and of international 
law"?^^ 
On 25 September, in its resolution 670 (1990), the Security Council explicitly 
confirmed that the sanctions against Iraq applied "to all means of transport, including 
aircraft" and elaborated further measures affecting shipping and air transport. 
Specifically, the Council decided that States would "deny permission to any aircraft to 
take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or 
Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstance" and that States were to deny 
overflight permission any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, and called upon 
States to detain any ships or Iraqi registry which entered their ports and were in violation 
of the sanction resolution. 
244 UN, Security Council resolution requesting the Council's sanctions Committee to determine whether 
there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait S/RES/666 (1990), 13 
September 1990. See Annexure VIII. 
UN, Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq immediately release foreign nationals abducted 
from diplomatic premises in Kuwait or Iraq S/RES/667 (1990), 16 September 1990. See Annexure 
IX. 
UN, Security Council resolution asking the Sanctions Committee to recommend a response to States 
requesting assistance with economic problems arising from the implementation of those sanctions 
S/RES/669 (1990), 24 September 1990. See Annexure X 
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For the vote and the debate on tightening sanction against Iraq, 13 of the 
Council's 15 members, including all five permanent members, were represented at the 
Foreign Minister level - only the third time in United Nations history that Foreign 
Ministers of all permanent members had attended a Security Council meeting. In 
statements, each stressed the need for a peaceful, political settlement to the crisis (S/PV. 
2943). Mr. Perez de Cuellar also addressed the Council on 25 September emphasizing 
that the manner and scale in which the Council was employing Chapter VII enforcement 
provisions in Iraq was unprecedented and that, therefore, the United Nations needed to 
demonstrate, among other things, "that the way of enforcement is qualitatively different 
from the way of war. That it strives to minimize undeserved suffering.... And that it does 
not foreclose diplomatic efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution...." (SG/SM/4495 -
SC/5215). 
In October 1990, the Security Council returned to the issue of Kuwaiti and third 
State national, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who were being held hostage 
and/or mistreated by Iraq. In its resolution 674 (1990) adopted on 29 October 1990, the 
Council demanded that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces cease and desist from 
such actions, permit the immediate departure of the detainees and ensure their access to 
food, water and other basic services.^ "^ ^ The Council also invited States to collate 
"substantiated information" on the grave breaches by Iraq of Council decisions, the 
Charter, international law, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic and Consular Relations. Further, the Council entrusted the Secretary-General 
with making available his good offices and, "as he considers appropriate, to pursue them 
and to undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crises". 
In resolution 674 (1990), the Council also condemned Iraq for the destruction of 
Kuwaiti demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis and the relocation of 
populations in Kuwait. These actions were part of what the Council subsequently 
described, in resolution 677 (1990) of 28 November, as an attempt by Iraq to "alter the 
UN, Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq releases third-State national being held in Iraq or 
Kuwait. S/RES/674 (1990), 29 October 1990. See Annexure XI. 
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demographic composition of Kuwait".^ '** In response the Council mandated the 
Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait, "the 
authenticity of which has been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait". The 
following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait gave to the Secretary-General 
32 computer tapes containing the official population register of Kuwait as of 1 August 
1990. Under the provisions of resoluUon 674 (1990), the Secretary-General was to 
establish, in cooperation with the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules 
and Regulations governing access to and use of this register. 
Convinced of the need to apply even greater pressure on Iraq and determined to 
secure full compliance with its decisions the Security Council convened again at the 
ministerial level on 29 November 1990. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the 
Council adopted resolution 678 (1990), which contained a clear choice for Iraq. Under 
paragraph 1, the Council decided to allow Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of 
goodwill", to fully implement on or before 15 January 1991 Security Council resolution 
660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions.^''^ Should Iraq fail to do so, said the 
Council in paragraph 2, the Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait 
were authorized "to use all necessary means" - words understood to mean military force 
- to uphold and implement the resolutions and to "restore international peace and security 
in the area". The vote on resolution 678 (1990) - 12 in favour, 2 against (Cuba, Yemen) 
and 1 abstention (China) - represented only the fourth time in United Nations history that 
the Security Council had decided to authorize Member states to use military force. 
Speaking after the vote, the United States said, "Today's resolution is very clear. 
The words authorize the use of force" (S/PV. 2963). The Soviet Union said the next was 
"one last sincere attempt to give common sense a chance to prevail" but cautioned that 
there should not be "any mistake about the collective will of the international community 
"^^  UN, Security Council resolution condemning Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic composition of 
the population of Kuwait. S/RES/677 (1990), 28 November 1990. See Annexure XII. 
••" Security Council resolution authorizing Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to 
use "all necessary means to uphold and implement" the Council's resolutions on the situation unless 
Iraq fully complies with those resolutions on or before 15 January 1991. S/R#ES/678 (1990), 29 
November 1990. See Annexure XIII. 
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as expressed here, or about its resolve and its readiness to act". France said that if Iraq 
chose to remain "locked into the use of force" the Security Council had no other choice 
"but to resort to this same means, which would appear to be the only one it recognizes". 
The United Kingdom said the resolution went "the last mile in search of peace" and that 
"the military option is reality, not bluff. 
China, in explanation of its abstention from voting, said that it was neither in 
favour, because the resolution permitted the use of military action, nor against, since 
China supported the call for Iraqi compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. 
Both Yemen and Cuba, opposing the resolution, objected to the Council's authorization 
of military action that would not be subject to the command or control of the United 
Nations. 
Diplomatic Efforts 
The 45-day period between the adoption of Security Council resolution (SCR) 
678 (1990) and the deadline for Iraqi compliance saw a number of initiatives aimed at 
averting an outbreak of war. Among them were a plan (S/21986) submitted by four non-
permanent members of the Security Council (Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia and Yemen), 
separate initiatives by the Movement of the Non-Aligned countries, the League of Arab 
States and the European Community and a French proposal for an international 
conference addressing all outstanding questions relating to the Middle East. However, 
these plans lacked sufficient international support to serve as viable solutions to the crisis. 
At no point until the outbreak of military action against Iraq in January 1991 did 
Saddam Hussein evince the slightest interest in negotiated settlement involving any 
climbdown by him. Whether this represented his bottomline or simply a negotiating 
posture in a dangerous game of brinkmanship we may never know. However, his stance 
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dictated both the substance and pace of a steady escalation of UN decisions against Iraq 
culminating in SCR 678 authorizing military action.^ ^*' 
On 9 January 1991, the United States Secretary of State and Iraq's Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs held six hours of talks in Geneva. The meeting 
did not make any headway and my predecessor's subsequent mission to Iraq in the days 
that followed was carried out amid dim prospects for diplomatic breakthrough. To gain 
support for his initiative, Mr. Perez de Cuellar first held discussions with United States 
President Bush, the representative of the Non-Aligned Movement, and members of the 
European Community before flying to Baghdad. Meeting with Minister Aziz on 12 
January and with President Hussein on 13 January, the Secretary General urged full 
compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. President Hussein reiterated 
his country's positions on various issues, including its claims to Kuwait and its call for 
"an Arab solution" to the crisis, and reaffirmed the linkage Iraq had made between the 
Iraq-Kuwait situation and other Middle East questions. Returning to New York just 
before the 15 January deadline, the Secretary-General stated that the talks in Iraq had 
been "polite but, unfortunately, unsuccessful".^^' 
On the evening of 16 January 1991, President George Bush telephoned the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to express appreciation for the latter's efforts in 
seeking to find a peaceful solution to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and to inform him that United 
States fighter aircraft would soon move into action against Iraqi targets in both Iraq and 
Kuwait. In a televised address that same evening, the President stated that the countries 
with forces in the Gulf area had "exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful 
resolution" and had no choice but drive Iraq from Kuwait by force, "when peace is 
restored", said President Bush, "it is our hope that Iraq will live as peaceful and 
cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of 
the Gulf. 
Malone, David M., The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-
2005, Oxford University Press, Noida. 2006, p.64. 
See The Hindu (Madras), The Times of India (New Delhi) and Indian Express (New Delhi) January 10-
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The United States reported the launching of the miHtary offensive against Iraq to 
the President of the Security Council is a letter dated 17 January (S / 22090), stating that 
further delay would only have prolonged the suffering of the Kuwaiti people and 
increased the risks to the coalition military forces. The purpose of the actions, said the 
United States, was the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction, occupation or 
dismemberment of Iraq, and every effort would be made to minimize civilian casualties. 
Kuwait wrote to the President of the Security Council on 17 January informing him that, 
with the expiry of the deadline set by the Council in resolution 678 (1990) and Iraq's 
continuing occupation of Kuwait, Kuwait was exercising its right or self-defence and that 
Kuwaiti forces were cooperating with the forces of "fatemal and friendly states which are 
equally determined" to end the Iraqi occupation.'^ ^^ Other States, including Egypt, France, 
Italy, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, likewise reported having taken military 
action. 
The campaign of serial bombardment launched by the international coalition 
against Iraq on 16 January 1991, followed by a ground offensive into Kuwait and 
southeastern Iraq commencing on 24 February, achieved the goal of ousting Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait and reinstating the legitimate Government of Kuwait. Iraq's agreement on 
27 February to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions led the 
coalition to suspend its military operations and created the long-sought opportunity to 
restore international peace and security to the region. 
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) represents one of the most complex and 
far-reaching sets of decisions ever taken by the Council. The end of hostilities was to 
usher in important new negotiations within the Security Council on the terms of 
Hussein's surrender, resulting in the adoption on April 3, of SCR 687, which came to be 
known as the 'Mother of all Resolutions' in mockery of Saddam Hussein's description of 
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the President of the Security Council stating 
that, deadline of resolution 678 (1990) having expired, it was exercising its right to self-defence with 
the cooperation of friendly states. S/22094. 17 January ] 991. See Annexure XIV. 
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Desert Storm as the 'Mother of All Battles.'^ ^^ The Resolution was conscious of the need 
for demarcation of the said boundary.^ '^* The longest text ever adopted by the Council, it 
sought to involve Iraq cooperatively in post-war measures to build lasting peace and 
stability in the region. At the same time, enforcement measures remained in effect, 
including the sanctions regime and the Council's authorization to Member States to use 
"all necessary means" to uphold Iraqi compliance. Implementation of resolution 687 
(1991) sent the United nations into uncharted territory in many areas, among them the 
Organization's work is demarcating the international boundary between Kuwait and Iraq 
its collaboration with the IAEA in the nuclear area, its administration of a compensation 
fund and the use by the Security Council of subsidiary bodies such as the Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) and the Sanctions Committee. The focus on the elimination of 
WMD as a key objective first came from the United Kingdom during negotiations of 
SCR 686 which provided for a provincial cease-fire, and was agreed in SCR 687.^ ^^ 
Resolution 687 (1991), drafted during the month of negotiations following the 
successful liberation of Kuwait, and adopted on 3 April 1991, was the fourteenth adopted 
by the Security Council in response to Iraq's invasion. '^'^  Sponsored by Belgium, France, 
Romania, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire, the text received 12 votes in 
favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Ecuador, Yemen). In the resolution's 26 
Preamble paragraphs, the Security Council welcomed the restoration to Kuwait of its 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate 
Government; restated the Council's objective of restoring international peace and security 
to the region; stressed the importance of various international agreements, to which Iraq 
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Security Council resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire, including deployment of a 
United Nations observer unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border; the removal or 
destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their reconstitution, under 
the supervision of Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA; and creation of 
compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. See Annexure XV. 
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was a party, covering conventional and nuclear weapons; and expressed a party, covering 
conventional and nuclear weapons; and expressed grave concern about the humanitarian 
situation in both Kuwait and Iraq. In section A of resolution 687 (1991), the Security 
Council demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international 
boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the Agreed Minutes of 1963^^^ and 
called upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to assist in the demarcation of 
that boundary. The Council also decided to guarantee the inviolability of the 
international boundary and to take, as appropriate, all necessary measures to that end in 
accordance with the Charter. 
The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations stated: 
"This resolution is unique and historic. It fulfills the hope of mankind to make the United 
Nations an instrument of peace and stability.... It establishes clear incentives for rapid 
implementation and trade-offs which will in stages produce a return to normalcy and non-
belligerency in the Gulf... This is a time of testing for the United Nations and a time of 
destiny as well. The international community acted through the United Nations to bring 
an end to aggression and lawlessness. It must now act as well to restore international 
peace and Security". 
The Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union stated: "The Kuwait crisis and 
the process of eliminating it were a serious test of the soundness of the new thinking, the 
new system of international relations. I think we can state with some gratification today 
that the international community, in the person of the United Nations and its Security 
Council, has passed that test and demonstrated that a considerable path has been traveled 
between the cold war and the new system of international relations. The Security 
Council has proved in practice its ability to implement its obligation under the Charter of 
the United Nations to maintain and restore international peace and security". 
"^" "Agreed Minutes" Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of 
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963. 
Document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964. See Annexure XVI. 
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The Permanent Representative of United Kingdom said that "the expulsion of Iraq 
from Kuwait and the latter's liberation are of far greater and of far more positive 
significance for all countries in the world, and for this Organisation as a whole than the 
many regional conflicts with which we have tried to grapple over recent decades. They 
have marked a clear, firm and effective determination of the world community not to 
allow the law of the jungle to overcome the rule of law. They have shown that the 
Security Council, with not only the solidarity of its permanent members but also 
supporting votes from countries representing every region of the world, has been able to 
act to repel aggression in the way its founding fathers intended it to do". 
According to Luis Fernando Solano Carrera, in the Iraq case, if there had been 
more participation, or if the Security Council had not worked on the basis of 
differentiated groups, we possibly would have quite another scenario before us, in which 
the UN would act on strong consistent mandates, legitimating interventions in this or any 
other country.^ ^^ The Permanent Representative of China emphasized the importance of 
an "early realization of formal cease-fire" as a main factor in his country's affirmative 
vote. France, said its Permanent Representative, viewed as essential the provisions of 
resolution 687 (1991) which were aimed at contributing "in the longer term to re-
establishing regional security", and stressed that the "heavy responsibilities" entrusted to 
the Secretary-General and United Nations responded to France's "desire to see our 
Organization play an important role in re-establishing peace in the region". Both China 
and France, in their statements of support for the resolution, also draw attention to the 
plight of the civilian population in Iraq. 
Kuwait said that the liberation of Kuwait proved that the United Nations, with its 
Security Council, "is an effective instrument for collective security and the maintenance 
of world peace and security". Iraq stated that the "destruction wreaked upon Iraq by the 
United Nations and its partners went beyond the limits and the objectives of resolution 
678 (1990)", and that the maintenance of economic sanctions against Iraq was in 
Luis Fernando Solano Carrera, 'The Future of International Law', in Bemhard Vogel, Rudolf Dolzer, 
Matthias Herdegen, (eds.) After the Iraq War: The Future of the UN and International Law, Social 
Science Press, New Delhi, p.50. 
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contravention of the Charter. SCR 678, almost certainly the most important text agreed 
by the Security Council in the immediate post-Cold War period, was adopted by 
twelve affirmative votes, one abstention (China), and two votes against (Cuba and 
Yemen).^ '^ ^ 
The provisions of resolution 687 (1991) calling on the United Nations to 
demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait boundary were among the reasons cited by Cuba for its vote 
against the resolution and by Ecuador and Yemen for their abstentions. Each contended 
that the Security Council lacked authority under the Charter to undertake the role that 
rightfully should either be exercised by the parties themselves or, with their agreement, 
be brought before the International Court of Justice. In addition, these three States 
questioned the legality of maintaining the sanctions regime which, Cuba and Yemen 
stated, had been explicitly tied by resolution 661 (1990) to achieving Iraq's withdrawal 
from Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen further rejected the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) 
concerning compensation, on the grounds that determining reparation fell within the 
exclusive purview of the International Court of Justice under the provisions of Article 36 
of its statute. 
Among other countries addressing the Council, India stated that its attitude 
throughout the crisis was governed by two basic considerations: "to being about the 
speediest possible liberation of Kuwait, and to minimize, to the maximum extent 
possible, the loss of life and the human suffering in all the countries directly involved in 
the crisis". Cote d'lvoire said, "Throughout this crisis Cote d'lvoire would have wished 
war to be avoided. Unfortunately, we had to wage war. The Council was obliged to 
ensure that law would prevail. It now remains for the Council to ensure that peace will 
prevail throughout the region". 
The UN Charter framers stressed concurrence of the five Permanent Members of 
the Security Council as an essential pre-requisite for collective enforcement action 
Malone, David M., The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-
2005, Oxford University Press, Noida, 2006, p.69. 
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against breaches of peace and acts of aggression. That meant that the enforcement 
measures with respect to threats to international peace and security and acts of 
aggression, as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter, could not be implemented if 
breaches of peace and acts of aggression were committed by any one of the five 
Permanent Members of the Security Council or any other member State which was aided 
and abetted by one of the Permanent Members. Nonetheless, as a manifestation of its 
resilience in adopting to the requirement of the changing situation, the United Nations, 
over the years, has evolved a "non-enforcement" system of what is known as "peace-
keeping operations". The peacekeeping system, in a nutshell, attempted, inter alia, to 
separate the combatants, over see observance of cease-fire and provide scope for 
mediation, negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the cause of conflicts. Despite some 
deficiencies, the system worked to cool down tensions in various conflict areas of the 
world. It would be meaningful to note that the peacekeeping operations were launched 
with the concurrence (explicit or implicit) of the permanent Members of the Security 
Council; and, of course, the cooperation extended by various sections of the membership 
of the United Nations if of no mean importance. In other words, the United Nations 
system of peacekeeping has evolved as a response to the challenges posed by the Cold 
War atmosphere to the Charter framework for enforcement action for the maintenance of 
peace and security. ^ °^ It is against this backdrop that one has to view the unprecedented 
United Nations response in the Gulf war. The Bush administration resorted to this forum 
only because it knew in advance that it would get what it wanted and that the United 
Nations had become a fig-leaf for United States. The Soviet Union was an active 
participant in the deliberations of the Security Council and often concurred with the US 
and other Western permanent members. As for China, the only Third World country to 
have permanent seat on the Council, it maintained a low profile, and in the main went 
along with what the other four permanent members decided. On the crucial Resolution 
678 it abstained. China also abstained on Resolution 688 which pertained to the 
behaviour of the Iraqi government towards its citizens, particularly the Kurds, and 
demanded entry of 'international humanitarian organizations' into Iraq. So did India, 
K.P. Saksena, 'Note by Design: Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Its Implications for the 
Future', International Studies, New Delhi, Vol. 16, 1977, pp. 15-32. 
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another important Third World State. The events during the Gulf crisis and war 
established clearly that Washington was willing and able to use the big stick, and that its 
memory of defeat by Vietnam was receding fast. In a sense Bush resorted to the military 
option, confident that moral right was on his side, to exorcize America of the Vietnam 
syndrome. 
This could be traced to: 
a) a high degree of cooperative spirit among the five Permanent Members 
(particularly, of course, between the United States and the Soviet Union) to 
begin with, and then among the fifteen members of the Council in general: 
b) The prolonged and varyingly productive informal, behind-the-scene 
interactions among the various members countries preceding the formal 
meetings: and 
c) The fact that the Security Council, in this case, effectively and consistently 
reflected the will of the world community as represented in the United Nations 
for sending unequivocal message to the country concerned (Iraq). 
Kuwait presented the situation as an "unwarranted invasion" by "a sisterly 
country" (Iraq) against a "peace-loving country" (Kuwait) and warned that, if not 
deterred in a decisive manner by the Council, "no country will be safe after this, and the 
security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every State will be jeopardized".^^' Iraq, 
on the other hand, contended that new "Free Provisional Government" of Kuwait had 
taken over in a coup and sought Iraq's assistance to restore order; that Iraq was pursuing 
no goal or objective in Kuwait and only desired cordial and good neighbourly relations 
with Kuwait; and that Iraq would withdraw its troops "a few days, or at the most a few 
weeks". 
Members of the Council considered Iraq's explanation as unacceptable and 
unbelievable. As the British representative remarked,^ ^^ "we have an invasion from 
outside; we have a phoney coup d'etat from within; and we have the purported 
UN, Security Council Official Record, Verbatim, 2932"'' mtd, 2 August 1990, p. 6. 
Ibid, p. 19. 
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establishment of a puppet government.... (and) the plot was botched because the timing 
was back to front". 
The United States informed the Council that it was in touch with many countries 
in the region for bringing an end to this "heinous act". Colombia's expression of "disgust 
and dismay" adequately reflected the mood at the Council. Observing that the Council 
had the primary duty to protect the small, vulnerable and the defenceless states, the 
representative of Colombia stated: "The Security Council represents a focus of world 
opinion. It is the way in which the international community can mobilise itself to 
maintain the purposes and ideals of the Charter and ensure that acts of this kind do not 
succeed".^ ^^ 
No wonder, then, the Council, in a strongly worded resolution adopted under the 
terms of Articles 39 and 40 of the mandatory Chapter VII of the Charter, determined the 
existence of a breach of peace as regards the Iraqi invasion, condemned the invasion, and 
demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops to the positions as 
located before the invasion.^ *'' 
Iraq had rejected the Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and described the 
action as "iniquitous and unjust" taken "without allowing itself sufficient time to 
comprehend the situation and to acquaint itself with the facts from the parties 
concemed"^^^ On the contrary, Kuwait, which welcomed the resolution, accused Iraq of 
plundering and looting Kuwait's resources and rebutted Iraq's claims of commencement 
of withdrawals. Kuwait called upon the Security Council to ensure that the will of the 
international community is exerted, through the imposition of sanctions against Iraq for 
refusing to abide by the will of the world community. Indeed, the United States, the 
European Community, Japan, Canada, and the Soviet Union had already announced 
measures like freezing of bank accounts, ban on oil supplies, stoppage of export of arms 
^" Ibid, p. 2]. 
^^ ^ The 8-Power draft was adopted as UN Security Council Resolution 660 (1990), 2 August 1990. 14 
members voted in favour, while not participate in the vote "for lack of instructions". 
^*' Letter from the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to the Secretary-General, Doc. 
S/21503, 13 August 1990. 
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etc. To widen the net and seek collective endorsement of those unilateral measures, the 
United States with the assistance of its close allies like Canada and the United Kingdom 
worked on a text for consideration by the Security Council. 
The Iraqi representative vainly warned in the Council that any move for economic 
sanctions, instead of helping resolution of the crisis, would exacerbate it and might create 
a heavy, negative impact on the economies of the developing countries.^ ^"^ Nonetheless, 
the council adopted the 9-power text imposing "one of the broadest set of sanctions ever 
put in place" covering all aspects of military, economic and financial relations with Iraq 
and occupied Kuwait. 
Yemen, the only Arab country represented on the Council as a non-permanent 
member, abstained with an explanation that it wished to avoid any negative effect on the 
diplomatic efforts. Yemen has undertaken to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
Cuba, the only other abstainer, argued that the decision to impose sanctions would tend to 
complicate the situation further and noted that the resolution merely endorsed sanction 
already imposed unilaterally by some countries.^^^ Let it be noted that neither Cuba nor 
Yemen - nor any other member of the Council for that matter - ever justified Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. They were all agreed on achieving immediate withdrawal of troops 
of Iraq. But notable differences arose as to how to pursue that objective, especially in the 
context of the question of supply of foodstuffs to foreign national stranded in Kuwait and 
Iraq, the "special economic problems" experienced by a number of countries as a 
consequence of implementation by them of the sanctions resolutions and the need to 
further tighten the modalities of implementation of the sanctions. 
Iraq justified the annexation on the ground that the Arab nations was one cind 
indivisible. It claimed that: 
For the statement of the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait. See UN Security Council Official 
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A part of the region cherished by Iraq - Kuwait - was separated from Iraq (by 
colonial Powers in the past). This was our country's area of strategic access.... This 
is why the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council decided to restore to our country 
the portion taken away from it, thus re-establishing the eternal, indestructible unity of 
our country. 
The ominous claims of Iraq made countries 
Wonder where does it end? Does it end in Kuwait? Does it move on to Saudi 
Arabia? Does it move to Jordan? Or does it move beyond, to other countries. '^^ 
No wonder, the Security Council unanimously pronounced that Iraqi annexation 
of Kuwait had no legal validity and declared it null and void.^ ^^ 
Iraq's illegal annexation and its efforts to sustain it led to series of violations by it 
of international obligations especially as regards the rights of foreign nationals in Kuwait 
and Iraq, and the preservation of immunities of diplomatic personnel. To pre-empt any 
American attack on military/strategic installations, Iraq took into custody foreigners in 
Iraq and Kuwait and converted them into human shields against any American attack. 
This Iraqi action in mid-August 1990 again led to a unanimous demand by the United 
Nations that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of 
the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular 
officials to such nationals and further demanded that Iraq took no action to jeopardize the 
safety, security or health of such nationals.^ ^^ 
Likewise, in response to Iraqi troops' entry into the French Ambassador's 
residence in Kuwait, the Council unanimously expressed its outrage at the Iraqi 
transgression and strongly condemned Iraqi actions against diplomatic missions and the 
abduction of foreign nationals who were present in the premises of those missions and 
demanded immediate release of foreign nationals.^^' 
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Ironically it was the US and not the UN which took over the leadership of the 
multinational forces. A number of developing countries were outraged by this 
development but they found themselves utterly helpless in face of the demonstration of 
power and influence by the US. The coalition troops neither worse the UN nor fought 
under the UN flag, and was the military staff committee directed the operations. 
Once American troops had begun arriving in Saudi Arabia, the Arab countries had 
divided on the simple question of the presence of non-Arab forces in the Saudi INGDOM. 
After meeting the Iraqi president in Baghdad on 28 August, Yasser Arafat expressed the 
need to fight the American and foreign presence in the region. Libya's leader. Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi, an Arab nationalist, was opposed to this military intrusion of the US 
into the Arab world. So too was president Zine al Abidine ben Ali of Tunisia, who had 
until recently been a favourite of Washington. Responding to the Islamic fundamentalist 
pressures at home, he had decided to change the overall direction of Tunisia's policies 
away from economic affairs and the US to political matters and Europe and the Arab 
world. The regime of Colonel Masyouya Ould Sidi Ahmad Taya in Mauritania had been 
friendly with Baghdad and its ruling Baath Party for several years, and had reportedly 
allowed the use of its territory for the testing of Iraqi intermediate and long-range 
missiles. In Algeria the government condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait while 
deploring the presence of alien forces in Saudi Arabia and the UN sanctions against Iraq. 
It was aware of the popularity of the Iraqi leader among ordinary citizens, and of the 
strength of the Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, who as elsewhere in the Arab and 
Muslim world were backing Saddam Hussein. The military junta in Sudan, led by 
General Omar al Bashir, being of Islamic fundamentalist hue, was sympathetic towards 
Baghdad. In both parts of the recently unified Yemen, north and south, the bias was also 
in favour of Saddam Hussein. Iraq had provided military officers and training to North 
Yemen for many years. And the Marxist state of South Yemen had been staunchly anti-
American. Unsurprisingly, an official radio broadcast in Yemen stated that 'the main 
threat to the region is the build-up of US and NATO forces, and the escalation of 
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psychological and propaganda warfare against Iraq and the Arab nation with the objective 
of pushing our region to the brink of military confrontation 272 
The Yemen's president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a pan-Arab nationalist, was 
ideologically close to Baathism, and his country (North Yemen, before May 1990) had 
been a traditional recipient of aid from Baghdad. Saleh stated that Yemen was opposed 
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but was strongly opposed to the build-up of US led forces in 
the Gulf, arguing that it endangered (Arab) sovereignty, oil resources and Arab national 
security. He refused to sell the loyalty of Yemen, a thinly disguised reference to the 
Saudi way of conducting diplomacy - through the chequebook. Saudi Arabia expelled 
many Yemeni diplomats claiming as in the case of their Jordanian counterparts, that they 
were helping the Iraqi diplomats to gain access to areas off-limits to them since the 
invasion. Also, Riyadh withdrew exemptions to Yemenis who hitherto had been allowed 
to enter the Saudi Kingdom without visas or sponsors and allowed to engage in 
commerce. The forces repatriation of tens of thousands of Yemenis inflamed public 
opinion in the republic against Riyadh, thus reinforcing the policy their government was 
27^ 
pursumg. 
Yemen was in some respects in the most difficult position of all. At the time, it 
was ideologically closer to Saddam Hussein than to his opponents within the Arab 
world,including Saudi Arabia, Yemen's powerful neighbour with which it entertained 
complex, often strained relations. Yemeni officials were conscious of representing a 
deeply split Arab World on the Council, and thus tactically were often drawn to seeking 
refuge behind the NAM shield as a first line of defence.^ '^* 
Yemen even refused to yield to Baker's threat, during his meeting with Resident 
Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa on 22 November, to cancel $70 million US aid to it if it 
- " Independent, 30 AugKxst 1990. 
'"^ New York Times, 30 August 1990, The Times, 30 August 1990 Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, 30 August 1990 Syrian troops reportedly moved to the South-East after pro-Iraqi 
demonstrations occurred in Abu Kamal and Deir al Zor. 
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failed to support the US-sponsored resolution at the Security Council. Responding to the 
pressure from Baker, the Yemeni leader said that his country was opposed to the presence 
and possible use of forces by foreign troops in the Gulf. He explained his position a few 
days later in an interview with the Washington Post. Confident that it was still possible 
to find a peaceful solution for the complete withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait 
and all foreign forces from the region, President Saleh said: 'I know Iraq is ready for 
dialogue. Why doesn't President Bush send a personal envoy to Baghdad or Geneva or 
any Arab capital to meet with a representative of the Iraqi leadership?' He was critical of 
US threats against Iraq. First the US says it is coming to protect Saudi Arabia from 
aggression, and now the US says it want to use force against Iraq and destroy its military 
capability. The entire world was against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but the foreign 
intervention and threats of force are leading some Arabs now to support Iraq.^ ^^ 
Saleh was not swayed by the threat of Washington to withdraw its aid to Yemen -
just as he was not intimidated by the vendetta of Riyadh against the nearly 1.6 million 
Yemenis resident in the Saudi Kingdom which meant a loss in the expatriates remittances 
home of $ 2 to $ 3 annually. During the initial stages of the Gulf crisis Sanaa balanced its 
condemnation of the Iraqi invasion with criticism of Saudi Arabia for inviting foreign 
forces. Angered by the criticism, Riyadh retaliated. On 19 September it announced that 
every Yemeni resident in the Kingdom must find a Saudi sponsor (a requirement waived 
in the past for Yemenis) within two months, or leave. By the deadline, 6,51,000 Yemenis 
had left Saudi Arabia, with another estimated 1,50,000 crossing the border unofficially. 
That meant in effect expulsion from the Saudi Kingdom of half of the Yemenis who, as 
manual workers, shopkeepers, drivers and petty contractors, served an economically 
beneficial purpose. Most of those leaving were obliged to sell their property at a fraction 
of its value. This engendered much bitterness against Saudi Arabia, and provided further 
backing for the principled stand that their government was taking on the crisis.^ ^^ 
^'' International Herald Tribunes, 23 November 1990, Washington Post, 26 November 1990, Guardian, 3 
December 1990. 
Independent, 24 November 1990. Relations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia had begun to sour 
before the crisis when Sanaa refused to sign a treaty resolving a border dispute in a region where over 
one billion barrels of oil reserves had been discovered. 
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President Saddam Hussein articulated his strategy in an interview with French 
television. He argued that Western victory in the Gulf would require not only defeating 
Iraq's military and destroying its economy, but also overthrowing his regime: a 
monumental task. He would 'win' just by hanging on, he maintained. Time was on his 
side, and ultimately the Americans would have to withdraw, humiliated, he concluded.^ ^^ 
His unexpressed estimation was that with time the US-led coalition would fall apart, 
providing him with the chance to compromise by accepting an 'Arab' solution' the sort 
he had offered to the US through back-channels. 
Meanwhile, he and his government tried to use US televisions networks to get 
their message across directly to the America people. His hour-long interview with Dan 
Rather of CBS-TV on 29 August, conducted like a summit between two leaders, was a 
propitious start for him. Every signal he sent out, including his body language, said that 
he is not feeling cornered, and indeed he thinks George Bush is the one cornered. Rather 
said 'He's not a person I'd want to fight. 
Nonetheless, there was strong case to be made that the Iraqi leader's strategy was 
flawed. He had made series of miscalculations. He had clearly underestimated the 
reaction of the world community, especially the Western powers, to his invasion of 
Kuwait. This was pointed out by no less a regional leader than President Rafsanjani, who 
referred to the time during the last stages of the (Iran-Iraq) war when Iran began 
harassing Kuwaiti ships. 'No sooner had we turned against Kuwait than the Americans, 
the English and all other satanic forces arrived in the region and stood against us, he said 
in his sermon on 24 August. The same number of ships and navies came (as now) and 
they even entered into war with us ... It could have been foreseen (by Saddam Hussein) 
that any aggression against Kuwait would brag about a similar development. ^^  
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Saddam Hussein's second major miscalculation was that he failed to see that with 
the termination of the Cold War in favour of the US, Moscow would not veto any anti-
Iraq resolutions at the UN Secretary Council. His thinking had not caught up with the 
contemporary political situation. 
The month of November was largely given over by the Permanent Members to 
discussing the form any authorization of the use of force would take. Presidents Bush and 
Gorbachev met in Paris on November 19 with the Soveit Union mainly focused on 
building in a grace period so that the leverage provided by an authorization for the use of 
force could be fully exploited in diplomacy before any trigger was actually pulled.^ **" 
Within weeks Saddam Hussein's disappointment with Moscow had reached such a level 
that on 25 August, Baghdad Radio aimounced that the previous day President Gorbachev 
had sent him a message at 5.30 p.m. calling for the adoption of measures of a radical 
nature', and asking for reply the same day by 7.00 p.m. failing which the presented to the 
Security Council concerning the embargo against Iraq. (Later it transpired that what was 
described by Baghdad Radio as Gorbachev's call for 'the adoption of measure of radical 
nature' was indeed a warning by him to Saddam Hussein that if Iraq failed to evacuate 
Kuwait it would face more rigorous enforcement of economic sanctions, and asking him 
pointedly whether he proposed to withdraw or not) Baghdad replied that the short time 
given to respond showed that the letter was just an excuse for Soviet inaction on the 
Security Council resolution. The exchange of letters between the two Presidents had 
begun soon after the Iraqi invasion, with Saddam Hussein rebuffing Mikhail Gorbachev's 
calls for the evacuation of Kuwait, rationalizing the Iraqi action in Cold War language by 
condemning Kuwait's royal rulers as 'greedy capitalists'. Sadoun Hamadi visited 
Moscow on 20 August but failed to bring a change in Soviet policy. Now, Gorbachev 
was under mounting pressure by President Bush to back the US-drafted resolution, 
allowing 'minimum force' to enforce sanctions against Iraq, that was to be presented to 
the Security Council. 
280 Malone, David M.. The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-
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The economic penalty for the Kuwaiti invasion was mounting daily, fuelling 
inflation and crippling Iraq's forty-plus major capital projects, including the world's 
largest petrochemical complex, due to lack of supplies and spares. Its oil wells were 
functioning at 20 per cent of capacity, producing just enough to meet the domestic 
demand. In its battle to overcome the ill effects of the UN economic embargo, Iraq 
instituted rationing for brad, sugar, tea and cooking oil (all of which were wholly or 
largely imported) - something it had done during its war with Iran. Having endured 
rationing for the best part of eight years, most Iraqis adjusted without much difficulty. 
Monthly rations for heavily subsidized essentials cost about three Iraqi dinars per adult in 
a family where the major breadwinner earned ID 85 a month. The government had large 
stocks of wheat, and its policy of confiscating food and other supplies from Kuwait eased 
the situation. By exempting peasants from military service, providing cheap credits and 
ordering farmers to plant 80 per cent of their land with wheat or maize, the government 
took steps towards self-sufficiency in food. 
In a way, Iraq had no choice but to withstand the consequence of the UN embargo 
on its own - after the failure of its attempt to persuade Iran not to participate in sanctions. 
During a clandestine visit to Tehran in early September 1990 the Iraqi foreign Minister, 
Tariq Aziz, had offered a set of economic proposals to President Rafsanjani. These 
included Iraq paying $35 billion as war reparation to Iran, and the establishment of an 
'Iran-Iraq Economic Cooperation Council', which would co-ordinate supplies to Iraq 
while selling Iraqi oil abroad through the pipelines of Iran. While Rafsanjani was 
reportedly non-committal, his later words and deed made plain his rejection. 
It can be pointed out that the United Nations could act swiftly and in accordance 
with the expectations of the founding fathers of the Organisation. The Security Council 
adopted six, out of a total of nine, resolutions under the mandatory provision of Chapter 
VII, that too in a matter of seven weeks. This would have been impossible, but for the 
collegial spirit demonstrated by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and 
281 New York Times, 20 September 1990 and 21 March 1991. 
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especially the unprecedented cooperation the Soviet Union extended by voting for - not 
vetoing - the resolutions aimed against its ally, Iraq. 
The role of the United nations in the Gulf situation has led some commentators to 
hope that it would augur well in future for an effective tole by the United Nations for 
enforcement of peace on the lines envisaged by the Charter. 
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ANNEXURE-I 
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the President of the 
Security Council requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council 
S/21423, 2 August 1990 
Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an 
immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the 
early morning of 2 August 1990. 
(Signed) MOHAMMAD A. ABULHASAN 
Ambassador 
Permanent Representative 
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ANNEXURE - II 
Security Council resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demanding the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces and calling for 
negotiations for peaceful resolution of their differences. 
S/RES/660 (1990), 2 August 1990 
The Security Council, 
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of 
Iraq, 
Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as 
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: 
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to 
the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990; 
3. Call upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the 
resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and 
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure 
compliance with the present resolution. 
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ANNEXURE - III 
Security Council resolution imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq 
and establishing a committee (the "Sanctions Committee") to monitor those 
sanctions 
S/RES/661 (1990), 6 August 1990 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 
Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the 
invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues, with further loss of human life and material 
destruction. 
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and 
to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, 
Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to 
comply with resolution 660 (1990), 
Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 
660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of 
Kuwait; 
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance 
of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of 
the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 
3. Decides that all States shall prevent: 
a. The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in 
Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; 
b. Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or 
are calculated to promote the expOort or trans-shipment of any commodities or 
products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag 
vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products ori9ginating in 
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Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, 
including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes 
of such activities or dealing; 
c. The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag 
vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other 
military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not 
including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian 
circumstances, food-stuffs, to any person or body for the purposes of any 
business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by 
their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 
promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products; 
4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq, or to 
any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any 
funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their 
nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their 
territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such 
undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to 
persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for 
strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, 
foodstuffs; 
5. Call upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations to act 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution 
notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of 
present resolution; 
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of 
procedure, a Committee of the Council consisting of all the members of the 
Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the 
Council with its observations and recommendations; 
a. To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the 
present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General; 
b. To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by 
them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down 
in the present resolution; 
7. Call upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of 
its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the 
Committee in pursuance of the present resolution; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the 
Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the 
purpose; 
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Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 to 8 above, nothing in the present 
resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and 
calls upon all States; 
a. To take appropriate measure to protect assets of the legitimate Government 
of Kuwait and its agencies; 
b. Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power; 
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress 
made in the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be 
submitted within thirty days; 
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early 
end to the invasion by Iraq. 
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ANNEXURE-IV 
Letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the 
Secretary-General concerning Security Council resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait 
S/21503, 13 August 1990 
Letter dated 13 August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the 
United Nations addressed to Secretary-General 
On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a 
letter from Mr. Tarqi Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Iraq. 
I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated 
as document of the Security Council. 
(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AI-ANBARI 
Ambassador 
Permanent Representative 
Annex 
Letter dated 13 August 1990 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General 
As you know, the Security Council has, within a small number of days, adopted a series 
of iniquitous resolutions against Iraq with a dispatch that is unprecedented in the history 
of the Organization. 
In the first resolution it adopted, the Council leaped immediately to the stage of 
invoking the provision of Chapter VII of the Charter without allowing itself sufficient 
time to comprehend the situation and to acquaint itself with the facts from the parties 
concerned and in complete disregard of the position of Iraq and clarifications it could 
provide. In a period of nor more than a few days, the Council then leaped to the stage of 
adopting a resolution on comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, once again in total 
disregard of the position of Iraq and any of its clarifications. There has never been such a 
procedure in the history of the Council, and it renders the resolutions adopted against Iraq 
unjust and out of keeping with the most elementary procedural notions in accordance 
with which the Council's work has been conducted in the past. 
What has thus far transpired in the Council would not have taken place had it not 
been for the methods of pressure and deception employed by the United States with 
number of Council members in order to induce them to vote for the said resolutions. The 
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United States is thus endeavouring to establish itself as the controller of the world and of 
its destiny. These unjust resolutions, which were prejudged by certain States members of 
the Council and which the United States has endeavored to impose, are evidently an 
ominous phenomenon in the history of the Organization, namely that of the imposition of 
double standards and selective judgments by force intimidation and otherwise. 
It is the United States, more than any other country in the world, that has regulaily 
violated the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly and international law, and particularly so in our region. The United 
States has used the big stick in addressing international issues, and it has imposed its 
tyrannical will by force of arms, intimidation and campaigns of disinformation. We see 
no need to demonstrate that fact by means of examples drawn from the dark record of the 
United States in the Security Council, which is well known to the international 
community and which some fair-minded members of the Council have recently recalled 
in the course of its meetings. 
We view the measures adopted by the Council as a flagrant injustice and as a 
denial of the facts of history and of contemporary events in the international community. 
In this connection, we have an important observation to make. Security Council 
resolution 661 (1990), unjust and precipitous as it is, stipulates, inter alia, that the 
iniquitous sanctions should not include supplies intended strictly for medical purposes 
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. 
The United States has, however, had the intention from the very outset of 
preventing the delivery of such supplies for the purpose of starving and intimidating g the 
people of Iraq, which is, however, a proud people, one that has fashioned civilizations 
throughout history and one which rejects humiliation and subjection. The United States 
has also incited a number of other States to follow its example, just as it has sought to 
impose a blockade on Iraq's exports and imports, thereby appointing itself the policeman 
of the world. Its trifling with words and designations does not alter this fact. Iraq calls 
upon the international community to reject these hostile and inhuman life in this crude 
fashion. 
In another respect, it must be said that the embargo process itself has the objective 
from the practical point of view of starving the Iraqi people, which would not alter its 
stance or affect its staying power. How can the Iraqi people obtain foodstuffs and 
medical supplies when its major resource, namely oil, is cut off? If the Security Council 
had been thinking along sound humanitarian lines, it would have been in keeping with a 
true humanitarian approach, to have allowed a certain amount of oil to be exported which 
would, at the least, suffice to provide for normal humanitarian needs, principally 
foodstuffs and medicine. 
Reference must be made to the fact that the United States has endeavored by all 
possible means to induce certain States to close the pipelines that carry Iraqi oil, although 
these pipelines represent Iraqi investments made prior to recent events and despite the 
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fact that the decision on closure does not in any way enter into the scope of the 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council and that it was resorted to only at the 
inducement of the United States. 
In conclusion, I must say to you, Mr. Secretary General, and through you to the 
entire international community that the Iraqi people, the Arab nation and all free peoples 
of the world who are proud of their sovereignty and independence will reject by all 
legitimate means the attempts of the United States to extend its domination over the 
world by force, intimidation and deception. 
(Signed) Tariq Aziz 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq 
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ANNEXURE-V 
Letter dated 12 August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the 
President of the Security Council reporting that military assistance has been 
requested for implementation of resolution 661 (1990) 
S/21498, 13 August 1990 
Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the 
following: 
Kuwait is grateful to all those Governments that have taken a principled stand in 
support of Kuwait's position against aggression and occupation by Iraq. It is considered 
essential that these efforts be strengthened so that the provisions of the relevant Security 
Council resolutions be fully and effectively implemented. 
In the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and 
pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the united Nations, Kuwait should like to notify 
you that it has requested some nations to take such military or other steps as are necessary 
to ensure the effective and prompt implementation of Security Council resolution 6661 
(1990). 
I would be grateful if you could circulate this letter as document of the Security 
Council. 
(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN 
Ambassador 
Permanent Representative 
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ANNEXURE- VT 
Security Council resolution expanding the sanctions against Iraq and authorizing 
maritime forces to take "commensurate" measures to ensure strict compliance 
S/RES/665 (1190) 25 August 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 
1990 of 9 August 1990 and 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990 and demanding their full and 
immediate implementation. 
Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Determined to bring to an end the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperil the 
existence of a Member State and to restore the legitimate authority and the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, which requires the speedy 
implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions. 
Deploring the loss of innocent lives stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and determined to prevent further such losses. 
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolution 660 (1990), 661 
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Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil, 
1. Call upon those Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which 
are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the 
specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security 
Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and 
verify their cargoes and destinations and to insure strict implementation of the 
provision related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990); 
2. Invites Member States accordingly to cooperate as may be necessary to ensure 
compliance with the provision of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of 
political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above; 
3. Requests all States to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 above; 
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4. Also requests the States concerned to coordinate their actions in pursuit of the above 
paragraphs of the present resolution using, as appropriate, mechanisms of the 
Mihtary Staff Committee and, after consultation with the Secretary General to 
submit reports to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee 
established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait, in order to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of the present 
resolution; 
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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ANNEXURE - VII 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq permit the departure of third-State nationals from Kuwait and Iraq 
S/RES/664 (1990), 18 August 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and its 
resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) or 6 August 1990 and 662 (1990) of 
9 August 1990, 
Deeply concerned for the safety and well-being of third-State nationals in Iraq 
and Kuwait, 
Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law. 
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultation 
with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the 
members of the Council on 17 August 1990, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait 
and Iraq of third-State nationals and grant immediate and continuing access of 
consular officials to such nationals; 
2. Also demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or 
health of such nationals; 
3. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by 
Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the Government of Iraq 
rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular mission in Kuwait 
and the withdrawal of immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such 
actions in the future; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on 
compliance with the present resolution at the earliest possible time. 
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ANNEXURE - VIII 
Security Council resolution requesting the Council's Sanctions Committee to 
determine whether there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to 
Iraq or Kuwait 
Se/RES/666(1990), 13 September 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, paragraphs 3 (c ) and 4 
of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs. 
Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for 
foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve 
human suffering. 
Noting that in this respect the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait has received 
communications from several Members States, 
Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the 
Committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen. 
Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under 
Security Council resolution 664 (1990) of 18 August in respect of the safety and well-
being of third-State nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this 
regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 
1949, " 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations, 
1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not, for 
the purposes of paragraphs 3 ( c ) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990), 
humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the Security Council Committee 
established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq 
United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75, No. 973 
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and Kuwait shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait 
under constant review; 
2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under resolution 664 (1990) in 
respect of third-State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully 
responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international 
humanitarian law including where applicable, the Geneva Convention relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of r 2 August 1949; " 
3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, that the Secretary-
General seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant 
United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other 
sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be 
communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee regularly; 
4. Also requests that in seeking and supplying such information particular 
attention will be paid to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, 
such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, 
the sick and the elderly; 
5. Decides that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-
General, determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent 
humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relive 
human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how 
such need should be met; 
6. Directs the Committee that in formulation its decisions it should bear in mind 
that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in cooperation 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate 
humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision, in 
order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the 
delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with 
the provision of the present resolution and other relevant resolutions; 
8. Recalls that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies intended strictly 
for medical purposes but in this connection recommends that medical supplies 
should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the 
exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies. 
United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75, No. 973 
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ANNEXURE - VIII 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq immediately release foreign 
nationals abducted from diplomatic premises in Kuwait or Iraq 
S/RES/667 (1990), 16 September 1990 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 
August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 
25 August 1990 and 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 
Recalling the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961" 
and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963,^' to both which Iraq is a 
party. 
Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and 
consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the privileges and immunities of these 
mission and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the 
international conventions mentioned above and international law. 
Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Council and 
the provisions of the conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence 
against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait, 
Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at 
the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were 
present in these premises. 
Considering also that these actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a 
flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of 
international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign 
nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel. 
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the 
Charter, 
1/ United Nations. Treaty Series, vol. 500. No. 7310 
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Considering further that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a 
new escalation of its violations of international law, obliges the Council not only to 
express its immediate reaction but also to consult urgently in order to take further 
concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
1. Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic 
premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of forewing 
nationals who were present in those premises; 
2. Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals mentioned in 
resolution 664 (1990); 
3. Also demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international 
obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, " the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963^ and international law; 
4. Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of 
diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and 
take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the 
performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the 
protection of their person and interests; 
5. Reminds all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661 
(1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990); 
6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as 
possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of resolutions of the Security 
Council and of international law. 
" United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 5(X), No. 7310 
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ANNEXURE-X 
Security Council resolution asking the Sanctions Committee to recommend a 
response to State requesting assistance with economic problems arising from the 
implementation of those sanctions 
S/RES/669 (1990), 24 September 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 
Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have 
been received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter, 
Entrusts the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) 
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for 
assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter and making recommendations 
to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action. 
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ANNEXURE- XT 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq release third-State nationals 
being held in Iraq or Kuwait 
S/RES/674 (1990), 29 October 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) 
of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 
(1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 
September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 
Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence 
and territorial intergrit7y and of the authority of its legitimate Government, 
Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take 
third-State nationals, and the other actions reported to the Council, such as the destruction 
of Kuwaiti demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, the relocation of 
population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private 
property in Kuwait, including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation of the 
decisions of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Convention 
relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949," the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation of 18 April 1961 the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 '^ and international law. 
Expressing grave alarm over the situation of third-State nationals in Kuwait and 
Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such States, 
Reaffirming that the above-mentioned Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and 
that, as a High Contracting Party to the Convention, Iraq is bound to comply fully with all 
its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches 
committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave 
breaches. 
Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety and well-
being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait 
" United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973 
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Deeply concerned at the economic cost and at the loss and suffering caused to 
individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by 
Iraq, 
Acting under chapter VII of the Charter, 
Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining international 
peace and securi9ty by seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through 
peaceful means. 
Recalling the important role that the United Nations and the Secretary-General 
have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the 
provision of the Charter 
Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait, which directly threaten international peace and security, and 
seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation. 
Calling upon Iraq to comply with its relevant resolutions, in particular 
resoluti9ons 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), 
Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq with its resolutions by 
maximum use of political and diplomatic means. 
1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease 
and desist from taking third-State nationals hostage, mistreating and 
oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals and any other actions, such as 
those reported to the Council and described above, that violate the decisions 
of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 
1949," the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961^' the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963"^ ' and international 
law; 
2. Invited States to collate substantiated information in their possession or 
submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph I above and 
to make this information available to the Council; 
Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its obligations to third-State 
national in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and 
United nations. Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973 
'^ Ibid., vol. 500, No. 7310 
'^ Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638 
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consular missions, under the Charter, the above-mentioned Geneva 
Convention, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Convention 
on Consular Relations, general principals of international law and the relevant 
resolutions of Council; 
4. Also reaffirms its demand that Iraq permit and facilitated the immediate 
departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third-State nationals, including 
diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to leave; 
5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic 
services necessary to the protection and well-being of Kuwaiti nationals and 
of third-State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of 
diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait; 
6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being 
of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take 
no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular missions in the performance 
of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of 
their person and interests, and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic 
and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of immunity of their 
personnel; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his 
good offices concerning the safety and well-being of third -State nationals in 
Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 
above, in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti 
nationals and to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and 
evacuation of third-State nationals; 
8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss damage ur 
injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third-States, and their nationals and 
corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by 
Iraq; 
9. Invites State to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those 
of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation 
by Iraq, with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance 
with international law; 
10. Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its 
previous resolutions, failing which the Council will need to take further 
measures under the Charter; 
11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait 
has regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with 
the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. 
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B 
12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices 
and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and to undertake diplomatic 
efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the basis of resolutions 660 (1990), 662 
(1990) and 664 (1990), and calls upon all states, both those in the region and 
other, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the 
Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and 
stability; 
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results 
of his good offices and diplomatic efforts. 
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ANNEXURE - XII 
Security Council resolution condemning Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic 
composition of the population of Kuwait 
S/RES/677 (1990), 28 November 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 
1990 and 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 
Reiterating its concern for the suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result 
of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, 
Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic 
composition of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of 
Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait; 
2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of population 
register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which has been certified by the 
legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the registration of the 
population up to 1 August 1990; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in cooperation with the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait, an order of rules and regulations governing access to 
and use of the said copy of the population register. 
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ANNEXURE - XIII 
Security Council resolution authorizing Member States cooperating with the 
Government of Kuwait to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement" the 
Council's resolutions on the situation unless Iraq fully complies with those 
resolutions on or before 15 January 1991 
S/RES/678 (1990), 29 November 1990 
The Security Council, 
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) 
of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 
(1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 
September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 
674 (1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its 
obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent 
relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council, 
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of United Nations for 
the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security. 
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its 
decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do 
so; 
2. Authorize Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, 
unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in 
paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary 
means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the 
area; 
Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken 
in pursuance of paragraph 2 above. 
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4. Requests the States concerned to keep the security Council regularly 
informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 
3 above 
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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ANNEXURE - XTV 
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the President of the 
Security Council stating that, the deadHne of resolution 678 (1990) having 
expired, it was exercising its right to self-defence with the cooperation of friendly 
States 
S/22094, 17 January 1991 
On instructions from my Government, I hereby transmit the following information to 
you: 
Following the expiry of the deadline set by the Security Council in its resolution 
678 (1990) for the full implementation of its pertinent resolutions, Kuwait notified the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that Iraqi forces continued to occupy all 
territories of the State of Kuwait. Accordingly, and pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 
678 (1990), Kuwait wishes to inform you that it is exercising its right to self-defence and 
to the restoration of its rights, first and foremost among which is the recovery of its 
territories, occupied by Iraq since 2 August 1990. In doing so, the Kuwaiti forces are 
cooperating with the forces of fr4atemal and friendly States which are equally determined 
to end the obdurate Iraqi occupation. 
We shall also transmit to you the statement issued by the Kuwaiti Council of 
Ministers concerning the beginning of the operation to liberate Kuwait. 
I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the 
Security Council 
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
(signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN 
Permanent Representative 
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ANNEXURE- XV 
Security Council resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire, including 
deployment of a United Nations observer unit; arrangements for demarcating the 
Iraq-Kuwait border; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
and measures to prevent their reconstitution, under the supervision of Special 
Commission and the Director General of the IAEA; and creation of compensation 
fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 
1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 
August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 
(1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 
October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990,678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 
686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 
We coming the restoration to K7uwait of its sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government, 
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention 
expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph2 of resolution 
678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent 
with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991), 
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, 
Taking note of the letter dated 27 February 1991 from the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security 
Council'' and of his letters of the same date addressed to the President of the Council and 
to the Secretary-General,^ and those letters dated 3 March^' and 5 March'*' he addressed 
to them, pursuant to resolution 686 (1991), 
1/ 
3/ 
4/ 
Official Records of the Security Council, Forty -Sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and 
March I99I, document SIllTTi. 
Ibid., documents S/22275 and S/linS. 
Ibid., documents S/22320 and S/22321. 
Ibid., document S/22330. 
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Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad 
on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of 
Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, recognizing and related matters",^' 
thereby formally recognizing the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of 
islands, which Agreed Minutes were registered with the United Nations in accordance 
with Article 102 of the Charter of the United nations and in which Iraq recognized the 
independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as 
specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932 and as accepted by 
the ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932, 
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary. 
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation 
of its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 
signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, '^ and of its prior use of chemical weapons, and 
affSirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such 
weapons. 
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Final Declaration adopted by all States 
7/ 
participating in the Conference of States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, 
establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons. 
Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,*' 
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying the Convention, 
Noting also the importance of all States adhering to the *.onvention and 
encouraging its forthcoming review conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and 
universal scope of the Convention, 
Stressi9ng the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on 
disarmament of its work on convention on the universal prohibition of chemical weapons 
and of universal adherence thereto. 
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore 
of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq, 
5/ 
6/ 
7/ 
8/ 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 485, No. 7063. 
League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138. 
A/44/88, annex. 
General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex. 
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Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to 
acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, '^ 
Recalling the objective of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 
region of the Middle East, 
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and 
security in the area and of the need to work to wards the establishment in the Middle East 
of a zone free of such weapons. 
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control 
of armaments in the region, 
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using 
all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region. 
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by 
resolutiQon 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait, 
Noting also that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of 
resolution 676 (1991) may Kuwait and third-State nationals are still not accounted for 
and property remains unretumed. 
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,'^' opened 
for signature in New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking 
hostage as manifestations of international terrorism. 
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism 
against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq, 
Taking note with g4rave concern of the reports transmitted by the Secretary-
il on 20 March'" and 28 March 1991,'^ ai 
urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait in Iraq, 
Genera nd conscious of the necessity to meet 
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the 
area as set out in its recent resolutions, 
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, 
'" United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485. 
'*" General Assembly resolution 34/146, annex. 
' " Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1991, 
document S/22366, annex. 
'^' Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and 
March 1991, document S/22409, annex. 
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1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to 
achieve the goals of the present resolution, including a formal cease-fire; 
2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international 
boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes between the 
State of Kuwait and Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly 
relations, recognition and related matter', ' signed by them in the exercise of their 
sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United 
Nations; 
3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements 
with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, 
drawing on appropriate material including the maps transmitted with the letter 
dated 28 March 1991 addressed to him by the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations,'"" 
and to report back to the Council within one month; 
Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international 
boundary and to take, as appropriate, all necessary measures to that end in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; 
B 
Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit 
within three days to the Council for its approval a plan for the immediate 
deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah 
and demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometers into 
Iraq and five kilometers into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed 
Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the 
restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matter'; to deter 
violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the 
demilitarized zone and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action 
mounted from the territory of one State against the other; and also requests the 
Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the operations of the unit 
and to do so immediately if there are serious violation of the zone or potential 
threats to peace; 
Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Council of the completion 
of the deployment of United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be 
established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with 
13/ Ibid., document S/22412 
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resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent 
with resolution 686 (1991); 
Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,'"' and to 
ratify the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, of 10 April 1972; '^ 
Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or 
rendering harmless, under international supervision, of; 
a. All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related 
subsystems and components and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities related thereto; 
b. All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty 
kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities; 
Decides also, for the implementation of paragraph 8, the following; 
a. Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the 
adoption of the present resolution, a declaration on the locations, amounts 
and types of all items specified in the paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-
site inspection as specified below; 
b. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments 
and, where appropriate witli the Director-General of the World Health 
Organization, within forty-five days of the adoption of the present resolution 
shall develop and submit to the Council for approval a plan calling for the 
completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval: 
i. The forming of special commission which shall carry out immediate 
on-site inspection of Iraq's biological chemical and missile 
capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any 
additional locations by the special commission itself; 
ii. The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the 
requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 
8 (a),. Including items at the additional locations designated by the 
Special Commission under paragraph (i) and the destruction by Iraq, 
*' League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138 
*' Genera] AssembJy resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex. 
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under the supervision of the Special Commission of all its missile 
capabilities, including launchers as specified under paragraph 8(b); 
iii. The provision by the Special Commission to the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency of the assistance and 
cooperation required in paragraphs 12 and 13; 
10. Decides further that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, 
construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9, and requests 
the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a 
plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with 
the present paragraph, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one 
hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution; 
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968; '^ 
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear 
weapons or nuclear weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or 
any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the 
above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the 
present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items 
specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the 
exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the Agency, with the assistance and 
cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the 
Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9(b); to accept, in accordance with the 
arrangements provided for in paragraph 13, urgent on-site inspection and the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified 
above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 for future ongoing 
monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings; 
13. Requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
through the Secretary General and with the assistance and cooperation of the 
Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General referred 
to in paragraph 9(b), carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear 
capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional 
locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the 
Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal or rendering 
harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12; to carry out the plan 
within forty-five days following approval by the Council and to develop a plan, 
taking into account the rights and obligations or Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for the future ongoing monitoring and 
verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12, including an inventory of all 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485 
187 
nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to 
confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be 
submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the 
adoption of the present resolution; 
14. Notes that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8 to 13 represent steps 
towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of 
mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global 
ban on chemical weapons; 
D 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the steps taken to 
facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any 
property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned 
intact; 
E 
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 
2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable 
under international law for nay direct loss, damage-including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources - or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait; 
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign 
debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its 
obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within 
paragraph 16 and to establish a commission that will administer the fund; 
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Council for decision, 
no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, 
recommendations for the Fund to be established in accordance with paragraph 18 
and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16 to 18, including 
the following; administration of the Fund; mechanisms for determining the 
appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund, based on a percentage of the 
value of its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, not to exceed a figure to 
be suggested to the Council by the Secretor-General, taking into account the 
requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in 
conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration 
external debt service, and the need of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for 
ensuring that payments are made to the Fund; the process by which funds will be 
allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluation losses, listing 
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claims and verifying their validity, and resolving disputed claims in respect of 
Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16; and the composition of the 
Commission designated above; 
20. Decides, effective immediately that the prohibitions against the sail or supply to 
Iraq oOf commodities or products other than medicine and health supplies, and 
prohibition against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 
661 (1990), shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council 
Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and 
accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential 
civilian needs as identified in the report to the Secretary-General dated 20 March 
1991,'" and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee; 
21. Decides to review the provision of paragraph 20 every sixty days in the light of 
the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the 
implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of 
determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein; 
22. Decides also that upon the approval by the Council of the programme called for in 
paragraph 19 and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions 
contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 13, the prohibitions against the import of 
commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against 
financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have 
not further force or effect; 
23. Decides further that; pending action by the Council under paragraph 22, the 
Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait shall be empowered to approve, when required 
to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities 
under paragraph 20, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of 
commodities and products originating in Iraq; 
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related 
resolutions and until it takes a further decision, all States shall continue to prevent 
the sale or supply to Iraq, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, 
by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of: 
a. Arms and related material of all types, specifically including the sale or 
transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military 
equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and 
components and their means of production for such equipment; 
11/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1991. 
document S/22366. annex. 
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b. Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 not otherwise covered 
above; 
c. Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the 
production, utilization or stockpiling of items specifies in paragraphs (a) and 
(b); 
d. Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to 
the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items 
specified in paragraphs (a) and (b); 
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance 
with paragraph 24, notwithstanding the existence of any contacts, agreements, 
licences or any other arrangements; 
26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to 
develop within sixty days, for approval of the Council, guidelines to facilitate full 
international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27, and to make them 
available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines 
periodically; 
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take 
such other action consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Council 
under paragraph 26 as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of 
paragraph 24, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate 
steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance; 
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22 to 25, except for the items 
specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 on a regular basis and in any case 
one hundred and twenty days following the adoption of the present resolution, 
taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress 
towards the control of armaments in the region; 
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure 
that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person 
or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such 
person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its 
performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Council in 
resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions; 
30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all 
Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross by providing lists of such persons, 
facilitating the access of the International Committee to all such persons wherever 
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located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee for 
those Kuwaiti and third-State nationals still unaccounted for; 
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-
General apprised, as appropriate, of all activities undertaken in connection with 
facilitating the repatriation of return of all Kuwaiti and third-State national s or 
their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990; 
H 
32. Requires Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of 
international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of 
such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and 
renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism; 
I 
33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to 
the Security Council of its acceptance of the above provisions, a formal cease-fire 
is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with 
Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990); 
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be 
required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and 
security in the region. 
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CHAPTER VI 
POST IRAQ-KUWAIT WAR DYNAMICS 
The prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War by the US-led coalition was intended to 
serve a number of purposes. It was useful to demonstrate to the world that any grave 
threat to American interests would not be tolerated, particularly where these required the 
unimpeded supply of fuel to the world's most energy-profligate nation. It was useful also 
to signal the new global power structure, the 'New World Order' in which a post-Cold 
War United States could operate without the bothersome constraint-of another global 
superpower. It was essential in these circumstances that Iraq be mercilessly crushed. As 
the American academic and dissident Noam Chomsky pointed out, the much weaker 
opponent 'must not merely be defeated but pulverised if the central lesson of World Order 
is to be learned: we are the masters and you shine our shoes'. There were other 
purposes: some obvious and some less so. The Americans did not disguise their delight at 
being able to experiment with a new generation of high-technology weapons. It was 
helpful to be able to test such devices on the flesh and fabric of a vulnerable state that 
was obligingly bellicose and conveniently racially-different from the United States. 
Another factor, rarely discussed, concerned strategic matters of an altogether different 
kind. Japan remains massively dependent on the huge oil tankers that ply the routes from 
the Gulf: how prudent for the United States to maintain a stranglehold on the crucial 
energy supply to a principal economic competitor in the rapidly developing tripolar 
system of world commerce.^ *^ It would be a mistake to believe that the primary purpose 
of the US initiated war on Iraq was the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. 
The expulsion was in fact no more than a means to various ends: it is plain 
enough that the United States has no principled (as opposed to tactical) objection to 
aggressions by sovereign states against others, and so the reasons for the onslaught on 
Iraq must be sought elsewhere. The US did not work to activate the United Nations in 
'*^ Noam Chomsky, The weak shah inherit nothing'. The Guardian, London, 25 March 1991. 
"*^  In the early 1990s there were many signs of escalating commercial tensions between the United States 
and Japan. In 1992 there were growing threats of a trade war between the US and Europe. With the 
Cold War over, the leading commercial players of the world were increasingly able to revert to their 
traditional practices of economic confrontation. 
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military opposition to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon and other Arab lands; to the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor; or to the various South African invasions of Namibia, 
Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, there is evidence that it conspired, to varying degrees, 
in such invasions; and, of course, the US itself has invaded many sovereign states 
(notably Grenada and Panama in recent years). Moreover, in order to protect the war on 
Iraq, the US sanctioned fresh contemporary or subsequent aggressions: further Israeli 
incursions into Lebanon, the Syrian onslaught on East Beirut, and the (post-Gulf War) 
Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Iraq. 
The war on Iraq, realistically viewed, was designed to protect US hegemony over 
oil (with the broad strategic aims that this implies), to educate the world about post-
Soviet political realities, to test new anti-personnel and other weapons, and to justify the 
absurdly high levels of investment in US military power. A further aim was to bolster the 
reputation of a US president beset by the 'wimp factor' and the prospect of a presidential 
election in 1992. No-one doubted that, whatever the Gulf War's other useful effects, the 
reputation of President George Bush had been much enhanced. Commentators queued up 
to proclaim the inevitability of Bush's re-election in November 1992. Thus, in an 
observation that was typical for the times, the respected journalist Mike Graham felt able 
to declaim: . . . after winning the war against Iraq and presiding over the death throes of 
communism. Bush knows that he barely has to lift a finger to be returned to power in next 
year's elections'. The little-known Arkansas governor. Bill Clinton, could be 
discounted since there were already 'whispers about secret affairs and illegitimate 
children. . . he appears vulnerable to the media inquisition that inevitably will occur if he 
runs'. In any event, 'no matter who gets the [Democratic] nomination, he is unlikely to 
become president. . .'^ ^^  Efforts to improve the image of an unimpressive American 
president must be judged less important than those designed to safeguard traditional US 
^^* Mike Graham, 'Bush finds comic relief in a rag bag of rivals'. The Sunday Times, London, 8 September 
1991. 
'"' Ibid. Virtually alone among the journalistic pundits, Andrew Stephen, The Observer, London, 8 
September 1991, while opining that Bill Clinton 'has probably had too many girlfriends for comfort', 
reckoned that the 1992 election would be 'much closer, much more exciting, than everyone else seems 
to think'. 
193 
interests. Individuals come and go, but attempts to sustain hegemonic power must be 
maintained over decades. Iraq had tasted the fruits of US strategic calculations. 
One of the most significant factors of the Gulf War was the speed with which the 
US-led coalition was able to achieve air supremacy. Iraqi air defences were 
systematically devastated, many of the targets being attacked time and time again. Within 
a matter of days it became clear that Iraqi aircraft were unlikely to engage allied planes 
and soon, with the speedy and comprehensive destruction of the multilayered Iraqi anti-
aircraft systems, allied aircraft were able to range and bomb at will. What this meant in 
human terms is hard for distant and comfortable observers to imagine. 
Tens of thousands of hapless Iraqi conscripts, many of them from groups known 
to be persecuted by Saddam Hussein, had no choice but to sit in the wastes of Iraq and 
Kuwait until the bombs fell. Here they were forced to suffer napalm, cluster bombs that 
shred human flesh, the air-fuel explosives (virtual mini atom bombs) that incinerate some 
and asphyxiate others, and the carpets of 'earthquake' bombs laid down by B-52s - all the 
obscene paraphernalia that in earlier days had killed perhaps three million people in 
Korea, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. 
The relatively brief war saw no first-hand journalistic accounts of the scale of the 
slaughter: one of the key lessons that Washington had learned from Vietnam was the 
tactical need to exclude journalists from the scenes of horror.^ *^ After the war, accounts 
appeared in the press, but few of these attempted to depict the numbers of the Iraqi 
casualties or the enormity of what had been accomplished. At Basra, the journalist Karl 
Waldron picked his way for 'perhaps 100 yards, trying to count the corpses, but it was a 
hopeless task. There were not enough whole bodies left to count'.^ ^^ Most of the slaughter 
was intentional, a matter of military planning; but some of it was accidental, as when the 
marketplace of Fallujah was bombed. Abdullah, the grandson of Terfeh Mehsan, is - we 
A detailed account of how journalists were restricted in their efforts to cover the Gulf War is given by 
John R. MacArthur, Second Front. Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, Hill & Wang, New 
York, 1992. 
Karl Waldron, 'Splintered remnants of a rout'. The Independent, London, 4 March 1991. 
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are told - a 'handsome but frail boy of 12 . . . Where his legs used to be, Abdullah has two 
little stumps, the skin flayed with septic cuts'.^ ^^ Some of the accounts describe the 
destruction of the convoys desperately attempting to flee from Kuwait; as, for example, 
on the doomed road to Umm Qasr: '60 miles of carnage . . . scores of soldiers lie in and 
around the vehicles, mangled and bloated in the drifting desert sands'. We were left in 
no doubt about the face of Iraq in March 1991: At one spot, snarling wild dogs have 
reduced two corpses to bare ribs. Giant carrion birds claw and pick at another; only a 
boot-clad foot and eyeless skull are recognisable. One flat-bed truck has nine bodies. 
Each man clutches the next. Their hair and clothes are burned off, skin incinerated by 
heat so intense it melted the windscreen on to the dashboard. Another body hangs from 
the driver's seat of a shrapnel-riddled front end loader. Half a corpse sits in a truck with 
twisted metal for an engine. Blowing sand laps at other bodies on the roadside.^ ^*^ Such 
reports soon stimulated discussion as to what might constitute a war crime. 
Thus the correspondent Denis Knight suggested that the deliberate massacre of 
thousands of fleeing soldiers might qualify. And what of the specific weapons used?^*" 
Paul Flynn, British Member of Parliament, cites a report that fuel air explosives were 
'designed to produce nuclear-like levels of destruction without arousing popular 
revulsion'; and comments^^^ that the 'cluster bombs, daisy cutters and fuel air explosives 
should not be classed as conventional weapons. . . They are massacre weapons.' He adds 
that the British government has wilfully refused to recognise 'the holocaust results of the 
Gulf War. The most recent estimate is that 100,000 to 200,000 Iraqis were killed and 
300,000 to 700,000 injured. Most of them Shia and Kurdish conscripts.' In no estimates 
are there fewer than tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties. 
The journalist Christopher Bellamy, after some preliminary computations, 
suggests that this 'still leaves a huge number [of Iraqi soldiers] missing' (possibly 
Ed Vulliamy, 'Limbs and lives blasted away by allied bombs', The Guardian, London, 5 March 1991. 
•*' Bob Dogrin, 'Desert claims death convoy', The Guardian, London, II March 1991. 
•^ ''° Ibid. See also the account by Michael Kelly, 'Carnage on a forgotten road', The Guardian, London, II 
April 1991. 
^'' The Guardian, 5 March 1991. 
'^'- The Guardian. 21 June 1991. 
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approaching 200,000).^ '^' British estimates, cited soon after the end of the war, suggest at 
least 90,000 Iraqi soldiers killed; with a French military expert estimating as many as 
150,000 Iraqi fatalities.^ "^^  When Beth Osborne Daponte, a demographer at the US Census 
Bureau, published her own estimates of 158,000 Iraqis, half of them women and children, 
killed in the war and its aftermath, efforts were made to fire her. Her boss, Barbara 
Torrey, accused Daponte of using 'false information' and of 'untrustworthiness and 
unreliability'. Lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) then threatened 
legal action, whereupon Daponte was reinstated. She later commented: 'They wanted to 
suppress the figures because 1 had broken them down to show how many women and 
children had died'. . I find it extremely disturbing that the US Census Bureau tried to 
suppress and delay the release of information that is embarrassing to the current 
administration. Government employees should not be fired for speaking the truth . . . in 
this case the figures were clearly politically embarrassing.'^ ^^ Ken Livingstone, British 
MP, pointed out that most of the 'vast slaughter' took place when the Iraqi government 
had already declared its willingness to withdraw from Kuwait and when in any case the 
Iraqi army was in a state of disintegration.^^^ And Marjorie Thompson, Chair of CND and 
the Committee to Stop War in the Gulf, commented in letters to The Independent (6 
March 1991) and The Guardian (7 March 1991) that the slaughter of the fleeing Iraqis 
was an unforgivable act that will come to rate alongside Dresden and Hiroshima 'as one 
of those acts no one in the world will be found to justify'. In one report, Robert J. Lifton, 
Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the City University of New York, and director 
of the Centre on Violence and Human Survival, quoted a taxi-driver who had summed up 
'accurately enough' the character of the one-sided conflict: 'This ain't no war. It's just us 
dropping bombs and killing people.'^ ^^ Here it is suggested that much of the slaughter 
could have been avoided if the war had been ended earlier, as the Soviet Union and other 
states had urged, while still achieving the goals laid down by the United Nations; and 
perhaps the war itself could have been avoided altogether 'by pressing sanctions and a 
'''^ Christopher Bellamy, 'Arithmetic of death in wake of Gulf conflict', The Independent, London, 20 
March 1991. 
"''* Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Allies tot up Iraqi losses'. The Guardian, London, 1 March 1991. 
Simon Jones, 'US demographer sacked for exposing Iraqi civilian deaths'. The Independent, London, 
23 April 1992. 
•'"' The Independent, 11 March 1991. 
•'^ Robert Lifton, Last refuge of a hi-tech nation'. The Guardian, London, 12 March 1991. 
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diplomacy of common security'. '^ ^ Further reports indicated the extent to which the war 
had been fought against human beings, rather than simply against tanks and other 
weaponry. 
Thus some discussion was provoked by the revelation that the American army had 
used earthmovers and ploughs mounted on tanks to bury thousands of Iraqi soldiers 
alive. One attack of this sort resulted in thousands of Iraqi dead and wounded, with not 
a single American fatality. Colonel Lon Maggart, commander of the US 1st Brigade, 
estimated that his forces had buried about 650 Iraqi soldiers; and Colonel Anthony 
Moreno, commander of the 2nd Brigade, commented: 'For all I know, we could have 
killed thousands... What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with people's arms and 
things sticking out of them'. Such improvised mass graves, to which must be added the 
bulldozing of thousands of Iraqi corpses at the end of the war, are part of the post-war 
face of Iraq and Kuwait. And there are many other characteristic features in the erstwhile 
battlefields: not least the massive detritus of beaten armed forces, the inevitable residue 
of unexploded ordnance, and the radioactive waste left in the desert by the allied forces. 
In November 1991 it was revealed in a secret report by the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority that the allied armies had left forty tons of depleted uranium 
ammunition on the battlefield.^^" Here it was suggested that the long-term health of 
thousands of Kuwaitis and Western clean-up teams could be threatened, with the 
chemically toxic and radioactive waste passing into the water supply and the food chain. 
The report estimated that US tanks fired some 5000 depleted uranium rounds, US aircraft 
many tens of thousands of rounds, and British tanks 'a small number'. The tank 
ammunition alone, it was reckoned, contained more than 50,0001b of depleted uranium, 
enough material to cause '500,000 potential deaths'. A particular hazard would exist in the 
form of the uranium dust produced when the uranium shells hit and burned out Iraqi 
''' Ibid. 
^'' Patrick Sloyan, 'Iraqi troops buried alive say American officers'. The Guardian, London, 13 September 
1991. 
Nick Cohen, 'Radioactive waste left in Gulf by allies', The Independent on Sunday, London, 10 
November 1991: Nick Cohen and Tom Wilkie, 'Gulf teams not told of risk from Uranium', The 
Independent on Sunday, London, 10 November 1991. 
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armoured vehicles. Ingested in sufficient quantities, the uranium dust would cause kidney 
failure and a range of cancers. In March 1993 an Associated Press (AP) report, citing 
research by the Boston-based National Toxics Campaign Fund (NTCF), stated that 
thousands of Gulf War veterans may be suffering from radiation sickness after being 
exposed to US uranium-tipped weapons.^ *" The NTCF chairman John O'Connor, 
referring to the widespread chemical contamination caused by the US in the Vietnam 
War, commented: 'What we have here is a new problem which we believe could be the 
Agent Orange of the nineties'. 
It can be assumed that many of the Iraqi casualties )were caused by inaccurate 
bombing: the US forces, while at first lauding the reliability of the 'smart' weapons, later 
came to admit the massive number of inaccurate targetings. Thus in one classified US 
analysis, the computer-navigated Tomahawk cruise missiles hit their targets just over 50 
per cent of the time.^ °^ The 'smart' laser-guided bombs launched from the US F-117A 
Stealth attack jets hit their targets in only about 60 per cent of the missions flown, in 
contrast to the 90 per cent claimed earlier.''°^ In any case, of the 88,500 tons of bombs 
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait, only 6520 tons were precision-guided, and 70 per cent of 
the total 'missed their targets', according to a defence expert quoted by The Washington 
Post. At the end of the war, wrecked armaments, unexploded mines and other 
munitions, radioactive debris and mass graves littered the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deserts. It 
was also suspected, though not at that time known for certain, that the American forces 
had drawn up plans for the contingency f launching chemical and nuclear attacks against 
Iraq. Thus Major Johan Persson, a liaison officer at a Swedish army field hospital, 
declared in interviews in Stockholm that he had seen official guidelines about the use of 
nuclear and chemical weapons in certain circumstances.'"'^ Declared Major Persson: 
'There was such an order. I saw it. I had it in my hand. It was the real thing.' When US 
Secretary of State James Baker met the Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz on 9 January 
^°' The Guardian. 19 March 1993. 
^^ Patrick Cockburn, Pentagon revises its Gulf war scorecard'. The Independent, London, 14 April 1992. 
Banon Gellman, 'Study questions famed accuracy of US weapons', The Guardian, London, 11 April 
1992. 
'^"' The Washington Post, 18 March 1991. 
Richard, Norton-Taylor, 'Gulf war allies had nuclear option, claims officer'. The Guardian, London, 28 
September 1991. 
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1991, days before the start of the US-led bombing of Iraq, Baker declared: 'We know that 
you have a vast stock of chemical weapons. . . Our sincere advice to you is not to even 
think of using them. If you do, or if we feel that you did, then our reply will be 
unrestrained. I hope I am understood well.' The authoritative commentator Mohamed 
Heikal noted Aziz understands 'that Baker was hinting at the use of nuclear weapons'.^ "^ 
It was also known that the infrastructure of the Iraqi state had been comprehensively 
devastated, though detailed reports had yet to emerge. At the end of the war the toll of US 
casualties was small; to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi dead, wounded and 
traumatised, tens of thousands more casualties were to be added. 
The six weeks of allied air raids had destroyed the bulk of the electrical power 
stations that supplied hospitals, water pumping facilities, sewage treatment plants and 
water purification facilities; in addition, these various facilities had often been totally or 
partially destroyed by the bombing. A consequence was that many parts of Iraq had to 
face a public health crisis of vast proportions. In the immediate aftermath of the war the 
residents of Baghdad, having had no electricity or running water since the onset of the 
bombing in mid-January, had to rely for drinking water on the Tigris River, now being 
fouled by gushing streams of raw sewage. Iraqi and international health authorities 
predicted that unless sanctions on Iraq were lifted the capital and other major cities would 
soon be facing outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, hepatitis and polio. Dr Mohammad Ani, the 
Iraqi director for immunisation and primary health care for the ministry of health, 
commented: 'We are being killed indirectly.'^ °^ The Rustumiya and Sarafiya sewage 
treatment and water pumping stations had been attacked with allied missiles and bombs, 
and nearby water treatment plants were working at about one-quarter of capacity. 
Raymond Naimy, an official of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
commented that Baghdad's water supply had been cut by 90-95 per cent, and a World 
Health Organisation (WHO) delegation noted a fourfold increase in the number of 
children being treated for diarrhoea.""** In March 1991 Dr Roger Vivarie, of the Paris-
"""^  Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, An Arab View of the Gulf War, HarperCollins, London, 1992, 
p. 289. 
Lee Hockstader, 'Health crisis looms in Baghdad'. The Guardian, London, 5 March 1991. 
»* Ibid. 
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based Medecins Sans Frontieres, reported: 'The situation in Baghdad and in Falluja, 
80km from the capital, which was visited by our team, was already very difficult a week 
ago. Hospitals, once among the most advanced and best equipped in the region, now lack 
the most elementary working tools. There is no infrastructure, no running water, no food 
and no medicine. All sanitary infrastructures have gone and not a single hospital is in a 
position to provide the most elementary of services.'^ °^ The UN special envoy, Martti 
Ahtisaciri, reported that Iraq was in a 'near apocalypse': Iraq was like a patient whose 
central nervous system had been destroyed. Ahtisaari warned that since the country's 
energy systems had been so badly damaged by bombing, food aid alone would not be 
sufficient to avert disaster. The UN sanctions committee was urged to respond to the 
crisis by declaring that an 'urgent humanitarian need' existed throughout Iraq. In his UN-
sponsored report, Ahtisaari himself commented: 'Nothing we had seen or read had quite 
prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. . 
.the recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic 
infrastructure'. Moreover, 'sanctions decided upon by the Security Council. . . seriously 
affected the country's ability to feed its people'; all sources of fuel and power and modem 
means of communication were now 'essentially defunct', with the telephone system and 
the mail service destroyed; the supply of food to private citizens had been reduced to 'a 
trickle'. There was a real risk of widespread deaths through disease and perhaps 
starvation. 
Ibrahim al-Nouri, the director of the Iraqi Red Crescent, was reporting on cases of 
cholera and typhoid detected in several towns, and urging international aid organisations 
to send water purification chemicals to help combat the diseases. Relief officials in 
Jordan were commenting that Iraqi hospitals had been forced to halve rations for their 
patients. In Basra and other cities women were forced to wash clothes and kitchen 
utensils in water contaminated with raw sewage, with the incidence of disease sharply 
increasing because of the shortage of food and the lack of clean water for drinking. All 
but two of the city's filtration plants were destroyed, and cholera and typhoid, not yet at 
epidemic proportions, were increasing. Said al- Tamimi, a medical engineer, was quoted: 
Safa Haeri, 'Food and medicines "crucial" to save Iraq', The Independent, London. 26 March 1991. 
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'A friend of mine brought me a bucket of water from the mains supply in which was 
swimming a little snake.' The death rate, particularly among children, was rapidly 
increasing: the main bridges across the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Shatt ai-Arab had 
been destroyed, making it impossible to take children to hospital where, in any case, 
virtually all normal services were impossible. 
At the same time it was impossible to monitor with any accuracy the incidence of 
the burgeoning cholera epidemic, since during the war and the ensuing civil unrest most 
of the laboratory equipment used to measure the disease had been destroyed. In a 
damning article in The New York Times, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national 
security adviser to President Carter, shattered the US claim that the war was fought with 
discrimination to minimise civilian casualties. He emphasised that damage-toll 'raises the 
moral question of the proportionality of the response' to Saddam Hussein's aggression 
against Kuwait. 
The respected British journalist Peter Jenkins, commenting on the Brzezinski 
report and other material, noted that the peace 'has turned into a nightmare, the 
continuation of the war by other means'." '^" Joost Hiltermann, Middle East organiser for 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), commented: 'The bombing was called surgical, but 
we're calling it neurosurgical: with extraordinary accuracy the allied bombs took the 
brain out of the country's ability to survive'; and PUR president Jack Geiger, having 
toured the region of Basra, described the effect as: 'Bomb now, die later. You don't kill 
people, you just cause the system to collapse.' The main themes of the PUR report were 
familiar enough: malnutrition, diarrhoea and dehydration among the children; dangerous 
drinking water; and a crippled economy.^" 
In the same spirit a Harvard medical team visiting Iraq found that the death rate of 
children under five was two to three times higher than before the war. They estimated 
that over the coming year a further 170,000 children would die because of the problems 
Peter Jenkins, 'War continues by other means'. The Independent, London, 24 April 1991. 
Ed Vuiliamy, 'Doctors find Iraq is slowly dying', The Guardian, Lxjndon, 16 April 1991. 
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caused by the Gulf War: the massively dislocated social infrastructure and the harshness 
of the enforced sanctions. Now typhoid and cholera epidemics were flaring up throughout 
the country, with hospitals - lacking antibiotics, infant formula, medicines, bandages and 
other supplies - unable to treat malnourished children. One Baghdad hospital reported 30-
35 new cases of cholera a week during April 1991; and infectious typhoid patients were 
being discharged in all regions because of a shortage of chloramphenicol, the drug 
needed for treatment. 
Dr Megan Passey, the leader of the Harvard team, said that the report would be 
presented to UN agencies, the US Congress and international relief agencies.^'^ In May 
1991 Iraq declared it was desperate for access to its overseas assets, now frozen by the 
US-dominated Security Council, in order to pay for the next four months' food supply. 
Deals had been signed with Australia and Canada for the import of 1.5 billion tons of 
wheat, half the country's needs, but the orders were dependent on Iraq gaining access to 
its foreign assets. It soon became clear that the United States, Britain and France were in 
no mood to lift the sanctions on Iraq, while at the same time Washington began pressing 
for a 50 per cent levy on all future Iraqi oil revenues. In June the Soviet Union, backed by 
China and India in the Security Council, urged some relaxation of the punitive sanctions 
on Iraq, if only to allow the purchase of food and medicines. On 12 June Britain blocked 
an Iraqi move for the unfreezing of currency printed in Britain for the purchase of food, 
but the Security Council's sanctions committee agreed that thirty-one countries could 
release Iraqi assets to facilitate the purchase of food, medicines and other essential 
supplies. At the same time it was clear that this measure was insufficient to meet Iraq's 
growing humanitarian needs. Figures provided by the Iraqi health ministry suggested that 
many patients were dying from infectious diarrhoeal diseases; death from such a cause 
was rare in 1990 but in the post-war period deaths were running at about thirty-two per 
thousand admitted to hospital (in April and May 1991, 17,000 people were admitted). At 
Baghdad's main hospital for infectious diseases the staff acknowledged that they were 
" ' Susan Okie, 'Child death rate doubles in aftermath of Gulf conflict'. The Guardian, London, 23 May 
1991. 
202 
treating many suspected cholera cases, as well as typhoid and meningitis.^'^ Dr Michael 
Viola, an American professor of medicine and microbiology who visited Iraq along with 
two other New York physicians, reported on the severe epidemic of several diseases, a 
situation now aggravated by malnutrition ('You don't need statistics. It's everywhere'). 
The journalist Patrick Tyler, who visited dozens of paediatric and infectious-disease 
wards across the country, encountered more than one hundred cases of marasmus, a 
condition of progressive emaciation caused by advanced malnutrition: 'Typical symptoms 
are a gaunt skeletal look and distended stomach. 
There were also many obvious cases of kwashiorkor, an advanced form of protein 
deficiency in toddlers seldom seen outside drought-stricken areas of Africa.' Dr Amera 
Ali, a physician at Ibn Baladi Hospital in Baghdad, commented that if all the marasmus 
cases were admitted, 'the hospitals would be full in one day'.-^ '^  In July 1991 the UN 
sanctions committee rejected an Iraqi request that $1.5 billion-worth of oil be sold to buy 
food and medicine. 
By August, according to official Iraqi sources, more than 11,000 people had died 
of starvation. The poor were at particular risk from malnutrition and disease: there was no 
suggestion that the Ba'athist leadership, against whom the sanctions were supposedly 
directed, was going hungry. Soon Western aid donors were warning that unless 
international sanctions on Iraq were eased the country could face malnutrition and disease 
on an unprecedented scale. UN officials confirmed the fresh incidence of marasmus and 
kwashiorkor, and reported infectious diseases such as typhoid, hepatitis, meningitis and 
gastroenteritis surging out of control. Washington and London continued to block a 
relaxation of sanctions on the grounds that the Iraqi authorities were refusing to co-
operate with UN officials required to inspect Iraq's surviving military facilities. In July a 
UN mission led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan issued a report on 'humanitarian needs in 
Iraq', compiled following 'observations and conclusions drawn from on the-spot 
evaluation'. The report declared that sanctions were having a substantial effect on the 
'^^  Patrick Tyler, 'Trade ban starves Iraqis', The Guardian, I^ndon, 25 June 1991. 
''' Ibid. 
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living standards of the civilian population. Damage to water treatment plants and the 
international block on the supply of spare parts had cut off an estimated 2.5 million Iraqis 
from the government system they relied upon before the war. The 14.5 million fraqis 
continuing to receive water via the pre-war system were now receiving less than a quarter 
of the pre-war amounts, and this was of doubtful quality. Raw sewage continued to flow 
in city streets and into rivers used for washing and drinking, resulting in unprecedented 
levels of infectious diseases, including typhoid and cholera. The international blockade 
on spare parts meant that medical, surgical, dental and laboratory equipment could not be 
maintained, and that the electrical supply for most agricultural purposes was running at 
about one-third of the previous years. The price levels of wheat and rice the two normal 
staple foods - remained at 45 and 22 times their pre-war levels, with government 
rationing providing only about one-third of the typical family's food needs. Almost half 
of the nation's 900,000 telephone lines had been damaged beyond repair, and all the 
international communications facilities had been destroyed. 
The Sadruddin mission urged that Iraq be allowed to import $1 billion worth of 
spare parts and other materials to begin the restoration of the oil industry; that immediate 
steps be taken to alleviate the priority needs identified by the mission in the areas of food 
supply, medicine, water and sanitation, power generation, telecommunications and the oil 
sector; that food imports, to meet the minimum consumption requirements, be allowed; 
that imports of fertilisers, pesticides, animal feed and drugs, machinery and spare parts 
needed to repair the irrigation and drainage system be allowed; and that imports should 
also be permitted for the repair of surgical, dental and diagnostic equipment, for 
ambulances, for water pumping and treatment facilities, for the sewage system, for 
electrical generation, for the oil industry, and for teleconrununications. 
On 26 August 1991 Iraq reported that more than 14,000 children had died because 
of the lack of drugs since the United Nations imposed the trade embargo. A month later, 
publicity was given to the results of the study carried out by the 87-member Harvard 
Study Team which investigated some 6000 Iraqi households. The earlier enquiry carried 
out by the same team found that the child mortality rate had doubled. Now it was found 
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that the death rate of under-fives had trebled and amounted to tens of thousands.^'^ 
Disease was rampant, with widespread epidemics of typhoid and cholera. There was also 
a major increase in domestic violence, with 'the highest rate of war-related psychological 
trauma ever found in a postwar study'.^'^ At the same time the UN Secretary-General, 
Javier Perez de Cuellar, was urging the Security Council to allow Iraq to sell increased 
amounts of oil to provide revenue for humanitarian purchases. 
In November ]99i there were reports of food riots in Baghdad and other Iraqi 
cities, with particularly serious disorder in the Baghdad (Shia) suburbs of Thawra and 
Khadhimaya.^'^ Prices of some essential foods had risen a hundredfold. Fifty kilogram 
bags of sugar and rice were now costing 500 dinars, equivalent to two months' salary for 
a professional. The Iraqi government, faced with a partially collapsed currency, ordered 
the major Rafidain Bank to accept currency known to be counterfeit. On 14 November 
the Iraqi agriculture minister, Abdul Wahab al-Sabagh, declared that thousands more 
children and old people would starve unless UN sanctions were lifted soon: '. . . only 
fifteen per cent of our people can afford to buy food on the free market. The rest must 
accept hunger. That is the reality of the embargo'. Iraq had been allowed to import 
100,000 tonnes of grain over the eight-month period since the end of the war, but the 
normal national requirement was 200,000 tonnes a month: 'Today we have a great lack of 
food and medicines. We lack spare parts for agricultural machinery. We lack fertilisers 
and pesticides as well as spares to get our power stations and oil refineries working again. 
We are a country that lives in the dark. . . we need pumps to bring the water to the fields 
and these require electricity which we do not have.' 
At this time the United Nations was expressing a willingness to allow Iraq to raise 
revenues to buy food and other essential goods, provided that the UN was allowed to 
supervise food distribution and secure reparations for the victims of the Iraqi aggression. 
Sara Helm, 'Child deaths "have trebled" since Gulf war', The Independent, London, 20 September 
1991 
317 
"' Ihid. 
Helga Graham, 'Starving Iraqis riot as food crisis deepens'. The Observer, London, 3 November 1991. 
205 
The British Overseas Development Minister, Lynda Chalker, announced that further 
action might have to be taken against Saddam Hussein unless he agreed to the UN terms 
for oil sales. On 20 November 1991 the director of Oxfam, Frank Judd, having just 
visited the region, called for a big international humanitarian effort to help the millions of 
Iraqis suffering malnutrition and now facing a winter without adequate food, medicines 
or housing. Now children with matchstick limbs and distended bellies, 'like drought 
victims from Ethiopia', could be seen in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. A doctor in a 
Baghdad hospital commented: 'It's a vicious circle. They get weaker and weaker from 
lack of food. Then they are susceptible to disease because they have no immunity, and 
that weakens them even more.' Britain had agreed a release of £70 million-worth of Iraqi 
assets to buy the freedom of the businessman, Ian Richter, but there was no control over 
how the money would be used: it was unlikely that the plight of the needy would be 
alleviated, and in any case President George Bush had asserted that the UN economic 
embargo must remain in effect. Again there was no suggestion that the measures were 
hurting the Ba'athist leadership. Some 30 per cent of all Iraqi children were now 
malnourished, with infant mortality trebled since the Gulf War. '^^  The situation in Iraq 
following the war was plain enough. The US-dominated Security Council was insisting 
that de facto biological warfare be waged against the impotent and traumatised Iraqi 
people, not against the Ba'athist leadership who alone were culpable. By now the reports 
were frequent and unambiguous: the UN sanctions - whatever the callous machinations of 
Saddam Hussein - were bringing disease, malnutrition and starvation to virtually the 
entire nation. Louise Cainkar, director of the Chicago-based Database Project on 
Palestinian Human Rights, having spent several weeks conducting fieldwork in Iraq, 
reported in detail on the effects of the UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq.^ ^° In Basra she 
encountered 'the same scene I was to see over and over again. . . Iraqi women holding 
thin, bloated and malnourished children. . .' On 20 May 1991 President Bush declared 
that the trade embargo would continue: 'We don't want to lift these sanctions as long as 
Saddam Hussein is in power.' And in the same spirit, the deputy national security adviser. 
Sara Helm, 'Oxfam urges action to end Iraqi hardship', The Independent, London, 21 November 1991. 
Marie Colvin, 'Saddam thrives as babies starve', The Sunday Times, 1 December 1991. 
Louise Cainkar, Desert sin: a post-war journey through Iraq', in Phyllis Bennis and Michel 
Moushabeck (eds.). Beyond the Storm, A Gulf Crisis Reader, Canongate, London, 1992, pp. 335-55. 
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Robert Gates, nominated by Bush to head the CIA, stated that the Iraqis would 'pay the 
price while he [Saddam Hussein] is in power'.^ '^ 
While few observers doubted the deteriorating plight of the ordinary Iraqi people, 
and while Bush repeatedly emphasised that the option of further military action against 
Iraq Was still open, the punitive sanctions - including a (de facto if not de jure) ban on 
imports of food and medicine - remained in place. WHO and UNICEF had warned of the 
'catastrophe' that would beset Iraq if sanctions were not lifted, but Washington and 
London remained largely oblivious to this concern. In May 1991 the White House 
spokesman Marlin Fitzwater repeated the familiar refrain that' All possible sanctions will 
be maintained until he [Saddam Hussein] is gone.' There was plenty of evidence that 
sanctions were devastating the Iraqi people, but no evidence that they were undermining 
the Ba'athist regime. 
The deteriorating health of the Iraqi population became increasingly obvious 
through the summer of 1991, though the US and Britain - as lead players on the Security 
Council - seemed reluctant to agree any relaxation in sanctions. These countries even 
went so far as to block Iraq's unilateral efforts to export $1 billion-worth of oil to buy 
food and other essential products, such as water purification tablets. A few states 
connived with Iraq to break the UN-imposed sanctions, but Iraqi imports remained only a 
fraction of pre-war levels. Jordan, for instance, was found to be trading with Iraq in 
violation of UN stipulations, as shown by an Iraqi-Jordanian Joint Committee document, 
with minutes signed by Abdul Wahid al-Makhzumi, adviser of the Central Bank of Iraq, 
and Dr Ibrahim Badran, under-secretary 1 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade for 
Jordan.''^ ^ In July there were signs that the US and Britain were prepared to allow Iraq to 
sell some oil for humanitarian purposes, provided such activity could be closely 
monitored I and regulated to bring reparations to some of those who had suffered because 
of the Iraqi aggression. There were signs also that the enduring US hostility to Iraq, 
" ' Patrick E. Tyler, 'Bush links ending of trading ban to Hussein exit'. The New York Times, 21 May 
1991. 
Helga Graham, 'King Hussein bursts sanctions to rebuild Saddam' s power'. The Observer, London, 23 
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evidenced by threat of further mihtary strikes, was now being countered by other Security 
Council members unwilling to see further conflict in the Gulf. On 29 July Maurice 
Gourdault Montagne, a spokesman for the French government, urged the Security 
Council to ease the trade embargo against Iraq. This pressure, combined with the 
entreaties of WHO and UNICEF, had some effect: on 15 August 1991 the Security 
Council authorised Baghdad to sell up to $1.6 billion-worth of oil to help pay for 
desperately needed food. The deal, under strict UN control, was seen as a one-off 
humanitarian gesture. Other resolutions passed at the same time fixed a ceiling of 30 per 
cent on the amount of annual Iraqi oil sales used to pay reparations: and condemned 
Baghdad's failure to co-operate with UN inspectors responsible for destroying Iraq's 
clandestine nuclear weapons programme. " It was soon being pointed out that the UN 
concession was totally inadequate, with even Secretary-General Perez' de Cuellar 
commenting that the restrictions on the pennitted oil sale would provide the Iraqis with 
'substantially less than the minimum food import requirements'.^ '^* The Iraqi government, 
perhaps predictably, condemned the half-hearted UN gesture as an interference with Iraqi 
sovereignty. 
On 4 February 1992 the Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Abdul Amir al-Anbari, 
declared that Iraq would not resume talks on possible oil sales: 'We decided that the talks 
were no longer useful or productive given the conditions imposed by Security Council 
resolution 706, which renders the production of Iraq oil a non-profitable enterprise and 
the Iraq (oil non-marketable.' However, by the end of March, agreement had been 
reached between the UN and the Iraqi authorities on the terms that would govern the 
resumption of Iraqi oil sales. Such agreement came too late to save many thousands of 
Iraqi deaths: a senior Iraqi health official, Abdul Jabbar Abdul Abbas, reported that in the 
first four months of 1992 the UN economic sanctions had caused nearly 41,000 deaths, 
including 14,000 child fatalities. And UN officials estimated that nearly five million 
children in the Middle East would spend their formative years in deprived circumstances 
" ' Trevor Rowe, 'UN allows Iraqi sale of oil to buy food', The Independent, London, 16 August 1991; 
Mark Iran, 'UN permits sale of $1.6bn of Iraqi oil'. The Guardian, 16 August 1991. 
"^  Tony Smythe, 'Oil revenues won't feed Iraq' (letter). The Independent, London, 19 August 1980; 
Leonard Doyle, 'Iraq oil exports "insufficient to prevent famine" The Independent, London, 7 
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as a result of the Gulf crisis. Thus Richard Reid, the UN Children's Fund director for 
North Africa and the Middle East, commented that: 'We can speak with alarming, grave 
assurance of a lost generation.' On 3 September 1992 Britain ruled out any easing of 
sanctions on Iraq, instead warning Iraq against any attempt to interfere with the aerial 
exclusion zone over southern Iraq (see below). A few weeks later, the Harvard research 
team published their estimate that 46,900 children under the age of five died in Iraq 
between January and August 1991 as an indirect result of the bombing, the civilian 
uprisings and the UN economic embargo. 
Iraq, claiming purely humanitarian motives, made frequent requests for an easing 
of sanctions. Thus in November 1992, for example, Tariq Aziz visited New York to ask 
the UN to relax the current restrictions, but the Security Council issued a statement 
saying that Iraq had only partially complied with UN demands and so there could be no 
relaxation of sanctions. It was now clear that the comprehensive embargo was drastically 
affecting every aspect of Iraqi life. There were serious and worsening shortages of food, 
medicines and the spare parts needed to repair the national infrastructure (sewage plant, 
hospitals, water purification systems and the like). Before the war children were given 
government-supplied meals at school but this was no longer possible; and the embargo, 
extensive enough to cover imports of paper, meant that newspapers were reducing their 
number of pages and editions, and that the book trade had virtually collapsed, massively 
hampering education at all levels. Ian Katz describes how the resilient Iraqi people are 
struggling to cope with appalling difficulties: thousands of engineers and doctors are 
unemployed, a pharmacist tells how she can only service a quarter of the prescriptions 
brought to her, a dentist describes how she caimot any longer obtain the necessary 
anaesthetics. And there is the frequent suggestion that the repression by Saddam's regime 
is a lesser evil than Iraq's constant humiliation at the hands of the West.^ ^^ 
The West, for the most part, continued to pay little attention to the privations 
brought to the Iraqi people by the seemingly permanent sanctions. Hugh Stephens, the 
coordinator for the unofficial British Commission of Inquiry for the International War 
•"' Ian Katz, reporting for The Guardian, 29 January 1993. 
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Crimes Tribunal, noted: 'Iraq is inhabited not only by its president, but by 18 million 
people who, in systematic contravention of Article 54 of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, are 
being subjected to hunger as a means of war, are being deprived of essential medical 
supplies and are facing the destruction of services essential to civilian life.'^ ^^ There were 
few signs that the bulk of the Iraqi people were blaming such privations on Saddam. 
The various aid agencies and UN-linked bodies continued to report the 
devastating impact of sanctions that had no justification in law or natural justice. To most 
independent observers the de facto (if not de jure) blocking of shipments of foodstuffs 
and medical supplies to an increasingly desperate population had nothing to do with 
alleged Iraqi violations of UN resolutions and everything to do with Washington's 
strategic and economic calculations in the context of Gulf oil. Now no-one had an excuse 
for not acknowledging the impact of the US-contrived sanctions. For example, the charity 
Medical Aid for Iraq (MAI), struggling to supply medicines and medical equipment to 
Iraqi hospitals, was publishing regular reports. One of these (relating to the delivery of 
medical supplies during January and February 1993) recorded the impression of MAI aid 
workers that the medical situation had worsened since the last visit (May 1992); and the 
observation that 'as always, it has been the children who have been hit the hardest'. The 
deteriorating situation was plain enough: The need in the hospitals is greater, with basic 
supplies such as cotton wool, dressings and soap being in desperately short supply. . . 
Shortages of milk powder, cannulae, antibiotics and syringes have been a problem since 
the Gulf War. . . now a lack of insulin has become a major problem . . . As a result 
children with diabetes are arriving at hospitals in comas and dying. . . foods containing 
protein are too expensive to buy. The result is an ever increasing number of children with 
kwashiorkor. . . In every hospital visited the children's wards were full of malnourished 
children, many of whom also have chest infections or gastroenteritis. Everyone seemed to 
know someone who had died recently due to lack of food or medicines. 
By any medical or health index a mounting disaster was afflicting the entire 
country. The growing number of malnourished pregnant women was resulting in an 
The Independent, 15 February 1993. 
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increasing number of premature births. Asthmatic children were dying because the 
supplies of salbutamol had long since been exhausted. In some hospitals, with syringes 
and cannulae being reused, there were no protein foods and no antiseptics. At the time of 
the MAI visit Dr Saad Al Tibowi, the director of the Samawa Children's and Obstetrics 
Hospital in southern Iraq, had given his own blood three times in the previous week. The 
situation was the same in all the hospitals visited: in Karbala Children's Hospital, 
Nassiriya Children's and Obstetrics Hospital, Kut General Hospital, Basra Teaching 
Hospital, the Baghdad Medical City Children's Hospital, the Alwiyah Children's Hospital, 
and others. Shortages of staff and supplies, a growing incidence of kwashiorkor and other 
nutritional deficiency diseases, a growing incidence of typhoid, the highest recorded 
incidence of measles and mumps (with all 'childhood diseases potentially fatal because 
immunity is low due to malnutrition), a growing incidence of rickets, diarrhoea, hepatitus 
A, polio and diptheria, children dying of the blood disease thalassaemia because the 
hospitals had run out of the drug desferal, a growing incidence of marasmus - all brought 
about by UN sanctions in violation of the Geneva Convention. On 22 June 1993 Shibib 
al-Maliki, Iraq's Justice Minister, told the UN World Human Rights Conference in 
Vienna that the United Nations was violating human rights by retaining sanctions: 'The 
people of Iraq suffer today from shortages of food, medicine and medical requirements. . 
. the blockade is causing thousands of lives to be lost among women and the elderly.' At 
the same time reports were appearing of a report prepared by Dr Eric Hoskins, a Harvard 
expert on public health, for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) on the health situation in 
Iraq. A 32-page 'preliminary draft' claimed to identify 'the impact of war and sanctions on 
Iraqi women and children'.^ ^^ It stated: 'Nearly three years of economic sanctions have 
created circumstances in Iraq where the majority of the civilian population are now living 
in poverty . . . by most accounts, the greatest threat to the health and well-being of the 
Iraqi people remains the difficult economic conditions created by nearly three years of 
internationally mandated sanctions and by the infrastructural damage wrought by the 
1991 military conflict.' The conclusion to the executive summary includes the comment: ' 
. . . politically motivated sanctions (which are by definition imposed to create hardship) 
cannot be implemented in a manner which spares the vulnerable.' UNICEF, alarmed at 
™ The Independent, 24 June 1993. 
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the obvious political import of the report, decided to shelve it (Hoskins: 'I think 1 
produced a good document'). 
A report produced by the joint FAO/WPP 'crop and food supply assessment 
mission' to Iraq,"^ *^ noted that 'pre-famine' conditions were being created: ' . . . the 
nutritional status of the population continues to deteriorate at an alarming rate. . . large 
numbers of Iraqis have now food intakes lower than those of the populations in the 
disaster stricken African countries.' Then - two years prior to writing this update - the 
Mission urged 'the most urgent response from the international community to seek a 
solution to this crisis'. Now (mid-1995) it seems that Washington is still prepared to do 
nothing to relieve the unremitting misery of the Iraqi people. 
One irony was that the Kurds in northern Iraq, supposedly protected by the United 
Nations, continued to suffer under the imposition of sanctions. Thus reports (August 
1993) highlighted the plight of Kurds dying in hospitals with no access to drugs. The 22-
year-old Runak Kamal, admitted to Arbil Hospital, died 10 days after graduating top of 
her class at Arbil University: there were no drugs for the minor infection that ended her 
life. Dr Chalak Barzingi, of the 400-bed hospital, commented that cholera was expected 
and that 'we have no intravenous fluids'. This was not, he declared, 'medicine in the 20th 
century'. At the same time Simon MoUison, of the Save the Children charity, noted the 
'collapsing situation' (The Independent on Sunday, Lx)ndon, 22 August 1993). On 1 
September Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, appealed yet again for the UN 
Security Council to lift the sanctions against Iraq - to no effect. Now it was being 
reported that more than 300,000 Iraqis had died as a result of medical shortages caused 
by the UN blockade. The Iraqi health minister, Umeed Madhat Mubarak, announced that 
4000 children under five were dying each month, compared with 700 a month before the 
Gulf War; with deaths of people over five having risen from 1800 to 6500 a month: 
'There are so many infectious diseases now which we had managed to eradicate. Now we 
are detecting a large amount of polio and cholera. We are now seeing so many newly 
detected cases of serious infectious diseases which are not just caused by the lack of 
^-^ FAOAVFP Report, No. 237, July 1993. 
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medical equipment and drugs but also by general sanitation conditions.' Nearly 1000 
cases of cholera, wiped out before 1990, had so far been reported in 1993. 
Another MAI report^ ^^ noted rocketing food prices, the growing incidence of 
malnourished children, diarrhoea and gastroenteritis that were 'rife', the block on medical 
literature to Iraq, the continuing sharp deterioration of the health facilities, many more 
cases of aplastic anaemia (associated with chemical pollution), and an increase in 
cancers, especially leukaemia, among the children. One cited example among many was 
a cancer ward (in the Baghdad Medical City Children's Hospital) 'full of dying children 
because of a lack of basic antibiotics and cytotoxic drugs'. At the same time there was an 
unprecedented upsurge of referrals of children with cancer. Similarly there were many 
more cases of meningitis. 
The tubing for resuscitaires in the City Children's Hospital were 'black with dirt, 
because of the shortage of cleaning and disinfecting fluids'. The labour ward was dirty 
('there is little soap or disinfectant'). There were no sheets, and so women were forced to 
give birth 'on hard plastic tables'. The last working blood gas machine in the hospital had 
broken and there were no spare parts: so children could 'no longer be ventilated'. The 
same sorts of problems existed in all the hospitals visited. Frequently there was no 
oxygen for emergencies as there were no spare parts to repair the cylinders. In one 
hospital supplies of catgut and silk had been exhausted: after one emergency caesarian 
section a woman 'had to be left open on the operating table for several hours while a 
member of staff went to fetch thread from another hospital'. The MAI workers saw a 
child dying from hydrocephaly: the intracranial shunts that would have saved his life 
were unobtainable. The conditions described for Najaf Children's and Obstetrics Hospital 
obtained throughout the Iraqi medical system: Aplastic anaemia, usually rarely seen, is 
now relatively common. The hospital is also seeing an increase in premature births and 
congenital abnormalities. . . There are many more children with leukaemia. . .Infections 
are a major problem. . . The hospital was short of salbutamol, and had no vitamin D 
injection to treat rickets. . .The obstetric department needs gloves, anaesthetics, muscle 
"" Report for the period September and October 1993. 
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relaxant and catgut. They have sometimes been unable to perform emergency caesarian 
sections. The labour ward is very dirty, due to a lack of cleaning solutions and 
disinfectants . . . Babies cannot be ventilated; there is no blood gas machine. Many are 
left to die..' 
By 1994 it was clear that any consensus in the so-called international community 
regarding UN sanctions on Iraq was breaking down. In the Security Council France and 
Russia were increasingly uneasy about the blockade, not obviously for any humanitarian 
reason but because they saw commercial advantage in a relaxation of the sanctions 
regime. Turkey, not a Council member but a strategically important NATO state, was 
also urging a change in sanctions policy; in particular, because Ankara feared the creation 
of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq that could only serve to strengthen the 
dissident Kurdish minority in Turkey. Thus Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, 
went to Ankara on 18 January 1994 to tell the Turkish leaders that sanctions must be 
maintained. At the same time a mission sponsored by the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies was collecting further evidence about the plight of the 
Iraqi people. 
The new report made dismal if, by now, familiar reading. This publication's 
Executive Summary includes the observations^^": The shortage of food in Iraq, the 
deterioration of the health care system and the hyper inflation has impoverished the 
majority of the Iraqi population.. .The government rationing system provides only half of 
the pre-war caloric ration. Most families cannot afford the other 50%. Animal proteins 
are missing in most diets. The nutritional status of children has been badly affected. 
Marasmus and kwashiorkor are on the increase. Provision of safe water and sanitation are 
badly affected by lack of chemicals, spare parts and maintenance for pumps and 
generators. . .The deterioration of the environmental conditions is also reflected in the 
emergence of diseases once thought to have been eradicated, such as malaria, cholera. 
^^ ^ Willem C. Smit and Dr Jean Pierre Revel, Report of the Assessment Mission to Iraq, II January 1994-
11 February 1994, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Amman, 
February 1994. The report itself cites other supportive studies: an in-depth international assessment 
(October 1991), a UNICEF report on children and women in Iraq (December 1992), an FAO/WFP 
mission assessment (July 1993), and an FAO report on nutritional status (November 1993). 
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typhoid fever, tuberculosis. Shortage of drugs, disposables, laboratory agents, 
maintenance and spare parts have (sic) reduced significantly the capacity of the health 
care facilities to diagnose and to provide adequate treatment. The magnitude of the needs 
to be addressed is far beyond the resources of all the aid organizations combined. 
In mid-March 1994, as the Security Council moved to its routine renewal of the 
sanctions regime, Russia again proposed that the oil embargo be lifted. Baghdad had 
complied with UN weapons-monitoring demands and now Moscow wanted 'a positive 
decision' on the embargo question to 'allow us to begin recovering Iraqi debts' (one 
estimate suggested that Baghdad owed Russia £4 billion, a debt incurred for Soviet-era 
arms purchases). Britain and the United States predictably resisted the Russian proposals. 
Said one British official: 'Our view is that the Iraqis respond to a tough line and they have 
started co-operating because of that line. The argument that we should respond and show 
flexibility is specious because that isn't what has secured the positive result so far.' Now 
British sources were expressing irritation with France for allowing the Total and Elf 
Aquitaine oil companies to hold talks in Iraq about possible future investments. 
This, reckoned London, was an unhelpful signal to Saddam at a time when 
firmness was needed. On 18 March the Security Council yet again renewed the punitive 
sanctions: in existence, so far, for well over three years. A further MAI report'''" provided 
yet more evidence of the worsening plight of the Iraqi people. MAI workers 'were 
particularly struck by the sharp deterioration of the health provision within Baghdad'; 
children with diabetes, epilepsy and asthma, for example, were not receiving medication; 
at the Kerbala Children's Hospital conditions had 'worsened considerably'; at the Samawa 
Children's and Obstetric Hospital conditions were 'deteriorating'; the Children's Hospital 
in Baghdad had 'no painkillers of any kind'; and so on and so forth. As London and 
Washington were keen to emphasise, it was important to be firm with Iraq. 
It was being reported that medical journals sent to Iraqi hospitals and doctors 
were being impounded by British Customs and the Post Office as a breach of UN 
" ' Report for the period 3-22 April 1994. 
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sanctions, despite repeated government assertions that medical-related supplies were 
exempt. ^ ^^  Thus copies of the British Medical Journal requested by Iraqi specialists were 
being returned by the Post Office to the British Medical Association, even when paid for 
by British residents in Iraq. Dr Stella Lowry, head of the BMA's international 
department, had reportedly told an Iraqi doctor working in Lx)ndon that commercial mail, 
including medical journals, was being blocked. George Galloway, a Labour Member of 
Parliament, wrote to Prime Minister John Major to denounce this policy as a 'flagrant and 
disgraceful breach of UN Resolution 661 [3(a): the ban on exports to Iraq does not 
include supplies intended strictly for medical purposes]'. On 17 May the United States 
and Britain again withstood the mounting pressure within the Security Council for a 
relaxation of the sanctions regime. 
In August, France and Russia were again reportedly urging the Council to ease 
sanctions in acknowledgement of Iraq's co-operation with the UN weapons inspectors. 
There were moreover perceived advantages in dealing with Saddam Hussein if no 
realistic successor could be identified. Said one French diplomat: 'It is a case of better the 
devil you know.' Washington and Paris had, diplomats claimed, exchanged angry 
messages over the sanctions issue. Russia, supporting the French line, had reportedly 
reached agreement with Baghdad on the reconstruction of the Iraqi oilfields: according to 
sources in Russia's foreign trade ministry the work would involve £1.5 billion of 
contracts for three Iraqi oilfields. Moscow was also said to be supporting a controversial 
Turkish plan to flush a disused oil pipeline in preparation for a resumption of Iraqi oil 
exports. On 28 August 1994, at a joint press conference in the Jordanian capital Amman, 
President Suleiman Demirel of Turkey and King Hussein of Jordan called for an easing 
of the UN sanctions against Iraq. Now it was being reported (The Daily Telegraph, 29 
August 1994) that various other countries - including Germany, Pakistan and Egypt -
were also supporting a relaxation in the sanctions regime. Britain and the United States, 
with support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, continued to resist any such move. In late 
September Baghdad announced that the already totally inadequate rations of cheap flour, 
rice and cooking oil had been reduced by a half. 
"- The Guardian, 9 May 1994. 
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A MAI report (for October 1994) confirmed further deterioration in the condition 
of the Iraqi people: "The situation has deteriorated sharply in the six months since MAl's 
last visit. . . The major concern of most Iraqis is the question of how to feed their 
families. . . A severe deterioration is detectable in all the hospitals visited by MAI . . 
further deterioration had been hard to imagine. . . Basic medicines and equipment are 
missing, whilst the numbers of sick and malnourished children continue to rise. The 
result is a deepening crisis which affects not only the present, but also the future. . . 'On 
13 October, as part of a new package of measures negotiated by Russia, Iraq agreed to 
recognise Kuwait. The Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev then proposed, in view 
of this development, that sanctions on Iraq be lifted in six months' time. But the United 
States and Britain continued to resist any change in the sanctions regime. Said Sir David 
Haimay, Britain's UN ambassador: 'One thing, however, is clear and that is the continued 
presence of Saddam Hussein as president of Iraq makes these questions [concerning a 
possible Iraqi threat to its neighbours] too difficult to answer satisfactorily.' Now, far 
from moving to ease the punishment of the Iraqi people, Washington was threatening the 
prospect of further military action against Iraq.^ "*^  The overthrow of Saddam was now the 
explicit USIUK condition, without any justification in UN resolutions or international 
law, for the easing of sanctions. 
On 12 January 1995 the United States, at the Security Council's regular 60-day 
review of the sanctions regime, was reportedly standing firm against any relaxation in the 
Council's punitive posture on Iraq. Now there were some signs that Britain was 'more 
reluctant... to acquiesce in a widening rift with France and Russia over policy towards 
Saddam Hussein'.' Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister, was continuing to insist 
that sanctions should be lifted: 'Iraq has implemented the major requirements which were 
set in the UN resolutions. According to the letter and spirit of the resolutions, the Security 
Council has to act positively towards Iraq.' In response, Madeleine Albright, US 
ambassador to the United Nations, was circulating data and photographs purporting to 
show that Iraq had kept items of military equipment stolen from Kuwait. 
" ' The Guardian, 18 October 1994. 
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France and Russia had struggled to secure a statement acknowledging Iraq's co-
operation with the UN special commission destroying and monitoring Baghdad's 
weapons of mass destruction. Britain was seemingly 'prepared for the first time to accept 
such a statement and is sharply aware of the mounting international pressure over 
sanctions'.^ ^^ When Washington refused to budge, Britain characteristically and supinely 
fell in line: sanctions would remain. Now UN sources were admitting that Iraq could only 
be persuaded to continue co-operating with the United Nations if Baghdad saw 'some 
light at the end of the sanctions tunnel'. Washington had barely acknowledged Iraq's 
important initiative in offering a formal recognition of the territory and sovereignty of 
Kuwait: Saddam - and by implication the Iraqi people - would be granted no relief until a 
'long-term pattern of compliance' had been demonstrated. How long is long-term? At the 
time of writing, sanctions will soon have been in existence for five years. 
Now there was growing acknowledgement that the sanctions could not be 
maintained for ever. As a new 60-day review of sanctions approached, Madeleine 
Albright was finding it necessary to pressure various countries with Security Council 
seats at that time - Oman, the Czech Republic, Italy, Argentina and Honduras - to fall in 
line: Washington was finding it increasingly uncomfortable to use its veto (to prevent the 
lifting of sanctions) in an increasingly unsympathetic Council atmosphere. Said one UN 
official: 'Everyone is starting to look beyond the March review because there is the 
expectation that soon we will be entering a new phase.' In the event the United States and 
Britain stood 'shoulder to shoulder' (Albright) in resisting any change to the sanctions 
regime, with a British Foreign Office spokesman commenting that the leopard had 'not 
changed its spots'; it was 'pressure' that had 'got us to where we are now and it needs to be 
maintained'. The review of sanctions by the Security Council in March 1995 saw no 
change in UN policy. The toll of dying children in Iraqi hospitals would continue to 
mount. The holocaust would go on. 
Why, despite the overwhelming military defeat of the Iraqi army, has the United 
States failed to secure its ostensible goal in Iraq, a stable pro-US regime? The removal of 
" ' Ibid. 
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Saddam Hussein has proved to be the beginning, not the culmination, of a long and very 
uncertain process of occupation and state building. The lawlessness and looting that 
greeted the US force's seizure of Baghdad on 9 April 2003 have evolved into a self-
sustaining dynamic that combines violence, instability, and profound uncertainty. US 
troops and the nascent Iraqi security services now face an insurgency that has managed to 
extend its geographic scope, while increasing the level of violence and the capacity for 
destruction and instability. 
The Roots of Instability in Iraq 
According to some proponents, the chaos and violence that greeted regime change 
have their roots in the legacies that Saddam's government bequeathed to Iraq. Iraqi 
regimes, because of their perceived domestic and international vulnerability, have sought 
to maximize their autonomy from society. This process reached its apex under the 
Baathist regime, built by Hasan al-Bakr from 1968 and consolidated under Saddam after 
1979. They built a powerful set of state institutions through the 1970s and 1980s that 
managed to reshape society, breaking organized resistance to their rule, effectively 
atomizing the population.^ ^^ It was not possible to talk of a functioning civil society in 
Iraq before 2003. The regime had broken, co-opted, or reconstructed all intermediate 
institutions that would have shielded society from the force of the state. 
However, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War (1990-1991), and finally the imposition 
of draconian sanctions changed the Iraqi state and with it Saddam's strategy of rule. From 
their application in 1990 until 1997, when UN-supervised oil revenues began to arrive, 
sanctions on Iraq effectively curbed the government's access to large-scale funding, with 
deleterious consequences for state and society. From 1991 until 2003 the effects of 
government policy and the sanctions regime led to hyperinflation, widespread poverty, 
and malnutrition. The historically generous state welfare provision that had been central 
to the regime's governing strategy disappeared overnight. The large and well-educated 
middle class that had grown in the years of plenty to form the bedrock of Iraqi society 
was impoverished. The story of Iraq from 1991 until 2003 is of a country suffering a 
"* Isam al-Khafaji, "The Myth of Iraqi Exceptionalism," p. 68. 
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profound macroeconomic shock.^ ^^ As sanctions began to take effect after 1991, there 
was a rapid decline in the official and visible institutions of the state. The government in 
Baghdad was forced to cut back on the resources it could devote to the armed forces and 
police. Before 1990, the bureaucracy of the Iraqi state had been complex and all-
pervasive. During the 1990s the effects of "self-fmancing" meant these institutions were 
hollowed out. Bribery was commonplace, as civil servants' official wages became at 
times almost valueless. The 1990s saw many professionals leaving the public service, to 
take their chances in the private sector or flee into exile. 
It was the supposed power of Iraq's state institutions that the US forces assumed 
they would inherit once they reached Baghdad. To quote Condoleezza Rice, "The 
concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything 
from ministries to police forces."^^^ However, these state institutions were by April 2003 
on the verge of collapse. The third war in twenty years and three weeks of looting in its 
aftermath pushed them over the edge. Civil servants did not return to work after the 
cease-fire, instead opting to protect their families and property as best they could. Their 
offices across the country, but especially in Baghdad, were stripped by looters and 
burned. The combination of war, sanctions fatigue, and rampant criminality led to a 
complete state breakdown. The subsequent extended exercise in state building has been 
far more costly and has required much greater expertise and resources than the Pentagon 
had anticipated. State institutions still remain to be built, and their relationship with 
society renegotiated. This will have to be done in the face of increasing resentment while 
meeting demands for Iraqi participation. 
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The difficulties in establishing law and order in the aftermath of the war also have 
roots in the type of campaign that US planners thought they were going to fight and the 
type of resistance that the Baathist regime attempted to organize. There is strong evidence 
that those planning the invasion underestimated the resistance they would face, most 
importantly by sections of the mainstream army and irregular forces, notably the 
Fedayeen Saddam. 
In February 2003, in the run-up to war, US Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki in a 
Senate hearing called for "something in the order of .several hundred thousand soldiers" 
to guarantee order. Other assessments concluded that occupying forces would need 
twenty security personnel, both police and troops, per thousand people to control the 
country. This compares to the forty-three per thousand that sustained Saddam in 
power.''''" This means coalition forces should have had between 400,000 and 500,000 
soldiers to impose order on Iraq.''*' However, senior civilians at the Pentagon played a 
key role in limiting the number of troops available to US commanders on the ground in 
Iraq. They were working on the assumption that at the advent of the air war or in the 
immediate aftermath of the invasion, a coup would remove Saddam from power and 
leave governing structures largely in place.'*'*^  President George W. Bush himself, in an 
eve-of-war speech, actively encouraged the Iraqi armed forces to move against their 
leaders.^ "*^  If a coup failed to materialize, then the supposition was that Iraqi forces would 
implode or simply refuse to fight in a fashion similar to that in the Gulf War, with 
thousands surrendering to allied forces.''*'' In addition, US secretary of defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, as part of his conmiitment to a "revolution in military affairs," put great 
emphasis on the use of precision bombing and technological advantage and encouraged 
General Tommy Franks, the man responsible for drawing up the plans for the invasion, to 
keep troop numbers as low as possible. The result was that in the middle of the invasion. 
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the United States had 116,000 soldiers in Iraq with 310,000 personnel in the theater as a 
whole, compared with the 500,000 anticipated by the Pentagon's planners before Franks's 
revision of their plans.'''*^ Faced with the overwhelming military superiority of the US 
Army and US Air Force, the Iraqi government had very few options when planning the 
defense of the country. With the reliability of the mainstream army in doubt, plans 
focused on the security services. Special and Republican Guards, and on 30,000 irregular 
forces, the Fedayeen Saddam and the Arab fighters who came to Iraq before the invasion 
to do battle with US forces. The regime also appears to have learned from the mistakes its 
military made in both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, when units had no ability to 
act on their initiative.'''*^ In an attempt to counter this, Baghdad decentralised army 
command and control down to the lowest level possible. By giving local control to a 
senior military officer, resistance continues after Baghdad was cut from its hinterland 
while the large arms dump spread around the country supplied the post war insurgency.^ '*^ 
The reality of the war and its aftermath differed from the assumption of US 
planners. The optimistic prognosis of Washington-based analyst that the Baathist 
government in Baghdad would be removed by a coup proved to be incorrect. Sections of 
the mainstream army fought more tenaciously than many had expected. The level of Iraqi 
resistance in the south of the country, especially around Umm Qasr and Nasiriya, 
surprised US Central Command. '^'* In motivational terms, this resistance reflected a 
factor that continues to dominate Iraq: nationalism. There is no doubt that ordinary 
conscript soldiers, 80 percent of whom were Shia, hated Saddam Hussein, but there still 
exists in the country a militant Iraqi nationalism, bom of three wars in the past two 
decades, and over a decade of punishing sanctions known to be engineered by the United 
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States. This was rallied during the war to motivate troops fighting against US forces that 
were widely seen to be out to grab Iraq's oil, not to benefit its people. 
The US occupation itself has facilitated insurgency. Previous best practice from 
post-Cold War peacekeeping operations stresses that establishing law and order within 
the first six to twelve weeks of any occupation is crucial for the credibility and legitimacy 
of the occupiers.^ "^ ^ For military occupation to be successful, the population has to be 
overawed by both the scale and the commitment of the occupiers. The speed with which 
US and coalition forces removed Saddam's regime certainly impressed the Iraqi 
population, and US military superiority initially appeared absolute. However, what began 
in April 2003 as a lawless celebration of the demise of Saddam's regime grew into three 
weeks of uncontrolled looting and violence. To Baghdad's residents, coalition forces 
appeared unable or unwilling to curtail the violence that swept across the city, 
encouraging the perception among would-be insurgents that the United States could not 
control the country. '^'^  At the same time, with the collapse of Saddam's regime, thousands 
of Iraqi troops simply merged back into their own communities while the stockpiling of 
weapons by the Baathist regime in numerous dumps across the country provided supplies 
of small arms and explosives for those who wanted to use them. Historically, there has 
been a high rate of private automatic-weapon ownership in Iraq, as the regime never tried 
to disarm the general population. The rapid collapse of the regime allowed munitions to 
become widely available at very low prices. The security vacuum that came to dominate 
Iraq did a great deal to undermine the initial impression of US onmipotence and helped 
turn criminal violence and looting into an organized and politically motivated insurgency. 
The initial goodwill that greeted the liberation of Baghdad quickly turned into popular 
disenchantment with the occupation's failure to establish order, and into increased 
nationalist resentment of it. To this extent the insurgency has fed off the mistakes of the 
occupation, utilizing the anger and alienation felt among sections of society. 
"^^  See Simon Chesterman, You, the People, pp. 100, 112. 
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Finally, in this vacuum, it was easy to resurrect the long tradition of Iraqi political 
discourse, which historically was strongly shaped by the ideological influences of Islam, 
Arab nationalism, and the increasingly Iraqi specific nationalism/^' Those fighting are 
mobilized by these influences to see their mission as ridding their country of a foreign 
invader and its collaborators. The evolving insurgency, involving diverse tactics and 
different targets, springs from several separate sources and a multitude of causes. The 
first identifiable group of insurgents are the "industrial-scale" criminal gangs operating in 
the urban centers of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. It is organized crime that constitutes 80 
percent of violence in Iraq and makes the lives of the population miserable. "^  The 
organized criminal groups predate regime change, having come to prominence in the 
mid-1990s at the peak of the social and economic suffering and state weakening caused 
by sanctions. 
These groups have been revitalized by the lawlessness of present-day Iraq, 
capitalizing on readily available weapons, the lack of an efficient police force, and the US 
occupation's paucity of intelligence. They terrorize the remnants of middle-class Iraq, 
car-jacking, house-breaking, and kidnapping, largely with impunity. It is groups like 
these that make the roads leading from Baghdad so dangerous, regularly kidnapping and 
killing foreign workers and Iraqis alike. In many cases these gangs are better armed and 
organized than the Iraqi police trying to stop them. Their continued capacity to operate is 
the most visible sign of state weakness. 
A second group involved in violence comprises the renmants of the Baath 
regime's security services, party loyalists, and Saddam's clientage network. This group is 
estimated to be responsible for up to 60 percent of the politically motivated violence.''^ ^ 
Sensing both the vulnerability and the incoherence of the occupation, they began 
launching hit-and-run attacks on US troops in May 2003 and have increased the 
frequency, skill, and geographic scope of their operations. The speed with which Saddam 
^" Isam al-Khafaji, "War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Decline of a State Controlled Society." 
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Hussein's government collapsed in the face of invasion and the chaos that caused meant 
that the beginning of the insurgency was reactive and highly localized. At various levels 
of former regime loyalists in Baghdad during 2003 paint a picture of a fractured and 
spontaneous rebellion against the United States."^ '"* However, the dissolution of the army 
and de-Baathification in May 2003 put an estimated 750,000 people out of work and 
- I C C 
available for the insurgency. " Against this background it was a small step for the Baath 
Party, an organization with a long history of covert operations, to move from reactively 
organizing for self-defense to proactively moving to offensive action. By November 2003 
the Baathist arm of the resistance had begun to cohere. Documents seized by the US 
military when it took Saddam into custody in December 2003 indicated that he had been 
in regular contact with those organizing the resistance. By 2004 a new politburo at the 
head of the Iraqi Baath Party had been formed, with representation of both the civilian 
and military wings of the party, and with personnel resident in the country and outside.^ ^^ 
Another source of violence is certainly the most worrying for the new Iraqi government 
and the hardest to deal with. This can be usefully' characterized as Iraqi Islamism, with 
both Sunni and Shia variations. After the Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions, 
Saddam infused the Baath Party's long-established, secular, broadly socialist rhetoric 
with an Islamism that reflected the Iraqi population's return to religion in the face of 
economic collapse and social dislocation.^ ^^ The strong nationalist and Islamic currents 
running through the Iraqi polity have combined to create a political ideology that 
preaches the defense of the Watan, the Iraqi homeland, against foreign and non-Muslim 
invaders. The battalions of the 1920 revolution are a good example of this dynamic. 
Formed in the suburban hinterland of Baghdad, they have, as their name suggests, 
merged an Iraqi nationalism with an Islamic radicalism. This potent combination meant 
that in 2004, groups like this were the fastest-growing wing of the insurgency, 
responsible for up to 20 percent of the violence against the US military and Iraqi security 
forces. This ideological aspect to the resistance movement is not going to disappear. 
^"' Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Sunni Insurgency," p. 3. 
^'' Phillis Bennis et al., A Failed "Transition, p. 37. On the influence of de-Baathification on the intensity 
of the insurgency, see Jon Lee Anderson, "Out on the Street. The United States' de Ba'thification 
program fuelled the insurgency. Is it too late for Bush to change course?" New Yorker, 15 November 
2004. 
"" Op. at. 
"^ Ibid. 
225 
An early indication of the cause and effect behind the mobilization of political 
violence in Iraq can be seen in the case of Fallujah, a market city of some 300,000 
people, thirty-five miles west of Baghdad. Notwithstanding Paul Wolfowitz's incorrect 
assertions, far from being a "hotbed of Ba'thist activity,"^^^ Fallujah was known in Iraq as 
the "Medinat al-Masajid," the City of Mosques, highlighting its deeply conservative 
reputation, famed for its adherence to Sunni Islam and,^ ^^  along with Ramadi, as a city 
where the secular government's influence was at its weakest, and where the state found it 
difficult to impose law and order. 
It was two weeks after the fall of Baghdad before US troops entered Fallujah. In 
the interim, Iraqi troops and Baath Party leaders left the town. Imams from the local 
mosques stepped into the sociopolitical vacuum, bringing an end to the looting, even 
managing to return some of the stolen property.^ ^^ Fallujah became a center of violent 
opposition to US occupation so soon after liberation because of a series of heavy-handed 
missions by US troops searching for leading members of the old regime.^*' Resentment 
escalated when two local imams were arrested. Events reached a climax when US troops 
broke up a demonstration with gunfire, resulting in seventeen Iraq fatalities and seventy 
wounded. This caused a spiral of violence and revenge that has destabilized the area and 
overshadowed the US military's attempts to impose order on the whole northwestern 
region of Iraq. The result was the killing of four private security guards at the end of 
March 2004 and a bloody retaking of the city by US Marines. 
The political organizations that emerged from Fallujan society to control the town 
and negotiate an end to the siege, the Mujahideen Shura (Resistance Council) and the 
Hayat al-Ulama al-Muslimin (Muslim Scholars Council), are indicative of the diversity of 
ideological trends within the opposition. Members of both groups claim to represent the 
variety of Islamic trends found in the northwestern region of Iraq. These include the Sufi 
tradition, which is influential in Fallujah, but also the much more austere and radical 
'* See Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 22 May 2003. 
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Salafi approach to Islam.^ ^^ Muqtada al-Sadr has been the political figure who has 
successfully rallied the nationalist and radical Islamic trends among Shia sections of the 
population. Sadr's support originates in the poorest and most disadvantaged sections of 
the Shia population. Capitalizing on a large charitable network set up by his late father, 
Sadr has used radical anti-US rhetoric to rally the disaffected to his organization. As the 
occupation failed to deliver significant improvements to people's lives, Sadr's popularity 
began to increase. In the run-up to the handover of power on 28 June 2004, Sadr's 
rhetoric and actions became more extreme in an attempt to convince the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) that he could not be excluded from the post occupation 
political settlement, as the CPA intended. Sadr deployed his own militia, the Mahdi 
Army, to increase his power in the large Shia slum of Baghdad, Al- Tharwa (renamed 
"Sadr City" following the war, after his dead father), and across the south of the country. 
This game of cat and mouse, with Sadr upping his rhetorical radicalism while 
highlighting his military capacity, meant that strategically the CPA could not ignore him. 
But it proved ill-judged to confront his organization at the same time that US Marines 
were trying to contain the Fallujan uprising. The CPA, by closing down Sadr's newspaper 
and arresting Sheikh Mustafa al- Yacoubi, one of Sadr's key deputies in Najaf, drew him 
into open conflict. The resulting revolts in key towns across the south of Iraq Basra, 
Amara, Kut, Nasiriya, Najaf, Kufa, and Karbala-as well as in Baghdad itself, highlighted 
two things. First, Sadr's organization had been preparing for just such a confrontation 
since the invasion at least, organizing the Mahdi Army with this in mind. Second, even 
with this lead time, the geographic scale of the southern uprising indicated a band 
wagoning effect; other smaller militias and local armed groups used the cover of Sadr's 
confrontation to launch their own preemptive strikes against coalition forces. 
In twice confronting the superior military forces of the occupation, Sadr's Mahdi 
Army clearly overreached itself. The full force of US air power used against the rebellion 
in Sadr City and Najaf broke it. However, the constituency that Sadr aspires to represent, 
the economically disadvantaged and politically alienated, will not disappear. The 
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widespread casualties resulting from the suppression of the revolt, particularly in 
Baghdad, have created a wellspring of resentment that will take years to diffuse. Sadr or 
politicians like him will have continued access to a constituency large enough to fuel 
radical political mobilization. 
The final contributing factor to the insurgency is the most controversial and 
difficult to judge: the role played by Arab fighters from neighboring countries and behind 
them the organizing capacity of AI-Qaida in Iraq. The US occupation has presented the 
actions of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-bom Islamist, as evidence of a sustained 
Al-Qaida presence in Iraq. There is clear evidence of foreign fighters playing a role in the 
insurgency and the suicide bombings that have plagued the country. Mobilized through 
diffuse and informal networks across the Middle East, they have been making their way 
to Iraq in an uncoordinated fashion. However, their numbers appear to be comparatively 
low, estimated by the US Army to be between 500 and 2,000. In March 2004 less than 
150 of the 10,000 security prisoners held by the US military in Iraq were non-Iraqi 
Arabs.^ ^^ Although it may be politically expedient for US and Iraqi politicians to stress 
the non-Iraqi aspects of the insurgency, the revolt is very much a homegrown 
phenomenon. 
The insurgency is diffuse in command and control, in personnel and in strategy. 
Clearly, US troops initially formed the main target. In a classic case of asymmetrical 
warfare, small bands of highly mobile assailants, making use of their local knowledge, 
inflicted increasing fatalities on US troops. With its genesis in late May 2003, by July the 
insurgents were beginning to show signs of greater professionalism, deploying organized 
recormaissance to perfect a modus operandi that used small groups of ten to fifteen 
fighters to attack with maximum efficiency and minimum loss of life.^ '^* Capitalizing on 
the lack of US armored transportation, the insurgents used rocket propelled grenades and 
improvised roadside bombs to great effect. By early summer 2003, road travel for US 
convoys had become very dangerous. By the autumn, US forces recognized the increased 
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geographical spread of the insurgency, the improved coordination between the different 
groups, but also their use of a wider range of arms, including mortars and mines.^ ^^ The 
downing of several US Army helicopters with heavy loss of life, in the first two weeks of 
November 2003, further indicated the vulnerability of US forces on the move. This gave 
rise to a negative dynamic in which increasing US casualties gave the impression that the 
insurgents could strike with impunity. In addition, the increasing violence spread a deep 
sense of insecurity across the population of Iraq, in turn increasing resentment of the 
occupation. 
As US troops have increasingly been redeployed to more secure bases outside 
urban areas, to reduce their vulnerability and political visibility, the insurgents have 
sought out more accessible targets. A small minority of those perpetrating the violence 
have deliberately targeted international institutions, specifically foreign embassies, the 
United Nations and the Red Cross, signaling that they would try to make any 
multilateralization of the occupation both costly and unworkable. Second, they began to 
target the nascent institutions and personnel of the new Iraqi state. This change in tactics 
was heralded by the attack on three police stations in Baghdad on the same day in 
October 2003. Since then, this method has broadened in its geographical scope and 
ferocity, with the use of car bombs to target police stations and army recruiting centers 
across the country. These attacks are designed not only to discourage Iraqis from working 
for the new state but also to stop the growth of its institutions. They undermine attempts 
to deliver to the Iraqi population what they have been demanding since the fall of the 
Baath regime: law and order. 
The final tactic adopted by radical Sunni jihadis was to target high profile Shia 
and Kurdish political figures in an attempt to fracture and destabilize the Iraqi polity. 
This has the potential to be most damaging to Iraq's long-term stability. The first 
indication of this was in August 2003, when a massive explosion outside the Imam Ali 
Mosque in Najaf (one of the holiest shrines of Shia Islam) not only cost the lives of a 
For example, military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel George Krivo, quoted in Patrick E. Tyler and Ian 
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hundred innocent civilians but also killed Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the 
leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a group that the UK 
and US governments had been assiduously courting to form the cornerstone of a new 
political order in post-Saddam Iraq. This bombing not only signaled the high cost of 
becoming involved in the governance of Iraq but also hinted at the increasingly sectarian 
nature of targeting. In February 2004, the tactic was extended to the Kurdish areas of Iraq 
when two suicide bombers killed 101 people in Arbil at the offices of the main Kurdish 
parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistcin. In a series of 
attacks on 2 March, by targeting the large crowds who gathered to commemorate the Shia 
festival of Ashura in Baghdad and Karbala, the perpetrators were clearly attempting to 
trigger a civil war between Iraq's different communities. This assumption was 
strengthened by the discovery in Baghdad of a letter allegedly written by a senior Islamist 
figure, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who argued that the only way to "prolong 
the duration of the fight between the infidels and us" is by "dragging them into a sectarian 
war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death at the 
hands of the Shia."^ ^^ US officials and Iraqi politicians have been keen to blame the use 
of suicide bombers and the rise in sectarian violence on outside forces,''^ ^ but the speed, 
number, and efficiency of these attacks point to a large amount of Iraqi involvement and 
direction. Such jihadis seek to create a new brand of radical sectarianism and mobilize 
Sunni fears of Shia and Kurdish domination. Although the use of indiscriminate violence 
has alienated the majority of Iraqi public opinion across all sections of society, the 
carnage it has produced has been a major setback for state building and stability. Those 
deploying this form of violence believe that the resulting chaos will further delegitimize 
the Iraqi government and hasten the departure of US troops. These groups hope that they 
would be best placed to exploit and eventually control the resulting political and security 
vacuum. 
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The Creation of Postwar Political Structures 
US planners anticipated a limited exercise in regime change and easily managed 
state reform in the aftermath of the war. However, once the institutions of government 
had collapsed, the task facing the occupation became complex and potentially 
contradictory: the building of a new political order that would be stable and legitimate yet 
also in broad agreement with US foreign policy aims. 
Toward this end, the role of former Baathists in the government had to be 
minimized, but other political forces that might destabilize a pro-US agenda also had to 
be identified and marginalized, not least in order to create a space within which a new, 
pro-US ruling elite could be nurtured. However, this policy objective clashed with the 
needs and demands of the Iraqi population. De-Baathification, the dissolution of the army 
and expulsion of 40,000 former administrators from the civil service, greatly hindered the 
restoration of government services and law and order. And the United States faced a 
highly mobilized society vocally expressing its newfound political freedom. Legitimizing 
a new government both internationally and even more importantly, domestically, had to 
involve, at some stage, handing power over to an Iraqi governing elite that was either 
popularly elected or could at least mobilize a significant section of Iraqi popular opinion 
to support its rule. Reactive US policy measures to meet these contradictory demands and 
interests were largely short-term, paying little attention to the medium- to long-term 
consequences of each new initiative. 
Apart from the collapse of the state itself, the central problem that hampered the 
occupation was an acute lack of knowledge about the country. The occupation authorities 
took up residence in the old seat of government, the Republican Palace, at the heart of the 
secure "green zone" in the center of Baghdad. It was dependent upon a small group of 
Iraqi exiles, long absent from the country. They returned with the invaders to act as a 
conduit between US forces and the Iraqi population, helping them to understand an 
unfamiliar society. Most important, it was hoped that these exiles would become the basis 
of Iraq's new governing class. 
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However, this reliance created distinct problems. The main organization formed 
in exile, Iraqi National Congress and its allies, brought back to the country a view of Iraqi 
society as irrevocably divided between sectarian groupings and mobilized by deep 
communal antipathy, a view that bore little resemblance to the real state of Iraqi society 
in 2003-2004.•'^ ^ This "primordialization" of Iraq clearly influenced the way the Iraqi 
Governing Council (ICG) was formed in July 2003, after negotiations between the US 
authorities and seven exiled parties. The United States promoted the IGC as "the most 
representative body in Iraq's history," but this could not come from the undemocratic 
method of its formation; instead it reflected the supposed religio-ethnic divisions in the 
country: thirteen Shias, five Sunnis, five Kurds, a Turkman, and a Christian. The forced 
and rather bizarre nature of this arrangement was highlighted by the inclusion of Hamid 
Majid Mousa, the Iraqi Communist Party's representative in the "Shia block" of thirteen. 
Such sectarian mathematics was also used to expand the number of cabinet portfolios to 
twenty-five, so that the spoils of office could be divided up in a similar fashion. The 
manner of the IGC selection caused a great deal of consternation across Iraqi opinion. 
Criticism focused on the fostering of an overt sectarianism that had previously not been 
central to Iraqi political discourse,"^ ^^  and on the damage that selection on the basis of 
sectarian or religious affiliations, rather than competence, would do to the restoration of 
government. Indeed, senior US officials themselves became rapidly disillusioned with its 
ability to deliver either leadership or legitimacy, noting that "at least half the council is 
out of the country at any given time and that at some meetings, only four or five members 
show up." A new governing structure was needed to cope with the rising insurgency but, 
as a senior occupation official said at the time, "it is unlikely that we will want to make a 
provisional government out of a council that has been feckless."^^" Faced with increasing 
pressure from the UN Security Council for real sovereign power to be delegated to an 
Iraq governing body, the increasing alienation of the Iraq population, and a rising tide of 
political violence, the Bush administration set 30 June 2004 as the deadline for 
transferring sovereignty to Iraq. But it was the intervention of the most senior religious 
figure in the country. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, that forced the democratization of 
*^* Isam al-Khafaji, "A Few Days After." 
^*' Rend Rahim Francke, "On the Situation in Iraq," pp. 8-9. 
Daniel Williams, "Iraqi Warns of Delay on Constitution Vote," Washington Post, 10 November 2003. 
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this hasty process. Sistani has continually pressed for early elections as the only way to 
reduce violence, guarantee Iraq's progress to democracy, and lessen the influence of the 
United States in running the country. His ability to influence events was highlighted by 
the hundred thousand people who demonstrated in Baghdad in January 2004 in support of 
his demands for nationwide elections. The transitional law finally agreed to by the Iraqi 
Governing Council in March 2004 reflected this demand and set a clccir timetable for 
progress toward democracy, stating that national elections must be held no later than 30 
January 2005. AyatoUah Sistani then encouraged the formation of a "Shia list" to fight 
the elections, a disparate group of 228 candidates and parties brought together and vetted 
by Sistani's advisers. 
The voting of 8.5 million Iraqis in the 30 January 2005 elections was certainly a 
historic moment. Despite nine suicide bombings in Baghdad and 260 attacks across the 
whole of the country, 58 percent of those eligible to vote did so. The elections, held under 
US occupation, were certainly not flawless; however, it would be churlish not to 
recognize the bravery and hope that propelled the majority of the Iraqi electorate to the 
ballot box. The Shia list, the United Iraqi Alliance, won 48 percent of the vote and 140 
seats in the 275-member assembly. The Kurdish Alliance, formed by the two main 
Kurdish parties, won 75 seats, with the list of US-appointed interim Prime Minister Ayad 
Allawi wirming 13 percent. 
Elections, by themselves, however, leave unresolved broader issues of political 
reconstruction. Iraq at the time of the elections was a country still lacking effective 
institutions, military, administrative, or political. The two political parties at the core of 
the victorious United Iraqi Alliance, the Al Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, were swept to power not by their own organization, 
canvassing, or legitimacy, but by their association with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. 
The danger is that they will not solidify the societal mobilization of the election by 
building mass party organizations and will instead lose the political momentum they have 
achieved and revert to a neo-patrimonial strategy of using state resources to buy political 
loyalty. The Iraqi population would then come to experience politics not as citizens but as 
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subjects, whose votes and political participation would become meaningless, causing 
them to revert to the cynicism and mistrust that has dominated postwar Iraqi politics. 
The Impact of US forces in Iraq 
The US government's policies have had a profound effect on Iraq, from its 
insistence on the maintenance of a punishing sanctions regime to its invasion and 
occupation of the country. Their damaging impact has obstructed Washington's ability to 
achieve its ostensible goal in Iraq, a stable but pro-US regime. 
Whatever ambitions Saddam Hussein had earlier entertained, following the 
catastrophic defeat of 1991 his first imperative was the survival of his regime. With good 
reason, their enemies portrayed Saddam and his Baathist colleagues as a group who 
would stop at nothing to retain power, but few took this to its logical conclusion. To 
survive, the regime habitually reacted with brutality toward those suspected of disloyalty, 
but survival also meant being ready to bow to superior force even at the expense of 
abandoning supposedly fundamental principles. This meant that sanctions could be 
effective in securing their declared aim of stripping Iraq of the weaponry with which it 
might pose a threat to other states in the region, but they were a blunt instrument in 
Washington's campaign for regime change, since the regime could adapt to the conditions 
they created, while inflicting the costs on the general population.^^' Saddam had never 
relied purely on force to retain power. Those employed in the institutional pillars of the 
regime, notably the secret police forces, the elite Republican Guard and other special 
forces, as well as the administrative elite, were well paid. Large-scale planned investment 
had raised Iraq's standards of literacy and health and its level of overall economic 
development to a place among the region's best by the time of the 1990-1991 Gulf War: 
almost all children attended school, affordable health-care was available to the whole 
population, and in 1987 Iraq's human development index rating was third in the Arab 
world after Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (though it should be added that this 
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 259-271, provides a good overall summary of the sanctions 
regime and why Saddam's regime proved resilient despite their ruinous impact on Iraq's people. 
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status was already threatened by a halving of oil revenues since 1979, and the costly 
1980- I 988 war with Iran). For Iraqis prepared to cooperate with the regime, there were 
rewards, including well-paid jobs. Young people were courted and coerced through the 
education system: none were able to go to university without at least appearing to support 
the regime and, among those who were sent abroad, a high proportion were government 
supporters who were prepared to inform on their fellow students if they stepped out of 
line to the slightest degree. 
Two wars and over a decade of sanctions had a devastating impact upon Iraq, but 
the suffering and burdens they imposed were distributed very unevenly among the 
country's population. There were some changes in the way patronage operated; it became 
a less centrally managed operation. Some people became party to smuggling operations 
to circumvent sanctions. But patronage continued to reward those considered reliable and 
loyal,' mostly a minority from the Sunni Muslim community^^^ who were shielded from 
most of the worst consequences of sanctions, partly by the employment and spending 
policies of the regime. Tribal identity had become relatively unimportant to Iraqis in 
modem times, particularly in the urban areas, but with the partial breakdown of the state 
under the impact of sanctions the regime began co-opting influential tribal leaders to fill 
the authority vacuum, giving them an enhanced status as arbitrators in disputes involving 
member- of their tribe and others, as well as land rights or the promotion of relatives to 
rewarding posts in the more favored cases. This "retribalization"^''^ was a retrograde step 
judged by the standard of the Baathists' proclaimed nationalist principles, but it 
reinforced a crumbling power base. 
It was the people whose loyalty had been seen as at best suspect or who were 
deemed unimportant to conciliate who suffered most under sanctions. Though they 
included some Sunni Muslim Arabs, the Shiite Muslim majority of southern and central 
Iraq suffered the most. Encouraged by George W. Bush, they had revolted against 
^^ " On US policy toward Iraq with particular stress on the sanctions issue, see Phyllis Bennis, "And They 
Call It Peace," pp. 4-7. On the overall impact of sanctions, see Sarah Graham-Brown, "Sanctioning 
Iraq," pp. 8-13; Sarah Graham Brown, Sanctioning Saddam. 
"^ Faleh A. Jabar, "Shaykhs and Ideologues." 
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Saddam's rule in 1991 and expected to receive US support. Instead, they were left to their 
fate woken Saddam rallied his loyal troops and drowned the rebellion in blood. It was 
widely believed that the United States, alarmed at rebels whose political leaders called for 
an Islamic republic and who were considered close to Iran, regarded its former ally, 
Saddam, as a lesser evil. Sanctions rubbed salt into their wounds; a vindictive regime that 
controlled whatever was imported into most of Iraq saw to that.""* The experience of 
Iraq's Kurds, some 20 percent of Iraq's population, was very different. Backed by the 
imposition of the northern no-fly zone and a stronger foreign reaction to Saddam's 
attempt to crush their revolt in 1991, they succeeded in establishing an autonomous 
region under its own elected parliament, which was not subjected to as rigorous an 
application of the sanctions regime as was the rest of Iraq after 1991, and also, under the 
oil-for-food program, received a 13 percent share of the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales. 
The oil-for-food program, which was agreed in 1996 and subsequently modified, 
allowed Iraq to sell more oil internationally and to pay for permitted imports after a 30 
percent cut of the takings had been allocated mainly for reparations payments to Kuwait. 
As its critics claimed, the program was manipulated by the regime, which ensured that its 
supporters received the greatest benefits, but it did check the decline in standards of 
living and the child mortality rate fell. To what extent Iraqis blamed Saddam for the 
sanctions varied according to their relationship to the regime, but many who loathed it 
and longed for its downfall also regarded the United States and the United Nations as 
responsible for their suffering in the repression of the 1991 uprisings and under sanctions. 
US Baseless war on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration 
resolved to embark on regime change in Iraq (former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill 
claims that planning for an invasion began earlier, within days of Bush taking office in 
Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiire Movement in Iraq, is an invaluable account of modem Iraqi Shiism, and 
particularly of its political movements. 
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January 2001). The administration used the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue to 
justify and secure support for war on Iraq, but war was never necessary to disarm Iraq. 
Hussein Kamil, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, told Western intelligence agencies 
after his defection from the regime in 1995 that Iraq's WMDs had been secretly destroyed 
following the earlier war.^ ^^  He was well placed to know the truth, having headed Iraq's 
biological weapons program, but in 2002-2003 the hawks in the West chose to sweep this 
inconvenient testimony under the carpet. The weapons had been destroyed because the 
United States and United Nations had demanded it, and Saddam's regime did not believe 
that it was possible to conceal them. Their destruction was undertaken secretly, it 
appears, lest the regime lose face before the peoples of Iraq and the rest of the region. 
There was a similar outcome in the case of Iraq's medium-range ballistic missiles. 
The Samoud-2 was not a formidable weapon. When armed with its payload, the Iraqi 
government maintained, its range would conform to the tight UN-declared restrictions 
upon Iraqi armaments. Neither the United States nor a UN Security Council that was 
seeking to placate it agreed: without a warhead, the missile had a range that exceeded the 
pre-scribed limit of 150 kilometers, and all stocks had to be eliminated. So it was that in 
the final days before their country was attacked, Iraqi soldiers were obliged to cooperate 
in the destruction of a weapon that would have allowed their army to hit the bases in 
Kuwait where the US and allied invasion forces had gathered to attack them. This was a 
telling indication both of the weakness and of the priorities of Saddam Hussein's regime. 
With war all but inevitable, it sought to avert it by yielding to external pressures that 
reduced its military capabilities. Neither this, Iraq's cooperation with the UN inspectors, 
nor their failure to find weapons of mass destruction could deter Washington from the 
war it had already determined upon. 
The immediate impact of the US invasion on Iraq's economic and social life was 
catastrophobic. Civilian casualties were mounting than most humanitarian agencies had 
expected, and the nightmare predictions of millions of refugees fleeing the tide of war did 
' " Nicholas D. Kristof, "Missing in Action: The Truth About Iraqi Arms," New York Times, 5 July 2003. 
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created problems. The worst damage came later, inflicted by the application of a 
blinkered ideological approach. The triumph of the US forces in Iraq was symbolized by 
the episode of the felling of Saddam's statue in Baghdad's Paradise Square on 9 April 
2003, although not in the way intended when it was offered up as a spectacle for a 
cooperative media by an army psychological operations team. A US marine colonel had 
decided to pull the statue down, but loudspeakers were used to call upon Iraqis to come, 
so that it would appear as if the liberated masses were spontaneously venting their hatred 
upon Saddam. US troops initially placed a US flag over the statue but removed it when 
they realized it would symbolize conquest rather than liberation. The smallish crowd of 
Iraqis proved incapable of pulling down the statue and the sun was sinking fast, 
threatening to ruin the photo opportunity of the statue's fall, so the marines used one of 
their vehicles to tug it from its plinth. The mighty statue was a hollow shell."'' In the first 
months of its rule, Washington acted as if Iraq was its property, to do with as it wished, 
although all would take place in the name of freedom and Iraqis would be found to give it 
a veneer of legitimacy. Paul Bremer, a conservative career diplomat who had earlier 
served as ambassador at large for counterterrorism, was appointed head of the occupation 
administration, dubbed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and a team of twenty-
five Iraqi political leaders who were prepared to cooperate with it were appointed to a 
body dubbed the Iraqi Governing Council. A portion of central Baghdad around one of 
Saddam's former palaces was fortified against attack, and this became the CPA's base of 
operations. When the provisional Iraqi government was set up under lyad AUawi, a 
former Baathist and leader of the US-backed Iraqi National Accord, in 2004, the CPA 
morphed into one of the largest US embassy establishments in the world, headed by John 
Negroponte, whose illustrious career had included service as US ambassador to Honduras 
during Ronald Reagan's campaign to bring down the Sandinista government in 
neighboring Nicaragua. lyad Allawi became prime minister. Despite the symbolism of 
the handover of sovereignty, the United States remained in charge: the provisional 
government's scope for decision making was limited and it certainly had no power to veto 
or interfere in the conduct of military operations by US or allied forces. It is now widely 
A US army study of the event was reported by the Los Angeles Times, reprinted in the Sunday Times 
(Singapore), 4 July 2004. 
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considered by supporters of the US invasion that Bremer's dissolution of the Iraqi army-
making some 400,000 armed and trained men unemployed-was a serious mistake. The 
move was justified at the time as part of a process of de-Baathification-the removal of all 
vestiges of the regime of Saddam Hussein from Iraqi life. It has included purges of the 
state bureaucracy and academia that have added another 100,000 to the ranks of the 
unemployed and discontented. This was a case of ideology prevailing over reason. 
The Iraqi army was founded following World War I, not after the Baathist coup in 
1968. Its command levels were staffed by men regarded by Saddam as regime loyalists, 
but (except for the Republican Guard) its rank and file were not politicized supporters of 
the government; many soldiers were alienated from it because of Saddam's repression of 
their communities, the severity with which they were treated by their officers, and late 
payment of wages. This national institution needed a weeding out of the cruel and 
corrupt, not abolition. The US-created police and armed forces lack credibility as Iraqi 
institutions: they are widely regarded as mere tools of the occupier. It is unemployment 
and poverty that drive men to join them, not belief, although this wins them no sympathy 
from the resistance groups, which attack recruits pitilessly. Their primary goal is to 
survive from one day to the next. As a result, people complain of a law-and-order 
situation that is much worse than it was under Saddam's regime. Theft and burglary are 
common; the kidnapping of individuals by criminal gangs for ransom by their families, 
practically unknown before US invasion, is now a common occurrence; all middle-class 
families have either experienced it for themselves or have friends who have. The streets 
have become no-go areas at night for women in Baghdad and the other central Iraqi 
cities. 
The purge of Baathists from the state bureaucracy, professions, and academia 
revealed its instigators' refusal to let their ideological zeal be tempered by mere practical 
considerations. Saddam Hussein's regime had tried to co-opt highly skilled and talented 
people. They were offered social prominence and promotion in their professions in 
exchange for proclaiming their support for the regime, while many also acted as monitors 
of any opposition to the regime among their colleagues. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
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the initial post-Saddam purge of these people was conducted with insufficient 
consideration for how much harm each individual had really done and for the probable 
consequences for society of the sudden removal of experienced policemen, 
administrators, and academics. The negative impact of the partial implementation of this 
policy has been exacerbated as tens of thousands of members of the middle class and 
intelligentsia have fled the violence and hardships of what some insist upon calling, in 
defiance of reality, "postwar Iraq." Economic reconstruction has been disastrously 
mishandled. Iraq's infrastructure had decayed since the late 1980s as a consequence of 
war and sanctions. During the US-led invasion and its aftermath, bombing and the 
movement of heavy tanks along streets fractured water and sewage pipes, already in a 
state of poor maintenance: water supplies remain unreliable in many areas. Electricity is 
often available for twelve hours or less a day) in Baghdad, and most of the country 
receives a supply of under three hours. 
Insurgent attacks and the deterioration under Saddam of the supply system, which 
now necessitates large-scale repair programs, were blamed, but this is no consolation to 
most Iraqis. They contrast the present state of the repair effort unfavorably with what 
happened in 1991, when the old regime restored electricity supplies to pre-Gulf War 
levels in a matter of weeks. In the ten months before the US invasion, Baghdad had 
electricity almost round the clock. The unreliability of the electricity supply has worsened 
the problem of fuel distribution. Power outages stop pumps from working, leading to 
lengthening queues of fhistrated motorists at gas stations. In the coimtry with the second 
largest oil reserves in the world, they may wait five hours to fill up their cars-unless they 
can afford to go to a hawker, who will sell them gasoline for up to fifty times its official 
pump price. Those who can afford to have bought private generators that they can use 
whenever the electricity supply fails, but this has increased demand for gasoline, which 
would be better used earning export revenues. 
The infant mortality rate is nearly twice its pre-invasion level, according to a 
survey conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Health in cooperation with the UN 
Development Programme and the Norwegian Institute for Applied International Studies. 
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The report, published in November 2004, revealed that a rate of acute malnutrition 
among children under five that peaked at 11 percent in 1996 under the sanctions regime, 
fell with the oil-for-food program to 4 percent in 2002, but in 2004 had shot up to 7.7 
percent-about 400,000 children. This is despite the continuation of the distribution of the 
food rations. In September 2004 the World Food Programme concluded, following a 
survey, that 6.5 million Iraqis-one in four of the population remained highly dependent 
on food rations. Some 2.6 million were so poor that they had to resell part of their rations 
to pay for necessities such as medicines and clothing. It is not yet known what the overall 
loss of life among Iraqis from all war-related causes is, as the occupying powers have 
deliberately refrained from collating this information, but an assessment published by the 
prestigious British medical journal The Lancet in October 2004 estimated it at 98,000 
people. US and British government sources disputed this figure, but are unable or 
unwilling to provide a "realistic" count of their own. 
Had the warriors in Washington and London given serious thought to postwar 
reconstruction before their attack, they might have been ready with a practical economic 
program that would have served both to repair damage speedily and to provide 
employment and income to desperate people. Iraq has a large middle class and no 
377 Les Roberts, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi, and Gilbert Burnham, "Mortality 
Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq." The Lancet released the paper on its website on 29 
October 2004, ahead of its print appearance in November. The survey was based on interviews 
conducted with thirty-three clusters of thirty households. The estimate of 98,000 is for the excess 
number of deaths over what would have been expected to occur during a comparable period of time 
before the war. Most deaths by violence were ascribed to air strikes by the allied coalition, which 
habitually plays down the impact of air attacks and stresses the death toll inflicted upon Iraqis by 
insurgent attacks. Other estimates of the number of Iraqi dead include the running total compiled by 
Iraq Body Count, based solely on news reports. As of 2 September 2005, this stood at a minimum of 
24,495 and a maximum of 27,705: the lower total provides for possible double counting based upon 
different reports of the same incidents. "A Dossier on Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003-2005." 
published by Iraq Body Count in association with the Oxford Research Group, offered a breakdown of 
24,865 deaths in the first two years of the war that agrees with the Lancet study in ascribing the largest 
proportion of deaths to coalition action: 37 percent of civilian victims are estimated to have been killed 
by US-led forces, 9 percent by "anti-occupation forces/insurgents," and 36 percent by criminal 
violence. The proportion of deaths inflicted by insurgent action upon Iraqi civilians has undoubtedly 
increased as the conflict has dragged on. In June 2005, Interior Minister Bayan Jabr told reporters that 
insurgents had killed about 12,000 Iraqis since the start of the occupation. The Ministry of Interior later 
told the New York Times that 8,175 Iraqis were killed by insurgents in the ten months that ended on 31 
May 2005. It did not provide a breakdown between civilians and police, but it did exclude Iraqi 
soldiers. Sabrina Tavemise, "Iraqi Death Toll Exceeded 800 a Month, Data Shows," New York Times, 
15 July 2005. 
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shortage of skilled workers for most trades; those who lived there were better equipped 
than anyone else to understand how its infrastructure worked, who needed to be 
approached to tackle specific problems, and how to lay hands on necessary supplies. 
They might have been contracted to handle reconstruction at a fraction of what foreign 
businesses would demand, and the money they were paid would then have been diffused 
into the wider economy, stimulating supply industries and the retail sector. Instead, the 
Bush administration bestowed its largesse on the likes of Halliburton, chiefly for 
rehabilitation of the oil industry and provision of services to the military. Much is made 
of the $18 billion that the United States has committed to haq for reconstruction, but only 
around $2 billion of that has so far been spent. Of the money passing through the hands 
of the ministries set up since the occupation began, huge amounts have gone missing. In a 
report issued on 30 January 2005, Stuart Bowen, special inspector-general for the 
reconstruction of Iraq, concluded that the Coalition Provisional Authority had failed to 
keep track of almost $9 billion that it had transferred to Iraqi ministries. The money 
derived from sales of Iraqi oil and from seized assets of the previous regime. It wasn't 
that the occupiers were without ideas about what to do with the Iraqi economy; they were 
just the wrong ones. There was a large state sector, which included the oil industry: What 
could be better than to throw it open to the bracing winds of the market? That would 
shake out a lot of inefficiency in the system, and short-term pain would translate into long 
term gain. And wasn't a well-functioning free enterprise system a cornerstone of 
democracy? In this case, the neoconservative ideological approach hit a wall of Iraqi 
opposition that included most of those who were cooperating with the United States. 
They recognized that throwing even more Iraqis out of work while their country was in a 
state of turmoil was not a good idea. They saw that a privatization of the Iraqi oil industry 
that could lead to its wholesale takeover by foreign companies would provoke a strong 
'^ * Yochi J. Dreazen, "Former Bush Aide Turns Critic As Iraq Inspector," Wall Street Journal, 26 July 
2005. Bowen conducted audits of spending in Iraq and reported his findings to the Defense and State 
Departments. They have exposed incompetence, embezzlement, and fraud on the part of US personnel 
in Iraq, as well as corruption in the new Iraqi ministries. It was Bowen who, in November 2004, called 
upon the US Army to withhold close to $90 million from Halliburton because it could not justify what 
it had charged. The Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit has concluded that at least half of the $1.27 million 
supposedly spent on military procurement by the Iraqi defense ministry in the eight months following 
the "transfer of sovereignty" on 28 June 2004 has disappeared. It has been paid to middlemen who 
have disappeared, given it away as kickbacks, or spent it on useless equipment. Ed Vulliamy and 
Richard Norton Taylor, "Millions Embezzled at Iraqi Ministry," The Guardian, 22 August 2005. 
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reaction from the entire population of their country, as well as confirming many in their 
view that the United States invaded their country in order to seize its oil. The would-be 
privatizers were not encouraged by the reaction of the international business community. 
Much as sectors of the Iraqi economy might have seemed like an appealing investment, 
many companies doubted that security could be guaranteed, and recognized that the 
proposed sell-off could be invalidated as contrary to international law: 
an occupying power's rights to make changes in the laws or economic system of 
an occupied state are strictly limited under Articles 53, 55, and 56 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. A 
commonsense approach eventually prevailed; the oil industry remains Iraq's 
property and the demolition of the state sector has been frozen, but the anger, 
outrage, and fear that the mooted reforms provoked have done their harm. There 
is no deep-rooted opposition to the privatization of most of the bloated state sector 
in Iraq, but it has to take place on Iraqi terms, not Washington's. 
Freedom fighters and the Struggle over Iraq's Political Future 
The Bush administration's economic and social policies after the invasion, thus, 
did nothing to conciliate most Iraqis. Many say that they are worse off now than they 
were under Saddam Hussein, and some have reacted with armed resistance to the 
occupation of their country by a foreign invader. 
Those who responded most forcefully came from the communities who had most 
to lose by the imposition of a new order in Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority, who see their 
traditionally dominant position slipping away, to the benefit of the Shiite majority. While 
the United States hoped to consolidate a pliant Iraqi leadership, the foremost Shiite cleric, 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, insisted on an elected parliament that would write a new 
constitution and the United States had to accede. It was the Shiite religious leadership 
who were chiefly responsible for keeping most predominantly Shiite areas out of the 
violent struggle against the occupation. While their community as a whole was deeply 
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hostile to the invaders, the leadership saw an opportunity to assert their rights in Iraq after 
decades of living under regimes that privileged the Surmi Arab minority. That required 
making temporary tactical compromises with the occupier; it also required calling for 
patience and restraint from Shiite Iraqis in the face of a series of sectarian suicide 
bombings. This approach finally paid off when the United Iraq Alliance (VIA), the 
political grouping backed by the Shiite religious leadership, won a majority of the seats in 
the January 2005 elections. 
Although Surmi Muslim Arab Iraqis had answered resistance calls to boycott the 
elections, and although the elections were held under conditions of war and occupation, 
they were not simply a sham. They are likely to be recognized in the future as marking a 
decisive moment in the reordering of Iraq's power structure. The coalition headed by US 
favorite lyad Allawi came in a distant third, after the UIA and the Kurdish alliance. The 
preferred course of the Shiite leadership will be to seek to unify Iraqis around agreed 
political goals and an acceptable power-sharing structure. If the process of establishing a 
national consensus is not derailed by deliberate sectarian attacks by elements of the 
resistance, it could result in a broad based agreement on a constitution, the restoration of 
a functioning Iraqi government, and a firm deadline by which the foreign occupation 
forces must leave every inch of Iraqi soil or face far stronger opposition than they have 
yet encountered. This is not the outcome of which the architects of the invasion dreamed. 
When Bush stood for reelection in 2004, he told Americans that their army was 
fighting the terrorists in Iraq so that it wouldn't have to fight them in the United States. 
However, it would never have had to fight against at least nineteen out of twenty of the 
people shooting at and blowing up US soldiers in Iraq if it had not invaded their country. 
When the history of "what went wrong in Iraq" comes to be written, there will be a 
school of thought that insists upon seeing the US intervention as a noble enterprise that 
was derailed by a combination of the misguided policies followed later and an insurgency 
of unemticipated strength, fed by those policies. Put simply, those who argue this view 
will claim that a different set of post occupation policies, particularly toward economic 
reconstruction, could have resulted in success. They will be wrong. The basic problem is 
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the occupation itself but insensitivity to Iraqi opinions, failure to meet desperate social 
and economic needs, and ill-considered policy initiatives that play well in 
neoconservative think tanks in Washington but not in the real world, only made things 
worse. Iraq is not US property to be partitioned, privatized, or remolded, and its people 
really do want freedom. 
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CHAPTER VII 
UNITED NATIONS AND IRAQ: POST WAR SCENARIO 
This chapter covers considerable ground. It follows in as comprehensive a manner 
as possible all developments which have affected the status and definition of the 
boundary up to August 1993. By this time, the land boundary had been demarcated in its 
entirety by the UN, while delimitation had been announced between the two states for the 
Khor Abdullah, although the UN would insist, contentiously, that its delimitation for this 
stretch of water was a demarcation. The subjects covered in this chapter are: the border in 
the UN settlement of the Kuwait Crisis, April-May 1991; UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer 
Mission (UNIKOM) and incidents in the border zone, April-August 1991; the 'northward 
migration' of Kuwait's international borders with Iraq, February-March 1992; the land 
boundary demarcation ruling and reactions to it, April-June 1992; the UN and the UN 
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) verdict on the land 
boundary, July-August 1992; resurrection of the Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait on 
the second anniversary of the invasion of the emirate, July-August 1992; the demarcation 
of the Kuwait-Iraq land border, the resignation of the UNIKBDC chairman and delays in 
announcing a water boundary for the Khor Abdullah, October-December 1992; border 
incidents and the expansion of UNIKOM's terms of reference, January-February 1993; 
border defences, Returned' oil wells and compensation for displaced Iraqis, February-
June 1993; a median line for the Khor Abdullah, March 1993; and the UNIKBDC's final 
report. May 1993. 
The 1991 UN border settlement of the Kuwait Crisis 
On 3 April 1991 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 by an 
overwhelming majority.^ ^^ The cease-fire resolution, christened the "mother of all 
Cuba voted against the resolution, while Ecuador and Yemen abstained. 
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resolutions' because of its length and comprehensiveness, produced few surprises on the 
border issue. Its preamble welcomed: 
the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity 
and the return of its legitimate government, affirmed; 
the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and political independence 
of Kuwait and Iraq..., 
noted; 
that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 
October 1963 'Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, 
Recognition and Related Matters', thereby recognizing formally the boundary 
between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with 
The United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter and in which Iraq 
recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait 
within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of 
Iraq dated 21 July 1932 and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 
10 August 1932 
and was conscious; 
of the need for demarcation of the said boundary. 
Paragraph two of the resolution 
demanded; 
that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary as set 
out in the 'Agreed Minutes...', ...registered with the United Nations and published 
by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations Treaty Series, 1964. 
Paragraph three 
called on; 
the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and 
Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on 
*^'' UN Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to the 
Situation between Iraq and Kuwait', United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI), 
DP/1104/Rev.3 - 41183 - December 1991, p. 20. 
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appropriate material including the map transmitted by Security Council document 
S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month. 
In paragraph four the UN 
decided; 
to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international 
boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in 
381 
accordance with the Charter. 
In announcing these measures to deal with the border issue, the UN relied, as it 
had done so to justify all actions taken since the outbreak of the crisis on 2 August 1990, 
on Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. By this the UN Security Council is empowered to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security'.''^ ^ 
Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad 
al-Jabir A1-Sabah wasted no time in registering the emirate's acceptance of the cease-fire 
resolution, and, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 4 April 1991, welcomed 
"the adoption of this resolution, which aims to eliminate the causes and the effects of the 
occupation'. In the same letter. Shaikh Sabah also communicated Kuwait's undertaking 
"scrupulously to comply with all of its provisions and to cooperate with you with a view 
•30-2 
to ensuring its implementation'. 
Iraq communicated its grudging acceptance of the cease-fire resolution in two 
items of correspondence: the first a lengthy letter dated 6 April 1991 from its Foreign 
Minister Ahmad Husain addressed jointly to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and 
Security Council President Paul Noter daeme: the second a brief statement of the same 
'*' Ibid., pp. 2\-2. 
^^^ 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the Situation between Iraq and Kuwait', 
op.cit., p. 1 
•^*^  For text of letter see UN Security Council document S/22457, 8 April 1991. 
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date from Iraqi National Assembly President Saadi Mehdi Salih that the Assembly had 
decided to comply with its terms.^ '^^  Aside from its tone - "it [Iraq] has no choice but to 
accept this resolution' - the Iraqi Foreign Minister's despatch was most notable for its 
castigation of the measures adopted by the UN for the settlement of the boundary 
question. Resolution 687 was described as an 'unprecedented assault on the sovereignty' 
of Iraq. The Security Council was accused of having 'determined in advance the 
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait' while Iraq sought to remind the Secretary-General 
'that in international relations boundary issues must be the subject of an agreement 
between States, since this is the only basis capable of guaranteeing the stability of 
frontiers'.''^ ^ Iraq continued to adopt its well-worn line that the 1963 'Agreed Minutes' 
were null and void since ratification of this instrument had never taken place in 
Baghdad.''^ ^ Hence it considered the boundary question as 'pending and unresolved'. The 
letter further complained that the Security Council had 'imposed on Iraq the line of its 
boundary with Kuwait' despite originally calling, in Resolution 660, for the two sides to 
settle their differences, which implicitly included the border question Iraq argued, 
directly through bilateral negotiations. Iraq concluded that in dealing with the boundary, 
'the Councir resolution is an iniquitous resolution which constitutes a dangerous 
precedent... an assault on the sovereignty of states'.^ **^  Despite al this, Paul Noterdaeme 
acknowledged, in his note of 11 April to Iraq's Permanent Representative at the UN, that 
Baghdad's acceptance of Resolution 687, however grudging, was 'irrevocable and 
unqualified'.^ ^^ 
With its acceptance of the UN's cease-fire terms in April 1991, Iraq had 
recognized formally the existing border-as mentioned in the 1963 'Agreed Minutes', 
which was the vague boundary delimitation established by the 1932 exchange of notes. 
The definition of this border, which has been referred to as the 'delimitation formula' by 
the UN since April 1991 is as follows: 
'^' UN Security Council document S/22480, 11 April 1991. 
^*' text of letter in UN Security Council document S/22456, 6 April 1991. 
*^* for a through treatment and convincing dismissal of this argument see Finnic. (1992). 
^" See text of letter in UN Security Council document S/22456, 6 April 1991. 
*^"' text of note in UN Security Council document S/22485, 11 April 1991. 
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From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards 
along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing 
sourth of Safwan wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the 
junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, 
Maskan [or Mashjan], Failakah, Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-al Maradim appertain to 
Kuwait.-^ *" 
This was thus the second time Iraq had committed itself formally to the old 
colonial delimitation since Kuwaiti independence. However, it had not committed itself, 
either previously nor now, to any one interpretation of this definition. There had been no 
mention of Britain's 1951 demarcation proposed in Resolution 687. Nevertheless, it 
remained the most detailed interpretation on record of the boundary introduced by the 
1932 correspondence. 
While Husain and Noterdaeme were exchanging letters, Perez de Cuellar was 
trying to m '^ke arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary', as he was 
committed to doing by paragraph three of Resolution 687. He planned to set up a 
boundary demarcation commission comprising representatives from both Iraq and 
Kuwait and neutral surveyors and cartographers, which would then establish and 
demarcate a definitive boundary line. Perez de Cuellar's draft report along these lines, 
circulated in mid-April 1991, prompted no objections from Kuwait. The emirate 
registered its full acceptance in a letter dated 19 April 1991. However as with Resolution 
687, the draft report was heavily criticized by Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmad Husain 
wrote on 23 April 1991 to the Secretary-General, the first half of the letter being identical 
to that section dealing with boundaries in his earlier submission of 6 April, reiterating his 
compliant that any final settlement of its southern boundary with Kuwait should properly 
be its own responsibility and should not be imposed from without. The remainder of the 
letter was dominated by Iraqi complaints concerning the Secretary-General's intended use 
of a series of maps showing the Kuwait-Iraq boundary, made available to the UN by the 
389 Letter dated 21 July 1932 from Nuri al-Said to the High Commissioner, Baghdad in FO 
371/16006. 
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British Government in late March 1991.^ °^ Ten sheets of the border prepared by the 
United Kingdom Director General of Military Survey, specified in paragraph 3 of 
Resolution 687 as constituting 'appropriate materials' upon which Perez de Cuellar was 
entitled to draw when making arrangements for demarcation were characterized by 
Ahmad Husain as follows: 
The Government of my country was not a party to the drawing of that map. It 
did not recognize the map, nor is there any proof of its having extended such 
recognition. Accordingly, the fact that you and the Council consider the map 
to be a part of the material to be drawn upon for the demarcation process 
constitutes an iniquitous and unilateral imposition against the will of Iraq, a 
sovereign State member of the United Nations, and a pre-judgement of the 
course of the land boundary before any commission embarks on the process 
of demarcating that boundary.^ '^ 
Iraq was clearly overstating the importance of these maps. In his letter of 28 March, 
Sir David Hannay, British Ambassador to the UN had written the following cover: 
The maps have been produced on the basis of the letter of the Prime Minister of 
Iraq of 21 July 1932 and the letter of the Ruler of Kuwait of 10 August 1932. As 
you know these letters do not offer a precise description of the boundary on the 
ground.^ ^^ 
Each sheet also possessed a standard Directorate of Military Survey disclaimer 
concerning the status and precise alignment of the international boundary. Even so, Iraq 
may have had a genuine if limited cause for complaint. The British maps were, strictly 
^^ See letter dated 28 March 1991 from Sir David H A Hannay, Ambassador of the United 
Kingdom at the UN, New York to the Secretary-General in UN Security Council document 
S/22412. 
^'' Text of letter dated 23 April 1991 from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UN 
Secretary-General in UN Security Council document S/22558 of 2 May 1991. 
'^^  Hannay, 28 March 1991, op.cit. 
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speaking, based upon more than the 1932 definition itself, yet at this stage, following the 
passage of Resolution 687, the vague delimitation introduced by the diplomatic exchange 
of that year was all that Iraq had committed itself to. The lines shown on these modern 
maps basically represented the best interpretation of the 1932 boundary that the British 
Military Survey could come up with in 1990. They had been compiled from a wide range 
of sources, including maps produced by various British Government departments dating 
back to the mid-1930s and surveys undertaken of the borderlands generally in more 
recent years, though these had been necessarily limited to the Kuwaiti side of the border 
zone. 
Britain's 1990 series of maps must also have made use of existing amplifications 
and clarifications of the original 1932 definition of the boundary, generally in the form of 
demarcation proposals which had not been acceptable to Iraq. Though it could not admit 
as much, the Military Survey had undoubtedly utilized Britain's 1951 interpretation to 
some degree, and also its precursor of 1940. Britain's 1951 demarcation proposal was 
ostensibly the boundary that the colonial power had intended to introduce with the 1932 
exchange of correspondence. Furthermore, despite Harmay's disclaimers, the boundary 
depicted on the British maps had already been used to construct the demilitarized zone 
along the Kuwait-Iraq border, which had been introduced by paragraph five of Resolution 
687. 
Despite its strong reservations concerning the method by which the UN proposed 
to settle the border question, and the employment of the British series of maps in 
particular, Iraq agreed unconditionally to accept the Secretary-General's proposals for 
demarcation: 
I also wish to note that, just as we accepted resolution 687 (1991) despite our 
objections to and criticism of its provisions, we will cooperate with you and 
will nominate a representative of our Government to participate in the 
Demarcation Commission, even if you take no account of the views and 
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comments we have expressed above. We do this because the circumstances 
forcing our acceptance persist. 
Perez de Cuellar presented his report, as required, to the Security Council, on 2 
May 1991. Its most salient points were as follows: 
I will now establish an Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, to 
be composed of one representative each of Iraq and Kuwait and three 
independent experts who will be appointed by me, one of whom will serve as 
Chairman. 
The terms of reference of the Commission will be to demarcate in geographical 
linates of latitude and longitude the intematic 
(1963) Agreed Minutes between Kuwait and Iraq... 
coord rn tional boundary set out [note^ '^^ ] in the 
[T]he Commission will also make arrangements for the physical representation of 
the boundary. 
The coordinates established by the Commission will constitute the final 
demarcation [note"^ ^^ ] of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait in 
accordance with the Agreed Minutes of 4 October 1963. 
The demarcation of the boundary will be accomplished by drawing upon 
appropriate material, ...and by utilising appropriate technology. 
[A]ll costs ...should be shared between the two interested parties. 
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Letter from Ahmad Husain dated 23 April 1991 in UN Security Council document S/22558 of 28 
March 1991. 
To describe the boundary as having been set out in the 1963 'Agreed Minutes' is perhaps misleading. 
The 1963 agreement merely mentioned the 1932 delimitation. 
Up to and including the release of the 'Final Report on the Demarcation of the International Boundary 
between the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation Commission', submitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 May 1993 by UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN has continued on occasions to demonstrate a 
surprising confusion over what is actually meant by demarcation. Coordinates provide a detailed 
boundary delimitation. They are not physical objects like stones or fences which can demarcate (i.e. 
mark out on the ground) a boundary. 
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The Commission will take its decisions by majority. Its decisions regarding the 
demarcation of the boundary will be final?^^ 
Later in May, Perez de Cuellar named the members of the UN Iraq-Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC). Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, formerly 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, was named as Chairman. British-bom Ian Brook, then of 
the National Land Survey of Sweden, and William Robertson of the Department of 
Survey and Land Information of New Zealand were named as the independent experts on 
the commission. Iraq was represented by Ambassador Riyadh al-Qaisi, and Kuwait by 
Ambassador Tariq A. Razouqi. Miklos Pinther, Chief Cartographer at the UN Secretariat, 
was appointed Secretary to UNIKBDC.^''' 
UNIKBDC first met in New York on 23-24 May 1991 to discuss procedural 
questions. Here the team apparently affirmed the technical, rather than political, character 
of its work, 'the nature of its task was demarcation'.^^* The commission moved to the 
border zone for an initial reconnaissance in mid-June 1991, its technical experts taking 
the same opportunity to call on the -f respective national survey offices in Baghdad and 
Kuwait. 
By this time the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was already 
firmly in —lace in the demilitarized zone which straddled the border. 
In paragraph five of UN Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 the Secretary-General had 
been requested to institute a UN observer unit to patrol and monitor a newly-created 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Kuwait-Iraq border: 
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See 'Report of the Secretary-General regarding Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) 
in UN Security Council document S/22558, 2 May 1991. 
'Final Report on the Demarcation of the International Boundary between the Republic of Iraq and the 
State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', enclosed in 
letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council in UN 
Security Council document S/25811, 21 May 1993, p. 10. 
Ibid., p.2l. 
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[The Security Council] [r]equests the Secretary-General, after consultation 
with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for 
its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations 
observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which 
is hereby established, extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into 
Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes between the 
State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of 
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters' of 4 October 1963; to 
deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of 
the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action 
mounted from the territory of one state to the other; and for the Secretary-
General to report regularly to the Council on the operations of the unit, and 
immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to 
399 
peace; 
As previously noted, the DMZ was measured using the British Military Survey 
maps supplied to the UN in March 1991. The Secretary-General's plan for the 
establishment of UNIKOM'*'"' was approved with the unanimous adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 689 on 9 April 1991."^ °' By 6 May 1991 UNIKOM had deployed 
itself fully within its allotted zone along the border. On 9 may 1991, after the UN 
observer unit monitored the withdrawal of all remaining military forces along the border, 
the DMZ came into effect. UNIKOM forces had deployed themselves, with the 
cooperation of both the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments, in the three operational sectors 
(south, central and northern) of the DMZ"^ "^ , with six observation posts initially 
399 
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For complete text of Resolution 687 see United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the 
Situation between Iraq and Kuwait', op. cit., p. 22. 
22 UN Security Council document S/22454 of 5 April 1991. 
For text of UN Resolution 689 see 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the 
Situation between Iraq and Kuwait', op.cit, p. 26. 
Although the DMZ is one undivided area of operation for UNIKOM, for operational purposes it was 
divided into 3 areas. The southern sector ran in a north-easterly direction from the trijunction of the 
Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi international boundaries at Wadi al-Audja to a point approximately two-thirds of 
the way up the Wadi Batin. The central sector ran from the latter point up the remainder of the Batin 
which is coincident with the Kuwait-Iraq border, then ran eastward to Safwan. The northern section 
ran eastward from the latter oasis settlement to Umm Qasr, then along the Khor Abdullah to the waters 
of the Persian Gulf. 
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established in each under the command of a regional sectoral headquarters (see Map 11). 
In addition to these fixed observation platforms, UNIKOM soon started to deploy 
temporary observation points, mobile air and land patrols and free-ranging investigation 
teams. Aerial reconnaissance was the only means by which the maritime border zone 
along the Khor Abdullah was monitored. Umm Qasr had been designated as UNIKOM's 
central headquarters, though a Kuwait City hotel (until 15 June 1991) and a logistic base 
at Doha (Kuwait) had to suffice during 1991 as the badly-damaged Iraqi port awaited the 
return of basic infrastructural necessities, such as electricity, water and sewerage. In early 
May 1991 the total strength of UNIKOM military personnel was 1385.'*°'' This 
comprised: 280 military observers; 556 personnel providing administrative and logistic 
support (this figure reflected the initial effort involved in setting up UNIKOM in their 
DMZ, but was thereafter reduced); and 544 blue helmets provided to protect the military 
observers in the form of five infantry companies assigned temporarily from the long-
established UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Cyprus (UNFICYP).'*"'* 
Though logistic support for UNIKOM's operations proved problematic in the early 
months because of the severe damage to the regional infrastructure sustained during the 
campaign to oust Iraq, the situation had improved by the end of the year by which time 
the UN observer unit enjoyed its full complement of transport and communications 
equipment. Much of this had needed only to make the short journey from the Iran-Iraq 
border, along which another UN observer mission (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group - UNIIMOG ) had been present until January 1991."*°^  
Iraq and Kuwait retained, of course, civil authority on their respective sides of the 
border. UNIKOM used the boundary line shown on the 1990 British Military Survey 
maps though, awaiting the deliberations of UNIKBDC, it could not and did not take a 
position on the precise location of this territorial limit. The 1990 British map line was 
utilized pragmatically therefore to facilitate UNIKOM's task, officially without prejudice 
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By June 1991 this figure had fallen to 963. 
Three of the five infantry companies were stationed one in each of the three operational sectors of the 
DMZ, the other two at Umm Qasr (UNIKOM headquarters-designate) and Doha (logistic base and 
temporary UNIKOM HQ from 15 June 1991). 
The fact that UNIKOM was still deployed along the recently-demarcated Kuwait-Iraq border in 
September 1993 and that UNIIMOG needed to be present along the Iran-Iraq border further east for the 
period between both sides acceptance of UN Resolution 598 and January 1991 only underlines the 
territorial instability that has persisted and still prevails in the northern Persian Gulf 
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to its position concerning the international boundary. By June, Iraq had 250 police in the 
DMZ while Kuwait was in the process of planning to rebuild and man some 30 police 
stations along its northern and northwestern borders. Already both governments had 
apparently agreed to limit police armaments to sidearms. This later gave rise to 
complaints from both Kuwait and Iraq that insufficient means were available to deal with 
smugglers, who generally possessed rifles and sub-machine guns. By the end of 1991 
Kuwait had established five police posts and one police observation point in the DMZ. 
Iraq's presence in the DMZ had increased to four border police centres and ten border 
police posts. Interestingly, five of these ten Iraqi posts were on the Kuwaiti side of the 
boundary indicated on the 1990 British Military Survey map. Attempts at the UN in New 
York as well as at the local level in the field to get Iraq to withdraw the offending posts 
met with the response from Baghdad that such an action would be impossible to defend 
politically, since these positions had been set up well before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990. This was another practical example of the confusion caused, even at this 
stage, by the presence of different de facto and de jure borders between Kuwait and 
Iraq. 
The presence of the five Iraqi posts in territory UNIKOM judged to be Kuwaiti 
made a mockery of the 'reasonable distance' principle which the UN Observer group had 
tried to establish for Kuwaiti and Iraqi civil authority along the border. Under this 
principle, formulated ostensibly to avoid incidents and friction, the Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
border authorities should have been limited to a distance of 1000 metres from UNIKOM's 
operative border, i.e. along the British Military Survey map line of 1990. Kuwaiti and 
Iraqi civil authority would have had the right to enter their last 1000 metres of territory if 
they had consulted UNIKOM in advance. Kuwait stated that it would be willing to abide 
by the principle, providing that Iraq also complied fully. However, according to 
UNIKOM, not only did Iraq maintain five police posts in Kuwaiti territory but it 
maintained a further two within its own "reasonable distance' zone to the immediate north 
of the operative border. With a mandate only to observe, there was little UNIKOM could 
do at this stage other than request unavailingly that the posts be withdrawn to territory 
lying indisputably within Iraqi territory. The posts were not withdrawn until January 
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1993. Clearly, there was not much hope in 1991 of the Reasonable distance' principle 
becoming practice. 
In the early stages of its operations at least, UNIKOM observed three types of 
border violations: minor incursions on the ground by typically small groups of soldiers; 
overtlights by military aircraft; and the carrying by Kuwaiti and Iraqi policemen of 
weapons other than side arms. Initially the number of transgressions was large, not 
surprisingly since until June there had been no signs on the ground to show civil authority 
exactly where the DMZ began and ended. By the end of October 1991 UNIKOM had 
reported 210 violations by Kuwait and allied forces of the Iraqi border as defined on the 
1990 British Military Survey map, and 29 violations of Kuwaiti territory by Iraq, 
excluding Iraq's five police posts which UNIKOM.'*^^ 
Undoubtedly the most-publicized violation of territory observed by UNIKOM 
occurred on 28 August 1991, when the Kuwaiti Coast Guard took 12 small vessels and 
detained 45 Iraqis in the Khor Abdullah off Bubiyan island. Original, over-dramaticized 
Kuwaiti accounts of the incident announced that an armed Iraqi force approximately 80 
in number had disembarked from gunboats and had attacked Bubiyan island. The Kuwaiti 
media alleged that the Iraqi force used heavy weapons and were backed by gunboat 
reinforcements sent from the Fao peninsula. After exchanges of fire, the defending 
Kuwaiti military repulsed the attack, or so Kuwait claimed, sinking seven boats and 
capturing over 40 of the invaders, while others in the Iraqi force either escaped or 
remained hidden somewhere on Bubiyan Island. Kuwait complained of Iraq's "armed 
aggression' to the Security Council, its Ambassador at the UN, Muhammad Abdulhasan, 
explaining that "this dangerous development demonstrates once again the aggressive 
intentions by Iraq against the security and peace of Kuwait and shows that Iraq has not 
learned its lessons'. Britain was quick to uphold the Kuwaiti complaint, even before 
""'' material detailing UNIKOM's operations on the border during 1991 has been taken from the following 
sources: 'Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission', 9 
May 1991, S/22580; 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Mission', 12 June 1991, S/22692; 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission (for the period 9 April to 2 October 1991)', 2 October 1991, S/23106. 
""^  UN Security Council document S/23106 of 2 October 1991, pp. 5-6. 
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UNIKOM could corroborate the account. The Foreign Office dehvered a stem protest to 
Iraq's envoy in London, Zuhair Ibrahim, and issued the following statement: 
The landing by a large group of Iraqi military personnel on Bubiyan Island on 
28th of August is the most serious Iraqi violation yet of the border with Kuwait, in 
direct contravention of the terms of the cease-fire contained in United Nations 
Security Council resolution 687. 
We condemn this further example of the Iraqi government's refusal to meet its 
international obligations and congratulate the Kuwaiti armed forces on their 
prompt response.'*"* 
Washington also precipitately congratulated the Kuwaitis "on their swift action in 
defending their lands'.'**'^  
UNIKOM's investigation into the incident, published in early September, revealed 
Kuwait's account to have been heavily exaggerated. The captured Iraqis had been taken 
from fishing boats and a speedboat off Bubiyan Island, while no evidence had been found 
to support claims that weapons had been carried on these vessels, that Iraqis had hidden 
on Bubiyan nor that fighting had actually taken place on the island. No Kuwaiti vessels 
allegedly involved in the fracas sustained any visible damage did UNIKOM find traces of 
all of the Iraqi vessels allegedly by the Kuwaitis in the low-lying mud-flats flanking the 
main navigation channel of the Khor Abdullah. UNIKOM suggested that it was most 
likely that the Iraqis arrested were probably private profiteerers collecting weapons, 
ammunition and other battlefield items for sale on the black market in Iraq. After all, 
similar operations by individuals dressed in civilian clothes and driving civilian vehicles 
were taking place in, along and probably south of the demilitarized land border zone 
further west. In a report dated 2 October 1991, UNIKOM commented: 
^Kuwait blocks Iraqi attempt to land troops on island', in International Herald Tribune, 30 August 
1991, p. 2. 
"^^  Ibid. 
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The question has been raised whether they are in fact military personnel but 
UNIKOM has not been able to establish that this is so. It has, however, been 
informed by the Iraqi authorities that they offer rewards to persons who 
retrieve weapons and ammunition from the battlefield. It has also had 
indications that there is an unofficial market for such items in Iraq.'"° 
UNIKOM's account of the Bubiyan episode therefore went some though not all 
the way towards supporting the Baghdad government's protestations of innocence, that if 
there had been an incident on or off the island, then \smugglers and pirates' might have 
been responsible."*'' 
When the Kuwaiti media on 5 September 1991 published only those portions of 
the UNIKOM investigation which supported their earlier, sensationalized accounts and 
the Kuwaiti National Assembly praised on the same day its armed forces for repulsing the 
infiltrating elements and arresting them, questions were raised about the emirate's 
treatment of the episode. Western commentators could not fail but to note that the Kuwait 
government had endorsed a bilateral defence agreement with the United States on 4 
September 1991, the very day that UNIKOM's findings were made public in New York. 
According to Dhari al-Othman, the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, an aim 
of the ten-year accord was to "deter any aggression or threat to Kuwait's sovereignty, 
security and unity of its lands'. After the over-exaggerated Kuwaiti version of the 
Bubiyan episode, Othman could now feel justified in adding the following footnote to the 
above aim: "...bearing in mind the continuing hostile intentions of the Iraqi regime'.'*'^  
The lingering feeling that Kuwait had been somewhat less than honest in its treatment of 
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UN Security Council document S/23106 of 2 October 1991, p. 7. 
this account of the Bubiyan episode has been informed by the following sources: letter from the 
Secretary-General reporting upon UNIKOM's investigation of the Bubiyan affair, 3 September 1991, 
S/23000, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission (for 
the period 9 April to 2 October 1991)'. 2 October 1991, S/23106, p. 7; BuU, G, (1991), 'A shabby 
episode'. Middle East International, No.408, 13 September 1991, pp. 8-9; 'Kuwait blocks Iraqi 
attempt to land troops on island', in International Herald Tribune, 30 August 1991, p. 2. 
Butt(1991),op. c;7.,p. 8. 
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the Bubiyan infraction and its chief Western allies less than objective in their responses 
was summarized by the British BBC correspondent, Gerald Butt: 
The general conclusion in the region seems to be that the Bubiyan incident -
a shabby episode - has brought no credit to Kuwait or the countries which 
fought for its freedom.'""^  
The Bubiyan episode was to have two general but discernible detrimental effects 
for Kuwait. 
Firstly, the Kuwaiti Government would claim privately in the period following the 
incident that the West did not treat seriously enough its future reports of Iraqi incursions. 
Secondly, the stem and Middle Eastern media would treat much more cautiously and 
critically future Kuwaiti announcements on border incidents and the issue of the UN 
demarcation of the border itself. Iraq's case would get greater coverage than previously. 
Nowhere was this more clear than with the reports in the Western broadsheets early in 
1992 that the UN was going to move the Kuwait border northwards by reallocating 
territory to the emirate at the expense of the Baghdad government. 
The ^ northward migration' of Kuwait's international borders with Iraq 
A flurry of articles in February 1992 in the respected British broadsheets'*''* 
predicted the loss of strategically-placed Iraqi territory to Kuwait with the impending 
announcement of the UNIKBDC verdict on the precise course of the land boundary, a 
decision which was not actually communicated until mid-April 1992. These reports were 
no doubt informed by various leaks but seemingly above all by the rather gratuitous 
comment of Dr Tariq A. Razouqi, UNIKBDC's Kuwaiti representative and Ambassador 
of Kuwait to France, that 'the demarcation of borders in 1992 will be totally different 
413 
414 
Ibid. 
for example, 'UN aims to redraw Iraq border with Kuwait', Mark Nicholson, The Financial Times, 
London, 19 February 1992; 'Kuwait set to gain from UN borders', Hella Pick, The Guardian, London 
and 'Dispute looms over new Kuwait border: Saddam Hussein could be at Kuwait's mercy for access to 
the Gulf if the UN moves the border to put the port of Umm Qasr in the emirate', Christopher Walker, 
The Times, London, 24 February 1992. 
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than 60 years ago'. The forecasts made in the British press that Iraq would be forced by 
the announcement of the UN demarcation decision to abandon oil wells in the southern 
tip of the Rumaila field, and to abandon the southern half of the modem port of Umm 
"Umm Qasr, turned out to be accurate, though no new boundary was being laid down by 
UNIKBDC as Razouqi's comments seemed to infer. It was merely that the old and vague 
de jure border was being delimited precisely and demarcated for the first time by the UN 
demarcation team. The UNIKBDC decision on the course of the land boundary would 
require Iraq to abandon all of the area it administered between the notional de jure border 
(i.e. the line temporarily regarded as being consonant with the line shown on the 1990 
British Military Survey map series) and the de facto border further south; up to which it 
had systematically encroached during the thirty-year period between the -first' Kuwait 
Crisis of 1961 and the eve of the ' second' on 1 August 1990: 
With very few exceptions, the difference between the de facto and de jure 
Kuwait-Iraq borders had not been internationally debated nor recognized until 
early 1992. Even then it confused many observers, including the journalists cited 
above. As this second edition goes to press (September 1993), precise details of 
the southernmost territorial extent occupied by Iraq remain something of a 
mystery. Iraq's creeping annexation between the two Kuwait crises remains to be 
mapped accurately'"^ while the Kuwaitis have not yet made detailed information 
on the subject available to the public.'*'^  
In a very general manner, it is worth recollecting just how and to approximately 
what extent Iraq had come to encroach over the notional or de jure border. The process 
started with the settlement of the 1961 Kuwait Crisis when Iraq extended its 
administration south to the Arab League Line,"*'* a track which ran roughly parallel to, 
but anywhere up to two kilometres south of, the notional de jure international boundary 
""' 'Decision on borders in April', Kuwait Times, 15 February 1992, p. 2. 
It is possible that some of the Iraqi military maps left behind in Kuwait after Saddam Husain's 
occupying force was forcibly removed from the emirate in the spring of 1991 might show the de facto 
border before August 1990. 
Though to do so, as noted earlier, might be considered too sensitive politically by the Kuwaiti 
government. 
''' Ibid. 
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with Kuwait.""^ This track was probably established originally by the British forces 
stationed to defend Kuwait during the 1961 crisis. It was essentially the nearest decent 
Kuwaiti site for an east-west route to what was then considered to be the de jure 
boundary. When an Arab League force relieved the British border forces in October 
1961, they positioned themselves no further north than this east-west link. The Arab 
League line was therefore established as the northern operative territorial limit for 
Kuwait, and Iraqi forces moved southwards to extend their administration to fill the 
narrow void. Iraq consolidated this small territorial gain in February 1963 when the 
thawing process in Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, begun by the fall of Qasim, resulted in the 
departure from the borderlands of the Arab League force. Thereafter, Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
border patrols would each utilize the track that was the Arab League line. During the 
1960s and 1970s, wells were sunk by Iraq at the southern tip of the super-giant Rumaila 
oilfield, directly above the Arab League line, which had essentially become in many 
places the de facto Kuwait-Iraq border. In the period thereafter further oilwells were 
sunk by Iraq in the Rumaila region south of the Arab League line itself."*^ " 
The modem Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, opened officially in 1961 with prominent 
Kuwaiti ruling family members present, soon expanded south to the level of the same 
Arab League line. Urban sprawl continued further south of the extended Iraqi port, 
unchecked during the 1970s as the Baghdad government strove to change the political 
geography of the border zone.'* '^ Kuwait, not generally in much of a position to protest 
against the encroachments of its more powerful northern neighbour, turned a blind eye to 
such developments but was careful never to give Iraq's creeping armexation any official 
recognition. The most important development in Iraq's encroachment had been the 
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The most detailed existing interpretation of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary at this stage in the early 1960s 
was Britain's December 1951 demarcation proposal, assented to by the Ruler of Kuwait but never 
accepted by the Iraqi Government. 
Indeed, the majority of wells lying nominally within Kuwaiti territory in Rumaila's southern tip, which 
the Iraqis have been required to abandon as a result of the findings of UNIKBDC (first announced on 
19 April 1992), lie south of the Arab League line. 
It will be recalled that between 1969, when Iraqi forces positioned themselves in Kuwaiti territory 
south of Umm Qasr, ostensibly to guard against possible attack from Iran at a time of crisis over the 
Shatt al-Arab, and 1972, Iraq had constructed a road three or four miles into Kuwaiti territory close to 
the mouth of the Khor Zubair. Perhaps the best source on Iraq's southwards encroachment across the 
nominal dejure boundary during the 1970s is Al-Mayyal, A. (1986), op .cit. 
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construction of a naval base with Soviet support in the early 1970s, entirely within 
Kuwaiti territory according to the 1951 British interpretation of the boundary, and 
modem maps produced of the border, including the 1990 British Military Survey series. 
Tactical pilotage and operational navigation charts produced in the late-1980s, openly on 
sale in Britain, clearly showed the division of Umm Qasr into Iraqi old and Kuwaiti new, 
that is the pre-1961 settlement as lying within fraq and its southern extension over the 
next three decades as lying within Kuwait. These and the 1990 British Military Survey 
series showed not just the Iraqi naval base but modern planned and unplanned housing, 
along with significant downtown areas of the expanded Iraqi port lying clearly within 
Kuwaiti territory and lying considerably further south than the Arab League line itself. 
Certainly it was the fairly widespread leak in February 1992 that nearly half of 
modem Umm Qasr was to be recognized as belonging to Kuwait that sustained the 
mmour that territory was being reallocated. Umm Qasr as it existed in 1961 would be 
recognized as lying entirely within Iraq. The extension of Iraqi infrastructure southwards 
over the de jure border would be disallowed by the UN demarcation commission. 
In the weeks preceding UNIKBDC's announcement on the course of the land 
boundary the a-it between the de facto and de jure Kuwait-Iraq borders was 
acknowledged but remained misunderstood. There were calls, many of them articulate, 
expert and intelligent,"*^^ for the UN demarcation team to show more flexibility in the 
execution of their tasks. Specifically, it was suggested that they might come up with a 
line which was "politically defensible' rather than valid from m a strict technical and 
historical perspective. It was suggested that this "politically defensible' line might extend 
southwards of what was likely to be confirmed as the de jure border at Umm Qasr and 
Rumaila so that Iraq need not abandon its oil wells and infrastructural development. In 
1992 the criticism of the UN seemed a little flawed and unfair. It might have had more 
^alidity in March 1991, when the UN had discussed how the border issue should be 
for example, from Sir Anthony Parsons, formerly British Ambassador to Iran and to the UN. at an 
'Anglo-Iranian Roundtable' held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, hosted and convened by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 10-12 March 1992; also, Fred Halliday, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, University of London, quoted in an article by Caryle Murphy in The Washington 
Post, 5 May 1992. 
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tackled in Resolution 687. UNIKBDC was purely carrying out its mandate when 
finalizing the existing boundary in law as defined previously by the 1932 exchange of 
letters. By extension, it had to ignore any temporary or de facto lines. There had been no 
criticisms of the UN directives for settling the boundary when the Secretary-General 
announced his plans in the spring of 1991. No-one then concerned themselves with, even 
if aware of, differences between de facto and de jure borders. The belated calls in the 
Western media for UNIKBDC to recognize the de facto border were of course, received 
enthusiastically in Baghdad."*^ ^ Unequivocal or apparently unequivocal neutral lobbying 
for its argument that UNIKBDC's verdict (when announced on 16 April 1992) was an 
unjust and unwarranted imposition probably encouraged Iraq to suddenly withdraw its 
delegate, Riyadh al-Qaisi from UNIKBDC. 
By mid-April 1992, within a year of its formation, UNIKBDC had announced its 
decision on the course of the Kuwait-Iraq land boundary. The line to be demarcated was a 
refinement of the detailed demarcation proposal submitted unavailingly by Britain (with 
Kuwait's prior approval) to Iraq in December 1951.'* '^* Right the way up to its invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990 Iraq had made demarcation along the lines of Britain's 1951 
interpretation contingent upon Kuwait first agreeing to cede or lease the islands of Warba 
and Bubiyan. Now Iraq was given a line, courtesy of the UN verdict, which approximated 
closely to the 1951 demarcation proposal but which contained no satisfaction on the 
islands issue. Indeed, as Umm Qasr expanded southwards across :he nominal de jure 
border in the 1960s and 1970s, it was doubtful whether Iraq would have agreed to the 
1951 demarcation proposal in its entirety, whatever the satisfaction given to it on ".he 
islands issue. For to have done so would have been to disallow this very encroachment in 
the same manner as the UN. 
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see the wealth of supporting (or apparently supporting) comment in Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmad 
Husain's letter to the UN Secretary General of 21 May 1992 (UN Security Council document S/24044 
of 1 June 1992), protesting against the course of the land boundary announced by UNIKBDC on 16 
April 1992. 
For details see 1951 demarcation proposal. 
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After its fifth session at UN Headquarters in New York, UNIKBDC announced 
the following decision on the course of the land boundary, communicated in a press 
release of 16 April 1992. The main points were: 
Adhering to the delimitation formula, and based on the findings of the independent 
experts and the deliberations of the Commission, the Commission has reached the 
following decisions on the boundary by voting, with Iraq not participating in the 
vote: 
1. That the boundary monument on the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border. Pillar No. 
1, shall be the starting point for the boundary along the thalweg of Wadi A1 
Batin, and therefore, the tripoint of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 
2. That the boundary south of Safwan shall be located at the distance of 1430 
metres from the south-west of the compound wall of the old customs post 
along the old road from Safwan to Kuwait; 
3. That the boundary at the northern end of Wadi Al Batin shall be the 
intersection of the thalweg of the Wadi and the latitude of the point south of 
Safwan; 
4. That the boundary south of Umm Qasr shall coincide with the location at 
which the boundary line on map sheet 5549-1 of series K7611, edition 2 
(1990), produced by the Military Survey of the United Kingdom, crosses 
the western shore of Khowr Zhobeir; and 
5. That the jimction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah shall be the one 
best identified for the Epoch 1932 and transposed onto modem orthophoto 
maps produced by the Commission. 
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The Commission has further decided that: 
(A) the boundary line in the Wadi Al Batin shall be a series of straight line 
segments of about two kilometres length best approximating to the lowest 
point line in the Wadi; 
(B) The boundary line from the point of the northern end of the Wadi Al Batin 
to the point south of Safwan shall be a line running along the common 
latitude of the points; 
(C) The boundary line from the point south of Safwan to the point south of 
Umm Qasr shall be the shortest line between the points; and that 
(D) The boundary line from the point south of Umm Qasr on the shore shall 
follow the low water line up to the location of directly opposite the junction 
of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah. 
The Commission has thus been able to draw the line of the boundary to the 
best of its ability and in light of all available information.'*^^ 
It will not surprise those familiar with the history of this troublesome territorial 
limit to learn that significant traces of Britain's demarcation proposal of 1951, the most 
detailed interpretation made to date of the 1932 exchange of notes, could be found in the 
line arrived at by UNIKBDC. Presented below is a brief commentary on the decisions 
reached by UNIKBDC for each prominent section of the Kuwait-Iraq land boundary, 
which makes use of information contained within UNIKBDC's final report of May 1993. 
Details are also given of the votes cast at the 36th session of UNIKBDC on 14 April 1992 
for each important decision on various sections of the border. The Iraqi delegate to 
UNIKBDC did not participate in any of these votes. 
The boundary along the Batin 
The UNIKBDC land boundary utilized the thalweg of the Batin in the west, as had done 
Britain's 1940 940 and 1951 demarcation proposals. A thalweg delimitation for the Batin 
"*" See press release entitled 'Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission completes fifth session, 
New York, 8-16 April', document number IK/101. 16 April 1992 
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had first b^en suggested in IQS?.'*^ ^ By adopting the thalweg, UNIKBDC sought to divide 
the traditional grazing lands of the Batin equally, which had been the intention in 1937, 
while the historically important wells of Hulaiba were left in Iraq. The deepest point of 
the wadi was probably as fair a division as any, though the shallowness of the feature 
meant that this was not always easy to establish precisely. It was perhaps a little ironic, at 
least to a geographer, that the thalweg, usually served to divide navigable international 
waterways, had been used for a dry wadi while later, in March 1993, the median line 
(tempered by equity) would be used for the navigable Khor Abdullah. The Chairman, the 
Kuwaiti representative and the independent experts voted in favour of the suggested 
thalweg delimitation, which was then adopted."*^ ^ 
The point south of Safwan, so problematic in earlier periods of the border's 
evolution, was defined as lying 1430 metres south of the compound wall of the old Iraqi 
customs post. Britain's 1951 Demarcation proposal had nominated a point lying 1000 
metres south of the customs post as the nodal point of the border.'^ ^^ The 'Final Report on 
the Demarcation of the International Boundary between the Republic of Iraq and the 
State of Kuwait by the UN Iraq Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission"* '^' explains 
of how UNIKBDC's 1430 metres figure was arrived at: 
The Commission considered that the two most probable positions for the 
notice board were nearly 1609 metres (1 mile) and 1250 metres south of the 
southwest extremity of the customs post. In the absence of other reliable 
evidence, the Commission gave equal weight to both measurements and 
decided on the mean distance of 1430 metres from the south-west extremity 
of the old customs post along the old road as the most probable location of 
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'Further report of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', 24 July 1992, 
IKBDCIRep.6, p. 60 
to compare the 1951 and 1992 distances from the former Iraqi customs post is slightly misleading since 
it was not until the recent survey operations of UNIKBDC that the exact location of the post could be 
established and then mapped with any degree of certainty 
Tina! Report of the Demarcation of the International Boundary between the Republic of Iraq and the 
State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', op. cit., p. 21 
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the noticeboard. The location of the point thus determined by the 
Commission is 180 metres farther south than the distance specified in the 
1940 Iraqi protest note and 430 metres south of the claim made then and later 
for Kuwait [i.e. within Britain's 1951 demarcation proposal]. 
The general location of the customs post was established, on site, using GPS 
equipment and coordinates determined in 1942 from astronomical observations. 
Image interpretation using several aerial photographs, dating from 1945 to the 
present day, enabled the Commission to determine the south-west extremity of the 
old customs post with good accuracy as well as the alignment of the old road south 
of Safwan beside which the notice board had been located. 
The representative of Kuwait and the independent experts voted in favour of the 
proposed boundary point south of Safwan. The Chairman abstained, perhaps because he 
sympathized to an extent with an Iraqi complaint, later to be articulated by Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Ahmad Husain in a better dated 21 May 1992 protesting to UNIKBDC that 
insufficient notice had been taken of arguments and evidence, for whatever reasons, in 
the shaping of the decision."* "^ 
UNIKBDC essentially agreed with the choice of point nominated in Britain's 1940 
and 1951 demarcation proposals for the terminus of the land boundary on the Khor 
Zubair south of old Iraqi Umm Qasr, also with the rationale behind the earlier British 
interpretations.'^ '^ The relevant paragraph from the May 1993 Final Report read as 
follows: 
The Commission decided that the demarcation of the intersection of the 
boundary with the shoreline at Umm Qasr should be in terms of the position 
of the Khowrs as shown on the 1936 map as it was considered that that was 
the position of the boundary as envisaged and intended from that time. This 
"^ ^ IKBDC/Rep.6, p. 60. 
' ' ' Op. at. 
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is also the position shown on the British 1:50 000-scale map transmitted by 
Security Council S/22412. This position has now been demarcated as the 
boundary at Umm Qasr by the Commission, leaving the Umm Qasr port 
complex and Umm Qasr village within Iraqi territory.'*^^ 
Despite all of the intense media debate in February 1992, the decision on the 
terminus of the land boundary south of old Umm Qasr had been relatively easy to make, 
given that there was no Prospect of UNIKBDC recognizing the pre-August 1990 de facto 
border. Clearly no new de jure boundary had been drawn. The UNIKBDC decision was 
consistent with Britain's 1940 and 1951 demarcation proposals and the terminal point 
shown on the British Military Survey map series of 1990. The Chairman, the Kuwaiti 
representative and the independent experts voted in favour of the proposed delimitation 
south of Umm Qasr, which was then adopted."*^ ^ 
The final section of the land boundary rurming from the point south of Safwan in a 
straight line to the junctions of the Khor Zubair and the Khor Abdullah west of Warba 
island was essentially defined to follow Britain's 1951 interpretation. The whole of the 
waters of the Khor Zubair were thereby left to Iraq. Like the 1951 interp' tion, the 
boundary hit the Khor Zubair at a point south of Umm Qasr (or, to be more i ite, its 
geographical extent before 1960) and then followed the low-water springs K ' the 
water inlet's western shore until its mouth was reached, after which it ran in h-
easterly direction through water to the junction of the khors. 
There was a minor difference between the way in which UNIKBDC's 1992 line 
and Britain's 1940 and 1951 interpretations left the western/southern bank of the Khor 
Zubair to link up with the junction of the khors. Whereas the 1992 line followed the low 
water mark of the western/southern bank of the Khor Zubair to its mouth, Britain's 1940 
proposal had specified that, in the event that a line drawn straight from the point of 
"^ ^ UNIKBDC Final Report, p. 23. 
"" IKBDC/Rep.6, p. 61. 
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Safwan to the junction of the khors would touch the eastern/northern bank of the Khor 
Zubair - UNIKBDC soon found that this was indeed the case - the boundary should 
'follow the low water line on the (western/southern) bank of the Khor Zubair to a point 
on the bank immediately opposite' the junction of the khors. Britain's 1951 demarcation 
proposal effectively prescribed the same formula as the 1940 proposal, though its 
wording was different: 
a) From the point 1000 metres south of the building mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) 
above, the frontier shall follow the shortest line between that point and the point defined 
in sub-paragraph (d) above, but only as far as the spring tide lowwater mark on the right 
bank of the Khor Zubair. (f) From the point of the spring-tide low-water mark on the 
right bank of the Khor Zubair mentioned in sub-paragraph above to the point on that low-
water mark nearest to the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above, the frontier shall 
follow the low-water mark. 
g) From the point on the low-water mark on the right bank of the Khor Zubair nearest to 
the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above to that point itself, the boundary shall be the 
shortest line which can be drawn. Either way, it was the express intent of all three to 
leave the whole of waters of the Khor Zubair to Iraq."*^ "* 
The Chairman and the independent experts voted for the proposed delimitation 
and, with the Kuwaiti voting against it, the proposal was adopted.'*^^ 
From the point of Safwan to the junction of the khors: fixing the position of the 
junction of the khors. A precise location for the jimction of the khors had proved 
somewhat more difficult to arrive at, as UNIKBDC explained. 
The Commission decided that the position of the Khowrs should be the position 
as close as possible to that of epoch 1932. Its position was determined following studies 
of charts produced between 1907 and 1991, aerial photographs covering a period of some 
^^ ^ Note-verbale from the British Embassy, Baghdad to the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 28 
December 1951 - reproduced in Schofield, R. (ed.) (1992), Vol. 5, pp. 49-52. 
''' IKBDC/Rep.b, p. 62 
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40 years from 1951 and topograhic maps. Although absolute positions varied, there was 
acceptably good agreement between the shore outlines on the maps and the details on the 
photographs, which led the Commission to rule out any significant effects of erosion or 
accretion around the junction of the Khowrs during the period covered by the materials 
studied. 
Six identifiable junction points were plotted on the 1:25,000 scale 
orthophoto map from charts produced in 1907, 1932, 1939, 1948, 1971 and 1991. 
The best available chart produced closest in time to epoch 1932 was the chart 
produced by the Basra Port Directorate in 1939. With the exception of the point 
derived from the 1932 chart and from the 1991 British Admiralty Chart, these 
points fall within a relatively small circle. 
The Commission decided to take into consideration the 1932 chart, despite its 
lower quality, in fixing the junction point, as it was produced at the time closest to epoch 
1932. The final position was a weighted mean position. This has been considered as the 
most likely location of the position referred to in the British proposal of October 1940 
and the December 1951 note verbale.'*^^ 
So, even though there had been some difficulty establishing its precise location, 
UNIKBDC's judgement on the junction of the khors, the easternmost point specifically 
defined in the UNIKBDC delimitation formula'*"^ ,^ again approximated closely to that 
envisaged in Britain's 1940 and 1951 demarcation proposals. Voting for the proposed 
junction of the khors had been unanimous, apart from the abstaining Iraqi 
representative. 
•"^^ UNIKBDC Final Report, p. 24 
•"^  the vague definition of the boundary contained within the 1932 exchange of notes actually referred to 
'the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdullah'. 
*^^ IKBDC/Rep.6, p. 61. 
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UNIKBDC's press release of 16 April 1992 had dealt only with the land 
boundary. It would be almost another year before its decision on the course of the water 
boundary along the Khor Abdullah was announced. 
As announced in UNIKBDC's press release of 16 April 1992, the Iraqi delegate, 
Riyadh al-Qaisi, abstained in all votes on the boundary, an action clearly designed to try 
and dissociate Iraq from the verdict and the process which had led up to it. Until this 
point al-Qaisi had participated in UNIKBDC's sessions, even if only appearing to be 
going through the motions. 
The immediate reaction in New York by Tariq Razouqi, the Kuwaiti 
representative on UNIKBDC, to the decision on the course of the land boundary, was one 
of delight. He described the verdict as a "magnificent achievement' for Kuwait, and that 
the emirate had 'proved that Iraq up to now occupied Kuwaiti territory and [had] 
exploited part of our country', adding that 'Kuwait will recover all its oil wells'.'*'*^  
Razouqi was technically correct when, two days later on his return to Kuwait, he stated 
that the UN decision was 'definitive' and did 'not need the approval of the Kuwaiti and 
Iraqi governments, which had earlier accepted resolution 687'. Other senior Kuwaiti 
officials, though delighted at the pushing back of the pre-August 1990 de facto Kuwait-
Iraq border for an average 600 metres along its entire 200 kilometre length, realized that a 
long diplomatic battle lay in store with Iraq before the UNIKBDC decisions could be 
fully implemented. 'The diplomacy will extend for years and years about the results of 
the commission and the fulfilment of the resolution, but it is a battle of diplomacy', was a 
typical reaction from anonymous senior aide."*^ ^ 
Kuwait was less than happy, however, with the UNIKBDC decision to place the 
whole of the waters of the Khor Zubair within Iraq."^' There had initially been an 
expectation by the Kuwaitis and experts close to the workings of the UN border 
•"^^ 'Kuwait rejoices over recovery of oil-rich teiritory from Iraq', Taieb Mahjoud, 18 April 1992, AFP 
180232, GMT Apr.92. 
"'"'' Diplomatic battle seen over Kuwait-Iraq border', Diana Abdullah, 20 April 1992, Reuter AG BEH, 
162146 GMT Apr.92. 
'Border demarcation deprives Kuwait of Khoural-Zubair', A^Kwa(7 Times, 4 May 1992, p. 2 
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demarcation commission, that the easterly Safwan-junction of the khors section of the 
boundary would follow a straight line no modifications so that much of the lower course 
of the Khor Zubair would have fallen within Kuwait. After all, this was the most logical 
interpretation of the vague 1932 definition of the boundary, if one took no notice of 
Britain's subsequent clarifications of 1940 and 1951. A straight line for this section of the 
boundary was also depicted on the 1990 British Military Survey map series. As already 
noted, one reason why UNIKBDC did not adopt the straight line option from Safwan to 
the junction of the khors was because to have done so would also have given the emirate 
a slither of the western/northern bank of the Khor Zubair, indisputably Iraqi territory.'*''^  
With L.NIKBDC basically affirming Britain's 1951 formula for this stretch of the 
boundary, there had been a split vote on this point, with Kuwait voting against the 
motion. Other confidential sources have commented that the Kuwaiti delegate's chief 
objection in all of this was simply the hurried manner by which the decision on this 
stretch of the boundary had been reached. 
Interestingly, in May 1992, there had been reports that had Iraq taken a more 
accommodation accommodating view of the UNIKBDC decision, Kuwait might have 
been prepared to concede part of the territory which the UN had only recently recognized 
as belonging to the emirate. Presumably, this would have involved the southern, modern 
half of Umm Qasr (or perhaps the part of it occupied by the Iraqi naval base built with 
Soviet support in the early 1970s) which the Baghdad government was now required to 
abandon with the UNIKBDC verdict. Kuwaiti Defence Minister Shaikh Ali Sabah al-
Salim Al-Sabah, allegedly made the following comments in Cairo on 4 May 1992: 
Kuwait, in agreement with the international committee for border 
demarcations, submitted an initiative proving its good intentions by 
conceding part of its territory to Iraq for humanitarian reasons. 
[T]his concession included an area bordering on the sea so that the Iraqi side 
will be able to use a huge commercial harbor. This is despite the fact that the 
border demarcation included this harbor as part of Kuwaiti territory, in 
442 UNIKBDC Final Report, para. 78, p. 23. 
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addition to another area in which a hospital was built which was also 
apportioned in Iraq's favor for humanitarian reasons. 
This Kuwaiti initiative was to founder, or so it seemed, in the face of Iraq's 
denunciation/rejection of the UNIKBDC decision, not made officially until mid-May 
1992."^ By the end of April 1992, however, Iraq had implicitly rejected the UN line, 
though perhaps Riyadh al-Qaisi's nonparticipation in the vote on the border had made this 
clear from the outset. Initially, unattributed noises were heard from Baghdad, claiming 
that UNIKBDC had used British maps, 'drawn up in the early part of the century with the 
deliberate aim of depriving Iraq of an outlet to the sea'. Upon his arrival in Cairo for 
the 97th ordinary session of the Arab League in late April 1992, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Ahmad Husain commented 'that the imposition of new borders between Kuwait and Iraq 
is not the best means of establishing peace and security in the region'.'*''^  Only a day 
earlier, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz had claimed that the UN verdict on the 
boundary was 'not based on any legal documents' and that 'the West knows full well that 
these borders can never be accepted, that the problem will continue to be unresolved'.'*'*^ 
Perhaps more surprising to some circles in the West was the rejection of the UNIKBDC 
verdict by the very Iraqi opposition groups many states would prefer to see ruling, in one 
way or another, in Baghdad. Their rejection and criticisms, admittedly inspired by the 
media-influenced belief that the UN was reallocating Iraqi territory to Kuwait, appeared 
before the present Baghdad government gave official notice of its denunciation/rejection. 
A press release signed by Saad Salih Jabir, Chairman of the Iraqi Free Council, 
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'Kuwait: Officials Comment on Adoption of New Iraqi Border: Defense Minister Says Land Given Up', 
FBIS: FBIS-NES-92-088, 6 May 1992, p. 10. 
There was considerable confusion surrounding the Kuwaiti initiative announced by Shaikh Ali in 
Cairo. According to a statement made only a day later by Kuwaiti Information Minister Badr Jasim al-
Ya'qub, the emirate should by right have been given much more territory along the west bank of the 
Khor Zubair. This would have involved, had UNIKBDC approved such a measure, Iraq ceding parts of 
Umm Qasr which both Britain and Kuwait had previously recognized as belonging to it. Al-Ya'qub's 
comments inferred that the land surrendered by Kuwait for humanitarian reasons to Iraq actually lay to 
the north of UNIKBDC's 16 April 1992 demarcation line and that had it not been for Kuwait's 
generosity Iraq would not even have held on to that portion of Umm Qasr it now retains. See 
'Information Minister Criticizes Demarcation", FB/S. FBIS-NES-92-088, 6 May 1992, p. II. This 
sounds highly unlikely and the Kuwaiti initiative remains something of a mystery. 
'Opposition Iraqis join border row', Liz Thurgood, The Guardian, 30 April 1992. 
Toreign Minister Opposes New Borders "Imposition", FB/S, FBIS-NES-92-082, 28 April 1992, p. 19. 
"UN Ruling on Kuwait Border "Implicitly Rejected", FB/S, FBIS-NES-92-081, 27 April 1992, p. 18. 
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characterized the UN decision as 'a serious compromise of Iraqi territorial integrity'.'*'*^ A 
mixed group of prominent Iraqi exiles claimed that the UNIKBDC verdict would 
'infringe on Iraqi sovereignty'.'*^^ The Shi'a al-Dawa Party recommended that a final 
delineation of the Kuwait-Iraq border should await the election of a legitimate and 
representative Iraqi government, after which bilateral negotiations would be set in train 
between the two neighbouring states to solve the issue once and for all.'* °^ Finally, the 
London-based Joint Action Committee of the Iraqi Opposition Forces in Britain claimed 
that the UNIKBDC decision on the course of the land boundary had 'caused great 
apprehension among all segments of the Iraqi people' and had placed 'the region on the 
threshold of regional problems which will benefit the enemies of the nation and 
region'.'* '^ The first notice of Iraq's official rejection of the UNIKBDC decision came on 
16 May 1992, when its National Assembly 'denounced all resolutions adopted by the 
border demarcation committee'. The National Assembly objected to the methods 
employed by UNIKBDC, while Riyadh al-Qaisi, who had served for the last time on the 
committee (he was to be withdrawn officially in July 1992), 'stressed that the committee's 
resolutions constituted a flagrant intervention into Iraq's domestic affairs and ran contrary 
to all laws and charters concerning the demarcation of international borders'. It was 
now obvious that while Iraq had accepted, albeit with considerable reluctance, the 
existence and aims of UNIKBDC, it could not live with its findings. On 21 May 1992, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmad Husain addressed an extraordinarily long letter of protest, 
44 pages with annexes, against the UNIKBDC verdict of the previous month. 
It was another detailed Iraqi 'review of the facts of history and geography', 
reiterating complaints made initially during April 1991, as the Secretary-General had 
formed UNIKBDC. In places, the letter was undeniably of some interest, for instance in 
its documentation of the relationship between Britain, Iraq, Kuwait and latterly the 
Hashimite Arab Union for the 1956 to 1958 period. 
*^^ 'Iraqi Free Council Condemns New Kuwaiti Border', FB/S, FBIS-NES-92-078. 22 April 1992, pp. 19-
20. 
"'" 'Opposition Opposes UN Kuwaiti Border Accord', FB/S, FBIS-NES-92-080, 24 April 1992. p. 17. 
"'*' Opposition Iraqis join border row', Liz Thurgood, The Guardian, London, 30 April 1992. 
*'*' 'Opposition Group Criticizes Accord', FB/S, FBIS-NES-92-081, 27 April 1992, p. 18. 
'Iraq: National Assembly condemns international demarcation of border with Kuwait'. BBC/SWB, 
MFJ1384A11. 19 May 1992. 
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Much of the British official record covering this subject has been withheld under 
the 50-year confidentiality rule. Ahmad Husain complained specifically that UNIKBDC 
had not made full use of the 'appropriate materials' which Iraq was prepared to make 
available to aid the demarcation team, charging that UNIKBDC had waited for a 
translation of photocopies of passports stamped at the Mitla ridge, which Kuwait had 
designated as the chief Kuwait-Iraq customs control post in the 1960s.'* '^' Ahmad Husain 
charged further that the Commission, instead of being patient in deciding upon matters 
and waiting for the presentation of the documents and notes referred to by the 
representative of Iraq, prevented all that by adopting in clear haste substantive technical 
decisions in regard to the demarcation of the co-called land boundary. This was done 
under the influence of clear pressure from the representative of the ruler of Kuwait.'*'''* 
The majority of the Iraqi Foreign Minister's letter attempted to substantiate 
Baghdad's view that the verdict reached by UNIKBDC contradicted the facts of history 
and geography. In support of these arguments the opinion of neutral observers was 
quoted and, intriguingly, that of the UNIKBDC chairman himself.'^ ^^  Ahmad Husain 
concluded that UNIKBDC's verdict was a 'purely political decision imposed by the 
Powers dominating the Security Council at present, particularly the Governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom'. He charged that the principal Western powers 
wished to create a political climate in the region in which they could justify the 
perpetuation of their military bases and of the presence of their armed forces in a state of 
453 
454 
455 
It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that Edward Heath appeared to have accepted during the late summer 
of 1990 the groundless Iraqi argument that by moving its chief customs post 75 kilometres north from 
the Mitla ridge to Abdaly, Kuwait had shifted its boundaries with Iraq northwards by a corresponding 
distance 
Letter dated 21 May 1992 from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the UN Secretary-General, 
enclosed in United Nations Security Council Document S/24044 of 1 June 1992, p. 7. 
These neutral observers ranged from British academics, including Fred Halliday and this author, to 
British, American and Arab journalists. 
Not all of the excerpts castigated the UNIKBDC verdict, but rather concluded (certainly this was the 
case with this author) that the problem of Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf was a geo-strategic fact 
which might well not disappear, whatever boundary line UNIKBDC had chosen to demarcate 
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occupation which will enable them to continue extorting the ruling regimes in Kuwait 
and the region and pillaging the oil wealth of the area.'*^ ^ 
His final word on the UNIKBDC decision was as follows: Any ratification by the 
Security Council of this unjust decision, which has been deliberately directed by two' of 
its permanent members, will constitute a very dangerous precedent, contrary in substance 
and consequences to the duties and responsibilities entrusted to the Council by the 
Charter of the United Nations.'*''^  An equally long letter of 9 June 1992 from Shaikh 
Salim Sabah al-Salim Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the UN Secretary-General wearily refuted one by one the Iraqi allegations. 
Kuwait reminded Iraq that it was its decision to invade Kuwait which had 
internationalized the question of settling borders. 
Has Iraq forgotten that it was its treacherous act of aggression and its 
disregard of international legitimacy which placed this problem outside the 
regional context, thus moving its obligation to respect such legitimacy to an 
international context? Iraq having rejected all acceptable means of resolving 
the boundary dispute thus created, it was essential that the United Nations 
should intervene and take charge."*'* 
Ahmad Husain's letter of 21 May 1992 was characterized by Kuwait as evidence of 
the continuation of Iraq's Mong tradition of...challenging international legitimacy, 
persisting in its aggressive intentions, proclaiming its refusal and rejecting all agreements 
and conventions ratified by [the Iraqi state]'.'*^^ 
The response of the UN to Iraq's Vee opus' of late May was for Paul 
Noterdaeme, the President of the Security Council, to issue a note on 17 June 1992, 
"'* Letter from Ahmad Husain, 21 May 1992, p. 18. 
^" Ibid. 
"'* Letter dated 9 June 1992 from the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
the Secretary-General, enclosed in UN Security Council document, S/24060 of 9 June 1992, p. 4. 
'"> Ibid., p. 2. 
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which affirmed that "the Boundary Demarcation Commission is not reallocating territory 
between Kuwait and Iraq, but is simply carrying out the technical task necessary to 
demarcate the precise coordinates of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq for the first 
time'.''^ '^  Noterdaeme commented that Ahmad Husain's letter appeared 'to call into 
question Iraq's adherence to Security Council resolution 687' and expressed concern that 
the letter "may be interpreted as rejecting the finality of the Border Demarcation 
Commission's decisions'. It ended with the following warning for the Baghdad 
government: 
The members of the Council wish to stress to Iraq the inviolability of the 
international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait being demarcated by the 
Commission and guaranteed by the Council pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) 
and the grave consequences that would ensue from any breach thereof. 
UNIKBDC verdict on the land boundary 
As preparations were being made for UNIKBDC's sixth session in New York, 
scheduled for 15-24 July 1992, the Government of Iraq formally withdrew its delegate 
from future sessions of the border demarcation commission. In another letter to the 
Secretary-General, the Iraqi Foreign Minister concluded that: [a]fter a prolonged study of 
all factors and circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that Iraq's opinion is not 
being heard in the committee and that regardless of our efforts to make it heard, there will 
be no opportunity for us to create an atmosphere of objectivity and justice...Based on the 
above reasons, we do not find that our participation in the abovementioned committee 
will serve any useful purpose."*^ ^ 
'"'° the reiteration of this comment was probably intended as much for the Western and Arab media, 
who continued to question the wisdom of UNIKBDC's verdict throughout the late spring of 1992, 
as for the Iraqi Government itself. 
"*' Note by the President, UN Security Council, document S/24113, 17 June 1992. 
*^^ Foreign Minister's letter to UN: reasons for boycotting border demarcation talks', BBC/SWB, ME/1434 
A/12, 16 July 1992. 
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Though Riyadh al-Qaisi attended no further meetings of UNIKBDC from July 1992 
to May 1993, he was provided with copies of all the essential documentation reviewed in 
these sessions and of the authenticated minutes on each occasion. 
UNIKBDC's sixth session resulted in a somewhat defensively-couched press release 
on 24 designed no doubt for a Western media which still maintained reservations over the 
April 1992 UN'IKBDC award.^" In this it was noted that: 
the oil wells in the fields between Safwan and the Batin exploited in the past 
by Iraq fell already in Kuwait according to the boundary shown on the British 
map referred to in Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 
The Commission's demarcation leaves Umm Qasr port complex, including all 
the warehouses, crane installations, deep-water anchorage and two wide 
berths, as well as the whole of Umm Qasr village, the Navy hospital and the 
sulphur works within Iraqi territory. With the port and the Khor Zubair in 
Iraq, the Commission's decisions on this section of the land boundary affirm 
Iraq's access to the sea. 
The Boundary Demarcation Commission is not reallocating territory between 
Kuwait and Iraq, but is simply carrying out the technical task necessary to 
demarcate the precise coordinates of the international boundary between 
Kuwait and Iraq for the first time. It unequivocally rejects any allegations of 
partiality.'*^ 
463 
464 
Some of the most consistently informed and critical reporting of the border issue has been provided by 
Wolfgang Kohler for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. For example, 'Das Bild des Friedens bei 
Umm Qasr ist trUgerisch: eine Fahrt an die unstrittene irakischkuweitische Grenze', 19 June 1992 and 
'Die "vierte Mauer" Kuweits: Mif3trauen beherrscht die Frage der Grenzziehung mit dem Irak', 23 
February 1992. 
Press release issued by UNIKBDC on 24 July 1992 at the conclusion of its sixth session in New York, 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed.) 1992), Vol. 5, op.cit., p. 664. 
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At the July session arrangements were made for the future demarcation of the line 
decided upon by UNIKBDC for the Kuwait-Iraq boundary, while a substantial interim 
report was finalized, in which UNIKBDC explained in some detail the basis upon which 
their decisions on the course of the land boundary had been reached. This report was 
released on 24 July 1992.''^ ^ The single map included within the interim report which 
purported to show the line of boundary decided upon by UNIKBDC was noteworthy (see 
Map 14). This showed the difference between the approximation of the de jure boundary 
depicted on the 1990 British Military Survey map series and the line decided upon by 
UNIKBDC to constitute the final course of the international boundary. It would .certainly 
have been helpful had UNIKBDC taken the same opportunity to plot the de facto 
international boundary as it existed immediately preceding the Iraqi move on Kuwait (i.e. 
the southern most extent of territory effectively administered by Iraq), but this is an 
exercise which remains to be satisfactorily undertaken. As an educating exercise, it would 
clearly be in the interests of Kuwait to produce a detailed map along these lines to 
convince those sceptics who are still maintaining in September 1993 that UNIKBDC 
has reallocated territory. 
What was surprising about the UN July map was that for the section from the 
Batin t eastwards to Safwan, UNIKBDC's final decision of 1992 ran parallel to but some 
distance north of the line shown on Britain's 1990 Military Survey maps.'*^^  There was no 
disparity at Umm Qasr As has already been noted, the UNIKBDC April 1992 line and the 
boundary depicted on the 1990 Military Survey series both hit the Khor Zubair at exactly 
the same place. The reasons given to this author for the divergence was simply that 
inadequate information existed in 1990 to depict the vague de jure boundary with any 
465 
466 
Turther report of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', 24 July 1992, 
IKBDC/Rep.6. Those readers interested in the finer technical minutiae of UNIKBDC's operations 
should see this document, which is in restricted circulation. Subjects covered are: field work of the 
commission (datum survey, primary control survey, aerial photography, photo control survey, 
coordinate systems, orthophoto mapping); research and analysis of documentation, evidence and 
mapping of the border area (western section, northern section, eastern section, consideration of the 
boundaries); summary of the deliberations of the commission (western section, northern section, 
eastern section, the boundary in its totality); statements of positions (position of the representative of 
Kuwait; position of the representative of Iraq, response by the independent experts; response by the; 
representative of Kuwait; response by the representative of Iraq, further response by the independent 
experts, concluding statement by the Chairman); further consideration of the eastern section; decisions 
(execution of the decisions, preparations for boundary demarcation on the ground); further work of the 
commission. 
IKBDC/Rep.6, p. 25. 
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great accuracy. After all, UNIKBDC's operations had involved the first joint survey of 
both sides of the border zone and the construction of more accurate maps than those 
existing previously, including the Military Survey series."*^ ^ The technical support lent to 
UNIKBDC's deliberations was impressive. In order to produce new and accurate maps of 
the border, four datum stations, 25 primary control stations and 137 photo control points 
were established between September and December 1991. Their positions had been 
respectively determined by GPS and Doppler observations. A series of 31 orthophoto 
maps was produced at a scale of 1:25 000 and several more ultimately produced for 
critical points on the boundary (e.g. Safwan and Umm Qasr) at the smaller scale of 
1:7,500. Extensive aerial photography was also undertaken to assist with the preparation 
of maps: a series at 1:2,500 to depict the discontinuity/continuity in the Rumaila/Ratga 
oilfields and settled areas of the border near Safwan and Umm Qasr; and a series taken at 
a later stage (1993) to provide false colour imagery for the determination of the boundary 
along the low-water spring line for the west bank of the Khor Zubair and for the 
determination of the median line along the Khor Abdullah."^^ 
There is almost certainly no reason to doubt the explanation given for the 
divergence in the de jure boundaries shown approximately by the British Military 
Survey in 1990 and the line ultimately demarcated by UNIKBDC. After all, the maps 
produced by UNIKBDC as a result of as deliberations depict prominent physical features 
that had hitherto escaped most modem maps of the region."**' It is perhaps regrettable, 
however, that UNIKBDC has not dealt more directly with the disparity between the lines 
in its various pronouncements and publications. At a time when hen sections of the 
international media were convinced that Iraq's southern boundaries were being 
UNIKBDC noted the necessity for new mapping at the outselt of its operations, as recorded in the May 
1993 final report: 'The maps and the related special data were, in the opinion of the experts, a 
necessary supplement to the existing maps and documents and would be required before demarcation 
on the ground could be carried out, as there were no adequate maps of the boundary area for the 
purpose of demarcation'. See UNIKBDC Final report', op.cit., p. 15. 
Schofield, (1993), 'The United Nations' settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait border, 1991-1993', op. cit., 
pp.79-80. For much greater detail on these technical questions the reader is referred to the 'Further 
report on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', 14 July 1992, 
IKBDC/Rep.b and UNIKBDC's 'Final report', op.cit. 
for example, the far from insignificant water inlet lying off the western/southern bank of the Khor 
Zubair south-east of Umm Qasr. 
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foreshortened, the map enclosed within UNIKBDC's interim report of July 1992 only 
intensified arguments, especially since the point at which the 1990 Military Survey map 
and the UNIKBDC's demarcated line diverged most coincided with the disputed 
Rumaila/Ratga oilfield. Even before the release of the map in July, Iraq was fully aware 
that the line decided upon by UNIKBDC was, for the most part, less favourable than that 
depicted on the 1990 British Military Survey map series, about which it had expressed so 
much concern in April 1991. As Ahmad Husain had stated in his letter of 21 April 1992: 
One of the striking facts relating to the work of the Commission is that the 
United Nations Commission came out with a boundary line on the basis of 
British sources and interpretations which is worse for Iraq's interests than the 
British line drawn on the basis of the same sources and interpretations on the 
British map (S/22412) referred to in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) 
and which successive Iraqi Governments did not recognise.'*'" 
UNIKBDC's detailed July 1992 interim report was presented to the Security 
Council by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 19 August 1992. Within a 
week UN Resolution 773 had been passed, welcoming the UNIKBDC verdict on the 
course of the Kuwait-Iraq land boundary and urging the UN border demarcation 
commission to finally settle the water boundaries further east between the two states 
along the Khor Abdullah. Its most important provisions read as follows: 
The Security Council: 
1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter of the 12 August to the President of the 
Council and the further report of the Commission enclosed therewith; 
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission for its work on the 
demarcation of the land boundary, and welcomes its demarcation decisions; 
470 letter dated 21 May 1992 from Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs in UN Security Council document 
S/24044, 1 June 1992 
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3. Welcomes also the decision of the Commission to consider the Eastern 
section of the boundary, which includes the offshore boundary, at its next 
session and urges the Commission to demarcate this part of the boundary as 
soon as possible and thus complete its work; 
4. Underlines its guarantee of the inviolability of the above-mentioned 
international boundary and its decision to take as appropriate all 
necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter as 
provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687; 5. Welcomes further the 
Secretary-General's intention to carry out at the earliest practicable time 
the realignment of the demilitarized zone referred to in paragraph 5 of 
resolution 687 (1991) to correspond with the international boundary 
demarcated by the Commission, with the consequent removal of the 
Iraqi police posts."* '^ 
It will be recalled, that at least until the end of 1991, Iraq retained police posts in 
Kuwaiti territory as defined on the 1990 British Military survey map. Though 
authorization to adjust the DMZ northwards had been given in UN Resolution 773 of 26 
August 1992, it was not until January 1993 that this was completed, at a time when 
hostilities were briefly recommenced against Iraq. As a result Iraq was compelled to 
withdraw its posts that had quickly been recognized by UNIKOM as lying within Kuwait 
during 1991 and also those which were now lying in Kuwaiti territory as a result of the 
UNIKBDC verdict on the land boundary and the consequent northwards shift of the 
DMZ.'*'^  
Resurrection of the Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait 
By the time Resolution 773 had been passed Kuwaiti anxieties had been 
heightened by the resurrection in the Baghdad media of the intermittent but historical 
'"' 'Resolution 773 (1992) adopted by the Security Council at its 3108th meeting on 26th August 1992', 
472 
S/RES/773 (1492), 26 August 1992. 
Letter dated 2! May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council', UN Security Council document, S/25811,21 May 1993. 
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Iraqi claim to the entirety of the emirate. Prominent Iraqi officials had also begun to call 
once more for political unity with Kuwait. A Baghdad television documentary on 5 July 
1992 on the history of Kuwait stressed the Iraqi identity of the state"*^ ,^ while Barzan al-
Tikriti, Iraq's envoy to the UN in Geneva and the half-brother of Saddam Husain, called 
on the same day for Kuwait to unite politically with its motherland to the north.'*^ '* The 
Iraqi newspaper Babil called for Iraqi-Kuwaiti unity in mid-July, while at the end of the 
month the Baghdad (Baath Party) daily al-Thawrah published the findings of an Iraqi 
academic that Kuwait was 'part of Iraq'.'*^^  The trickle of articles and broadcasts became 
a positive flurry by the second anniversary of the invasion itself. The army newspaper al 
Qadisiyah ran an editorial on 2 August 1992 under the banner 'The great Day of the Call 
and the mighty historic action'; al-Thawrah talked of "The eternal Day of the Call' and al-
Iraq of 'The glorious Day of the Call and Iraq's eternal territorial integrity'. The 
government daily, Al Jumhuriyyah predicted that 'Kuwait will eventually return to its 
rightful owners. How and when? History will answer this question.' The Iraqi media 
variously castigated Kuwait as 'an Iraqi town on the coast of the Gulf and its rulers, 'a 
mirage in the desert'.'*'^  Also on 2 August 1990 former Iraqi Prime Minister Saadun 
Hammadi commented that 'Britain and the United States know the truth about Kuwait, 
that it belongs to the motherland, Iraq. They also know how they planted their agents, the 
Al Sabah family, to dismember and plot against the Arab nation'."^ ^^  The then Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaidi, then joined in the fray himself by labelling 2 
478 
August 1990 an 'immortal day' and Kuwait a 'usurped land'. 
The demarcation of the Kuwait-Iraq land border 
In their seventh round of meetings held in New York between 12-16 October, 
UNIKBDC made final preparations for the actual demarcation of the land boundary, to 
476 
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'Baghdad television broadcasts programme on Kuwait's Iraqi identity', BBC/SWB, ME/1426 A/8, 7 
July 1992. 
'Saddam Husayn's brother reportedly calls for Iraq-Kuwait unity', BBC/SWB, ME/1426 A/9, 7 July 
1992. 
BBC/SWB, ME/1432 A/10, 14 July 1992, and ME/1448 A/2, 1 August 1992. 
BBC/SWB, ME/1450 A/3-4, 4 August 1992. 
BBC/SWB, ME/1449 A/8, 3 August 1992. 
BBC/SWB. ME/1450 A/2. 4 August 1992. 
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start the very next week. The offshore boundary, which UNIKBDC had been 'urged' to 
finalize in UN Resolution 773 of 26 August 1992, occupied most of the energies of the 
commission, with the independent experts presenting their in-depth study of the 
subject.'*^^ Ultimately it was decided that more information needed to be gathered before 
UNIKBDC could come to a decision on the course of the water boundary and, more 
pertinently, whether, as things stood, it possessed the mandate to nominate a boundary 
delimitation for the Khor Abdullah.'*^" 
By the end of October 1992 the demarcation of the line decided upon by 
UNIKBDC in April was proceeding smoothly, with Kuwaiti Interior Ministry officials 
reporting that the Iraqis were no longer hindering the work of the UN border demarcation 
commission. Demarcation had started in the south-west at the Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
international boundary tripoint at Wadi alAujah. Pillars were being laid every two 
kilometres along the line announced in April 1992. Each pillar weighed four tons, 
measured 3.3 metres in length (1.8 metres of which was buried underground once the 
pillar was in position) and measured 40 centimetres in diameter at its highest point and 90 
centimetres in diameter at its base.'* '^ A concrete collar weighing four tons was positioned 
over each pillar flush with the ground. Each pillar had two witness marks, to facilitate 
repositioning should this ever become necessary, one on the Iraqi and one on the Kuwaiti 
side of the border. By 26 October 1992, UNIKOM spokesman Abdullatif Kabbaj 
confirmed that 11 pillars along the Wadi Batin in the west were in place. A UNIKBDC 
team of 13 New Zealander surveyors and 45 Swedish constructors assisted a construction 
crew contracted from the Eastern Asphalt and Mixed Concrete Company (EAMCO) in 
positioning each boundary monument. By the end of October they were emplacing pillars 
at the rate of three a day.'*^ ^ On 23 November 1992 the UN aimounced that the last of the 
106 pillars demarcating the line announced on 16 April 1992 had been laid, somewhat 
479 
480 
UNIKBDC press release dated 16 October 1992. 
There were reports at the time of the seventh session that UNIKBDC's preference for a water boundary 
along the Khor Abdullah was along the median line rather than the thalweg. 
The pillars and their concrete collars were manufactured by the Eastern Asphalt and Mixed Concrete 
Company of Bahrain. Each pillar was steel-reinforced and consisted of silica-mica aggregate concrete. 
'Border demarcation work proceeding smoothly: Fahed', Kuwait Times, I November 1992, p. 1 and 
'Border demarcation going smoothly: "Iraqis not hindering work'",/IraZ? Times (Kuwait), 1 November 
1992, p. 3. 
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ahead of schedule. A UNIKOM spokesman confirmed that there had been Tull 
cooperation from both sides' in the marker-laying operation/^^ perhaps a little surprising 
given fraq's withdrawal from UNIKBDC in July and the resurrection of its historical 
claim to the entirety of Kuwait soon afterwards.''*''* 
In a letter of 4 November 1992 addressed to the UN Secretary-General, Mochtar 
KusumaAtmadja announced his resignation (to become effective from 20 November 
1992) as Chairman of UNIKBDC, ostensibly for personal reasons.'**^ Though there is no 
question that the former Indonesian Foreign Minister probably wanted to move on to 
other things, it was no secret that the UNIKBDC chairman was troubled by what he 
regarded as the inadequate mandate possessed by the border demarcation commission to 
demarcate, or more accurately delimit, the boundary along the Khor Abdullah. The 
problem as he saw it was that no delimitation for the khor existed in UNIKBDC's 
delimitation formula' (the boundary so vaguely described by the 1932 exchange of 
notes) which could then be demarcated. This he made clear in a letter addressed to the 
Legal Counsel of the UN on 6 November 1992. The current Minister for Foreign Affairs 
in Iraq, Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, used the arguments contained within Kusuma-
Atmadja's letter of 6 November 1992 to dispute the UNIKBDC's award of a boundary 
along the Khawr Abdullah (the regard did not actually materialize until March 1993) in 
his letter of 6 June 1993, reacting against UN Security Council Resolution 833 of 27 May 
1993. 
On 6 November, the Chairman of the Commission addressed another, more 
detailed letter on the same subject [his resignation] to the Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations. This letter made it clear that the resignation was due to two causes, the first 
being a personal reason and the other being that he had "for some time [had] reservations 
about the terms of reference of the Commission'. The Chairman revealed in the above-
mentioned letter how he had several times raised with the Legal Counsel some aspects of 
*" Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia), Vol. 36, No. 9. 30 November 1992, p. A2. 
"**" Later, during April 1993, UNIKBDC laid down intermediate pillars within the 2 kilometres stretches, 
between those 106 pillars already established, on those occasions where intervisibility was impaired by 
interfering terrain. See UNIKBDC 'Final report', op. cit., pp. 27-8. 
"** Ibid., p. 10. 
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the Commission's terms of reference; that the offshore boundary (Khawr Abdullah) was 
not specifically referred to in the 1932 Exchange of Letters, which meant that 
delimitation was lacking for the Commission on which to base the operation of 
demarcation entrusted to it; and how the Legal Counsel had explained to him 'that any 
change in the mandate of the Commission was out of the question'. The letter explained 
also that the question had been discussed once again by the Chairman and the Legal 
Counsel in May and had also been discussed at two meetings held between the Chairman 
and the Legal Counsel, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General, on the other hand, in 
July and September 1992. And how the Chairman had described' the situation that made 
it "impossible' for him to continue in office "unless certain modifications were made to 
the mandate of the Commission'.'**^ 
So Kusuma-Atmadja resigned to be replaced as UNIKBDC Chairman on 20 
November 1992 by the Greek jurist Nicolas Valticos, former Assistant Director-General 
of the International Labour Office. During the commission's eighth session in Geneva 
(14-16 December 1992), Valticos' first, was concluded, somewhat contentiously, that 
there was "sufficient basis to proceed with demarcation' of the Khor Abdullah. 
Following deliberations on the matter, the Commission further decided that the 
principle governing the demarcation of the boundary line in Khowr Abd Allah 
should be the median line, it being understood that a principal object and purpose 
of the frontier settlement is navigational access for both parties.''* ^ 
Implementation of the median line principle in the form of an announcement of a 
boundary delimitation for the Khor Abdullah would not actually take place until March 
1993. Before UNIKBDC could finalize maritime borders between Kuwait and Iraq in 
March, the land border erupted as an international flashpoint once again during the 
second week of January. Iraqi incursions over the newly-demarcated border contributed 
significantly to the United States and Britain renewing their bombing of southern Iraq on 
'*'* letter from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 6 June 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General 
in UN Security Council document S/25905, 8 June 1993. 
*" UNIKBDC press release, 16 December 1992. 
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13 January 1993, albeit in a much more limited form than previously. It had ultimately 
been as a result of UN Resolution 773 of 26 August 1992 that Iraq was given a deadline 
of 15 January 1993 to retrieve property left behind in areas it used to occupy. These 
former areas of Iraqi occupation fell into two categories: i) not only was the Baghdad 
government required to abandon the police posts it had maintained in the Kuwaiti side of 
UNIKOM's DMZ ever since the latter was set up in the late spring of 1991, but; ii) as a 
result of the DMZ shifting generally northwards on 15 January, to coincide with 
UNIKBDC's April 1992 line,"°° Iraq was also being required to vacate the area between 
the approximate de jure boundary shown on the 1990 British Military Survey map series 
and the Tmal' de jure boundary as recently defined and demarcated. At the same time 
Kuwait was trying to establish new police posts on its newly-recognized northern limits. 
With UNIKOM empowered only to observe movements of the forces of the two states as 
the northwards shift of the DMZ to the demarcated border was being given physical 
effect, and with the demarcated border in itself offering no protection with pillars placed 
every two kilometres, all the ingredients for an outbreak of incidents were there. 
Troubles began when, on 7 January 1993, Kuwait accused Iraqi forces of 
attacking one of its established frontier posts."* ^  Over the next four to five days, Iraq 
crossed the newly demarcated boundary with increasing regularity, employing ever 
greater numbers to retrieve everything it could lay its hands on before the UN deadline of 
15 January 1993 was reached. Though Iraq argued that it had been given permission on 
29 December to mount these 'smash and grab' raids, a charge denied by UNIKOM 
spokesman Abdullatif Kabbaj, it was the manner, intensity and scale of the Iraqi actions 
that most concerned the Kuwaitis and the UN. Iraq had been forbidden from destroying 
buildings or recovering its arms and ammunition which remained on the Kuwaiti side of 
the originally-defined DMZ, but on 10 January sent 500 civilians over the newly-
demarcated border to the site of its former naval base in modem (Kuwaiti) Umm Qasr to 
strip an arms dump, and who proceeded to take away with them four Chinese-made anti-
'"' There were a few exceptions. In a few small stretches, the DMZ in the Wadi Batin was shifted 
eastwards in Iraq's favours since UNIKBDC's 16 April 1992 decision on the boundary cut inside the 
line shown on the 1990 British Military Survey series in these places. 
""^  Reuters round-up by Inal Ersan, Kuwait, 7 January 1993. 
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ship silkworm missiles.'*^ *^  Though Iraq was within its rights in retrieving all other 
materials, UNIKOM, who claimed that it should have been informed of each incursion in 
advance and that such actions should have taken place under its supervision, was 
evidently unprepared for the arrival of heavily-equipped salvage crews from the north. 
Also on 10 January 1993, UNIKOM reported that the same large body of Iraqis actually 
attempted to destroy the observer unit's own base at Camp Khor nearby. Once they had 
stripped former warehouses in confiscated Umm Qasr of all usable debris and metal 
scrap, the Iraqi salvage teams destroyed what remained of the shells of these buildings. 
They also recovered water tanks, electric cables and spare parts wherever possible. 
On 11 January Kuwait urged the UN to take decisive action against Iraq over the 
incursions. UNIKOM and other observers sent to the scene in the next couple of days 
appeared to confirm the blatant flouting of arrangements by Iraq for its complete 
withdrawal from areas it formerly occupied and the aggressive, heavy-handed nature of 
its unauthorized retrievals. Iraq did: help its case with the issue of characteristic rhetoric 
in Baghdad. On 13 January, as the allied forces prepared once again to bomb Iraq, Abdul 
Jabir Mohsin, adviser to Saddam Husain, was quoted in al-Jumhuriyya as saying that 
Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq ...and will return to q despite the United States and 
the Security Council', while on the same day, Iraqi Defence Minister Ali Hassan al-Majid 
claimed that his forces were "ready to free Iraqi territory, soiled by traitors from the north 
to the extreme south'.'* '^ 
The whole episode had essentially resulted from Iraq's resentment at having to 
comply physically on the ground with UNIKBDC's April 1992 decision on the border, 
the content and of which, as we have seen, had never been acceptable to the Baghdad 
Government. After the limited allied air strikes and the passing of the 15 January 
deadline, after which the DMZ was moved northwards to coincide with the newly-
Perhaps some of the blame here lies with UNIKOM. Though only an observer force, with no powers to 
resist the heavy-handed Iraqi retrievals, it was supposed to have destroyed by the end of December 
1992 all arms and ammunition, irrespective of their original ownership, lying within the DMZ. 
Material on the Iraqi raids of January was taken from the following articles, amongst other sources, in 
the Arab Times (Kuwait): 'Back to the brink', "Retrieval was on-going', 'UN urged to take decisive 
action', 12 January, p. 1; and 'Baghdad reiterates claim on Kuwait', Iraq: flashpoint on frontier', 14-15 
January, p. 11. 
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demarcated boundary, Iraq withdrew on 17 January its 6 police posts remaining south of 
the UNIKBDC line, replacing them further northwards at points indisputably within Iraqi 
territory/^^ The security situation improved markedly after this point. The chief result of 
the affair was that the mandate of UNIKOM, on the recommendation of the UN 
Secretary-General''*^ ,^ was extended to actively resist serious Iraqi violations of the 
demarcated boundary in the future. When the Security Council passed Resolution 806 on 
5 February 1993, therefore, UNIKOM became a genuine peacekeeping force rather than 
an observer unit. The essential provisions of the resolution were as follows: 
The Security Council 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 January 1993 
(S/25123), 
Noting with approval that work is being completed on the realignment of the 
demilitarized zone referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) to 
correspond to the international boundary demarcated by the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, 
Deeply concerned at recent actions by Iraq in violation of relevant Security 
Council resolutions, including the series of border incidents involving the United 
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), 
1. Underlines once again its guarantee of the inviolability of the international 
boundary between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq and its decision to 
take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the 
Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991); 
492 
'Kuwait says Iraqi raids continue', Arab News (Riyadh), 28 January 1993. At the end of May 1993 
UNIKOM spokesman Abdullatif Kabbaj confirmed that Iraq had reestablished all of its police centres 
and posts that previously lay south of the April 1992 UNIKBDC line at a distance generally 1 km north 
of this newly-demarcated line; see 'Baghdad pulls back 6 border posts, police centre despite rhetoric', 
A. Wahap Yazaroglu in Arab Times, 27-28 May 1993, p. 1. 
Paragraph 5 of report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 18 January 1993 in 
UN Security Council document, S/25123. 
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2. Approves the report, and decides to extend the terms of reference of UNIKOM 
to include the functions contained in paragraph 5 of the report; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to plan and execute a phased deployment of the 
strengthening of UNIKOM. 
5. Reaffirms that the question of termination or continuation of UNIKOM and 
the modalities of UNIKOM will continue to be reviewed every six months 
pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 689 (1991), the next review to 
take place in April 1993;'^ ^^ 
The effect of Resolution 806 was therefore to authorize the emplacement of a 
UNIKOM peacekeeping force of up to 3,600 blue helmets to patrol the recently-
demarcated border. The force was to consist of three lightly-armed mechanized infantry 
battalions of 750 members each, plus support personnel. Deployment was to be phased, 
however, as noted above."*^ ^ By the end of May 1993 UNIKOM was still awaiting the 
arrival of a mechanized battalion of 775 soldiers and support staff to augment its 247 
lightly-armed observers. 
Border defences in 1993, Returned' oil wells and compensation for displaced Iraqis 
A demarcated border is a tangible feature but generally does not materially 
increase the security of the surrounding borderlands, especially in this case with pillars 
laid every 2 kilometres, except in its usual effect of eradicating future dispute over the 
precise course of the territorial limit. Ever since the UN-sponsored settlement of the 1990 
Kuwait Crisis and the resultant 1991 Gulf War, Kuwait has been considering appropriate 
systems of border defences to guard against the contingency of future attacks from the 
north. In December 1991 it was reported that Kuwait was plarming to construct an 
"'" 'Resolution 806 (1993) adopted by the Security Council at its 3171 st meeting, on 5 February 1993', UN 
Security Council document S/RES/806 (1993), 5 February 1993. 
"'' 'UN battalion to patrol border' in Kuwait Times, 6 February 1993. 
'More troops to be deployed along border - Kuwait', Arab News (Riyadh), 31 May 1993. 
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elaborate "Berlin Wall' system of defences at an estimated cost of £300m, consisting, for 
the whole length of its border with Iraq, of an "electrified fence, electronic sensors, 
mines, automatic machine-guns and searchlights'."*^^ Further reports in February 1992 
commented that Western companies were swamping Kuwait with high-tech proposals for 
border defence systems, including a "fence with rotating laser guns which would 
automatically zap any living thing that approached'/^^ By early May 1993, as the emirate 
announced that it was to sign a fourth bilateral defence agreement with Russia to 
supplement the three it had earlier concluded with Britain, France and the United States, 
the Kuwaiti Cabinet finally plumped for an arrangement which will see a 3 metres deep-
ditch dug along the entire length (200 kilometres) of the land border. The ditch will be 5 
metres wide and sealed on its Kuwaiti bank by the construction of sand hills to a height 
of 4 metres."*^ ^ The arrest and imprisonment of a number of Westerners over the last year 
for allegedly "straying over the border' from Kuwait has only heightened Kuwait's 
anxiety to see these plans become reality. Despite UNIKOM's tougher mandate since 
February, there is a widespread belief that the latest people to be detained in this regard 
(an Englishman and German during the early summer of 1993), were, like those before 
them, probably apprehended south of the demarcated line within Kuwaiti territory.^"" 
By early March 1993 Kuwait had established control over all of the oil wells in 
the southern tip of the super-giant Rumaila field which UNIKBDC had judged to lie 
within the emirate. In total, eleven had changed hands. Eight of the wells worked by Iraq 
until 2 August 1990 had been found by UNIKBDC to lie south of the Arab League line, 
which, in many instances, had effectively formed the de facto border up to this point. 
These were taken over by Kuwait on 18 January 1993. A further three lay between the 
Arab League Line and the "final, inviolable' de jure border demarcated by UNIKBDC. 
These were taken over by the emirate in March, though Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ahmad al-
'Kuwait to fortify border with Iraq', Patrick Cockburn, The Independent, 17 December 1991. 
'Kuwait eyes laser gun security fence'. Arab News (Riyadh), 4 February 1992. 
'Kuwait to dig a trench all along its Iraq border', Youssef M.Ibrahim, International Herald Tribune 
(London), 3 May 1993. 
Schi 
76. 
'"" ofield, (1993), 'The United Nations' Settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait Border, 1991-1993', op. cit., p. 
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Baghli had stated before this time that they (and the other eight) would not be exploited 
until the situation with Iraq had 'settled down'.^ '^ ' 
It is interesting to look at the Rumaila/Ratga situation in the light of UNIKBDC's 
findings. There is now no doubt whatsoever that Ratga is the geological extension of the 
Rumaila field according to the UNIKBDC demarcation decision, it was Iraq, not 
Kuwait' , who had been tapping its neighbour's oil in the years before 1990, though 
since no-one knew what the boundary was in this region before UNIKBDC's research, 
not even the British Military Survey, there seems little sense in pointing fingers too 
accusingly. Nevertheless, while Kuwait produced around 10,000 barrels per day (b/d) 
before August 1990 from Ratga, a figure of 20-30,000 b/d was typically -produced by 
Iraq during the same period from the 11 wells which have subsequently been recognized 
as belonging to the emirate. 
In late January 1993 Kuwaiti Interior Minister Shaikh Ahmad al-Hamud Al-Sabah 
had predicted that agricultural projects along the newly-demarcated border were most 
likely to be the scene of future border incidents. Long-established Iraqi farms north of 
Abdaly jutted at the very '.east up to 1 kilometre inside the newly-demarcated 
boundary."^ °'* At the beginning of the year access for about 50 Iraqi farmers in this region 
to their land (principally tomato crops) in Kuwait was relatively simple, since the only 
physical marker in their way was a sand berm which could be crossed easily by foot.^ "'' 
This was for Iraqi farms which straddled the newly-demarcated boundary. Others have 
been left stranded wholly in Kuwaiti territory as a result of the UNIKBDC decision. By 
March, as we have seen, Kuwait was actively considering elaborate plans for border 
defence systems, which, when actualized, would cut off the Iraqi farmers from their 
'"' 'Kuwait: Reconstruction Continues through the Crisis', Petroleum Argus (London), 25 January 1993; 
'Kuwait takes over Iraq wells', Gulf News (Abu Dhabi), 9 March 1993. 
As Iraq alleged during July 1990 on the eve of its invasion of the emirate. 502 
'°^ 'Kuwait: Reconstruction Continues through the Crisis', Petroleum Argus (London), 25 January 1993; 
'Kuwait takes over Iraq wells'. Gulf News (Abu Dhabi), 9 March 1993. 
Mark Fineman, Middle East correspondent of the San Francisco Examiner (San Francisco), noted that 
UNIKOM patrols had been 'extremely sympathetic' to the plight of the disadvantaged Iraqi fanners: 
personal communication to author, summer 1992. 
' ° ' 'Kuwait says Iraqi raids continue', Arab News (Riyadh), 28 January 1993. 
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Kuwaiti land for good. No doubt realizing this, Shaikh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, the 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister, announced on 21 March 1993 that: 'the Government 
of Kuwait has decided to compensate Iraqi farmers for parts of their farms included 
within the Kuwaiti territories as a result of the border demarcation between the two 
countries'."^"^ Little more was heard of the issue before June, when Kuwaiti Foreign 
Ministry Undersecretary Sulaiman al-Shahin announced that a team of Swedish surveyors 
had been appointed to compile a report on Iraqi assets affected by the UNIKBDC 
demarcation. They had apparently been asked to 'survey the area where there are some 
farms, houses and people', Kuwaiti officials confirmed that the UN had been asked to 
draw up recommendations for the possible compensation of Iraqis who have ended up in 
Kuwait as a result of the recent border demarcation. Iraq, of course, would be loath to 
accept such compensation if offered, since to do so would be to lend formal recognition 
to the UNIKBDC line and to admit Kuwait's rights over the territory concerned. Most of 
the 'stranded' Iraqis, 63 families to be precise, remain in the modern (post-1960), 
southern half of Umm Qasr recognized as belonging to Kuwait with the UNIKBDC 
demarcation decision.^ "^ At least 50 Iraqi buildings remain south of the UNIKBDC line. 
Having eventually decided, following the resignation of its chairman Mochtar 
Kusuma-Atmadja in November 1992, that it could 'demarcate' water boundaries without 
expanding its terms of reference, UNIKBDC announced in Geveva during its ninth 
session (15-18 March 1993) a median line delimitation (tempered by equity) for the final 
eastern, section of the border from the junction of the khors to the point where the Khor 
Abdullah meets the waters of the Persian Gulf proper. 
The Commission then decided on ...the demarcation of the boundary along the 
median line in the Khowr Shetana and Khowr bd Allah. The Commission decided on the 
geographical coordinates which define the median line from a point nearest to the 
'°* 'Kuwait to compensate Iraqis', Arab Times (Kuwait), 22 March 1993. 
'"' 'Kuwait may compensate Iraqis caught by new borcjer', William Maclean, Reuters 09-1805: BC 
KUWAIT-IRAQ. 
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junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah to a point at the eastern end of the 
Khowr Abd Allah where there is a marked change in the general direction of the coast. 
UNIKBDC's eventual conclusion that a delimitation existed along the Khor 
Abdullah which could be demarcated was undoubtedly the most contentious aspect of its 
entire operation. There was nothing wrong with the boundary ultimately arrived at along 
the median line, that is providing UNIKBDC's contention was accepted that the water 
inlet constituted territorial sea and that no special circumstances applied. Iraq was not, as 
we shall see, to accept such reasoning, doubtless in part because the main navigation 
channel it had dredged and maintained over the years now lay, for the most part, to the 
south of the median line nominated by UNIKBDC.^^ Whatever the rights and wrongs 
here, a more important question was whether the UN had possessed the right or the 
powers to announce a course of boundary for the Khor Abdullah. The border demarcation 
commission's first chairman had concluded that properly they did not. His comments 
concerning the issue when resigning have already been noted. Moreover, he recalled in 
the July 1992 interim report how the independent experts on UNIKBDC (Ian Brook and 
William Robertson) had earlier arrived at the same conclusion: the independent experts 
had at an earlier session responded to a request to demarcate the offshore section by 
stating in their view they could not do so."'''° 
The explanation given in UNIKBDC's May 1993 final report of the basis upon 
which they demarcated an existing delimitation for the Khor Abdullah is tenuous. 
508 
509 
510 
UNIKBDC press release, 18 March 1993. 
this was certainly true of the most important stretch of the water boundary delimitation announced by 
UNIKBDC in March 1993 for the Khor Abdullah, as can be seen, though not always very clearly, in 
Map 15, a reduced copy of a UNIKBDC map produced in may 1993 entitled 'Khawr 'Abd Allah 
demarcated by the United nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission'. Conversely, the 
shorter stretch of the water boundary delimitation along the median line of the Khor Shetana (the 
northernmost-westerly arm of the Khor Abdullah above Warba Island) left the navigation channel 
previously dredged and maintained by Iraq within Iraqi territorial waters. The UNIKBDC map did not 
ultimately find its way into the UNIKBDC's final report of the same month, presumably because of its 
poor quality. It had been produced simply by plotting a median line for the khors on the latest edition 
of the British Admiralty chart No. 1235 (18 October 1991). 
IKBDC/Rep.6, 24 duly 1992, p. 53. 
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By the Khowr Abd Allah section, the Commission refers to the maritime, or 
offshore boundary from the junction of the Khowr Zhobeir and the Khowr Abd 
Allah to the eastern end of the Khowr Abd Allah. The Commission felt that the 
closing statement of the delimitation formula, mentioning the islands of Warbah, 
Bubiyan, etc. as appertaining to Kuwait, gave an indication that the existing 
frontier in that section lay in the Khowr Abd Allah. 
The Commission gave careful consideration to this section of the boundary. 
Having closely examined the language of the delimitation formula and the 
historical evidence on this part of the frontier, including earlier proposals for 
demarcation, and having taken into account the legal aspects of the matter, the 
Commission agreed that it had a sufficient basis to proceed with demarcation of 
the Khowr Abd Allah section. The Commission noted, moreover, that all the 
historical evidence pointed to the existence of a general agreement between the 
two countries on a boundary in the Khowr Abd Allah.'"^" 
What had persuaded UNIKBDC that a boundary delimitation existed along the 
Khor Abdullah? As stated above, it was historic evidence. According to the border 
commission's third progress report of May 1993, the practice of both Kuwait and Iraq 
subsequent to 1932 had 'provided further evidence of the recognition of an agreed 
international boundary in the Khowr Abd AUah.'^ '^  The then Iraqi Prime Minister had, 
during the mid-1930s, stated that it was difficult for Iraqi customs launches to know in 
whose territory they were, in the region of the junction of the khors. The same employees 
of the Iraqi customs service had instructions not to infringe the land or water boundaries 
of Kuwait. During 1934 and 1935, British Political Agent, Harold Dickson, had 
apparently produced several maps which labelled the centre line down the Khor Abdullah 
as the 'Kuwait boundary line' and these had been passed on to the Iraqi authorities. 
Twenty years later the map accompanying Iraq's request for leasehold rights over Warba 
and a 4-kilometre strip of land along the northern border also showed this boundary for 
the Khor Abdullah.^'^ 
" ' UNIKBDC 'Final report', p. 24. 
'Third Progress Report of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', 
IKBDC/Rep.7. 20 May 1993, p. 8. 
' " //?/V/.,p. 8. 
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Yet surely all of this was best classified, like maps and documentation concerning 
other parts of the boundary, as ^appropriate material' upon which UNIKBDC could draw 
when trying to arrive at a more detailed interpretation of their vague delimitation formula. 
All the delimitation formula (the boundary defined in the 1932 exchange of notes) 
effectively prescribed for this stretch of the boundary was that the islands of Warba and 
Bubiyan belonged to Kuwait. 
'The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, 
Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Koweit'. '^'* 
That the Khor Abdullah separates Iraq (the Fao peninsula) from Kuwait (Warba 
and Bubiyan) is obvious, but the very fact that the boundary lies somewhere within the 
water inlet in no way: constitutes a delimitation. It might have been more reasonable for 
UNIKBDC to claim that the boundary had been allocated along the Khor Abdullah.^'^ 
Though UNIKBDC was probably justified in concluding that "all the historical evidence 
pointed to the existence of a general agreement between the two countries on a boundary 
in the Khowr Abd Allah', it cannot escape, he fact that the 1932 delimitation formula said 
nothing of any line, however vague. It is the view of this author that UNIKBDC 
delimited rather than demarcated the Khor Abdullah section of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary. 
Clearly this is a serious cheirge, given that the border commission possessed no mandate 
to delimit and one cannot but feel some sympathy with the protests levelled against .he 
UNIKBDC's verdict in this vein by the Iraqi Foreign Minister in his letter of 6 June 1993. 
He was essentially making the same point as had Kusuma-Atmadja in resigning as the 
first chairman of UNIKBDC. 
It had taken until 1940, with the appearance of Britain's first clarification of the 
vague 1932 boundary, for an actual line to be nominated for the Khor Abdullah. This, as 
was the case with Britain's 1951 demarcation proposal, had run along the thalweg of the 
"^ Ibid, pp.9-\0. 
Allocation is the first stage of an international boundary's evolution, where the powers responsible 
merely allocate a strip of territory within which a boundary line will, in future be delimited precisely. 
In the case of navigable waterways, for instance, delimitation usually follows the thalweg. 
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water channel, essentially following Edmonds proposals of spring 1937. '^  Though the 
thalweg has generally been regarded as the norm for boundaries along navigable rivers 
and waterways since the conclusion of the Versailles treaties of 1919, UNIKBDC 
decided to plump for a median line delimitation on the basis that the Khor Abdullah and, 
perhaps a little more arguably, its western arm along the Khor Shetana were territorial sea 
and therefore not subject to the set of circumstances which would usually have seen a 
thalweg delimitation nominated. There was a historic precedent: In 1959, Coucheron-
Aamot, a Norwegian hydrogvapher, produced a report, officially authenticated by the 
Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum, which defined a median line as the boundary in the Khowr 
Abd Allah. This official chart, taken from an annex to the Coucheron-Aamot report was 
transmitted to the Danish Embassy in Baghdad by the Iraqi Foreign Minister on 22 
August 1960 and subsequently published in the Pleadings of the International Court of 
Justice.^'^ 
The rationale behind the adoption of a median line delimitation was as follows: 
along the entire course of the Khor Abdullah (classified by UNIKBDC as territorial sea to 
which no special circumstances were applicable), "navigational access should be possible 
for both states to the various parts of their respective territory bordering the demarcated 
boundary'." '^^  This statement resulted in part from a short statement prepared by the 
Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat on navigational access: The Commission 
views navigational access for both States to the various parts of their respective territories 
bordering the demarcated boundary as of importance for ensuring an equitable character 
and for promoting stability and peace and security along the border. In this connection, it 
is the opinion of the Commission that such navigational access is possible for both States 
through the Khowr Zhobeir, the Khowr Shetana and the Khowr Abd Allah to and from 
their own respective waters and territories bordering their boundary. The Commission 
notes that this right of navigation and access is provided for under the rules of 
international law as embodied in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea ratified by both Iraq and Kuwait. Taking into consideration the particular 
'^* Op.Cit. 
' " UNIKBDC 'Final report", op. cit.. pp. 14-15. 
"* Ibid.,p. 24. 
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circumstances of the area, it is also the view of the Commission that the right of access 
imphes a non-suspendible right of navigation for both States. 519 
In constructing a median Hne deHmitation, UNIKBDC utihzed the 1991 British 
Admiralty Chart No. 1235. The low-water spring lines shown on this chart were verified 
by infrared false-colour aerial photography. Established hydrographic techniques were 
used to construct baselines. These were acceptable to Kuwait while Iraq failed to respond 
either way. UNIKBDC determined the terminal point of the median line of the Khor 
Abdullah on the Persian Gulf by identifying a significant change in the direction of the 
coastlines of the two riparian states.'^ *^^  Joining up the junction of the khors in the west 
with the median lines and dealing with a shoal to the immediate east of Warba island 
called for a little more imagination. As UNIKBDC's final report testifies: The 
Commission determined that the boundary connection from the generalized median line 
to the junction of the khors was the shortest line between them. From that point the 
median line adopted by the Commission is defined by a set of coordinates which are 
calculated from the baseline points established on opposite low-water lines as depicted on 
the 1991 edition of British Admiralty Chart No. 1235. At the eastern end of Warbah, a 
drying shoal, called the Warbah spit, that could be subject to major change over the years, 
has been charted on the British Admiralty Chart. Here two median lines were calculated, 
one taking the shoal into account and the other ignoring it. Equal weight was given to 
both lines and an average line was calculated between the two medians to decide the 
demarcation line.^^' 
Physical representation (i.e. demarcation) of the UNIKBDC line for this section 
of the boundary (junction of the khors to the Persian Gulf) was deemed impractical and 
uimecessary. Demarcation of the low-water springs line along the western/southern bank 
of the Khor Zubair to the junction of the khors had been very limited. During the final 
field session [early spring 1993], a modified pointer pillar was placed on line between 
pillar No. 106 and the low-water springs line. Plaques were emplaced on the jetties where 
' " Ibid.,p. 27. 
^^ Ibid, p. 26. 
"' Ibid. p. 26. 
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the low-water springs line continued beneath them. An offset mark was emplaced at the 
southern end of the stone-faced embankment, south of the southernmost jetty. Two 
pointer poles, which uniquely define the direction between the last point on the low-water 
springs line and the junction of the Khowrs, were also emplaced and three witness marks 
were established nearby.^ ^^ 
Whilst Kuwait's UNIKBDC delegate, Tariq Razouqi labelled the occasion of the 
finalization of the emirate's borders with Iraq "a historical day in the history of Kuwait', " 
unease was clearly felt at Iraq's continuing absence from the sessions of the UN border 
demarcation commission. Iraq expressed no immediate reaction to the border 
commission's announcement of a boundary delimitation for the Khor Abdullah, though it 
was later to pass scathing comment in its Foreign Minister's letter of June 1993 in 
reaction to Resolution 833 of late May. Though Kuwait could satisfy itself that Iraq had 
bound itself on paper to the future decisions of UNIKBDC in the aftermath of the 1991 
Gulf War, it nevertheless sent a formal protest against Iraq's continuing non-participation 
to New Zealander Terence O'Brien, President of the Security Council, a few Jays later 
urging that body to take "appropriate measures' to ensure the Baghdad Government's 
compliance with "the letter and substance of its relevant resolutions'.'^ '^' 
UNIKBDC's constitutes the "final' delineation of the demarcated Kuwait-Iraq 
boundary 
During its tenth session in Geneva (3 to 7 May 1993), UNIKBDC considered a 
draft report on its activities since July 1992^ ^^  and finalized a draft report on the history 
of the "demarcation', which was to become the final report. At its eleventh and final 
session two weeks later (17 to 20 May 1993), UNIKBDC "approved the coordinates 
constituting the final demarcation of the international boundary between Iraq and 
"^ Ibid., p. 2^. 
'UN cornerstones equitability in demarcation of sea border', Arab Times (Kuwait). 20 March 1993, p. 1. 
'Protest against Iraqi absence in UN meeting' Kuwait Times, 25 March 1993. 
" ' To succeed its interim report of July 1992 (IKBDC Rep.6, 24 July 1992). 
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Kuwait'.^ ^^ UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali was himself present, receiving 
copies of these coordinates, a map illustrating the boundary and UNIKBDC's final report. 
The UNIKBDC press release on 20 May 1993 was careful to make the following points 
on the completion of the operations of the border demarcation commission: The 
Commission's task was to demarcate the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait 
set out in the 'Agreed Minutes' signed by them in 1963. The nature of the that task related 
solely to the demarcation of the boundary and its work was technical and not 
political...The Commission has made extensive efforts to obtain all appropriate material 
available for this demarcation and has given every opportunity to both parties to submit 
any materials and to present their views fully. Every aspect related to the demarcation of 
the boundary has received careful consideration from the legal, historical, technical and 
practical points of view. 
The Commission has not reallocated territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but has 
simply carried out the technical task necessary to demarcate, for the first time, the precise 
coordinates of the international boundary reaffirmed in the 1963 Agreed Minutes.^ ^^ The 
same points were made the very next day by the UN Secretary-General in transmitting 
UNIKBDC's final report^ ^^ to the Security Council, with its coordinates for the 
boundary.^ ^^ Boutros Boutros-Ghali described how he had deposited one of the three 
certified copies in the archives of the UN for safe-keeping and how the other two would 
be sent on to the respective govenmients in Kuwait and Baghdad. The Secretary-General 
added that: the Commission has fulfilled its mandate. It demarcated in geographic 
coordinates of latitude and longitude the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait 
set out in the [1963] Agreed Minutes, made arrangements for the physical representation 
of the boundary through the emplacement of an appropriate number of pillars or 
monuments and provided for arrangements for continuing maintenance and location 
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UNIKBDC press release, 20 May 1993. 
Ibid. 
The 'Final report' receives no individual analysis in this section. However, the vast number of 
extractions from references to the document throughout this postscript bears witness to the critical 
importance of this primary source. The two maps included within the text of the UNIKBDC final 
report. 
Letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council enclosing the 'Final report', op.cit. 
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accuracy of the surficial boundary representation.^""' The coordinates established by the 
Commission thus constitute the final demarcation of the international boundary between 
Iraq and Kuwait set out in the Agreed Minutes of 4 October 1963. In accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), both Iraq and Kuwait shall 
respect the inviolability of this international boundary and its inviolability will be also 
guaranteed by the Security Council.''^' 
In his next paragraph, the Secretary-General authorized UNIKOM to finalize 
realignment on the ground of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary in accordance with UNIKBDC's 
demarcation decision. Since this had already been done for the land boundary 
demarcation in January with the DMZ moving generally northwards to correspond with 
the line announced in April 1992, one can only presume that UNIKOM were being 
requested to give physical effect to the delimitation recently announced letter from the 
Secretary-General dated 21 May 1993 for the Khor Abdullah, though there had been no 
realignment as such, as no boundary delimitation had previously existed for the water 
inlet. 
Boutros-Ghali then appeared to demand of Kuwait and Iraq (or was he 
guaranteeing on the part of the UN?) that 'personnel... involved in the implementation of 
the arrangements for maintenance of the surficial representation of the boundary are to 
enjoy unimpeded freedom of movement in the area of the demarcated boundary as well 
as all necessary privileges and immunities for the fulfillment of their task.^ ^^ The 
maintenance or administration of a demarcated border is often regarded in political 
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UNIKBDC, in its final report, had asked the Secretary-General to request that the survey organizations 
associated with the workings of the border demarcation commission over the last two years provide the 
following services on an on-going basis: a) to inspect the pillars and markers of the Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary on an annual basis; b) to report to [the Secretary-General] after each inspection; c) to take 
appropriate measures for repositioning, repairing or replacing those pillars and markers, as necessary; 
and d) to monitor the adequacy of and to emplace any additional boundary markers such as buoys, 
pilings or other markers, as may be deemed useful. UNIKBDC also considered that a cleared access 
road should exist alongside the recently-demarcated boundary to facilitate the future maintenance of 
the boundary pillars. 
Letter from the Secretary-General dated 21 May 1993. 
Ibid. 
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geography as the fourth stage in the evolution of an international boundary, after 
allocation, delimitation and demarcation. 
The Secretary-General concluded his letter on a hopeful and expectant note: As 
stated above, the decisions of the Commission concerning the demarcation ...are final. I 
believe that the work performed by the Commission will have a beneficial effect on the 
restoration of international peace and security in the area concerned, in conformity with 
the purposes of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The certainty and stability of the 
boundary are in the best interests of Iraq and Kuwait and I expect the Governments of 
both countries to respect the objective and impartial results achieved by the Iraq-Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commission. 
Within a week the Security Council had unanimously adopted UN Resolution 833 
on 27 May 1993. By this, The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, and in particular 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof, its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991, its resolution 773 
(1992) of 26 August 1992, and its resolution 806 (1993) of 5 February 1993; Recalling 
the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 May 1991 concerning the establishment of the 
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (the Commission), the 
subsequent exchange of letters of 6 and 13 May 1991 (S/22558, S/22592 and S/22593), 
and the acceptance of the report by Iraq and Kuwait; Having considered the Secretary-
General's letter of 21 May 1993 to the President of the Security Council transmitting the 
final report of the Commission (S/2581I and Add. I) dated 20 May 1993; Recalling in 
this cormection that through the demarcation process the Commission was not 
reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it was simply carrying out the 
technical task necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the 
boundary set out in the 'Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of 
Iraq regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters' 
signed by them on 4 October 1963, and that this task was carried out in the special 
circumstances following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) 
'" Ibid. 
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and the Secretary-General's report for implementing paragraph 3 of that resolution 
(S/22558); Reminding Iraq of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991), and in 
particular paragraph 2 thereof, and under relevant resolutions of the Council, and of its 
acceptance of the resolutions of the Council adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which forms the basis for the ceasefire; Noting with 
approval the Secretary-General's instruction to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) to finalize the realignment of the demilitarized zone 
with the entire international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait demarcated by the 
Commission; Welcoming the Secretary-General's decision to make the necessary 
arrangements for the maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary, as 
recommended by the Commission in Section X (c) of its report, until other technical 
arrangements are established between Iraq and Kuwait for this purpose; Acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; 
1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter of 21 May 1993 to the President of the 
Council and the 20 May 1993 report of the Commission (S/25811 and Add.l) 
enclosed therewith; 
2. Welcomes also the successful conclusion of the work of the Commission; 
3. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission for its work on the land part of the 
boundary as well as the Khor Abdullah or offshore section of the boundary, and 
welcomes its demarcation decisions; 
4. Reaffirms that the decisions of the Commission regarding the demarcation of the 
boundary are final; 
5. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with international law and relevant 
Security Council resolutions respect the inviolability of the international 
boundary, as demarcated by the Commission, and the right to navigational access; 
6. Underlines, and reaffirms its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the above-
mentioned international boundary which has now been finally demarcated by the 
Commission and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in 
accordance with the Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Resolution 687 
(1991) and paragraph 4 of Resolution 773 (1992) 
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6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.^ '^* 
UNIKBDC's mission therefore had, according to the UN, been successfully 
completed, its decisions were final, while the demarcated line was to be guaranteed for 
the foreseeable future against possible future Iraqi infractions. At the same time as 
Resolution 833 was passed, the British and American members of the Security Council 
passed comment on the demarcated Kuwait-Iraq boundary. The British Ambassador to 
the UN, Sir David Hannay, held that Ht]he demarcation of this frontier, both on land and 
sea, is a crucial contribution to achieving peace and security in the region and to avoiding 
disputes such as that which preceded, but which certainly did not justify, Iraq's 
aggression in August 1990'.^ ^^ US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright stressed, 
somewhat confusingly, that UNIKBDC 'has not established a new boundary. The 
commission has, with impressive technical expertise, identified more precisely and 
marked on the ground a boundary that has existed since its acceptance by both Iraq and 
Kuwait on 4 October 1963'.^ ^^ Since the US is, of course, likely to be the main sponsor of 
the UN's undertaking to guarantee the inviolability of the boundary, Albright's following 
phrase was no doubt meant partially for Baghdad's ears: 'My Government wishes to 
underscore the importance it attaches to the inviolability of the demarcated boundary 
between Iraq and Kuwait and the seriousness of its guarantee by the Security Council'.^ ^^ 
Three days before Resolution 833 had been passed. Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-
Jabir al-Sabah, Kuwait's First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
had written to Boutros-Ghali, conveying the emirate's 'appreciation and gratitude for the 
historical and pioneering role played by the UN in enforcing the principles of justice and 
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'Resolution 833 (1993) adopted by the Security Council at the 3224th meeting on 27 May 1993', 
S/RES/833 (1993), 27 May 1993. 
'Provisional verbatim record of the 3224th meeting of the Security Council', held at Headquarters, New 
York, 27 May 1993, S/PV.3224, 27 May 1993. It was noticeable, though not necessarily significant, 
that Hannay's comments in this instance, taken at face value, supported the process of demarcation, if 
not the actual line of demarcation decided upon. This contrasted with statements of the US and other 
Security Council members. 
Ibid. The clear implication of this statement, probably not 
intended, was that no Kuwait-Iraq boundary existed before October 
1963. 
Ibid. 
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peace and promoting the bases of security and stability in the world'. He continued by 
expressing his Meep conviction that this historical achievement by the Commission is 
considered an effective contribution to the role of the UN in finalizing the boundary 
demarcation process which had always been a great actual threat to security and stability 
in this vital region of the world'.'^ ^^ Just as predictable as Kuwait's welcome of the 
Secretary-General's letter of 21 May 1993 introducing UNIKBDC's final report was 
Iraq's castigation of the border commission's final decisions as formalized with the 
unanimous passage of UN Resolution 833. In his letter of 6 June 1993, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, gave the 'initial viewpoint' of his government, 
pending more detailed study and consideration of UNIKBDC's verdict and operations in 
the future, after which a fuller response would be forthcoming. The Iraqi Government 
reaffirmed points made in earlier letters of 6 April 1991 and 21 May 1992, reproducing 
the conclusion of the latter item as its closing statement. The vast majority of al-Sahaf s 
letter protested against the boundary delimitation announced by UNIKBDC for the Khor 
Abdullah. The right of UNIKBDC to demarcate a nonexistent delimitation was 
questioned, with some justification, as has already been seen. Special exception was 
taken Boutros-Ghali's covering letter of 12 August 1992 to UNIKBDC's interim report of 
24 July 1992, which had, it will be recalled, laid out the basis upon which UNIKBDC had 
reached its April 1992 verdict on the course of the Kuwait-Iraq land boundary.^ ^^ In his 
letter of 12 August 1992 the Secretary-General had produced the following statement: 
As far as the offshore boundary is concerned, the Council might wish to 
encourage the Commission to demarcate that part of the boundary as soon as possible, 
and thus complete its work. UNIKBDC, as we have seen, was urged to go on and do 
just this in Resolution 773 of 26 August 1992. Yet, as al-Sahaf continued with some 
logic, the UN Secretary-General's statement had been made 'even though the Secretariat 
letter from Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General. 24 May 1993 in Demarcation of the International Boundary 
between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq by the United Nations. Centre for Research and 
Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, p. 165. 
Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, of 6 June 1993 to the Secretary-General in UN 
Security Council document S/25905, 8 June 1993. 
Letter dated 12 August 1992 from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Li Daoyu, 
President of the Security Council, New York. 
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knew full well that the Commission had not yet agreed that it was competent under its 
terms of reference to demarcate the offshore boundary and although its Chairman's 
position on this matter was very clear to it and reached the point of implied resignation if 
this matter was imposed on the Commission'.''*' Al-Sahafs letter has already been 
analyzed for its treatment of the resignation of UNIKBDC's first chairman, Kusuma-
Atmadja, during November 1992. The Iraqi Government then raised a number of legal 
questions in relation to UNIKBDC's maritime award of March 1992. Firstly, as we have 
seen, that there had been no delimitation agreed between Kuwait and Iraq in the past for 
the Khor Abdullah which could now be demarcated. Secondly, the Khor Abdullah had 
not been assigned the characteristic of the territorial sea in the 1932 exchange of letters 
which had defined the boundary (the delimitation formula'). Iraq therefore doubted that 
its waters could be classified as territorial sea. Thirdly, even it was territorial sea, a set of 
^special circumstances' applied. Iraq argued that this had at one stage been affirmed by 
the independent experts on the commission, which mean that the median line need not 
necessarily be chosen, but rather a different delimitation altogether.''*^ Fourthly, Iraq 
asserted that the UN had no right to impose a boundary delimitation upon a member state. 
Al-Sahaf further complained that UNIKBDC's nomination of the median line 
seriously threatened "Iraq's right to enjoy freedom of access to the sea by exercizing its 
historic right to unrestricted and safe navigation in the Khawr Abdullah area, to an extent 
that will, in the future, place it in the position of a landlocked state'. Here he was clearly 
mindful of the vast expense incurred by Iraq over the years in improving and maintaining 
navigation facilities along the Khor Abdullah, also that much of the main navigation 
channel customarily used by Iraq in the past lay on the Kuwaiti side of the median line. 
As the Iraqi Foreign Minister explained, somewhat exaggeratedly: Iraq has spent billions 
of dollars over scores of years on excavation works, the extension, improvement and 
maintenance of the channels, main and secondary navigation lanes leading into and out of 
'"' Letter of 6 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to UN Secretary General, op.cit. 
Iraq enumerated these 'special circumstances' as follows: first, delimitation of the Khor Abdullah 
boundary was being effected for the first time; second, Iraq had substantial historic rights in the Khor 
Abdullah, while Kuwait had traditionally not carried out substantial navigation along the water inlet. 
308 
the Khawr Abdullah and the erection of maritime installations, ports and wharves in the 
Khawr Abdullah area in order to ensure the flow of its maritime trade.^ '*^ 
Kuwait, only a week earlier, had seemingly commented on the position of the 
Khor Abdullah's principal navigation channel, previously maintained by Iraq, within (at 
least partially) Kuwaiti territorial waters south of the median line, indeed suggesting that 
some accommodation of probable Iraqi sensitivities might be made. Its Ambassador to 
the UN, Muhammad Abulhasan, was reported as stating that all Iraqi ships Whether 
commercial or military' might be allowed to pass through Kuwait's territorial waters from 
and to Iraqi ports, providing they represented no threat to Kuwait's national security.^ 
Iraq's Initial viewpoint' of 6 June 1993 prompted an almost identical response 
from the President of the Security Council to that which had greeted Ahmad Husain's 
lengthy letter of 21 May 1992, protesting against UNIKBDC's original announcement of 
its decision on the course of the land boundary. Again the members of the Security 
Council 'noted with particular concern' the Iraqi communication, again it was stressed 
that UNIKBDC had not reallocated territory but had simply carried out the technical task 
of demarcation' and again Iraq was warned of the 'grave consequences that would ensue 
from any breach' of the newly-demarcated boundary.^ '*^ 
There can be little doubt that UNIKBDC's 1992 land boundary demarcation is 
what Britain meant to introduce with its announcement of the vaguely-described border 
in identical, unchanging terms on various occasions in the early part of this century: as 
the outer limit of Kuwaiti authority when concluding the unratified Anglo-Ottoman 
settlement of July 1913; the Cox-More exchange of notes of April 1923; and the Kuwaiti-
Iraqi exchange of notes in the summer of 1932. In the words of someone close to the 
operations of UNIKBDC during these last two years, UNIKBDC's demarcation decision 
was effectively 'a refinement' of Britain's earlier demarcation proposal of 1951, which 
had stood for nearly forty years as the most detailed existing interpretation of the 
'"^ Letter of 6 June 1993 from Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to UN Secretary-General, op. cit. 
'Kuwait denies allegations on defining of borders', Arab Times (Kuwait), 29 May 1993, p. 5. 
'^ ^ note by the President of the Security Council, 22 June 1993. 
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vaguely-defined de jure Kuwait-Iraq boundary, even though it was not capable of being 
mapped in detail. 
UNIKBDC appears to have adhered to its mandate in demarcating the land 
boundary. In April 1991 it was asked to settle along the line of the de jure boundary and, 
by extension, to ignore any de facto or temporary borders. As a result, the degree to 
which Iraq extended its administration southwards across the notional lie of the de jure 
boundary in the three decades between the Tirst' and "second' Kuwait Crises (the precise 
details of this extent still remain elusive to everyone but the UN and the Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti governments) has been disallowed by the UN. Beginning early in 1992, strong 
objections started to appear in the Western and Arab media when it was belatedly 
realized that UNIKBDC's execution of its mandate was not only going to result in 30 
years of creeping Iraqi annexation in the borderlands being disregarded but 
unceremoniously cancelled. In other words, it was as if the development of the 
borderlands during the last three decades simply had not happened. 
UNIKBDC's March. 1993 prescription for a median line delimitation along the 
Khor Abdullah has left the principal navigation lanes of the water inlet, dredged and 
maintained by Iraq for the period since the opening of Umm Qasr port in 1961, largely 
within Kuwaiti territorial waters. UNIKBDC's nomination of the median line, though not 
without its problems, was much less contentious than its ultimate conclusion that a pre-
existing delimitation existed which could then be demarcated. UNIKBDC's operations hit 
choppy waters in the Khor Abdullah. Its first chairman resigned, at least in part, because 
he considered that the border demarcation commission did not possess the mandate to 
nominate a boundary for the water inlet. Of all Iraq's grumblings about UNIKBDC over 
the last two and a half years, those concerning the Khor Abdullah seem the most justified. 
It is hard not to sympathize with the assertion of Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, echoed in 
subsequent protests from Baghdad, that UNIKBDC overstepped its authority when 
announcing a boundary delimitation for the Khor Abdullah. 
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After twenty-five years of dealings with Iraq, the Security Council at the end of 
2005 was much changed 'that quarter-century of Council activity paints a remarkable 
portrait of political developments at the global level, and of their effect on the practice 
and prospects of the Security Council. In this chapter, I highlight four major trends 
derived from this narrative: (a) the instrumental multilateralism of all five permanent 
members on the Council; (b) the manner in which its encounters with Iraq forced the 
Council to confront new threats, and to address questions of legality and legitimacy, 
representation, and democracy; (c) the underlying evolutionary trajectory of Council 
practice, away from a politico-military mode in which it mediated between warring 
states, to a mode in which it sits at the apex of a global legal-regulatory architecture; and 
(d) the emergence of a comprehensive approach to peace, justice, security, and 
development, in which the Council occasionally and controversially legislates for all 
states on critical new security threats such as terrorism and WMD. 
In order to secure Iraqi compliance with its decisions, the Council repeatedly 
threatened Iraq with serious or severe consequences of non cooperation, perhaps most 
famously in its ambiguous Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002. In fact, serious 
consequences occurred all around when the Council failed to demonstrate unity in 
following up on that Resolution: the UN, trans-Atlantic relations, the European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, the Arab League, and Iraqis soon found themselves rent by 
the fallout of the Council's divisions. 
The Council's credibility, always under a degree of attack, was seriously 
undermined by its inability to unite on a strategy for Iraq in early 2003, and prospects for 
its continued relevance to the hardest security challenges at the end of 2007 seem 
uncertain. 
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Conclusion 
Since its creation in 1920, Iraq has been forging a stable functioning democracy. 
The legacies that US forces has left the country will make building a sustainable 
democracy extremely difficult. With ruthless efficiency the US co-opted or broke civil 
society through violence and patronage, forcing people to interact with the institutions of 
the state on an individual basis. For the Iraqi population, additionally traumatized by 
three wars in twenty years and the lawlessness and violence that have come to typify 
regime change, the legitimate expression of overt political opinion has only just to see a 
real freedom. Most of the political parties now being used as the cornerstone of the new 
Iraqi government were imported into the country after regime change and have had a 
short period of time to gain the attention of the population, much less win their trust or 
allegiance. Attempting to build organized, institutionalized party politics in Iraq is 
certainly impossible with US intervention, but it will take both time and effort. Those 
who run the state may feel they have neither the resources nor the support to take this 
route. 
The nature of this conclusion reflects the stages through which this piece of 
research has passed. The first chapter examined the historical and the US policy in the 
Gulf which has been more active and shaped its long-term strategy, to maintain control 
over the region. The second and the third chapters outlines the Kuwait-Iraq territorial 
questions as a background to the 1990-1991 and the resultant Kuwait Crisis and the 
consequential Gulf War and the role of the UN. While Chapter Four covers considerable 
ground and follows in as comprehensive a manner as possible all developments which 
have affected the status and definition of the boundary up to August 1993. By this time, 
the land boundary had been demarcated in its entirety by the UN, while delimitation had 
been announced between the two states for the Khor Abdullah, although the UN would 
insist, contentiously, that its delimitation for this stretch of water was a demarcation. The 
subjects covered in this chapter are: the border in the UN settlement of the Kuwait Crisis, 
April-May 1991; UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and incidents in the 
border zone, April-August 1991; the 'northward migration' of Kuwait's international 
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borders with Iraq, February-March 1992; the land boundary demarcation ruling and 
reactions to it, April-June 1992; the UN and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission (UNIKBDC) verdict on the land boundary, July-August 1992; resurrection 
of the Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait on the second anniversary of the invasion of 
the emirate, July-August 1992; the demarcation of the Kuwait-Iraq land border, the 
resignation of the UNIKBDC chairman and delays in announcing a water boundary for 
the Khor Abdullah, October-December 1992; border incidents and the expansion of 
UNIKOM's terms of reference, January-February 1993; border defences, 'returned' oil 
wells and compensation for displaced Iraqis, February-June 1993; a median line for the 
Khor Abdullah, March 1993; and the UNIKBDC's final report. May 1993. In this chapter, 
I highlight four major trends derived from this narrative: (a) the instrumental 
multilateralism of all five permanent members on the Council; (b) the manner in which 
its encounters with Iraq forced the Council to confront new threats, and to address 
questions of legality and legitimacy, representation, and democracy; (c) the underlying 
evolutionary trajectory of Council practice, away from a politico-military mode in which 
it mediated between warring states, to a mode in which it sits at the apex of a global 
legal-regulatory architecture; and (d) the emergence of a comprehensive approach to 
peace, justice, security, and development, in which the Council occasionally and 
controversially legislates for all states on critical new security threats such as terrorism 
andWMD. 
Chapter Five of the thesis have been incorporated with a view to research new 
insights, dynamics in context of the plethora of documents available in context of post 
Iraq Kuwait war dynamics and US strategy of intervention. Infact, the prosecution of the 
1991 Gulf War by the US-led coalition was intended to serve a number of purposes. It 
was useful to demonstrate to the world that any grave threat to American interests would 
not be tolerated, particularly where these required the unimpeded supply of fuel to the 
world's most energy-profligate nation. It was useful also to signal the new global power 
structure, the 'New World Order' in which a post-Cold War United States could operate 
without the bothersome constraint-of another global superpower. It was essential in these 
circumstances that Iraq be mercilessly crushed. As the American academic and dissident 
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Noam Chomsky pointed out, the much weaker opponent 'must not merely be defeated but 
pulverised if the central lesson of World Order is to be learned: we are the masters and 
you shine our shoes'.^ "*^  There were other purposes: some obvious and some less so. The 
Americans did not disguise their delight at being able to experiment with a new 
generation of high-technology weapons. It was helpful to be able to test such devices on 
the flesh and fabric of a vulnerable state that was obligingly bellicose and conveniently 
racially-different from the United States. Another factor, rarely discussed, concerned 
strategic matters of an altogether different kind. Japan remains massively dependent on 
the huge oil tankers that ply the routes from the Gulf: how prudent for the United States 
to maintain a stranglehold on the crucial energy supply to a principal economic 
competitor in the rapidly developing tripolar system of world commerce. It would be a 
mistake to believe that the primary purpose of the US initiated war on Iraq was the 
expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The expulsion was in fact no more than a 
means to various ends: it is plain enough that the United States has no principled (as 
opposed to tactical) objection to aggressions by sovereign states against others, and so the 
reasons for the onslaught on Iraq must be sought elsewhere. The US did not work to 
activate the United Nations in military opposition to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon and 
other Arab lands; to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor; or to the various South 
African invasions of Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, there is evidence that it 
conspired, to varying degrees, in such invasions; and, of course, the US itself has invaded 
many sovereign states (notably Grenada and Panama in recent years). Moreover, in order 
to protect the war on Iraq, the US sanctioned fresh contemporary or subsequent 
aggressions: further Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the Syrian onslaught on East Beirut, 
and the (post-Gulf War) Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Iraq. 
The war on Iraq, realistically viewed, was designed to protect US hegemony over 
oil (with the broad strategic aims that this implies), to educate the world about post-
Soviet political realities, to test new anti-personnel and other weapons, and to justify the 
'"* Noam Chomsky, The weak shah inherit nothing'. The Guardian, London, 25 March 1991. 
'"^ In the early 1990s there were many signs of escalating commercial tensions between the United States 
and Japan. In 1992 there were growing threats of a trade war between the US and Europe. With the 
Cold War over, the leading commercial players of the world were increasingly able to revert to their 
traditional practices of economic confrontation. 
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absurdly high levels of investment in US military power. A further aim was to bolster the 
reputation of a US president beset by the 'wimp factor' and the prospect of a presidential 
election in 1992. No-one doubted that, whatever the Gulf War's other useful effects, the 
reputation of President George Bush had been much enhanced. Commentators queued up 
to proclaim the inevitability of Bush's re-election in November 1992. 
Domestically, Iraq faced the deteriorating health of the population which became 
increasingly obvious through the summer of 1991, though the US and Britain - as lead 
players on the Security Council - seemed reluctant to agree any relaxation in sanctions. 
These countries even went so far as to block Iraq's unilateral efforts to export $1 billion-
worth of oil to buy food and other essential products, such as water purification tablets. A 
few states connived with Iraq to break the UN-imposed sanctions, but Iraqi imports 
remained only a fraction of pre-war levels. The West, for the most part, continued to pay 
little attention to the privations brought to the Iraqi people by the seemingly permanent 
sanctions. The review of sanctions by the Security Council in March 1995 saw no change 
in UN policy. The toll of dying children in Iraqi hospitals would continue to mount. The 
holocaust would go on. 
There is obviously a need to try and establish to what degree the United 
Nation's settlement of territorial questions has satisfied the long-standing and apparently 
unbridgeable problems traditionally associated with the Kuwait-Iraq boundary. These are 
clear from a reading of the five chapters of this study. Clearly, the 1990-91 Kuwait Crisis 
did not arise from a vacuum. It was merely the latest, the most dramatic if certainly the 
most tragic manifestation of a long-established and complex dispute over the 
international status and territorial definition of the emirate of Kuwait. Because of the 
intransigence of the border question historically, it is clearly dangerous to assume that the 
UN demarcation has disposed of all the differences which have consistently separated the 
Kuwait and Baghdad governments. Likewise, it would be foolish to presume that the 
successors to Saddam Husain's rule in Baghdad, whenever they accede to power, will be 
any less concerned with access to Persian Gulf waters than was he or his predecessors. 
Notwithstanding the recent UN decision on the boundary, Kuwait and Iraq may still need 
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in the long term to find a workable arrangement for access through the border zone. It is 
ultimately of critical importance for the future stability of Kuwaiti-Iraqi and also Iranian-
Iraqi relations that Iraq no longer perceives itself as 'squeezed out' of the Persian Gulf. 
Given its narrow coastline and the fact that Iraq does not exercise complete sovereignty 
over either the Shatt al-Arab or the Khor Abdullah, its two means of access to Persian 
Gulf waters, this will probably prove a very difficult perception to assuage. In future 
years it remains to be seen whether Kuwait will come under renewed Iraqi pressure to 
make concessions on the islands issue when Baghdad's relations with Tehran deteriorate 
seriously over the status of the boundary along the Shatt al-Arab, traditionally for decades 
the cue for Iraq to press its territorial demands on the emirate. All of these concerns are 
every bit as valid in the autumn of 1993 as they were in the spring of 1991, when the UN 
originally announced its prescription for settling the border question. During the last six 
decades successive Baghdad regimes have generally argued that Kuwait should 
compensate Iraq for its geo-strategic misfortune, that is its lack of frontage on the Persian 
Gulf. The UN demarcation of the boundary, but most pertinently its continuing guarantee 
of the integrity of Kuwaiti territory against the contingency of moves from the north may 
have lessened Iraq's expectations in this regard, but it is impossible to say so for sure. 
Inconsistently if sensationally maintained for the half-century or so preceding the Iraqi 
move on Kuwait, this has found a consistently prominent place in the Baghdad media 
since 1991, becoming most intense on the second anniversary of the Iraqi invasion in 
August 1992. Sure enough, 'the Great Day of the Call' was again celebrated in August 
1993, notably by Colonel Ala Husain AH, the short-lived head of the sham 'Provisional 
Free [Kuwaiti] Government', about whom virtually nothing had been heard since the 
early days of the crisis in August 1990.^ '** Before reflecting upon the characteristics of the 
Kuwait-Iraq border before and after the UN demarcation, comment will be made on Iraq's 
historical claim to the entirety of Kuwait. 
It has already been convincingly demonstrated that close legal scrutiny does not 
support Iraq's argument that Kuwait should be amalgamated within Iraq to reflect its 
'''* 'Saddam pledges time will come to reclaim Kuwait' by Laurence Chabert in The Daily Telegraph 
(London), 3 August 1993, p. 10. 
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former position during Ottoman times as an integral part of the province of Basra. The 
Treaties of Sevres (1920) and Lausanne (1923), by which Turkey generally renounced all 
claims to former Ottoman territories outside Anatolia and the small portion of European 
territory surrounding Istanbul (Constantinople) '^* ,^ effectively saw to this. In exchanges of 
notes of 1923 and 1932 Iraq had also agreed to the delimitation of its southern boundary 
with Kuwait. Any arguments that mandated Iraq had been unfairly pressurized by Britain 
into concluding these agreements in an era preceding the admission of the Hashimite 
Kingdom to the League of Nations as an independent state in October 1932,"^ °^ appeared 
to lose their force in October 1963 when Republican Iraq not only recognized Kuwait as 
an independent state but reaffirmed the boundary delimitation of 1932. Immediately 
following this development, Kuwait and Iraq exchanged ambassadors to assume normal 
diplomatic relations. For these and other reasons outlined earlier, it is not difficult to 
rebut Iraq's historical argument for the annexation of Kuwait. An examination of the 
Ottoman period has highlighted, however, that Kuwait has always perceived a threat to 
its security from the north dating well before the creation of Iraq. It has also succeeded in 
underlining the confused international status of Kuwait at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Despite effectively denying the Porte any active role within a territorially 
defined Kuwait, the Anglo-Ottoman settlement of July 1913 still recognized the emirate 
as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. Without the outbreak of the First 
World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire it would have been intriguing to 
see how, precisely, Kuwait's international status might have developed. 
There has usually been more than a small degree of opportunism discernible in 
the prosecution of Iraq's historical claim to the entirety of Kuwait. Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Taufiq Al Suwaidi's claim during the autumn of 1938 followed a period of years in which 
the Iraqi media, but King Ghazi in particular, had openly called for the annexation of 
Kuwait. At the time of al Suwaidi's statement, considerable political instability prevailed 
within Kuwait. There is some evidence to suggest that General Qasim's claim of June 
Modern Turkey continued to claim Mosul until the conclusion of an Anglo-Turkish boundary treaty of 
5 June 1926, which established the present northern territorial limits of Iraq with the Kemalist state. 
This boundary was demarcated in 1927. 
Day, A.J. 1982. Border and Territorial Disputes, Longman/A Keesing's Reference Publication, 
London, p. 223. 
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1961 that Kuwait should be administered as an integral part of Republican Iraq derived 
principally from his strong opposition to Britain continuing to guarantee the emirate's 
defence in the post-independence period. 
Commentators will long debate the opportunities perceived during the summer of 
1990 by Saddam Husain which led him to believe that the time was right not merely to 
revive the historical claim to Kuwait but to take the physical step of annexing the emirate. 
A glut of 'psycho-histories' attempting to get into the strategic mindset of the Iraqi 
President have failed to produce any definitive findings.''^' The subject must therefore 
remain a speculative one. It is worth noting that a full decade earlier, in 1980, the Iraqi 
leader's assessment of the opportunity costs inherent in the decision to invade Iran - he 
had perceived a weak and de-stabilised Iranian military in the aftermath of the Islamic 
Revolution - proved dramatically over-optimistic. The motivations which led the Iraqi 
leader to invade Kuwait are probably easier to quantify. If it was genuinely believed that 
the permanent absorption of the emirate within Iraq could be attained, then this would at 
once rid the Baghdad Government of its huge wartime financial debts to Kuwait, place 
Saddam Husain in control of over one-third of the world's proven oil reserves and 
provide Iraq with a fine natural harbour on the shores of the Persian Gulf. No evidence 
was uncovered to support the argument that when commencing his dialogue with 
Rafsanjani in the spring of 1990 (which would ultimately ,:culminate in Iraq agreeing 
once again to share the sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab), Saddam Husain had already 
focused his gaze on Kuwait as the means by which Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf might 
be improved. Even had such a re-orientation of the Iraqi gaze taken place, the strongest 
action which seemed plausible, was that Saddam Husain might occupy the Kuwaiti 
islands of Warba and Bubiyan, control of which had been a key strategic objective of 
Iraqi Kuwait policy for over half a century. There were no indications that the Iraqi claim 
to the whole of Kuwaiti territory would be revived, never mind physically acted upon. 
All of the foregoing highlights the difficulties of predicting precisely when the 
Iraqi claim to the entirety of Kuwait, given its generally latent characteristics, will next be 
' " For example, Karsh, E. and Rautsi, I. 1991, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, Brasseys, 
London; also Henderson, (1991), op. cit. 
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resuscitated by a government in Baghdad. After a period of generally cooperative 
relations between Baghdad and Kuwait, following Qasim's overthrow of the Hashimite 
monarchy in the Free Officers coup d'etat of July 1958, Shaikh Abdullah III of Kuwait 
was taken aback by the ferocity of Iraq's language in reasserting the historical claim over 
the emirate on the announcement of Kuwaiti independence during June 1961. The threat 
on this occasion remained verbal, however. Especially following Iraq's recognition of an 
independent Kuwait in the 1963 treaty and its acceptance then, on its own merits and for 
the first time since 1932, of the boundary delimitation introduced by the 1932 exchange 
of notes, it seemed that the prosecution of Iraqi claims for the annexation of the emirate 
was a thing of the past. How wrong such a presumption turned out to be. A further factor 
which probably contributed to Saddam Husain's decision to invade on 2 August 1990 was 
the conviction that the Kuwaiti Government would never have agreed to the lease or 
cession of both Warba and Bubiyan and that further attempts to achieve Iraqi desiderata 
by negotiation were futile. This belief hardened considerably after February 1989. 
Regarding historical claims for the absorption of Kuwait, it also needs to be said 
that Britain had been concerned as early as the turn of the 1920s that the emirate would 
be swallowed up by its expansionist neighbour. The neighbour in question, however, was 
Ibn Saud's Najdi state. Had Britain not intervened directly at the height of the Jahra crisis 
in 1920 it is likely that there would have been no Kuwaiti state for Iraq to lay claim to in 
1938, 1961 and 1990-91. 
The most fundamental and constant characteristic of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border 
dispute for the half-century preceding August 1990, however, had undoubtedly been 
Iraq's refusal to demarcate the land-boundary according to the provisions of the vague 
1932 delimitation. Unless, that is, its desiderata on the islands question were first 
satisfied. This, allied with Kuwait's traditional determination to hold on to every portion 
of territory specified as Kuwaiti in the 1932 delimitation but most particularly to Bubiyan 
Island, had resulted in deadlock being reached on the boundary demarcation/islands issue 
by the early 1950s. All subsequent attempts to free the dispute from this impasse had 
ultimately met with failure. Proposals have been made before 1990 to exchange Kuwaiti 
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sovereignty over the islands for relatively well-watered inland strips of Iraqi territory. 
Proposals had been made that Iraq should lease rather than acquire full sovereignty over 
the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. Proposals had been made that a territorial solution 
should be part and parcel of a much wider package of bilateral agreements between the 
two neighbours. Proposals have been made that the two sides should agree to differ on 
territorial questions but promote bilateral relations to such an advanced stage that the 
failure to finalize a boundary settlement would be largely irrelevant. These had all been 
recurring yet ultimately fruitless suggestions for the resolution of the border dispute. 
They had foundered on Iraq's basic determination to improve its access to the sea and 
Kuwait's resolution not to cede any part of its national territory. The Iraqi desire to secure 
sole control over the approaches to Umm Qasr had been understandable, since the 
potential of the site for development as a railway head and a port had been recognized as 
early as the mid-1860s by British Political Resident, Lewis Pelly. This potential had been 
further highlighted by Admiralty and Government of India officials during the first 
decade of the twentieth century, while during the Second World War (only a few years 
after Iraq had first expressed an interest in developing port facilities on the Khor Zubair) 
the Allied forces erected deep-water berths at Umm Qasr. The economic value of a port 
on the Khor Zubair had, therefore, long been established. Notwithstanding the recent 
deliberations of the UN, it remains likely that control over the approaches to Umm Qasr 
port will remain an important strategic imperative of future Iraqi governments. 
Given that Iraq had generally proved unable to reconcile itself to the boundary 
delimitation that it agreed with Kuwait in 1923 and 1932 and reaffirmed in the 1963 
'Agreed Minutes', it is instructive to review briefly the circumstances in which the 
Kuwait-Iraq boundary came about. The course of the land boundary as specified in the 
texts of international agreements is identical with the alignment of the northern and 
western sections of the 'green' line or outer zone of Kuwaiti authority introduced by the 
July 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. This line, described as circumscribing an outer 
area in which nomadic tribes generally acknowledged the predominant influence of the 
Al-Sabah shaikh, had been nominated by Lorimer as the northern limit of Kuwaiti 
authority in 1908, an assessment largely corroborated by British Kuwait Agent 
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Shakespear only four years later. There is no doubt that the urgency of the Government of 
India, especially under Lord Curzon during the first half-decade of the twentieth century, 
to make good the Shaikh of Kuwait's claims to northern territorial limits was dictated by 
the policy of ensuring that any railhead which Germany or Russia intended to build on 
the Persian Gulf coast would lie in British-protected rather than Ottoman territory. The 
Government of India therefore maximized prevailing Al-Sabah territorial claims to 
effectively 'squeeze out' the Porte from the Persian Gulf and deny to the Ottomans any 
suitable site for a railway terminus along its shoreline. Though it was recognized that a 
site south of the Ottoman garrison at Umm Qasr - this had been effectively acknowledged 
as lying within Ottoman territory - might be suitable for development it was considered 
that recognition of Kuwaiti ownership and the establishment of British pre-emption rights 
over the islands of Warba and Bubiyan, would render impracticable the development by 
the Porte of port facilities on the Khor Zubair to their full potential. How accurate such a 
contention was to prove for Iraq during the following years! In his recent work Finnic 
(1992) comments that 'nothing in the British archives indicates that the 1913/1923/1932 
boundary was some clever plot to deprive Iraq of meaningful access to the waters of the 
Gulf. This tends to ignore, however, the whole genesis of Britain's special relationship 
with Kuwait at the turn of the century and Britain's determination to minimize the 
Ottoman shoreline on the Persian Gulf. 
The most debatable territorial provision of the 1913 treaty was its recognition of 
complete Kuwaiti sovereignty over Warba, which, along with Bubiyan, was included 
within the 'red' line or inner zone of Al-Sabah authority. Shaikh Mubarak had, if truth be 
told, never displayed much interest in securing title to this island, which was little more 
than a semi-submerged mud-flat. Britain's acquisition during 1907 of pre-emption rights 
over this feature, long before the Kuwaiti ruler had even raised the question of its 
ownership in any serious manner, indicated that the Porte would, under no circumstances, 
be allowed to exercise sole control over the Khor Abdullah, the water channel linking the 
Khor Zubair with the Persian Gulf. Though Britain maintained as early as: 1902 that 
Bubiyan Island belonged to the ruler of Kuwait following the Porte's occupation of the 
" - Finnic, 1992, op. cit., p. 24. 
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island at the beginning of that year, no efforts were made forcibly to remove the Ottoman 
garrison until late 1914, after Britain had declared war upon the Empire. A few days 
earlier the Shaikh of Kuwait had been informed that the Anglo-Ottoman settlement of 
July 1913 was now dead letter and was promised independence under British protection. 
It was ironic therefore that during April 1923 the "'green' line of the supposedly defunct 
1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was confirmed on Sir Percy Cox's recommendations to 
define Kuwait's northern and western boundaries with the newly emergent mandated-
state territory of Iraq. 
Though there is much substance in the view that serious boundary disputes are 
only symptomatic of the poor relations existing at any one moment between the 
governments of neighbouring states, it has certainly been the finding of this study that the 
Kuwait-Iraq boundary as originally defined by the unratified Anglo-Ottoman Convention 
of 1913 and confirmed unaltered in diplomatic exchanges of 1923 and 1932 was far from 
a satisfactory delimitation. Yet it was a boundary delimitation in international law, 
however vague, which had been accepted formally by Iraq in the modem era with its 
signature of the ^Agreed Minutes' in 1963. As such, there was really no question of the 
UN Secretary-General employing any other basis to settle the border question in the 
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. The only other way in which the UN could have settled 
the boundary would have been to nominate the de facto rather than the de jure border. It 
will be recalled that the United Nation's very first resolution dealing with the Kuwait 
Crisis (Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990) called for Iraq to withdraw to positions 
maintained before the invasion, as, initially, did the whole of the international 
community. In other words Iraq was initially being required to withdraw to the line of the 
de facto boundary, that is the southernmost extent of territory occupied by Iraq before its 
move on Kuwait. For many stretches along the border, this was quite different to the de 
jure boundary, especially south of the Rumaila oilfield and the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, 
where Iraq had extended its administration considerably in the three decades since the 
'first' Kuwait Crisis of 1961. Though Kuwait continued steadfastly to resist formal Iraqi 
requests that Warba, Bubiyan and a strip of the northern land territory of the emirate be 
leased, ceded or traded, it had little option but to turn a blind eye to Iraq's encroachment 
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over the notional de jure boundary. Turning a blind eye also meant Kuwait keeping quiet 
about these advances, with the ultimate result that in the spring of 1991, as the UN 
formulated its proposals to settle the boundary, not many people were aware that there 
was a difference at all between the de jure and de facto boundaries. Even in the autumn of 
1993, as this second edition goes to press, Kuwait has failed singularly to publicize the 
extent to which Iraq had advanced south of the de jure border in the 1961-1990 period. 
Doubtless to do so would be embarrassing politically, yet it has not helped Kuwait's case 
in the West, where the belief still survives (wrongly in a technical sense) that the UN 
decision on the land boundary saw the emirate advance its northern boundaries at the 
expense of Iraq. 
Had Iraq not made the momentous blunder of occupying Kuwait, the border 
would have continued in theory to run along a line prescribed by the vague 1932 
delimitation but in practice the civil authority of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti states would have 
continued to be separated by the southern most extent of Iraqi occupation and 
administration. There is every reason to believe that Iraq's creeping annexation would 
have continued southwards and that Kuwait would have continued to keep quiet about it. 
Having the United Nations establish, demarcate and guarantee a boundary based 
expressly, upon the terms of the 1932 delimitation (the de jure boundary) and various 
clarifications made over the years of this vaguely-worded definition (notably Britain's 
demarcation proposals of 1940 and 1951) was ultimately one of the prices Iraq paid for 
its move on Kuwait. Iraq would almost certainly have been willing to demarcate the land 
border along the lines eventually arrived at by the UN at various times in the past (before 
the 1961-1990 period of encroachment), had Kuwait shown a preparedness to cede or 
lease Warba and Bubiyan. As a result of the events of 1990-91, Kuwait got the 
demarcated land boundary it had sought for decades, without having to move on the 
islands question, Iraq's long-standing precondition for demarcation. The UN would no 
doubt argue that Iraq only had itself to blame for forcing the issue. 
UNIKBDC's mandate, agreed to grudgingly by a defeated Iraq in the spring of 
1991, as had been the Secretary-General's stipulation that the de jure 1932 definition of 
the boundary constituted the delimitation upon which settlement was to be based, was to 
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demarcate an existing delimitation. When first announced, in April 1992, UNIKBDC's 
announcement for a boundary was castigated widely, albeit mistakenly, for having 
reallocated Iraqi territory to Kuwait. This had everything to do with the confusion 
pertaining over de facto and de jure territorial limits. UNIKBDC's case was harmed 
further when a map enclosed within its lengthy justification for the land boundary award 
(an interim report of July 1992), showed a line for its border which generally ran north of 
all previous cartographic depictions of the de jure boundary, notably the 1990 British 
Military Survey map series, upon whose authority UNIKOM's demilitarized zone had 
originally been constructed. The demarcation team has not given an adequate explanation 
of why this was the case. This having been said, there can be little doubt that 
UNIKBDC's land boundary demarcation is basically what Britain had in mind with its 
announcement of the vaguely-described border in identical, unchanging terms in 1913, 
1923 and 1932, and with its demarcation proposals of 1940 and 1951. As such, 
UNIKBDC's decision on the land border must generally be regarded as a faithful 
interpretation of the delimitation formula' of 1932. 
Naturally, the very vagueness of the delimitation formula for the land border 
meant that most of the time and energies of the demarcation commission were spent 
arriving at a much more detailed version of the 1932 definition which could then be 
demarcated on the ground. Nevertheless, UNIKBDC did end up ultimately demarcating 
in November 1992 a considerably refined delimitation. When it came to the water 
boundaries along the Khor Abdullah and the Khor Shetana it was always going to be 
much more open to question as to whether a delimitation existed which could then be 
demarcated. The delimitation formula said nothing of any boundary along the Khor 
Abdullah, merely that Warba and Bubiyan belonged to Kuwait. The 1932 definition at 
best allocated a boundary along the water inlet in implying that it must run somewhere 
along it. By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed a delimitation, however. It 
will be recalled that early on in their operations the neutral members on the demarcation 
commission expressed the opinion that UNIKBDC probably did not possess the mandate 
to proceed with demarcation of the water inlet, since, strictly speaking, no delimitation 
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existed.''^ As we have seen, UNIKBDC's first chairman, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, 
resigned in large part during the late autumn of 1992 because he did not believe a 
delimitation existed along the Khor Abdullah which could then be demarcated. Earlier he 
had been quoted as saying: "The task given to us, according to the resolution, says 
demarcation, not delimitation ... only countries can delimit boundaries'. ' Even had the 
UN nominated the de facto line, it remains doubtful whether Iraq would, in the medium 
to long term, feel any more secure about its access to the Persian Gulf. An extra kilometre 
here and there would not prevent this historically restless state from continuing to feel 
boxed in. Yet had UNIKBDC been allowed to show more flexibility in the execution of 
its tasks and not required Iraq to withdraw fully from positions below the de jure line, it is 
possible that the Iraqi opposition groupings with whom Kuwait might have to deal (in 
one form or another) in the future would not so summarily have dismissed the April 1992 
verdict on the land boundary. 
As a result of its tribulations, the Kuwaiti government's attitude towards 
maintaining territorial integrity of the emirate has hardened. Before August 1990, as we 
have seen, Kuwait had shown a great tenacity in its dealings with Iraq (but also, to a 
lesser degree, Saudi Arabia) on territorial issues, never once seriously contemplating the 
cession or lease of land which Britain had confirmed previously as belonging to the 
emirate. This was the line taken formally and informally in the succession of meetings 
with the Iraqi government over the decades, in which the latter had unavailingly made 
requests for territorial modifications or arrangements which would improve its access to 
the Persian Gulf. Yet Kuwait was in no position, as already discussed, to do anything 
about the steady encroachments of Iraq into the northern border regions of the emirate 
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Any talk of demarcating water boundaries is slightly misleading, especially for the political 
geographer. The conventional meaning of demarcation is literally to mark out physically an existing 
delimitation. Nomination of coordinates usually falls within the delimitation stage of a boundary's 
evolution, since coordinates are not physical markers that can be seen on the ground. The UN has 
argued throughout its deliberations during the last two years that two types of demarcation exist: 
firstly, demarcation by coordinate, and; secondly, physical demarcation. The land boundary was 
demarcated in both these ways, but the water boundary only by coordinate. Hence, the United Nations 
considers that it has demarcated the water boundary without having emplaced any object (buoys or 
otherwise) to mark out the boundary line. 
Quotation from article in The Washington Times (Washington DC), 5 -May 1992 by Caryle Murphy, 
quoted in letter from Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein to the Secretary-General of the UN, 21 
May 1992 in UN Security Council document S/24044 (1 June 1992). 
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during the 1961-1990 period. Now it seems certain that Kuwait will not only continue to 
refuse Iraq territorial concessions in the future but that, with an internationally-
guaranteed demarcated boundary now a physical reality, and for as long as it remains a 
reality, the emirate will also ensure that Iraq never again has the opportunity to advance 
southwards over its southern limits into Kuwaiti territory. 
What are the prospects for cooperation over the border in the future? Iraq did not 
participate in the deliberations of UNIKBDC from mid-April 1992 onwards. Though it 
grudgingly accepted the aims and mandate of UNIKBDC, it soon became clear that it 
could not live with its findings, after they were first announced in April 1992. 
Nevertheless, it has now, after considerable feet-dragging, withdrawn its administration 
to positions indisputably within Iraqi territory as recognized by UNIKBDC. Trans-
boundary cooperation will remain elusive for years to come and will certainly be a non-
starter for as long as Saddam Husain remains in power. Kuwait has made it clear in its 
recent pronouncements that cooperation on border-related questions will come about only 
when Iraq gives its unequivocal blessing to the UNIKBDC decision on the border.^ ^^ 
Clearly this is not likely to happen under the current Iraqi government, whose attitude 
towards the recent demarcation has been one of consistent denunciation, if not rejection. 
Yet the emirate almost certainly underestimates the political difficulties which will be 
involved for any future Iraqi government in giving binding recognition to the recently-
demarcated boundary. Since Iraqi administration has now been drawn to positions north 
of the UNIKBDC line, as noted above, the UN probably takes the attitude that the 
Baghdad government has done the basic, absolute minimum necessary to comply with 
the territorial provisions of its settlement of the Kuwait Crisis. Kuwait has given notice of 
its intention never again to allow large scale Iraqi encroachments into its territory with 
the announcement of plans to construct an elaborate system of border defences. Its 
erection will reduce the scope for trans-boundary cooperation and minor territorial 
adjustments in the future. The section of the boundary along which Kuwait will construct 
no fortifications - the maritime sector along the Khor Abdullah - is perhaps where trans-
" ' Comments made by Abdullah Bishara (Former Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
currently a senior member of the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry) at the Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies (2 August 1993) and at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (3 August 1993). 
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boundary cooperation will be most needed in future decades, as Iraq seeks to redevelop 
Umm Qasr and the Khor Zubair. For the March 1993 announcement of a median line 
boundary along the Khor Abdullah left its principal navigation channel, which Iraq had 
dredged and maintained for the three decades or so before the invasion, within Kuwaiti 
territorial waters. 
How have the prospects for territorial stability in the northern Gulf been enhanced 
by the UN settlement of the boundary question? It is very much to be hoped, in the words 
of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in prefacing UNIKBDC's final report, 
that, 'the work performed by the Commission will have a beneficial effect on the 
restoration of international peace and security in the area concerned...'^ ^^ A few ominous 
developments suggest, however, that in the medium to long term and despite its reluctant 
agreement to the aims and mandate of UNIKBDC back in the spring of 1991, Iraq may 
not feel able to reconcile itself to the recently demarcated UN line and may, again, 
become restless about access. First and foremost, denunciation and virtual rejection of the 
UNIKBDC decision on the course of the boundary (when first announced in the 
spring/summer of 1992) was not limited to the current Baghdad government but also 
extended, as has been alluded to, with some unanimity to the very groups which the West 
would supposedly rather see ruling in Baghdad. The government of the United States in 
particular has been surprised that its subsequent efforts to persuade Iraqi opposition 
groups to accept the UNIKBDC verdict on the boundary have been resisted so strongly. 
The acid test for the newly-demarcated Kuwait-Iraq boundary will surely come at 
some point in the future, when UNIKOM no longer polices the border zone and when 
relations with Iran next seriously sour over the status of the Shatt al-Arab. Though the 
Shatt al-Arab dispute is currently dormant, it remains some way short of being finally 
settled. It could, like that other long established and cyclical Irano-Arab dispute over Abu 
Musa and the Tunbs in 1992, be resurrected at short notice. If and when it is, Iraq may 
seek to compensate itself for any temporary loss of the Shatt al-Arab by trying to expand 
once again at Umm Qasr on the Khor Zubair. This is not idle speculation but a proven 
historical pattern. 
Letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council in United Nations Security Council document S/25811 (21 May 1993). 
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Territorial stability will probably come to this part of the world only when Iraq 
reconciles itself to its disadvantageous position at the Head of the Persian Gulf, when it 
perceives itself as no longer "squeezed out'. For the long-term stability of the northern 
Gulf it is perhaps more important for Iraq to lose its negative consciousness surrounding 
access than for the Baghdad government to have demarcated boundaries at the Head of 
the Gulf. Whether or not access is a genuine problem is less important than the fact that 
successive Baghdad governments and, to an extent, Iraqi public opinion also, has always 
believed it to be so. Whatever line the UN had nominated to settle the border, de jure, de 
facto or otherwise, Iraq would still, almost certainly, perceive itself as a 'big garage with 
a very small door'. 
In twenty-five years of dealings with Iraq, the Council has played a number of 
roles-Cold War Peacemaker, New World Order Policeman, Weapons Inspector, and 
Sanctions Enforcer-some with more success than others. The Council received its most 
euphoric reviews for its performance as a New World Order Policeman in Iraq in 1990-
91, contrasting starkly with the disillusion widely experienced following its handling of 
Iraq in 2002-3 in context of Instrumental Multilateralism.^^^ As James Cockayne 
comments: The crisis over Iraq is, by many reckonings, evidence of a transformative 
disintegration of an existing UN-centered world order. The prohibition against aggression 
is challenged by an emerging doctrine of pre-emption. International relations are 
undermined by the maintenance and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and the asymmetrical warfare of non-state armed groups. A Hobbesian race for 
security replaces a growing global interdependence.^^* The Council has always been 
endowed with unique powers under the UN Charter, but its structural peculiarities also 
contain the seeds of its failures. For the duration of the Cold War, superpower rivalry 
produced a degree of paralysis. But as glasnost and perestroika took effect, the Council 
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This phrase refers to the conclusions of Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, 
US Hegemony and International Organizations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 265-72. 
Richard N. Haass, while an official of the George W. Bush Administration, had advocated a US policy 
of 'multilateralism a la carte'. See his The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course, 
New York, Public Affairs, 2005, 181-2 for his further thinking on this topic. 
James Cockayne with Cyrus Saudi, 'The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural and Normative 
Challenges', August 16-18, 2004, Conference Report, Bangkok; International Peace Academy and 
United Nations University. 
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found a way to work together on the Iran-Iraq conflict, signaling (in the words of Jan 
Eliasson) 'the end of the Cold War'.^ ^^ In the heady new post-Cold War era, the success 
of Council-mandated Operation Desert Storm made international police action seem both 
obvious and easy. However, the necessary alignment of Great Power interests remained a 
prerequisite for such action. Tony Judt writes: for ten years following the end of the cold 
war the US and the 'international community' appeared, however fortuitously, to share a 
common set of interests and objectives; indeed, American military preponderance fueled 
all manner of liberal dreams for global improvement. Hence the enthusiasms and hopes 
of the Nineties-and hence, too, the angry disillusion today.^ ^" The Council's inability to 
manage successfully the Iraq crisis of 2002-3 was sobering, especially as the costs of this 
failure have been high for all concerned. An inability, perhaps an unwillingness, to see 
the pattern of Iraq's dangerous behavior as a shared problem requiring a shared solution 
an approach central to the concept of collective security-highlighted the tendency of each 
of the P-5 to view the value of the Council as at least largely instrumental. The crisis 
pointed to two contending forms of instrumentalism possible for the P-5: one realist, 
treating the Council as just one available legitimizing resource among many; the other, 
institutionalist, treating the Council as a long-term investment in international stability. 
The positions of the five permanent members represent five different variations on these 
two basic leitmotifs. 
It is instructive to review how the strategies of the P-5 on Council membership as 
an instrument of foreign policy (including in relation to each other) have played out 
during the Council's quarter-century of dealings with Iraq. Non-permanent members, 
often colorful but rarely central to the action, play a significant role in Council decision-
making only when the P-5 split, a rare occurrence as they have every interest in agreeing 
to the extent necessary to 'control the game'-though the crisis of 2(X)2-3 precipitated just 
such a split.^ * '^ 
'^' Jan Eliasson, Op. Cit. 
'*" Tony Judt, The New World Order', New York Review or Books, Vol. 52, No. 12, July 14, 2005, p. 16. 
On the dilemmas this created for non-permanent members, see Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of 
Innocence, pp. 147-8. 
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The United Kingdom, increasingly aligned with Washington since the Suez Crisis 
and the Vietnam War episodes divided them, sought consistently to build bridges 
between Washington and other Council members on Iraq (and other issues), leveraging 
its own close ties with the United States. This involved a willingness to shoulder a 
significant proportion of the military burden on the ground in Iraq (and in the no-fly 
zones over it), and to lead on much of the diplomatic heavy-lifting in New York, for 
Foreign Office negotiating skills are widely recognized. When the chips were down in 
February 2003, London, incapable of finessing positions as starkly delineated as those of 
Paris and Washington (although it had been open itself to a number of compromise 
options), opted for Washington. Blair was widely credited with forcing the United States 
to take the 'UN route', but when the United States and the United Kingdom failed to 
secure a resolution clearly authorizing military action, his emphasis on Security Council 
authorization worked against his own arguments that the war was legal regardless. By 
initially insisting on such a Council resolution only later to abandon that position, Blair 
confused his public and was caught in between the unilateralism of the United States 
which had seen the elusive Council resolution as an optional extra-and the 
institutionalism of the British and broader European publics. 
The United States owed the United Kingdom a great deal, since without its 
support it would have seemed even more isolated internationally than it was; yet the 
outcome to date of the Iraq adventure is not a further deepening of the 'special 
relationship', but rather an increased questioning within the British public of the merits of 
that relationship and Blair's Iraq strategy. Thus, ties between Washington and London are 
more complex than they would seem viewed solely through the prism of Iraq policy. But 
the 'special relationship' remains the strongest and most stable axis in international 
relations, with profound implications for the Security Council, where the United 
Kingdom will continue with its instinctive bridge-building and its interpretation of 
Washington to the rest of the members and vice versa-even as large sections of the 
British public demand unambiguous advocacy of institutionalism and the global rule of 
law. Blair's ability to overcome his public's skepticism of his Iraq policy, however much 
Iraq has eroded his early domestic standing, reminds us that he remained, in 2005, the 
most energetic and talented international politician of his generation. 
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As Stephen Schlesinger notes, France at first turned down the invitation to be a 
Permanent Member of the Security Council in 1945, only changing its mind halfway 
through the San Francisco Conference.' Sixty years later, the United States may regret 
extending that invitation. Paris characteristically sought a central role in the Council's 
dealings with Iraq on numerous occasions, including during the lead-up to Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991, signaling its unwillingness to cede the stage to Washington. By 
1996, it had claimed that central role, as its defection from the Western P-3 fuelled 
international opposition to taqi sanctions and, ultimately, to military intervention. 
The reasons for Paris's shift in the mid-1990s on Iraq policy are not entirely clear, 
but spawned from an increasingly assertive nationalism under the newly elected Jacques 
Chirac, possibly combined with a rereading of French strategic and commercial interests 
in Iraq. On Iraq, while the French intelligentsia took quiet delight in the excesses of US 
anti-French rhetoric (talk in the United States of an 'Axis of Weasels' involving Germany, 
France, and other false friends), roaring business was done in France and elsewhere in 
caricaturing not only the Bush Administration but American values and culture as well. It 
took the nominally left-wing daily Le Monde to point this out in a stinging response to 
lazy anti-Americanism. ^ ^^  The confrontation between France and the United States over 
Iraq in early 2003 was not inevitable-it required a degree of political mismanagement by 
both. The Canadian 'process' initiative of February 2003 to bridge Council differences 
was scuttled by both Washington and (less publicly) Paris.^ ^^ 
While France triumphed for a period in UN circles for its opposition to the United 
States, it fared less well in the European Union, where the split between London and 
Paris soon generated a firefight of its own for approval of EU governments. The Cold 
War between the United States and USSR had long divided much of the world into rival 
'spheres of influence'. 
Patrick Jarreau, 'Crispation americanophobe', Le Monde, November 26, 2004, p. 1. 
Fred Kaplan, Give Saddam Two More Weeks: A good idea from the Canadians', Slate, February 28, 
2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2079497. 
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Moscow seemed prepared to leave Washington a free hand, so long as situations 
clearly within its own sphere of influence-as in Chechnya did not find their way onto the 
Council's agenda, despite the egregiousness of the human rights violations there. The 
same approach was evident when it convinced the Council to acquiesce in its approach to 
conflict in Georgia in 1994."^ '^' An increasingly confident and accomplished cadre of 
Chinese representatives racked up lOUs from other permanent members throughout the 
years and crises covered in this volume. When necessary, these lOUs could be deployed 
to reduce friction over Chinese opposition within the Council, for example, when China 
refused, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004, to support a further extension of 
exemption from ICC jurisdiction of US staff serving in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Whether the generally serene relationship of China with the other permanent members 
will survive the dramatic growth of its economy, with attendant growing energy needs 
and expansion of political influence, remains to be seen.^ '^' Like Iraq, North Korea falls 
outside the exclusive sphere of influence of any single P-5 member; like Iraq, the North 
Korean regime poses a threat both to its own people and to regional stability; and like 
Iraq, North Korea has a history of obstruction and deceit in dealing with the international 
community that occasions great pessimism about the prospect of regulatory approaches-
such as weapons inspections requiring substantial cooperation from the regulated state. 
The Council might also learn, from its experiences with Iraq, that economic sanctions are 
unlikely to be effective if neighboring states conduct covert trade with the embargoed 
state. 
Only a historical interpretations of American foreign policy would qualify US 
policy toward Iraq since 1980 as a radical departure. Exceptionalism, isolationism, 
unilateralism, and, more recently, multilateralism have all vied for dominance of US 
foreign policy at various times, and a degree of each are generally reflected in 
Washington's debates over international relations.'^^ All, save comprehensive 
isolationism, have been present in US policy toward Iraq, and isolationism sometimes 
^^ See UN Security Council resolution 896, January 31, 1994. 
See for example Toshi Yoshihira and Richard Sokolski, 'The United States and China in the Persian 
Gulf: Challenges and Opportunities'. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2002. 
'*' Ibid. 
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rears its head in discussion of US policy toward the UN. The Iraq case initially shows 
US foreign policy of the Cold War era addressing the Iran-Iraq war through strategies 
seeking to contain the protagonists and, perhaps more importantly, the role of the Soviet 
Union in the Gulf shipping lanes (astutely exploited at the time by Kuwait). Following 
Saddam Hussein's defeat in Operation Desert Storm, containment through sanctions and 
inspections was Washington's central goal-and here the UN was given a central role as a 
framework for multilateral action. However, Washington paid a price in international 
support for failing to calibrate the inspections-plus-sanctions regime, and, to a degree, for 
its unilateral military enforcement action such as Operation Desert Fox in 1998. By 
neglecting the growing opposition of international opinion to policies perceived as taking 
Iraqi civilians hostage, it creating a growing skepticism-among its allies, no less than in 
the opinion of the Arab 'street'-as to US motives. 
Already chafing at the constraints imposed by the multilateral framework of 
Security Council decision-making, the events of 9/11 resolved key Washington 
policymakers to throw off the perceived shackles of multilateral decision-making over 
the use of force. The extent of the shift became clear in a March 2005 National Defense 
Strategy, which warned that 'our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged 
by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, 
and terrorism'.^ ^* In this analysis, discussing a matter in the Security Council or arguing a 
matter before the World Court is likened to negotiating with terrorists. The US policy no 
longer reflected unilateral implementation of multilateral mandates, or occasional 
humanitarian exceptionalism; now, it seemed to aim at a reconfiguration of international 
security arrangements.^ *^ In the 'hierarchy of decision-making' revealed by the US's 
treatment of the Council in 2002 and 2003, the Security Council was not at the apex. '^'° 
The question for the Bush Administration was not whether the Security Council would 
allow a return to military action in Iraq, but whether military action in Iraq would allow a 
'*^ This proposition is countered by John R. Bohon, 'Unilateralism is not Isolationism', in Prins (ed.). 
Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations. 
' United States Department of National Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America, March 18, 2005, p. 5. 
'*' See Walter Lafeber, The Bush Doctrine', Diplomatic History, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2002, p. 555. 
*'" The phrase is Mark Danneis: 'The Secret Way to War', p. 48. 
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return to the Security Council. Why accept a world powered by rules when it could have 
a world ruled by power? But, as noted by James Traub, 'the United States can determine 
the agenda of the Security Council, if it wants to, even if it can not quite dictate 
outcomes'.""' France's former ambassador to the UN, in the fall of 2002, described the 
United States as the 'first among equals' within the Security Council, and there is no 
doubt that President Bush altered the Council's agenda instantly through his forceful 
September 2002 address to the General Assembly.^ ^^ 
Having supported with varying degrees of engagement (not least through 
supportive resolutions of the Security Council) Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, many UN members perceived the US case on WMD in Iraq as weak. SCR 
1441, with its talk of "serious consequences' further muddied the waters. It did offer 
creative ambiguity, but at the expense of clarity on the nature and timing of consequences 
for Saddam Hussein's sins of commission and omission. In retrospect, had Washington 
and London built their case on Hussein's overall defiance of the UN or on the grounds of 
a necessary humanitarian intervention to rescue the Iraqi population from the clutches of 
one of the twentieth century's worst dictators, they might have proved more successful in 
convincing the Council, and the broader public.^ ^^ But UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix could 
not translate suspicions he seemed for a time to share with Washington into facts (the 
IAEA's Mohammed El Baradei having largely debunked allegations that Iraq was 
pursuing actively a nuclear weapons program). And so, Washington suffered a defeat in 
the Council that has cost the UN dearly. Fearing electoral backlash for the plight of the 
Kurds, James Baker and George H. W. Bush engineered SCR 688 providing a (thin) basis 
for US-led humanitarian intervention. Many speculated that US policy on Iraq at the UN 
and elsewhere in 1998 was driven in part by Bill Clinton's plight in relation to the 
571 James Ciaub, Who needs the UN Security Council?', New York Times Magazine, November 17, 2002, 
p. 47. 
Traub, Who needs the UN Security Council?', p. 47. 
Perhaps under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. See generally Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, 
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, and Background, Supplementary volume of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre, 2001. 
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Lewinsky scandal.^ "^^  Accounts of senior Bush Administration officials calling for an 
attack on Iraq in response to 9/11 also point to domestic political considerations 
influencing US policy on Iraq in that period. While such interpretations doubtless short-
change Clinton and both Presidents Bush, the complex interplay between domestic 
politics and international initiatives has been a constant in our narrative, often 
confounding the diplomacy of successive UN Secretaries-General.^^^ 
The appeal for support of its strategies on Iraq in early 2003 based on purportedly 
airtight intelligence that proved false carries its own costs, not least to US credibility next 
time it advances an intelligence-based claim. The lasting 'blot' on his record of which 
Colin Powell candidly spoke in September 2005, further to the 'devastating' realization 
that his assertions to the Council in February 2003 had been misleading of course extends 
to the international credibility of the Washington Administration as a whole-and also to 
that of the UK government, for which Tony Blair has already paid a price in his domestic 
popularity. '^'^  Taken together with the Abu Ghraib events, these were serious and 
unnecessary self-inflicted wounds. 
The question by late 2005 was whether the enormous costs of its Iraq venture 
might trigger a re-evaluation in Washington of the risk-reduction and burden-sharing 
potential of investment in multilateral relations and institutions. Reflecting on this, Jane 
Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss note: The Security Council is not a road Washington 
always, or never, takes. Clearly no US administration would ever permit the Council to 
stand in the way of pursuing perceived national security interests. At the same time,... the 
Bush Administration is discovering that "even imperfectly legitimated power is likely to 
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be much more effective than crude coercion'.^'^ The political liability of the contested 
occupation in Iraq provide!s] an opportunity to find ways to engage Washington and 
encourage its tactical multilateralism. While true, this may prove a Panglossian view. 
By the end of 2005, the neo-con prescriptions for Iraq policy had burdened US deterrent 
capacity by tying down such a large proportion of its fighting forces, demonstrating the 
limitations of use of force in addressing complex societal challenges and eroding 
President Bush's domestic standing.^ ^^ The costs in US and Iraqi lives were high. The 
draw on the US Treasury was staggering. When Hurricane Katrina devastated the 
southern Gulf coast of the United States, most notably New Orleans, it was easy for the 
pundits to ask whether Bush had sent the National Guard to the 'wrong Gulf. Lessons 
of the Iraq venture, particularly those relating to the difficulties inherent in foreign 
occupation, were being registered although the US military was horribly stuck in Iraq for 
an indefinite future. One of the most serious implications of the way in which events have 
played out in Iraq may be that 'the brief era of consensual international intervention is 
already closing ...'"^ **' While Europe remained in favor of a multilateral system with 
strong powers of intervention, it-along with much of the rest of the world-continued to 
fear and resist such intervention conducted by the United States. As Tony Judt has 
argued, this is good news for no one: If the US ceases to be credible as a force for good, 
the world will not come to a stop. Others will still protest and undertake good works in 
the hope of American support. But the world will become that much safer for tyrants and 
crooks-at home and abroad. 
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Thus, the Council's decisions on Iraq came to seem decreasingly legitimate to 
much of the UN membership. For many, the root of the Council's "legitimacy' deficit is 
its unrepresentative membership, slighting the developing world and thus undermining 
the Council's authority. As Michael Ignatieff has put it: What passes for an 'international 
community' is run by a Security Council that is a museum piece of 1945 vintage.^ ^ Such 
an analysis spurred attempts to reform the membership of the Council in 2005, 
predictably sucking oxygen away from other important reform initiatives. Debate on 
possible models for Council reform became both vexed and heated in the spring of 2005, 
with anti-Japanese demonstrations in China-ostensibly relating to historical grievances-
adding an edge to the proceedings. "* These discussions were described by the President 
of the General Assembly, Jean Ping, as 'awakening great passions and fixed attitudes'.^ ^^ 
That the EU is over-represented is clear, and this was particularly so in 2003 with 
Germany and Spain swelling its ranks in the Council.^ ^^ But would the outcome on Iraq 
have been much different had Germany and Spain been absent and Brazil and India 
present (with or without vetoes)? If anything, the Council's experience in Iraq suggests 
that Council enlargement will not be a cure-all. It may, in fact, risk aggravating a 
tendency toward dilatory maneuvers and occasional paralysis. As Simon Chesterman 
pointed out, a more representative Security Council might be fairer, but not necessarily 
more effective."^ ^^  This is in part the case because meaningful Committee decision-
making is generally more difficult in large groups than in small ones. Further, Ramesh 
Thakur convincingly identifies the Council's 'performance legitimacy' as a much greater 
problem than its composition.^ ^^ Washington would find it more difficult at home to give 
CQQ 
the back of its hand to an Alliance of Democracies than to the UN. The utility of such 
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an approach is highly questionable, on at least three bases. First, it ignores the reality that 
Washington's principal opponents on Iraq policy had been other democracies such as 
France and Germany. Second, it suggests that confrontation through exclusion of major 
powers, such as China, would be a good policy for the United States-a debatable thesis at 
the very least. The debate now pervades much discussion of extra-Council uses of force, 
whether in 'humanitarian intervention' or counter-terrorist prevention.^ It was notably 
central to discussion of the US-UK action against Iraq in 2003.^^' Events in Iraq reveal 
the limits of such debates. After the invasion, Anne-Marie Slaughter, having revised her 
earlier opinion that while illegal the military action might be legitimate, commented that: 
[t] he most important lesson of the invasion of Iraq is that the safeguards built into the 
requirement of the multilateral authorization of the use of force by UN members are both 
justified and necessary."^ ^^  Once the problems inherent in the occupation of Iraq were 
clear, the legitimacy of the enterprise faded for many. With considerable foresight, 
Jeremy Greenstock remarked before the invasion, "[w]hen fantasy meets reality, reality 
always wins.^ ^^ This is not to say that the United States is in any way above the law, or 
even, as Michael Glennon seemed to argue gleefully, that the Security Council's 'failure' 
on Iraq represents the end of 'the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of 
law'.^ "^* Glennon's arguments on the 'desuetude' of such law were, within months, 
powerfully repudiated by Thomas Franck-and just as much so by subsequent 
developments, incurring serious costs to the United States."^ '^^  These factors and the 
preponderance of instrumental approaches to the Council's decisions by each of the P-5 
suggests that the 'collectively authorized use of force' will remain, as the High Level 
Panel characterized it, neither rule nor exception.^ ^^ 
Perhaps the most challenging implication of events in Iraq for these interlocking 
debates on legality and legitimacy, representation, and democracy has, however, been 
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largely overlooked. The growth in support of ideologies or faiths rejecting the UN's basic 
tenets has been present-if obscured-in the Council's dealings with Iraq for the last twenty-
five years, first in Iran's promotion of the primacy of shari'a over international 
humanitarian law during the Iran-Iraq war, and more recently in negotiations over the 
role of shari'a in the new Iraqi constitution.^ *^^  The normative systems the UN has done so 
much to help develop since 1945 are here truly challenged. As 9/11 made clear that the 
very concept of 'collective security', forcing the Security Council to adopt a more 
preventive stance.^ ^^ Examples of the Council taking action in this mode in Iraq include 
its approach to the Iran-Iraq war, the establishment of UNIIMOG, UNIKOM, and the 
political aspects of UNAMI. In the legal-regulatory mode, the Council typically 
establishes detailed rules governing the behavior of States, individuals, or other subject 
entities. Examples of the Council taking action in this mode in Iraq abound: UNSCOM, 
UNMOVIC, the sanctions regime, the OFF Program, and the UNCC. UN Deputy 
Secretary-General Louise Frechette recognized the need for transformation following the 
release of the Volcker Inquiry's September 2005 Report: Everyone today agrees that the 
UN faces very different management challenges than those of the Cold War period. The 
UN was then mainly a deliberative body. Our major task was to support negotiations. Our 
administrative systems have not adapted to new mandates and activities. On 
management, the Secretariat and Member States have failed to adjust. Problems can 
arise when the Council establishes what it seems to intend as an independent delegate, 
but then fails to allow that delegate to exercise truly independent discretion. In Iraq, this 
problem arose with political interference on a number of levels in the administration of 
the OFF Program, UNSCOM, and during the US-UK contestation of UNMOVIC's work 
in 2003. The mandate and operations of the 661 Committee proved particularly 
problematic. A failure to adopt an impartial decision making procedure risks producing 
illegitimacy, as the UN Compensation Commission's refusal to give Iraq standing in its 
claim process risked aggravating Iraq's victim mentality. In the long-term, that can only 
hurt the UN. Such considerations also need to pertain to the decision-making procedures 
' ' ' Cockayne, 'Islam and International Humanitarian Law', pp. 616-19. 
''* Correspondence with James Cockayne. 
' ' ' See Louise Frechette, 'L ONU doit reformer sa gestion', Le Figaro, September 8, 2005. Original in 
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of the Council itself, not least in engagement with relevant stake-holders and in the 
transparency of its own proceedings. One former German ambassador has described a 
complete loss of transparency and of the right of the concerned parties, e.g. Iraq, to 
address the Council in corpore while it is still in the process of deliberation.^"" By 
disregarding the success of inspections and sanctions, Washington discarded an effective 
system of containment and deterrence and on the basis of faulty intelligence and wrong 
assumptions, launched a preventive war in its place.^"' The UN Secretariat has been 
excoriated for mismanagement and worse but, so far. Security Council members have 
largely enjoyed a 'free ride'.^ "^ Most of the people who dealt with this were thinking of 
how to ensure that 'the majority' [the Shi'a] had the decisive voice in postwar Iraq. Very 
different to attitudes in 1997, Shi'a had by 2003 acquired a collective identity and a kind 
of collective virtue by being the majority of the population. For understandable reasons, 
no-one really considered the Sunnis, qua Sunnis, to be a community and saw them more 
in their various incarnations: as Saddamists, as Ba'thists, as Communists, as Safaris, as 
secularists, as tribalists etc etc. The notion of a 'Sunni community is very recent, after all, 
and, as events in Iraq have demonstrated, it is doubtful that there is one in any meaningful 
sense of the term. This is what is making it so difficult to identify and to bring in a group 
or individuals that would be seen as representative in any way of the Sunni Arabs as a 
whole.^ °^ Making war is risky, with the law of unintended consequences kicking in 
spectacularly in the case of Iraq. This makes contingency plaiming involving a wide 
variety of scenarios (including state collapse) advisable. It is not at all clear that the 
planners of Operation Iraqi Freedom were drawing on a broad range of expertise or open 
to the range of possible outcomes on the ground to Saddam Hussein's overthrow. 
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Few experts-inside or outside government-predicted the extent and nature of state 
collapse in Iraq following the US-UK invasion. As Toby Dodge has commented: The 
expert view on the socio-political dynamics post Saddam was that Iraqi nationalism was 
strong, as was a commitment in the non-Kurdish areas of the country to a unified state. 
The big thing all the policy makers missed was the almost complete collapse of the state. 
Once that had happened and was not rectified, the traumatised population of Iraq grabbed 
whatever sub-state identities it could in order to gain some foothold in the chaos that has 
swept the country.... Once the institutions of the state disappear (for whatever reason) 
different local, communal or sectarian identities leap up to take their place.*'"'* At the time 
of writing, it remains to be seen whether politics will take hold in Iraq, or whether it will 
descend, once more, into violence. The questions raised about Iraq's future are 
increasingly those relevant to domestic politics, particularly the relations between the 
major ethnic and political factions within the country. Having endured the tyranny of a 
minority regime for so long, might Iraq now succumb to insensitive, possibly autocratic 
leaders representing a majority challenged, through terrorist violence, by an insurgency 
rooted in that very minority? 
To answer that question, we must also consider how the collapse of the Iraqi state 
is connected to regional politics. (The absence of an even mildly effective regional 
organization in the Middle East is one of the peculiarities of this case, the Arab League 
having proved severely challenged in responding to Saddam Hussein's serial 
provocations after 1990, prior to which Arab governments broadly supported his 
aggression.) A regime as despotic as Saddam Hussein's could only flourish as easily as it 
did in a region of dysfunctional polities, as Kanan Makiya and many others have pointed 
out.^ ^^  Whether the regional inclination toward totalitarian and authoritarian government 
of various stripes will overwhelm budding Iraqi representative government or whether, 
rather, a new Iraqi model will influence its region, inducing more inclusive government 
Toby Dodge in correspondence with the author, June 6, 2005. Dodge in mid-2005 published a 
stimulating analysis of contemporary Iraq and its prospects. See Toby Dodge, Iraq's future, the 
aftermath of regime change, Adelphi Paper 372, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2005. 
See Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World, New York. W. 
W. Norton, 1993. 
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else where the neo-con vision-also remains to be seen. The influence of events in Iraq, 
including its recent elections, on the broader Arab scene, restless and yearning for 
political change, should not be underestimated.^^ The Security Council itself is 
implicated in the collapse of the Iraqi state. Combined with this, the Council's assertive 
role in supporting the fight against terrorism, through SCR 1373 and subsequent 
decisions, contributes to a sense among many peaceable Arabs that the UN is an 
instrument of a self-serving P-5 dealing in double standards and aiming to marginalize 
the Muslim world.^ ^^ Writing about future prospects for Iraq in 2002, Charles Tripp 
suggested: Those who are seeking to develop a new narrative for the history of Iraq must 
recognize the powerful legacies at work in the country if they do not wish to succumb to 
their logic... The restricted circle of rulers and the primacy of military force have 
combined with the massive financial power granted to successive Iraqi governments by 
oil revenues to create dominant narratives marked by powerful, authoritarian 
leadership.^ "*^ 
The corruption revealed by the Volcker Inquiry is only the most obvious, and 
perhaps not the most invidious. Other examples included the US intelligence infiltration 
of UNSCOM, and the willingness of even Council advocates for a tough approach to 
Baghdad to condone illegal oil-smuggling from Iraq to Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. The 
goal of 'regime change', so often articulated in Washington (and occasionally London) 
after 1997, was unpopular among many governments at the UN, who suggested it shifted 
SCR 687's goalposts. Some were preoccupied with their own regime survival; others 
were fearful of where such policies might lead for weaker countries. In fact, SCR 687 
sought to stigmatize the Iraqi regime and to deter others in the region and beyond from 
similar behavior. When Washington and London moved to implement regime change in 
Baghdad in 2002-3, this long-ruiming and sour debate handicapped their arguments. 
Indirectly and for some, SCR 687 might also have been intended to promote regional 
stability and societal change in the Middle East. It did undermine Iraq's capacity for 
See Marc Lynch, "Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere', Politics Sr Society, Vol. 
31, No. 1,2003. 
Such was the nature of the indictment of the UN made by Osama bin Laden in his address broadcast on 
Al Jazeera on November 3, 2001 in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. 
*°* Fripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 295-6 and pp. 312-28. 
342 
aggression against neighboring countries. That, in turn, created the possibility for 
developing countries (the overwhelming majority at the UN, and sometimes the majority 
in the Council) to develop serious and vocal reservations over the stringent sanctions 
punishing Iraq's population with little apparent effect on Baghdad's leaders. It would take 
a global catastrophe to design an alternative and that alternative might not represent aia 
improvement. The Iraq saga is replete with lessons for actors in and students of 
international relations, some of which this narrative has attempted to distil. 
Why, despite the overwhelming military defeat of the Iraqi army, has the United 
States failed to secure its ostensible goal in Iraq, a stable pro-US regime? The removal of 
Saddam Hussein has proved to be the beginning, not the culmination, of a long and very 
uncertain process of occupation and state building. The lawlessness and looting that 
greeted the US force's seizure of Baghdad on 9 April 2003 have evolved into a self-
sustaining dynamic that combines violence, instability, and profound uncertainty. US 
troops and the nascent Iraqi security services now face an insurgency that has managed to 
extend its geographic scope, while increasing the level of violence and the capacity for 
destruction and instability. 
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